gin to answer the essential research question: howdo we know a norm when we see one? We can only have indirect evidence of normsjust as we can only have indirect evidence of most other motivations for politicalaction (interests or threats, for example). However, because norms by definition em-body a quality of "oughtness" and shared moral assessment, norms prompt justifica-tions for action and leave an extensive trail of communication among actors that wecan study. For example, the United States' explanations about why it feels compelledto continue using land mines in South Korea reveal that it recognizes the emergingnorm against the use of such mines. If not for the norm, there would be no need tomention, explain, or justify the use of mines in Korea at all. N

t is perhaps interesting to remember at this juncture that Foucault linkedthe displacement of the intentional subject with modem power relations thathe himself associated with war.? What he meant, I think, is that subjectswho institute actions are themselves instituted effects of prior actions, andthat the horizon in which we act is there as a constitutive possibility of ourvery capacity to act, not merely or exc1usively as an exterior field or theaterof operations.

Intelligibil-ity does not imply that linguistic or semiotic meaningsare stable, but it does require at least enough stability sothat what one actor learned still applies when anotherspeaks

draget nämns även att ”[m]än har mer än dubbelt så stora inkomster avförsäljning av finansiella tillgångar”. Ett mått kopplat till försäljningar påverkas avi vilken utsträckning innehavaren omsätter (säljer och köper) sina tillgångar.Eftersom män hanterar sitt sparande mer aktivt är det inte ett självklart mått påskillnader i hur stora tillgångar kvinnor och män har. Även utanförmögenhetsstatistik och andra mer direkta mått på hur tillgångar är fördelade gårdet dock att utgå ifrån att män i genomsnitt har större finansiella tillgångar änkvinnor.1 En trolig förklaring till detta är att män (i genomsnitt) har högrelivsinkomster än kvinnor och därmed utrymme att spara mer över tid. Det finnsäven skillnader i hur kvinnor och män fördelar sina tillgångar mellan sparformer,vilket vi återkommer till

ämställdhet är en spegling av förhållanden i samhället i stort. Faktorer somfördelning av inkomster och tillgångar mellan män och kvinnor ligger utanför dettauppdrag, som handlar om ett mer jämställt sparande. Vad som är ett lämpligtsparande för en viss person beror på en rad faktorer, varav många är individuella.Vad som bör eftersträvas i det här sammanhanget är jämställda förutsättningar attfatta väl övervägda och ändamålsenliga beslut om sparande utifrån den egnasituationen. Grundläggande kunskaper behöver ges i grundskolan så att alla fårsamma förutsättningar. Senare i livet behöver kunskaperna byggas på och tillgångtill information och utbildningsmaterial finnas tillgängligt för dem som vill ochbehöver öka sina kunskaper.Förslag på åtgärder utifrån uppdraget:• Utbildningsinsatser med kvinnor som särskild målgrupp.• Kompletterande läromedel om långsiktigt sparande för grundskolan.• Kontinuerliga hushållsundersökningar för att mäta resultat över tid.Åtgärder som bidrar till mindre skillnader i finansiella kunskaper passar väl in i ettarbete för att skapa mer likvärdiga förutsättningar på finansmarknaderna förkvinnor och män

Fördelningen av ekonomiska resurser mellankvinnor och män efter inkomstgrupp

Även om båda partierna erkänner problematiken och delar det övergripande målet att kvinnoroch män ska ha samma makt att påverka, visar studien på betydande skillnader i hur dessamål förföljs och kommuniceras. Slutligen belyser resultaten vikten av att inte bara diskuterapolitiska ambitioner utan också att konkreta åtgärder och genomförda strategier för att främjakvinnlig representation inom politiken

nligtPitkins definition innebär substantiell representation konkreta handlingar för att representeraoch främja de frågor och mål som är relevanta för de representerar. Socialdemokraternaillustrerar detta genom att adressera och främja jämställdhetsfrågor i praktiken.

