45 Matching Annotations
  1. Nov 2019
    1. Truman's action can be upheld as an exercise of the president's inherent military power as commander-in-chief.

      This action cannot be upheld because the court ruled that the Presidents powers as commander-in-chief do not extend to labor disputes.

    1. The state also says that it has an interest in preserving the flag as a symbol of national unity. The Court agrees

      The court declared that the government, state or otherwise, would not decide on national symbols, therefore making this a false defense.

    2. there is no evidence of an expressive element in his actions.

      This is false, as the court decided that Johnson's burning of the flag was in fact considered "expressive conduct."

    3. Second Amendment

      This should say "First Amendment," not second.

    4. As a result, the Texas law is a permissible regulation of speech.

      This is not true. It was ruled that this Texas law was unconstitutional.

    5. may always prohibit the expression of an idea whenever society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.

      This is false.The basis of the court's decision in this case was that speech/expression could not be regulated just because the public may find it offensive.

    6. Justince Kennedy

      Justice Kennedy did not dissent.

    7. Separate Opinions

      This was a 5-4 decision and only three dissenting Justices are provided below. Stevens, White, O'Connor, and Rehnquist dissented.

    8. painted an American flag on his bare chest, but painted it upside down.

      This is incorrect. What he actually did was burn the American flag.

    9. Arthur Smith

      Gregory Lee Johnson was the defendant in this case.

    10. 397

      The year 1989 should be included after what already is present here.

    1. 10 percent of the private schools available were religious, and only 5 percent of students used their vouchers at private schools.

      I believe both of the percentages were much higher than these. I think that above 80% of the schools families could use their vouchers at were religiously affiliated.

    2. Additionally, the constitutionality of this program turns on whether most schools in the program are religious.

      I believe that this is false, because the court said it didn't matter if most of the institutions were religious or not, since that is a personal choice of the parents/families the money is allocated to.

    3. Here, the program is not one of true private choice. It is not neutral in all respects toward religion and is part of an attempt to channel funds to wealthy citizens who send their children to religious schools. Only certain religious groups are free to participate.

      This is false reasoning, as it does not correlate with the court's decision in favor of Zelman. The court said that it was a program of true private choice because the money was being given directly to individuals, who could then decide where to send their students, not to the institutions themselves.

    4. the program most likely violates the establishment clause.

      This should say that the Establishment Clause is not violated because n each of the aforementioned cases (Mueller, Witters, and Zobrest) that is what was decided.

    5. O'Connor: dissenting

      O'Connor had a concurring opinion.

    6. Baltimore

      This case dealt with Ohio's pilot program in Cleveland, not with school districts in Baltimore.

    7. First Amendment's free exercise clause

      Although this case does deal with the First Amendment, which the free exercise clause is a part of, I think that this should be more specific and say Establishment Clause instead.

    8. 14th Amendment to the Constitution?

      This case had nothing to do with the Fourteenth Amendment, but rather the First Amendment and more specifically, the Establishment Clause.

    9. 7–2

      The decision was not 7-2, it was 5-4, in favor of Zelman.

    10. Epstein and Walker, p194

      This is not a proper legal citation. A legal citation would not refer to our textbook.

    11. 1982

      This date is incorrect, as the case was both argued and decided in 2002.

  2. Oct 2019
    1. the right of the General Government to tax banks chartered by the States, will equally sustain the right of the States to tax banks chartered by the General Government.

      To clarify, is this stating that the right to tax banks goes both ways, allowing for the state government to tax federal banks in the same way the federal government will tax the state banks? Was this a point of major importance in the decision of this case?

    2. Even the 10th Amendment, which was framed for the purpose of quieting the excessive jealousies which had been excited

      I know that the 10th Amendment discusses reserved powers in the United States, but I'm not familiar with the "excessive jealousies" being referred to here. What does this mean/is this referencing?

    3. instrument

      What exactly is the "instrument" that keeps being referred to here?

    1. Clark: concurring in the judgment of the Court

      Should this just say "Concurring?" The textbook tells us that Mr. Justice Jackson was who Concurred in the Judgement and Opinion of the Court.

