Belgium was created and meant to be a neutral buffer state for the European powers and was required to not partake in colonial affairs. This makes it all the more shocking to learn of King Leopold II's endeavors to acquire a piece of the African pie - a private colony is better than no colony (According to him).

This is but a part of the rationalization the European powers had to establish (also similar to mental gymnastics) to justify the plunder, looting, and murder of other (non-European) peoples.

Not only did they establish these alliances, they willingly planted these people in power in the first place (e,g, Mobutu). In some instances, they didn't need to put these people in power but just support them through some very morally questionable behaviors because it serves their interest during the period of the Cold War (e.g. South Africa and Apartheid).

This is also a continuing phenomenon, though one that now extends beyond the bounds of Africa - mainly also thinking about Asia and the horrendous working conditions of some populations that would never be considered acceptable in a Western state.

Can't we argue that this has not changed? Although we no longer really look to the Treaty of Westphalia to understand sovereign states, but rather look to modern and international alternatives, the faulty assumptions that all are equal within the international state arena persists and is faulty.

Perhaps through notions such that of the "standards of civilization" in the 19th and 20th centuries. However, these powers continue to do so in the 21st centuries through other notions, such as human rights.

Arguably not only historically, as this is something that continues into the modern day as well. The international hierarchy still very much exists.

But wasn't the concept of sovereignty and the nation-state as we understand them now European imports to the African continent? As far as I understand, a number of African states had no other option than to become states to get juridical recognition within the international system.

This reads as a reference to the Jackson and Rosberg reading - mainly relating to the juridical and empirical state.

Not only that, but it also obstructs international/global action when it comes to issues that transcend borders - with the largest example being climate change.

Can't help but think of this statement within a more modern context. Providing education and/or healthcare are costly operations - would they also help in consolidating late forming states?

Within the 21st century, this element of war making has evolved from what it used to be. The neutralizing of rivals still exists, but is more subtle - can we discuss this further?

This distinction is important. Not only does the state racketeer, but if one is born within a state, they can never really opt out of that state's racketeering.

Although it makes sense, it also reads in a rather funny way or as an oxymoron. The pacification that took place occurred sometimes due to or based on coercion.

Early European state builders were essentially competing with one another as to who had the biggest/best army.

Those are the same people that would be expected to have the "legitimate" use of force. However, since Tilly is referring to early European state building, I would assume a social contract did not formally exist during this time - allowing for no particular outline of what those who have legitimate use of force can and cannot do. It is worth mentioning that even with the existence of social contracts that have those explicit outlines, those who have "legitimate" violence often blur the lines of what is legal and what isn't, what violates and what doesn't.

Similar to how Luther did not foresee the emergence of capitalism based on the reformation of the church (according to Weber). It is, still, an interesting indirect side effect however as it really begs the question of what kind of indirect links are being made today - but some things can only be seen in retrospect.

As remarked above, this is very similar - if not the same - to Samuel's argument of early (European) state formation.

I believe Tilly's main point really shines here. On the one hand, the state according to Weber monopolizes violence. And although illegitimate violence will almost always exist, it is the state that is perhaps even more capable to committing "larger" acts of violence. One example that comes to mind includes how some state apparatuses in the US deliberately planted various drugs in specific (poorer, usually black) neighborhoods that they wanted to target with said violence. This is, of course, if we do not take into account how violent it is to put drugs within these communities in the first place.

Samuels also argues for this, though he argues that war making is what leads to state making through increasing the incentive for leaders of states to collect taxes from the people to fund their expensive wars. This has the indirect effect of creating a(n efficient) bureaucracy.

One of the most prominent examples of this is perhaps that of France, with the French economy relying rather heavily on trading arms and weapons with poorer countries - examples include (but are not limited to) Egypt and Lebanon. Those same weapons are used to destabilize those countries and then French politicians are quick to denounce the use of these weapons against civilians.

Interesting how Tilly, as opposed to Samuels, really questions the idea of state makers being "self-seeking entrepreneurs" rather than taking it for what it is or at face value. Tilly seems to be more critical of this definition already.

Although this is arguably more of an issue within the Third World, the reading seems to imply that it is only an issue within the Third World and I am inclined to disagree. Even Western European nation-states struggle with this. Examples include Spain, and those who want to separate and create an independent state for the Catalonian region. Another example is France and those who would like to secede and create an independent Corsican state.

Which later boil down to the separation of South Sudan from Sudan itself.

Once again, this goes to speak about the arbitrariness of African borders. Many of those borders were drawn with blatant disregard for ethnic, cultural, or political groupings of African people. Everyone wanted a piece of the African pie, but no one cared to learn about it.

In this sense, the state should be understood as both empirical and juridical - rather than one or the other.