Moderaterna, representerade av Josefin Malmqvist och Merit Frost Lindberg, betonararbetslinjen och en bidragsform som nyckelfaktorer för att öka kvinnors egenmakt ochtrygghet. Frost Lindberg framhäver behovet av reformer och betonar att det bör löna sig attarbeta, medan Malmqvist lägger fokus på konkreta åtgärder som översyn avstrafflagstiftningen för att öka kvinnors trygghet. Moderaternas debatter och argument förökad kvinnlig representation präglas av deras åtgärder, där ekonomi och arbete är två centralakomponenter. Lönsamt arbete och inkludering av alla grupper på arbetsmarknaden ses somvägar för att öka jämställdheten och representationen av kvinnor. I de båda analyseradedebatterna presenterar Moderaterna konkreta politiska åtgärder för att lösajämställdhetsproblem, men de saknar tydliga exempel på genomförda handlingar jämfört medSocialdemokraterna.

iksdagsdebatten

Snarare framträder deskriptiv representation frånSocialdemokraternas sida, eftersom båda motionerna är skrivna av män som representerarkvinnor. Dessutom antyder Johanssons argument att en lösning är att bryta normer kringmaskulinitet för att främja att kvinnor får makt över sina egna liv.

ige i dagens läge måste stå upp för jämställdhet, lika rättigheter och likarepresentation för kvinnor och män. Johansson menar att konservativa högerkrafter nuifrågasätter och attackerar kvinnors rättigheter. Motionen betonar behovet av feministiskutrikespolitik för att säkerställa kvinnors rättigheter, resurser och representation i en globalkontext som präglas av systematisk underordning av kvinnor (Motion 2023/24:2562).Symbolisk representation kan därför ges till känna i detta resonemang, där han menar attSverige bör vara som en symbol och led pinne för representation och jämställdhet runt om ivärlden. Vidare understryker Johansson

etoningen på att främja jämställdhet och minska utanförskap genom åtgärder som ökarlönsamheten för arbete visar på partiernas vilja att göra verkliga politiska förändringar och ensträvan efter att korrekt återge den nuvarande situationen och de specifika hinder kvinnorkonfronteras med, detta kan ses som en indikation på substantiell representation dååtgärderna för representation inte gjorts men ett främjande för handlingar som bör träda ikraft

nligt Pitkins definition av representation bör då kvinnliga representanter ansesagera i linje med medborgarnas intressen. Om kvinnor däremot missgynnas deras rätt attuttrycka sina åsikter eller om deras åsikter inte ges tillräcklig uppmärksamhet, indikerar dettaatt de inte uppfyller Pitkins krav på att representation bör vara en aktiv handling. Följaktligensaknar de en verklig möjlighet till politiskt inflytande.