    2. Separate Opinions

      Only seven Justices are listed in this section, and there were/are nine total.

    3. Roberts: dissenting

      Roberts was not a Justice in this case.

    4. dissenting

      Jackson had a concurring opinion.

    5. Yes

      Following the question above, this answer should be no. The court did not rule in favor of the President, as the false answer given here suggests.

    6. Can Congress take over an industry in order to prevent a union from striking?

      I don't believe this accurately summarizes the legal issue this case tackled. I believe it is better summarized in the following words.. "Was the President acting within his Constitutional powers when he seized the nation's steel mills in order to prevent the union from striking?"

    7. commerce

      I believe there are two errors within this highlighted section:First, Secretary of Commerce should be capitalized, and second, the name of the Secretary of Commerce, Charles Sawyer, should be included, as it's an important fact to the case.

    8. Vietnam War

      The Vietnam War did not begin until 1955, therefore this labor dispute took place during the Korean War.

    9. sugar

      The labor dispute in this case actually dealt with the steel industry, not the sugar industry.

  3. Sep 2019
    1. The exercise of this original right is a very great exertion; nor can it, nor ought it to

      If the exercise of this original right is so great in his opinion, why does he say that it should not be frequently repeated?

    2. If, by law, the officer be removable at the will of the President

      Is this stating that the President has the ability to call for the removal of a Supreme Court Justice? If so, does the President still have this ability today?

    3. obloquy

      In the context of this case, what is the meaning of the word "obloquy?"

    4. The government of the United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men.

      I'm not sure that I fully understand what this means. My interpretation of this statement is that the United States government is more centered around its established laws than it is around its people, however, disagreeing with this statement, I question my understanding.

    1. And the essence of that history is, basically, we don't want to, as a country -- well, the vast majority of States, to fund houses of worship.

      I believe this section of Sotomayor's questioning suggests that she was one of the justices who dissented. I have that take away from this section because in it, she appears to greatly defend the state for not wanting to get involved with the church financially, and even goes on to say that the church will not shut down its religious practices without the funding, therefore implying that it is not necessary.

    2. On that -- on that question, I guess rather long ago now in the Everson case back in 1947, this Court said in no uncertain terms what the Framers didn't want was tax money imposed to pay for building or maintaining churches or church property. And doesn't that fit this case? And if so, is Everson passé?

      This section of Ginsburg's commentary leads me to believe that she was one of the dissenters, because as she asks Cortman if the case of Everson in 1947 is applicable to their present case and he replies that it is not, she almost directly distinguishes that they are on opposing sides.

    3. I mean, suppose Missouri offered 50 full college scholarships every year to students who achieved certain academic criteria -- who satisfied certain academic criteria, and this was open to public school students and private school students.

      Is it pretty common for analogies to be used in a court room in this way? I have noticed the Justice's use of comparisons and prompting questions through analogies quite frequently throughout this case.

    4. Then you have to do it.

      I think what Justice Breyer is arguing here is that health and safety is the responsibility of the public/state, therefore it should be funded on this notion. This leads me to believe that he is another justice who voted in the majority.

    5. But still the question is whether some people can be disentitled from applying to that program and from receiving that money if they are qualified based on other completely nonreligious attributes, and they're disqualified solely because they are a religious institution doing religious things.

      I have a clarification question. So, following this statement, all institutions who want to receive funding from their state government must first apply for it and meet additional requirements before receiving said funding?

    6. As long as you're using the money for playground services, you're not disentitled from that program because you're a religious institution doing religious things. And I would have thought that that's a pretty strong principle in our constitutional law.

      This statement points me to believe that Kagan was one of the justices who voted in favor of the church, as she defends it's right not to be excluded from funding based solely on the fact that they are a religious institution doing religious things.

    7. What are we -- so -- so I guess what I'm asking is, do you see value in the other side in having some flexibility here for States to make these sorts of choices?

      I was a little confused throughout this section and was questioning, how/why are states given so much "leeway," as Cortman calls it, to make decisions about what they will or will not fund and how they will set up those programs? Couldn't/doesn't this often directly counter federal regulations of not dispersing state/government funds to religious organizations?