27 Matching Annotations
  1. Feb 2019
    1. It is not fundamentally wrong to identify as anti-Zionist on the grounds that the emancipatory aspects of Zionism as a national liberation movement for Jews has been outweighed by its racist, militarist, and settler colonial aspects. However, the failure to recognize the broad ideological spectrum among those who consider themselves Zionists—including those who oppose the occupation and support certain forms of BDS to pressure Israel’s right-wing government to change its illegal repressive policies—is quite unfair and makes it difficult to build the broad alliances necessary for the BDS campaign to achieve the needed political impact.

      Anti-Zionist among non-Jews is a problem on face. One can be Jewish and anti-Zionist. One can be Jewish and Zionist. One can be non-Jewish and a Zionist ally. Non-Jews who are anti-Zionist are either uniquely denying national self-determination to Jews or claiming the right to define Zionism from Jews.

      Among non-Jews, anti-Zionist is not a valid ideological position. One can make anti-Zionist policy choices, but cannot be anti-Zionist.

    2. Despite this, however, U.S. supporters of the Israeli government have been remarkably successful in portraying the BDS campaign as its most extreme elements. The result has been near-universal condemnation of BDS by leading liberal politicians, the Democratic Party, and others who have previously been more sympathetic to campaigns in support of human rights, international law, and corporate responsibility.

      Any examples? Because, seriously, RoR is the thing there, and that's pretty plain by the author's own admission.

    3. One reason is that there are few cases where civil society organizations have come together so explicitly to call for such a campaign, as with the case in Palestine.

      Many of those other countries face an even more repressive political environment than do the Palestinians. Having civil society organizations is a necessary prerequisite to their coming together.

    4. By contrast, no companies have withdrawn from Israel itself and a number of entities which have divested from companies supporting the occupation have explicitly noted that they are not advocating a total boycott of Israel.

      But Israeli academics operating entirely within the Green Line have been targeted/boycotted.

    5. A BDS campaign focused on ending the occupation would therefore have a much greater impact than one focused on the dissolution of a Jewish state of Israel.

      But who would organize such a thing? It's just tactics...

    6. The BDS campaign targeting the Israeli occupation threatens the profits of such powerful corporations as Hewlett-Packard, Motorola, and Caterpillar and encourages other campaigns for corporate responsibility.

      But also academics, artists, cultural exchange programs...

    7. Boycotts, divestments, and sanctions is not an organization or even a movement.

      More than a little disingenuous in this case. That's like saying "football isn't an organization" while pretending the NFL and NCAA don't count. The tactics are not entirely new, but the organization is. Hell, they have a website called bdsmovement.net.

    1. By rejecting any role for the United Nations or the relevance of international humanitarian law in occupied territories, and by insisting that such questions should only be resolved through voluntary agreement of the occupying power, Harris is effectively giving license to aggressors worldwide to conquer and occupy their neighbors with impunity.

      What a ridiculous implication.

  2. Jan 2019
    1. Johnston, who represents Evan’s biological father and Anthony’s grandparents, says she has been inundated with calls from Kansans frustrated by their dealings with the department. Most are grandparents or parents trying to intervene on behalf of children they believe have suffered abuse

      Test

  3. Mar 2017
    1. Students need learning goals, and they need to set these for themselves.

      Again, assumes quite a bit of freedom on the part of the students. Institutional goals/outcomes or disciplinary goals/outcomes that have to be included?

    2. There is probably no need to release all the content at once. Doing so (to the tune of about 15 weeks worth of content) could be way overwhelming for any student. Releasing all the content at once around a very specific chunk of the course makes the most sense.

      Chunked release of information--here's everything we're doing for unit 2, for example? Or two weeks' worth because things are additive/scaffolded?

    3. For the most part, I made myself go through the modules in the order in which they were created. I assumed they were placed in that order for a specific reason. If I hit content I already knew or didn’t want to apply just yet then I skipped over it to return to later if needed.

      This is a lot of faith in the instructor (and not necessarily misplaced). It also requires a certain level of pre-existing familiarity to make those decisions about what is/is not useful and a certain intention in taking the course (i.e., there won't be an exam and the course is mostly voluntary).

    1. A manager's services, with regard to performance, are authorized by the organization, not the employees. This subtle equivocation between authority and authorizing someone to provide a service is the whole foundation for Heifetz's claim that leadership is a helping function.

      Seems both a reasonable critique and a place where F&R's legitimate power would be a relevant concept.

    2. But does the person who has even a brief leadership impact on people not need some kind of authority in order to command the attention of prospective followers? The degree of personal authority or credibility that is required to lead is situational, thus not a part of the basic meaning of leadership.

      Missing key research on group comm. and organizational theory, not to mention compliance gaining/French and Raven.

    3. Heifetz says that Hitler is not a leader in spite of his ability to inspire people to follow him. He claims that leaders must "elevate" followers, not just influence them.

      Heifetz dissembles on the Quintilian question.

    4. technical leadership does not just give people answers; it persuades them to accept a better way.