nomisk utjämning strävar S-kvinnor efter att eliminera socioekonomiska klyftor i helanationen och skapa ett samhälle präglat av jämlikhet, jämställdhet och sammanhållning(S-kvinnor, 2023).I motsats till Socialdemokraterna motsatte sig Moderaterna kvotering och implementeradeistället rekommendationer år 2009. Dessa rekommendationer stipulerade att var femtekandidat på valsedeln borde vara en ny kandidat och att sammansättningen av valsedlarnaborde vara representativ med avseende på kön, etnicitet och ålder. Moderaterna antogdessutom en 40-60 gräns (Kindenberg & Rosberg, 2012, s. 87-88). Med 40-60 gränsen avsesen gräns på 40 procent av representationen bör utgöras av kvinnor (Sainsbury, 2004, s. 74).Inom Moderaternas historik tilldelades kvinnor år 1910 möjligheten att delta i val tillstadsfullmäktige och kommunfullmäktige. Trots nio valda Moderata kvinnor var derasdeltagande lägre än männen, särskilt i Stockholm där kvinnors representation stagnerade vidcirka tre procent. Året därpå, 1911, bildade engagerade kvinnor, många från kvinnligarösträttsrörelsen, Stockholms Moderata Kvinnoförbund för att främja kvinnors politiskaengagemang och öka representationen (Moderaterna, 2023).Idag existerar inom Moderaterna ett nätverk vid namn Moderatkvinnorna, vilket har tagitöver rollen från det tidigare kvinnoförbundet. Moderatkvinnorna har som huvuduppgift attarbeta med kvinnors aspekter och företräda kvinnor i politiska frågor samt öka den moderatakvinnlig representation. Enligt Moderaterna är engagemang och deltagande nödvändigt för enbred representation på olika nivåer. Inom riksdagen, landsting och kommunfullmäktigeförsamlingar samt nämnder strävar man efter en ökning av kvinnors representation, motiveratav övertygelsen att kvinnor besitter kunskaper och erfarenheter som är viktiga för detpolitiska arbetet. Moderaterna anser att det lokala arbetet är kärnan i partiets verksamhet, ochmed de nya stadgarna försvinner kravet på lokala hierarkier. På alla nivåer fokuserar man påatt belysa det kvinnliga perspektivet i politiska frågor. Dessa åtgärder skapar förutsättning fören ökad kvinnlig representation inom partiorganisationen och som förtroendevalda i politiskaförsamlingar (Moderaterna, 2023)Sveriges riksdagspartier intar varierande strategier för att öka kvinnlig representation. DärSocialdemokraterna tillämpar kvotering, medan Moderaterna istället har införtrekommendationer och en 40-60 gräns. Dessa skillnader har bestått över tid. Men efter valet2022 uppgår könsfördelningen i Moderaterna till 50% kvinnor och 50 % män, medan26

Denna studie har därför analyserat material relaterat tillSocialdemokraternas och Moderaternas kvinnoförbund, inklusive bakgrund och aktuellaställningstaganden, för att ge en översikt av kvinnors närvaro inom respektive parti. Detta föratt uppsatsen ska kunna besvara den första frågeställningen som ska besvara hur kvinnorrepresenteras i politiska partier samt hur det sett ut historiskt

ör en djupare analys av partiernas ställningstaganden kring representation och jämställdhethar studien behövts avgränsats. För att begränsa omfånget av denna undersökning kommerstudien att fokusera enbart på representationen av kvinnor i de historiskt sett två mestframstående riksdagspartierna, Socialdemokraterna och Moderaterna. Detta då de ärriksdagspartier som

denna kontext syftar uppsatsen till att undersöka följande frågeställningar:Hur representeras kvinnor av svenska politiska partier?Finns det några skillnader i hur kvinnor representeras mellan olika politiska partier ?

nswers to this question reveal that although general election turnout was down sharply in 2001,people were still were more likely to contemplate voting than doing anything else in politics. Specically, 80per cent said that there was a greater than 50–50 probability that they would vote in the next local election,and 59 per cent said that there was a greater than 50–50 probability that they would vote the next electionfor the European Parliament (Table 7.1). Average scores on the 0–10 point scales for these items were 7.8and 6.1, respectively.

People who do more resource-demanding activities (working for candidatesor parties, attending candidate or party meetings or rallies) also do less demanding ones (voting, discussingpolitics with friends and family). But, those who do the latter do not necessarily perform the former.

However, without the latency component, our analyses will ultimately become tooconfined. We will systematically overlook important aspects of political behaviour, andfocus on changes (i.e. declining levels of participation) within the more limited political-parliamentary sphere. Accordingly, we will find low electoral turnout, eroding publicconfidence in the democratic institutions, scepticism, cynicism and lack of trust. Atthe same time, we will completely overlook a number of “pre-political” or “potentiallypolitical” activities that citizens may be involved in. More importantly, we will overlookthe potential willingness to take action. The really interesting question is of course if and inwhat ways such “pre-political” or “stand-by” engagement can be channelled into manifestpolitical participation. For example, are the current political institutions able to process suchengagement into conventional political action, or are we in fact facing a paradox here: maywe find vivid civic engagement or at least strong feelings of readiness and willingness to actin combination with declining levels of manifest political participation? Here lies the realchallenge for future research

They do not think it a goodthing about equality that it would make the well off worse off.And when their critics charge them with being willing, for thesake of equality, to grind everyone down to the level of the worstoff, or even lower, they do not say, in response: well, yes, let usgrind down if necessary, but let us achieve equality on a higherplane if that is possible.