The definition of the juridical state, which is a component of international law. With this in mind, it is clear that the juridical state has more criteria than the empirical state.

Hence why Somalia is considered a failed state - on the one hand we have those attempting to create a centralized government, but on the other the pirates.

As opposed to European states that defined themselves during early state formation in opposition with other European states (through warfare), African states were defined or outlined by their colonizers (Berlin Conference).

Since there is a dichotomy between the empirical and juridical states - the definitions of each is important. The empirical state is one that has territory and control over that territory (sovereignty).

Due to the lack of legitimacy of that state with its own people - perhaps due to a lack of a coherent social contract?

But these states also used national education for the purpose of turning the masses into people with nationalist understanding.

We can perhaps understand this as early or more basic formulations of nationalist sentiment evolving.

As they were largely overthrown and/or killed by intelligence operations run by their former colonizers (i.e. Lumumba).

First through religion and missionaries. Then through the "civilizing mission". And now through "human rights".

Also the most industrialized states.

Although there is less incentive to spend on the military, late forming states still require taxation to fund their educational and health institutions (for example) and these act as incentives. I would personally argue that they have a lesser capacity to collect taxes, despite the incentive being there.

As these states have had less time to establish their own functioning bureaucracies and governments.

Although true, states still existed before the 1600's - or am I misunderstanding what's being stated here?

Another monumental shift is perhaps a more recent one, with Europe turning outwards to look for non-European territories to overtake and non-European people to colonize. Got me thinking about how the new pan-European (mainly EU) identities form and what they mean for the continent and the concept of the nation-state - especially in relation to movements such as Brexit and Frexit.

This is also coined/theorized in Weber's Protestant Ethic and the spirit of capitalism.

This also outlines the rise of mercantilism and the need for law enforcement (as well as law) to protect private property and those who own them.

Not only that, but the treaty does not outline the state in the way we have come to understand it today. The treaty might be helpful but it's not the end all be all.

In some parts of the world (i.e. Egypt), they are considered to be an extension of the state or are at least influenced by it. What do we make of this overlap?

Although true, this statement kind of ignores why state and nation do not coincide. Most borders, especially in the global south, seem arbitrary as they were drawn by the former colonizers. This definitely contributes to the issue.

In the Middle East, this definitely seems to be the case given the shared lingua franca that is modern standard Arabic (MSA). Not only that, but also the existence of Pan-Arabism. Both of these definitely blur the lines.

Interesting example given that Japanese internment camps existed in the United States

Similar to the Kurds, for example. Though they seem to have a very coherent national identity, a state does not exist to back it up - mainly due to the issue of territory.

This statement begs the question of which came first - the nation or the state? Though the conception of the modern nation-state seems recent, the concept of state pre-dated it. I'm mainly thinking of the ancient world. However, those ancient civilizations also had a form of political identity that united them - though I am unsure if it can be considered a "national" identity.

I find it rather strange how the author continues to push this dichotomy between democracies and dictatorships when it comes to violence. It implies that democracies are inherently less violent, and perhaps normatively they should be. In application, however, that is not always the case.

Max Weber's definition of the state.

The way I've come to understand this is that the state is a much more abstract concept when compared to government. The government relates more to who's in power and how they get there, while the state relates to institutions.

This directly ties in with the dilemma of the individual vs. the collective. An example of this would be the current crisis in the US with wearing masks for example - as some people think they transgress on their democratic right to not wear them.

Perhaps this is a bit critical, but is this not at least somewhat the state of the world we live in right now? Law and order do exist, but do not apply equally to everyone.

Though I understand his conscious distancing from God, it seems a little difficult given that he's evoking an image of a biblical monster that is only subdued by God.

I would argue that it's often a mix of both of these elements.

Normatively speaking, the state should prevent these situations from arising within the state. However, what happens when these situations take place with people from outside of that state?

This statement is very loaded, and though it follows the arguments presented, it also carries socio-historical connotations concerning individual-collective thought dilemmas (neo-liberalism comes to mind).

Reminds me of the "guiding ideal" from the O'Neil (2012) reading last week - "reconciling freedom and equality".

With global issues on the rise, such as climate change, this question becomes more and more crucial to answer.

These states all have one thing in common that (I believe) is linked to the classification of them being "failed" states - all of them dealt with colonialism and/or imperialism, though in varying degrees. Therefore, are we witnessing a link between colonialism and the failure to establish proper governments/institutions?

Does the term "legal" here refer to the state having its own domestic law? Or is it a reference to the state's recognition in international law?

Can we conceptualize the pirates as being a form of decentralized government in this case? Or is their disorganization a handicap to that kind of classification? (Also thinking of what kind of social contract would exist in this case)

This distinction with "failed" is important. Despite Somalia not having one of the most important elements of modern states (a central government), its statehood is not challenged.