      Contradicts the "hard facts" above. Good place to explore open hand vs. closed fist.

    5. Not all leadership occurs in the context of a problem.

      Exigence would be a useful concept here. The problem implies something is wrong, but the exigence is simply something other than it should be (leaving aside "marked by urgency" for the moment).

    6. is followed by communities in Australia

      Someone in Australia still has to do the thing, someone there is leading.

    7. Leadership can bring about immediate action or attitude change without the need to think through the issues.

      Seems uncharitable. Changing values may imply as much about recognizing values one didn't know before.

    1. Zionism understands particularist national identities as the best way to contribute to the broader world. Communities cannot exist with boundaries—and those boundaries often convey values, traditions, memories that help people find meaning—and contribute good deeds, important ideas, innovative technologies, benefitting everyone, far “beyond” one’s own particular national bubble.

      Should be "without boundaries," but also points back to intersectional identity approaches. Identity is complex, doesn't get erased, but identity markers must be operant. Why is "Jewish" an invalid identity marker? Returns to the caricature referenced above.

    2. Moreover, the Jewish state’s Jewishness is not solely religious because Jews are a people too. With anyone able to convert into the Jewish religion and thus join the Jewish people, Zionism is one of the most permeable, least biologically-based, and least racist, nationalisms.

      "least racist nationalism" is an interesting choice because of the implied intrinsic racism in all nationalisms. Preference for Jews while not excluding non-Jews can be pragmatically justified, but requires the recognition of terminal antisemitism to avoid the charge of racism.

    3. Although Zionism is a version of ethnic nationalism, and American nationalism is a version of civic nationalism, both are mission driven. For both, national identity is not just about being born into the community. Rather, there is a communal sense that through belonging one becomes someone different – more caring, giving, responsible—and in so doing betters the world.

      Membership in the community obligates someone to communal action--the identity itself elevates the individual through those obligations, not despite them, and certainly not without them.

      It's a far more complimentary (and frankly, tenable) view of American exceptionalism, that Americans are superior not by the virtue of being American, but by the things being American calls them to be. That, of course, goes back to the communal investment in ideals and values to backstop the individual's identity markers. That means that there is nothing intrinsically valuable in being American, but the value comes out of the communal performance of "American." When that performance falls apart, so too does the exceptionalism of the label.

      That is also different from an ethno-nationalism (which is typically shot through with subrosa or justificatory religious superiority) and from the explicitly ethnoreligious--nationalism of Israel.

    4. Without memory, we lack identity; and without identity we lack ethical anchors let alone a moral mission—individually and communally.

      Ethics come from identity, derived from shared memory.

  4. Dec 2016
    1. But I do not think that American Jews have an intermarriage problem; what we have, instead, is an intermarriage symptom. No amount of fretting about the symptom is going to make it go away. You deal with a symptom by identifying and attempting to heal the underlying malady.

      Sort of odd approach to the question.

    1. In terms of the Enlightenment tradition and secular thought, the target here would not be the radicalism of the French Revolution but the moderate Enlightenment tradition with its “gentle light of Enlightenment,” as Steffen Martus describes it. In times of insecurity, intellectuals have the opportunity to show the promising hope of moderation.

      The Enlightenment failed to spread that light to all corners. Difficulty with that as the model now.

    2. In this regard, there is also a need today to include Islam in our understanding of the history of Western civilization. As Islam emerged in late antiquity on the edges of the Roman Empire on the Arabian Peninsula it became a unique expression of religious sentiment within an intercultural and interreligious context of Arab, Jewish, and Christian theological debate. Some rightwing populists today want to present Islam as a radical alterity that has nothing to do with Western civilization. From the perspective of Jewish and Christian religious history, however, Islam is better understood as a proximate-other. As historical-critical exegesis of the Quran and scientific historical research of the emergence of Islam have shown, the genesis of the religion was deeply related to Jewish and Christian traditions and the theological debates of late antiquity in the Arab contex

      Seems both to understate the role of Judaism and Christianity in the origins of Islam, and mix Judaism and Christianity together in their proximity to Islam. Those two histories do not overlap easily (nor are they only two histories!)

    3. The push for stronger cultural identities and political borders is inseparable from the general concern about Islam and immigration. Most of the new populists are promoting a one-sided criticism of Islam. This is connected to the public fears of terrorism, angst about Sharia, the status of women in Muslim communities, demographic tensions (aging European populations with lower birth rates and younger immigrant populations with higher birthrates), and issues surrounding the social integration of immigrants. In this context, talk about the Jewish and Christian heritage of the West has reemerged in secular Europe and in the United States as an alternative identity-forming heritage. This is the case even in a very secular place like former East Germany.

      The Jewish and Christian heritage is not really under discussion. Christian, sure, but many of the populist parties in the US and Europe are either explicitly or tacitly identifying with historically anti-Semitic ideologies. See the embrace of Trump by the KKK, American Nazi Party, "alt-right,"; the Austrian Freedom Party; the historical anti-Semitism of the French Popular Front.