Maybe some egalitarians would main -tain their zeal in a world of millionaires and billionaires in whichno one’s life is hard, but the politically engaged socialist egali -tarians that I have in mind have no strong opinion about in -equality at millionaire/billionaire levels

ncome cause unusually productive people to produce more thanthey otherwise would; and, as a result of the incentives enjoyedby those at the top, the people who end up near the bottom arebetter off than they would be in a more equal society

The variables relevant to an agent's choice are the range of options presented as available, the expectedpayos that the agent assigns to those options, and the actual payos—the outcomes—that result from thechoice. All interfering behaviours, coercive or manipulative, are intended by the interferer to worsen theagent's choice situation by changing the range of options available, by altering the expected payosassigned to those options, or by assuming control over which outcomes will result from which options andwhat actual payos, therefore, will materialize. Thus physical obstruction and agenda‐xing both reducethe options available; the threat of punishment and the non‐rational shaping of

Interference cannot take the form of a bribe or a reward; when I interfere Imake things worse for you, not better. And the worsening that interference involves always has to be moreor less intentional in character: it cannot occur by accident, for example, as when I fall in your path orhappen to compete with you for scarce goods

It isthese institutions—what Rawls calls "the basic structure"74—that stand in need of justification, because, by defining theterms of cooperation, they have such deep and pervasive ef-fects on the welfare of people to whom they apply regardlessof consen

ccordingly, onemight say that the greater degree or extent of social coopera-tion in national societies (compared with that in internationalsociety) justifies stronger intranational principles of justice.Imagine a world of two self-sufficient and internally justsocieties, A and B. Assume that this world satisfies the ap-propriate resource redistribution principle. Imagine also thatthe least-advantaged representative person in society A isconsiderably better off than his counterpart in society B.While the members of A may owe duties of mutual aid to themembers of B, it is clear that they do not also have duties ofjustice, because the two societies, being individually self-sufficient, do not share membership in a cooperative scheme.Now suppose that the walls of self-sufficiency are breachedvery slightly; A trades its apples for B's pears. Does this meanthat the difference principle suddenly applies to the worldthat comprises A and B, requiring A to share all of its wealthwith B, even though almost all of its wealth is attributable toeconomic interaction within A? It seems not; one might saythat an international difference principle can only commandredistribution of the benefits derived from international so-cial cooperation or economic interaction. It cannot touch thebenefits of domestic cooperation.It may be that some such objection will turn out to requiremodifications of a global difference principle. But there arereasons for doubting this. Roughly, it seems that there is athreshold of interdependence above which distributive re-quirements like a global difference principle are valid, butbelow which significantly weaker principles hold

ow those who would pursue thisline must recognize that any account of how institutional obli-gations arise that is sufficiently psychological to make plausi-ble a general conflict of global and sectional obligations willprobably be too psychological to apply to the large modernstate.73 If this is true, then proponents of this view face a di-lemma: either they must endorse the strongly counterintui-tive conclusion that obligations of justice may not even holdwithin large modern states and are appropriate primarilywithin smaller solidaristic communities or organic groups; orthey must agree that obligations ofjustice may be justified byconsiderations other than those of strong common sentiment.

