This action cannot be upheld because the court ruled that the Presidents powers as commander-in-chief do not extend to labor disputes.

The court declared that the government, state or otherwise, would not decide on national symbols, therefore making this a false defense.

This is false, as the court decided that Johnson's burning of the flag was in fact considered "expressive conduct."

This should say "First Amendment," not second.

This is not true. It was ruled that this Texas law was unconstitutional.

This is false.The basis of the court's decision in this case was that speech/expression could not be regulated just because the public may find it offensive.

Justice Kennedy did not dissent.

This was a 5-4 decision and only three dissenting Justices are provided below. Stevens, White, O'Connor, and Rehnquist dissented.

This is incorrect. What he actually did was burn the American flag.

Gregory Lee Johnson was the defendant in this case.

The year 1989 should be included after what already is present here.

I believe both of the percentages were much higher than these. I think that above 80% of the schools families could use their vouchers at were religiously affiliated.

I believe that this is false, because the court said it didn't matter if most of the institutions were religious or not, since that is a personal choice of the parents/families the money is allocated to.

This is false reasoning, as it does not correlate with the court's decision in favor of Zelman. The court said that it was a program of true private choice because the money was being given directly to individuals, who could then decide where to send their students, not to the institutions themselves.

This should say that the Establishment Clause is not violated because n each of the aforementioned cases (Mueller, Witters, and Zobrest) that is what was decided.

O'Connor had a concurring opinion.

This case dealt with Ohio's pilot program in Cleveland, not with school districts in Baltimore.

Although this case does deal with the First Amendment, which the free exercise clause is a part of, I think that this should be more specific and say Establishment Clause instead.

This case had nothing to do with the Fourteenth Amendment, but rather the First Amendment and more specifically, the Establishment Clause.

The decision was not 7-2, it was 5-4, in favor of Zelman.

This is not a proper legal citation. A legal citation would not refer to our textbook.

This date is incorrect, as the case was both argued and decided in 2002.

To clarify, is this stating that the right to tax banks goes both ways, allowing for the state government to tax federal banks in the same way the federal government will tax the state banks? Was this a point of major importance in the decision of this case?

I know that the 10th Amendment discusses reserved powers in the United States, but I'm not familiar with the "excessive jealousies" being referred to here. What does this mean/is this referencing?

What exactly is the "instrument" that keeps being referred to here?

Should this just say "Concurring?" The textbook tells us that Mr. Justice Jackson was who Concurred in the Judgement and Opinion of the Court.

Only seven Justices are listed in this section, and there were/are nine total.

Roberts was not a Justice in this case.

Jackson had a concurring opinion.

Following the question above, this answer should be no. The court did not rule in favor of the President, as the false answer given here suggests.

I don't believe this accurately summarizes the legal issue this case tackled. I believe it is better summarized in the following words.. "Was the President acting within his Constitutional powers when he seized the nation's steel mills in order to prevent the union from striking?"

I believe there are two errors within this highlighted section:First, Secretary of Commerce should be capitalized, and second, the name of the Secretary of Commerce, Charles Sawyer, should be included, as it's an important fact to the case.

The Vietnam War did not begin until 1955, therefore this labor dispute took place during the Korean War.

The labor dispute in this case actually dealt with the steel industry, not the sugar industry.

If the exercise of this original right is so great in his opinion, why does he say that it should not be frequently repeated?

Is this stating that the President has the ability to call for the removal of a Supreme Court Justice? If so, does the President still have this ability today?

In the context of this case, what is the meaning of the word "obloquy?"

I'm not sure that I fully understand what this means. My interpretation of this statement is that the United States government is more centered around its established laws than it is around its people, however, disagreeing with this statement, I question my understanding.

I believe this section of Sotomayor's questioning suggests that she was one of the justices who dissented. I have that take away from this section because in it, she appears to greatly defend the state for not wanting to get involved with the church financially, and even goes on to say that the church will not shut down its religious practices without the funding, therefore implying that it is not necessary.

This section of Ginsburg's commentary leads me to believe that she was one of the dissenters, because as she asks Cortman if the case of Everson in 1947 is applicable to their present case and he replies that it is not, she almost directly distinguishes that they are on opposing sides.

Is it pretty common for analogies to be used in a court room in this way? I have noticed the Justice's use of comparisons and prompting questions through analogies quite frequently throughout this case.

I think what Justice Breyer is arguing here is that health and safety is the responsibility of the public/state, therefore it should be funded on this notion. This leads me to believe that he is another justice who voted in the majority.

I have a clarification question. So, following this statement, all institutions who want to receive funding from their state government must first apply for it and meet additional requirements before receiving said funding?

This statement points me to believe that Kagan was one of the justices who voted in favor of the church, as she defends it's right not to be excluded from funding based solely on the fact that they are a religious institution doing religious things.

I was a little confused throughout this section and was questioning, how/why are states given so much "leeway," as Cortman calls it, to make decisions about what they will or will not fund and how they will set up those programs? Couldn't/doesn't this often directly counter federal regulations of not dispersing state/government funds to religious organizations?