Apple's recent high-profile court battle with the FBI over access to the iPhone of San Bernardino terrorist Syed Farook
I forgot about this event. This could be an interesting follow-up
29 Matching Annotations
- Jan 2019
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www-sciencedirect-com.ezproxy.neu.edu www-sciencedirect-com.ezproxy.neu.edu
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NSA reportedly intercepted some 20 trillion phone calls, emails and other communications by Americans, leading many tech firms to introduce unbreakable encryption across their devices, datacentres and comms services
Interesting!
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www-sciencedirect-com.ezproxy.neu.edu www-sciencedirect-com.ezproxy.neu.edu
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An example heterogeneous network architecture is shown in Fig. 1.
Here's the example I was looking for
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In such networks
It would be nice to have an example of a heterogeneous network
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web.a.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.neu.edu web.a.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.neu.edu
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never buy a smartphone, and never take advantage of a free Web service that you have to log in to.
But at what cost to the leisure aspect of your life?
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Apple doesn't put the process to opt out of targeted advertising (go.pcworld.com/appleoptout) front and center. Time and again, Apple says that you can reset the identifier it uses to link you to the content you want to see, or opt out; however, that process is left to the user to discover for himself or herself.
Another situation where most people won't know about this opt-out option
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tweaks to allow you to turn off location tracking, voice searches, and other features; viewing and editing your preferences; adjusting your public profile; and much more. And you can download Google's data hoard, too.
Seems like many companies do provide some sort of transparency to the users in one way or another
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What can I do about it? It's an amazing amount of information, although you can download it all right here (go.pcworld.com/fbyourinfo), using Facebook's Download Your Information tool
Turns out you can find your information
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Because the latest version of Windows is always asking for information in the guise of being helpful, it's easy to think that Microsoft's the poster child for the collective attack on your digital privacy. But it's not.In fact, there are plenty of other companies who feel perfectly entitled to require you to hand over your personal info before they open their doors
Seems like this article is making point against user data collection; could use to explain significance of this topic in my research.
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www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
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Furthermore, our analysis does not distinguish between user data that is shared consciously by the consumer, such as posting a workout to social media, and the user data that is collected by the app passively through the permissions requested, such as reading a user’s contacts.
The data in this source doesn't seem like it will be terribly useful. Concepts throughout the document may be useful, but not he results.
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we found that a core group of app families are sparsely connected and may be exchanging user data, though this analysis is not able to determine the directionality of exchange.
Directionality would be nice to know. Could provide lifecycle of user data.
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The instrument, based on a systematic review of methods for app content analysis [12], covered 4 domains: (1) app characteristics, (2) partnerships and affiliations, (3) developer and funding characteristics, and (4) permissions
What other domains exist that aren't included?
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self-reported collection and sharing of user data, while recognizing that this likely underreports the extent of both data collection and distribution.
Weakness
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A great deal of consumer data, collected actively through consumer reporting or passively through sensors, is shared among apps
Article incorporates IoT concepts which relates to some of the questions I'm asking relating user data collection from IoT devices.
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independent coders
How skilled are these coders? Where are they from? Rather vague...
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We sought to describe how consumer data generated from mobile health apps might be distributed and reused. We also aimed to outline risks to individual privacy and security presented by this potential for aggregating and combining user data across apps.
Thesis
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2017 Jun;
Recent enough article
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delivery.acm.org.ezproxy.neu.edu delivery.acm.org.ezproxy.neu.edu
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The high percentageof miscomprehension implies that our results need furthervalidation, and suggests the need to find ways to explainthe coarsening of browsing data before collection.
Limit- unreliable data
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In general, the following categories weremost sensitive: adult, medical, finance, online communities
Important findings
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The typical per-son values URLs five times more than categories (the me-dian=5
Important finding
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57% spend 6+ hours/day on the interne
For personal or work use? I think this is a distinction that should be made as people don't typically browse in the same manner between the two applications of browsing.
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630 participants who completed the sur-vey and passed the attention check and comprehensionquestions. All our analysis is performed on these 630 re-sponses
Even a worse sample size
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809 completed the survey andpassed the attention check
VERY small sample size compared to total population who uses internet. Also, doesn't specify how diverse the locations of participants is; this is significant because if all participants are in CA, that won't provide the best representation of the overall US population.
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Privacy concerns arereduced if profiles do not contain sensitive categories, butis there variation in what categories a person considerssensitive?
Thesis
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Since interest profiles are often built and associatedwith users by default [1] and have to be turned off explicitly,there is an implicit assumption that categorical informationis much less sensitive compared to URLs, at least for cate-gories considered not sensitive
Does the typical user know how to turn off interest profiles, or that they exist to begin with? Personally, I was unfamiliar with this concept until reading this sentence. Whose assumption is it that categorical information is less sensitive?
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Coarsening or fuzzing data before collection is a standardprivacy technique. One example is location data, where it iscommon to enhance privacy through location coarsening,for instance, substituting a specific GPS coordinate with thecity or region
Method of respecting user privacy while still collecting data. Abstract user's location to city/region so exact location of user is not known.
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Not surprisingly, user under-standing of how these systems work is limited
Accurate
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Even if the useropts out of interest-based ads, the advertising cookie is stillassociating the user with a collection of URLs.
Some background on how data is collected.
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Linda Naeun LeeThe Tor Project, Inc.217 1st Ave South #4903Seattle, WA, USAlinda@torproject.orgRichard ChowIntel Corporation3600 Juliette LaneSanta Clara, CA, USArichard.chow@intel.comAl M. RashidxAd Inc.189 N Bernardo AveMountain View, CA, USAal.rashid@xad.com
Pros about these authors: All work in the tech field whose companies require direct usage of browsing data collection.
Cons: These authors will most likely be slanted to argue that user attitudes are of a characteristic which is beneficial for tech companies so that any negative attitudes towards data collection, which would put more pressure on these companies that the authors work for, would be downplayed.
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