The underlying intuition is that citizens owesome sort of special obligation to the less fortunate membersof their own society that is capable of overriding their generalobligation to improve the prospects of less advantaged groupselsewhere

n this limited respect, the problem of bringing aboutinternational distributive justice is similar to that of escaping aHobbesian state of nature. In both cases, the absence of faircoercive institutions—which makes more probable the ab-sence of reliable expectations of reciprocal compliance—undermines the motivational basis for compliance with prin-ciples of justice. In both cases, the solution of the assuranceproblem is effective coordination of the actions of all of theactors involved. But there are important differences as well.First, the risks of voluntary compliance are different. Moralpersons in Hobbes's state of nature risk death, while in inter-national relations they risk relative deprivatio

akes this a significant feature of coercive institutions; theperception that such institutions can assure a fair distributionof the burdens of social cooperation is likely to be an impor-tant source of the motivation for compliance

uch objections are not persuasive because they misun-derstand the relation between ideal theory and the real world.Ideal theory prescribes standards that serve as goals of politi-cal change in the nonideal world, assuming that a just societycan, in due course, be achieved. The ideal cannot be under-mined simply by pointing out that it cannot be achieved atpresent

one mighthold that interdependence is a necessary but not a sufficientcondition for the global application of principles of justice,and that other necessary conditions (like the existence ofpolitical institutions or of a capacity for a sense of justice) donot obtain in international relations. Second, one might arguethat special features of social cooperation within nationalsocieties organized as states override the requirements ofglobal principles, so that these cannot be understood as ulti-mate

Thus, a global difference principle does not necessarilyrequire transfers from rich countries as such to poor coun-tries as such. While it is almost certainly the case that an inter-national difference principle would require reductions in in-tercountry distributive inequalities, this would be becausethese inequalities are consequences of impermissible inter-personal inequalities. Furthermore, because the differenceprinciple applies in the first instance to persons, it would alsorequire intrastate inequalities to be minimized if necessary tomaximize the position of the (globally) least advantagedgroup

evidence of global economic and political interde-pendence shows the existence of a global scheme of socialcooperation, we should not view national boundaries as hav-ing fundamental moral significance. Since boundaries are notcoextensive with the scope of social cooperation, they do notmark the limits of social obligations. Thus the parties to theoriginal position cannot be assumed to know that they aremembers of a particular national society, choosing principlesof justice primarily for that society. The veil of ignorancemust extend to all matters of national citizenship, and theprinciples chosen will therefore apply globally.54 As Barrypoints out, a global interpretation of the original position isinsensitive to the choice of principles

These facts, by now part of the conventional (if controver-sial) wisdom of international relations, describe a world inwhich national boundaries cannot be regarded as the outerlimits of social cooperation. International interdependenceinvolves a complex and substantial pattern of social interac-tion, which produces benefits and burdens that would notexist if national economies were autarkic

n the other hand, the interna-tional distribution of the gains from trade and investmentdepends significantly on the relative power of domestic gov-ernments to control the behavior of locally owned as well asmultinational firms, and there is evidence that some develop-ing countries are growing more powerful in this regard

orld of self-sufficient national societies is not subject tosomething like a global difference principle.) But there isnothing in this reasoning to suggest that we can only havemoral ties to those with whom we share membership in acooperative scheme. It is possible that other sorts of consider-ations might come into the justification of moral principles.Rawls himself recognizes this in the case of the natural duties,which are said to "apply to us without regard to our voluntaryacts," and, apparently, without regard to our institutionalmemberships.

want to argue only that objections of this sort do not apply tothe parallel claim that the distribution of natural resources issimilarly arbitrary. Like talents, resource endowments are ar-bitrary in the sense that they are not deserved. But unlike tal-ents, resources are not naturally attached to persons

Reasoning analogously, the parties to the internationaloriginal position would view the natural distribution of re-sources as morally arbitrary.26 The fact that someone hap-pens to be located advantageously with respect to natural re-sources does not provide a reason why he or she should beentitled to exclude others from the benefits that might be de-rived from them. Therefore, the parties would think that re-sources (or the benefits derived from them) should be subjectto redistribution under a resource redistribution principle

t would be better to say that the requirements of jus-tice apply to institutions and practices (whether or not theyare genuinely cooperative) in which social activity producesrelative or absolute benefits or burdens that would not exist ifthe social activity did not take place

This moral minimum does not depend on the existence of any insti-tutional connection between ourselves and other persons: It governs ourrelations with everyone in the world

