- Mar 2020
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mmcr.education mmcr.education
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As a result, the Texas law is a permissible regulation of speech
This law was not a permissible regulation of speech
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may always
Government may not prohibit expression
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Court has let governments regulate such actions
The Courts precedents don't agree with this. The precedents recognize that a principal function of free speech is to invite dispute.
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more restriction-permissive standard
This was a less demanding rule under O'Brien
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there is no evidence of an expressive element in his actions.
there was evidence of an expressive element
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Does an act of Congress
This case involved an act of the state prohibiting burning of the American flag.
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Dissent by Justince Kennedy
Justice Kennedy wrote a concurring opinion.
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violate the Second Amendment
Does this violate the First Amendment
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Arthur Smith, painted an American flag on his bare chest, but painted it upside down
Gregory Lee Johnson was the protester and he burned the flag given to him by another demonstrator.
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491 U.S. 397
Does not include the year of the case 491 U.S. 397 (1989)
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mmcr.education mmcr.education
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distinction between government programs that provide aid directly to schools and programs of true private choice
there has been a distinction between programs that provide aid to religious schools and programs of true private choice.
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1982
2002
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10 percent of the private schools available were religious, and only 5 percent of students used their vouchers at private schools.
80% of schools that participated were religious schools. 96.7% of students who attended private schools chose religious schools.
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dropped out
Either failed or dropped out
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turns on whether most schools in the program are religious
the constitutionality does not turn on whether or why, most private schools are run by religious organizations, or most recipients choose to use the aid at a religious school.
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most likely
is not readily subject to challenge under the establishment clause.
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It is not neutral in all respects toward religion and is part of an attempt to channel funds to wealthy citizens who send their children to religious schools. Only certain religious groups are free to participate.
The program is entirely neutral with respect to religion. It provides benefits to a wide spectrum of only by financial need and residence in a particular school district.
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the program is not one of true private choice
this program is one of true private choice
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free exercise clause
They charged the program violated the establishment clause
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dissenting
Stevens did dissent but did not author an opinion of his own.
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dissenting
O'Connor wrote a concurring opinion
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7–2
The vote was 5-4
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the 14th Amendment
the First Amendment's Establishment clause
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Baltimore
The case was regarding the Cleveland City School District
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Epstein and Walker, p194
The legal citation should include report the case came from, volume of that report, page number and year.
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- Feb 2020
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mmcr.education mmcr.education
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But were it otherwise, the choice of means implies a right to choose a national bank in preference to State banks, and Congress alone can make the election
Is this stating that if the Federal government wants to place an organization in a State (such as a bank) then the State government has no say? They must allow the Federal government or Congress to do as they wish?
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A Constitution, to contain an accurate detail of all the subdivisions of which its great powers will admit, and of all the means by which they may be carried into execution, would partake of the prolixity of a legal code, and could scarcely be embraced by the human mind. It would probably never be understood by the public
Is it being argued here that if we were to specifically outline all the powers that the Federal and State government have in a document it would be too much? That it would be too overwhelming to lay out exactly what each portion of the government can and can not do?
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The powers of the General Government, it has been said, are delegated by the States, who alone are truly sovereign, and must be exercised in subordination to the States, who alone possess supreme dominion.
Is this stating that the States have power over the Federal Government and that whatever power the Federal Government has in decision making must come from the states?
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mmcr.education mmcr.education
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Jackson: dissenting
Justice Jackson wrote a concurring opinion.
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Truman's action can be upheld as an exercise of the president's inherent military power as commander-in-chief.
Truman's actions could not be upheld. The Constitution did not subject this law making power to presidential or military control.
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Yes. By a vote of 6-3 the Court ruled against Youngstown Sheet & Tube
This should read no. The Court voted 6-3 and ruled against Sawyer.
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Congress
It should state the executive branch instead of Congress.
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Vietnam War
The nation was involved in a war in Korea.
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The lawmaking power in the United States is within Congress's domain, but Congress has clearly chosen to rid itself of that power and give it to the president
Congress had not chosen to rid itself of this power in this case.
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sugar manufacturing industry
The dispute began in the steel industry.
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- Jan 2020
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mmcr.education mmcr.education
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It would be giving to the legislature a practical and real omnipotence, with the same breath which professes to restrict their powers within narrow limits. It is prescribing limits, and declaring that those limits may be passed at pleasure.
Is Marshall referring to checks and balances here? That it cannot allow the legislature overstep its powers in the Constitution by interpreting law?
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To enable this court then to issue a mandamus, it must be shown to be an exercise of appellate jurisdiction, or to be necessary to enable them to exercise appellate jurisdiction.
Does this mean if a case is determined to be of original jurisdiction that a writ of mandamus cannot be issued? It can only be issued in an appellate case?
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is not authorized to issue a writ of mandamus to such an officer, it must be because the law is unconstitutional, and therefore absolutely incapable of conferring the authority, and assigning the duties which its words purport to confer and assign.
Is Marshall stating that the writ of mandamus is unconstitutional in this case?
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mmcr.education mmcr.education
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You have to have a position. And -- and it seems to me that if you can't answer the question whether or not you could prohibit tours for religious schools while allowing tours for other schools, I don't understand the basis of your program -- your position
This points towards Justice Roberts being in favor of the church. My takeaway is that he feels that if the State can't have a position on refusing tours to religious schools then they don't truly have a position in this matter.
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And the essence of that history is, basically, we don't want to, as a country -- well, the vast majority of States, to fund houses of worship
This points to Justice Sotomayor as one who dissented. Along the same lines as Justice Ginsburg she believes there is a long history of keeping State funds away from houses of worship.
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On that -- on that question, I guess rather long ago now in the Everson case back in 1947, this Court said in no uncertain terms what the Framers didn't want was tax money imposed to pay for building or maintaining churches or church property. And doesn't that fit this case?
I believe Justice Ginsburg was one who dissented. She points out that that there is precedent in the Everson case and given the language of the Constitution no tax money should go to maintaining church property.
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Very well. If it does not permit a law that pays money out of the treasury for the health of the children in the church, school, or even going to church, how does it permit Missouri to deny money to the same place for helping children not fall in the playground, cut their knees, get tetanus, break a leg, et cetera? What's the difference?
This points to Justice Breyer being in favor of the church. He points out that there is no difference in providing money in health context then there is in this case as this new surface could be construed in a health conscious way.
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And unlike the scholarship example or, frankly, the example in Locke v. Davey, it is a publicly visible manifest demonstration of State endorsement.
Should there be any difference between public vs private demonstration of State endorsement? Does it really matter if this money is going to something that is visible or not? The money is still going to religious organization so should this included in Layton's argument?
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The idea that the government is going to dictate what is taught at a church, even if they're willing to accept it, which they are here, is anathema to the Establishment Clause considerations that have highlighted many of these questions --
Is Layton arguing here that if the church were to allow the government to dictate what is being taught at the preschool they would be able to receive the grant? This still does not change the fact that this is a religious organization?
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And Missouri Supreme Court case law says the way we decide those questions is -- is -- is how much religious influence is there in a church? In other words, are they serious about their faith? Do they -- is it voluntary for the students there? And so there's a question about how religious you may be in order to receive the benefit or not.
I was confused by Cortman's argument here. Is he arguing that the State believes they can make a determination on how religious an organization is based on how the it perceives the organizations seriousness about their faith? And thus could award certain benefits to organizations they felt were less serious about faith because they did not see them as a religious organization?
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