It is supposedto be a variation on the political conception, according to which one canbe moved above the default position defined by human rights and col-lective self-interest through participation in the institutional structuresthat make complex economic interaction possible. But if those institu-tions do not act in the name of all the individuals concerned, and aresustained by those individuals only through the agency of their respec-tive governments or branches of those governments, what is the

nstruments for the common pursuit of self-interest.

erhaps such a theory of justice as a “continuous” function of degreesof collective responsibility could be worked out. It is in fact a natural sug-gestion, in light of the general theory that morality is multilayered. But Idoubt that the rules of international trade rise to the level of collectiveaction needed to trigger demands for justice, even in diluted form. Therelation remains essentially one of bargaining, until a leap has beenmade to the creation of collectively authorized sovereign authority

Very importantly, they rely for enforcement on thepower of the separate sovereign states, not of a supranational forceresponsible to all

urrent international rules and institutions may be the thin end of awedge that will eventually expand to seriously dislodge the dominantsovereignty of separate nation-states, both morally and politically, butfor the moment they lack something that according to the political con-ception is crucial for the application and implementation of standardsof justice: They are not collectively enacted and coercively imposed inthe name of all the individuals whose lives they affect

nstitutions that serve thesepurposes are not designed to extend democratic legitimacy andsocioeconomic justice, but they naturally give rise to claims for both, inrespect to their design and functionin

People engaged in a legitimate collective enterprise deserve respect andnoninterference, especially if it is an obligatory enterprise like the pro-vision of security, law, and social peace. We owe it to other people—con-sidered as individuals—to allow them, and to some degree enable them,to collectively help themselve

The political conception of justice neednot be based on the strong personification of peoples and need notimply the principled toleration of nonliberal societies. I would take amore individualistic position than Rawls does. The question of interna-tional toleration is difficult, but I believe that although there are obviouspractical reasons for liberal societies not to try to impose liberal domes-tic justice universally, there are no moral reasons for restraint of the kindRawls offers. It is more plausible to say that liberal states are not obligedeither to tolerate nonliberal states or to try to transform them, becausethe duties of justice are essentially duties to our fellow citizens

This requirement is based not on a comprehensive value of equality,but on the imperative of securing basic rights, which can be done moreor less locally. But once the state exists, we are in a new moral situation,where the value of equality has purchase. The difference between thepolitical and the cosmopolitan conceptions is that the latter sees the for-mation of the state as answering also a universal demand for equality,even if as a practical matter it can be realized only locally. On the polit-ical conception, by contrast, the only universal requirement of equalityis conditional in form: We are required to accord equal status to anyonewith whom we are joined in a strong and coercively imposed politicalcommunity.

he answer from the point of view of the political conceptionmust be that there is no single level of full moral concern, because moral-ity is essentially multilayered

ccording to the political conception ofjustice, between the call for such institutions and a call for the institu-tion of global socioeconomic justice. Everyone may have the right to livein a just society, but we do not have an obligation to live in a just societywith everyone. The right to justice is the right that the society one livesin be justly governed. Any claims this creates against other societies andtheir members are distinctly secondary to those it creates against one’sfellow citizens

The World Bank is in some respectssuch an institution, and the International Criminal Court aspires to be.The question is whether international developments will countenancethe bending of national sovereignty needed to extend the authority ofsuch institutions, both to command funds and to curb domestic rightsviolations with force, if necessary

his moral minimum does not depend on the existence of any insti-tutional connection between ourselves and other persons: It governs ourrelations with everyone in the world.

his minimal humanitarian morality governs our relation to allother persons. It does not require us to make their ends our own, but itdoes require us to pursue our ends within boundaries that leavethem free to pursue theirs, and to relieve them from extreme threatsand obstacles to such freedom if we can do so without serious sacrificeof our own ends

Political institutions create contingent, selective moral rela-tions, but there are also noncontingent, universal relations in which westand to everyone, and political justice is surrounded by this larger moralcontext.The normative force of the most basic human rights against violence,enslavement, and coercion, and of the most basic humanitarian dutiesof rescue from immediate danger, depends only on our capacity to putourselves in other people’s shoes. The interests protected by such moralrequirements are so fundamental, and the burdens they impose, con-sidered statistically, so much slighter, that a criterion of universalizabil-ity of the Kantian type clearly supports them. I say “statistically” becausethe restrictions implied by individual rights can in particular cases bevery demanding: you may not kill an innocent person to save your life,for example. But the importance to all of us of blanket immunity fromsuch violation dominates the slight danger that we will be called on tolose our lives rather than violate the constraint. This is based not on autilitarian calculation but on the great importance to each person ofthe kind of inviolability conferred by rights.

n short, the state makes unique demands on the will of itsmembers—or the members make unique demands on one anotherthrough the institutions of the state—and those exceptional demandsbring with them exceptional obligations, the positive obligations ofjustice.

ther states; the laws are not imposed in their name, nor are they askedto accept and uphold those laws. Since no acceptance is demanded ofthem, no justification is required that explains why they should acceptsuch discriminato

The reason is that itsrequirements claim our active cooperation, and this cannot be legiti-mately done without justification—otherwise it is pure coercion

believe it comes from a special involvement of agency or the will thatis inseparable from membership in a political society. Not the will tobecome or remain a member, for most people have no choice in thatregard, but the engagement of the will that is essential to life inside asociety, in the dual role each member plays both as one of the society’ssubjects and as one of those in whose name its authority is exercised.

ocioeconomic justice is different. On the political conception it isfully associative. It depends on positive rights that we do not haveagainst all other persons or groups, rights that arise only because we arejoined together with certain others in a political society under strongcentralized control. It is only from such a system, and from our fellowmembers through its institutions, that we can claim a right to demo-cracy, equal citizenship, nondiscrimination, equality of opportunity, andthe amelioration through public policy of unfairness in the distributionof social and economic goods

awls must resistthe charge that moral consistency requires him to take individuals as themoral units in a conception of global justice. To do so would make a hugedifference, for it would mean that applying the principles of justicewithin the bounds of the nation-state was at best a practical stop-gap.Rawls’s anti-monism is in essence a theoretical rejection of such stan-dards for moral consistency. Just as there is no inconsistency in govern-ing interpersonal relations by principles very different from those thatgovern legal institutions, so there need be no inconsistency in govern-ing the world differently from its political subdivisions. But if what weare looking for is moral, and not just logical, consistency, the differencesbetween the cases must in some way explain why different principles areappropriate.The way to resist cosmopolitanism fundamentally would be to denythat there is a universal pressure toward equal concern, equal status, andequal opportunity. One could admit a universal humanitarian require-ment of minimal concern (which, even in the world as it is, would notbe terribly onerous, provided all the prosperous countries did theirshare). But the defense of the political conception of justice would haveto hold that beyond the basic humanitarian duties, further requirementsof equal treatment depend on a strong condition of associative respon-sibility, that such responsibility is created by specific and contingentrelations such as fellow citizenship, and that there is no general mor

These are all different cases ortypes of relation, and the principles that govern them have to be arrivedat separately.

n Rawls’s domestic theory this expresses itself in two ways: first, inthe priority of individual liberty, which leaves people free to pursue theirown personal ends rather than requiring them to pursue just outcomesprivately; and, second, in the application of the difference principle notto the distribution of advantages and disadvantages to individuals, butrather to the probabilistic distribution of ex ante life prospects (whichalways include a range) to those born into different socioeconomicclasses. Even if the basic structure supported by law satisfies the differ-ence principle by arranging inequalities to maximize the expectationsof the lowest class in this sense, individual choices are not expectedto be governed by that principle

he political conception of justice therefore arrives, by a differentroute, at the same conclusion as Hobbes: The full standards of justice,though they can be known by moral reasoning, apply only within th

If one takes this political view, one will not find the absence of globaljustice a cause for distress. There is a lot else to be distressed about:world misery, for example, and also the egregious internal injustice of somany of the world’s sovereign states. Someone who accepts the politicalconception of justice may even hold that there is a secondary duty topromote just institutions for societies that do not have them. But therequirements of justice themselves do not, on this view, apply to theworld as a whole, unless and until, as a result of historical developmentsnot required by justice, the world comes to be governed by a unifiedsovereign powe

there is no obligation to enter into that relation withthose to whom we do not yet have it, thereby acquiring those obligationstoward them

very state has the boundaries and population it has for all sorts ofaccidental and historical reasons; but given that it exercises sovereignpower over its citizens and in their name, those citizens have a duty ofjustice toward one another through the legal, social, and economic insti-tutions that sovereign power makes possible. This duty is sui generis, andis not owed to everyone in the world, nor is it an indirect consequenceof any other duty that may be owed to everyone in the world, such as aduty of humanity. Justice is something we owe through our shared insti-tutions only to those with whom we stand in a strong political relation.It is, in the standard terminology, an associative obligation

nstead, their existence is precisely what gives the value of justiceits application, by putting the fellow citizens of a sovereign state into arelation that they do not have with the rest of humanity, an institutionalrelation which must then be evaluated by the special standards of fair-ness and equality that fill out the content of justice.

This would be analogous to the requirement that within astate, the institutions of private property, which allow people to pursuetheir private ends without constantly taking into account the aims ofjustice, should nevertheless be arranged so that societal injustice is nottheir indirect consequence

describe the world order as unjust, but the absence of justice is adefect all the same.

umanitarian duties hold in virtue of the absolute rather than the rel-ative level of need of the people we are in a position to help. Justice, bycontrast, is concerned with the relations between the conditions of dif-ferent classes of people, and the causes of inequality between them

Hobbes himself was not disturbed by the appearance of this problem inthe international case, since he believed that the essential aim of justice,collective security and self-interest, could be effectively provided forindividuals through the sovereignty of separate states

But the same need for assurance is present if one construes theprinciples of justice differently, and attributes to individuals a non–self-interested motive that leads them to want to live on fair terms of somekind with other people. Even if justice is taken to include not only col-lective self-interest but also the elimination of morally arbitrary inequal-ities, or the protection of rights to liberty, the existence of a just orderstill depends on consistent patterns of conduct and persisting institu-tions that have a pervasive effect on the shape of people’s lives. Separateindividuals, however attached to such an ideal, have no motive, or evenopportunity, to conform to such patterns or institutions on their own,without the assurance that their conduct will in fact be part of a reliableand effective system

hat creates the link between justice and sovereignty is somethingcommon to a wide range of conceptions of justice: they all depend onthe coordinated conduct of large numbers of people, which cannotbe achieved without law backed up by a monopoly of force.

He argued that although we can discover true principles ofjustice by moral reasoning alone, actual justice cannot be achievedexcept within a sovereign state

The claim to processfairness requires that no group – in this casewomen – be discriminated in this way, but in orderto argue for that conclusion we have to move, inone way or another, away from an exclusivereliance on health achievement.Third, health equity cannot only be concernedwith inequality of either health or health care, andmust take into account how resource allocationand social arrangements link health with otherfeatures of states of affairs

asic education and other early childhood interventions, affordable hous-ing, income security, and other antipoverty policies. We know, for exam-ple, that early childhood interventions, like the Perry High/Scope Project(Schweinhart et al. 1993), have lasting effects on educational achieve-ment, employment, marriage, and the reduction of mental illness. The Waron Poverty’s Head Start program produced lasting effects on educationalachievement; educational achievement, in turn, has a direct influence onhealth behavior in adulthood, including diet, smoking, and physical activity(Acheson 1998). Other policies that might reduce differential risks couldexplore changes in worker control and authority in the workplace (Mar-mot et al. 1997).

The various institutions that affect opportunity must be weighed againsteach other. Similarly, the resources required for fair equality of opportunitymust be weighed against the needs of other important social institutions.This is true even if we believe that guaranteeing fair equality of opportunityshould have (lexical or strict) priority over principles of justice promotingwell-being in other ways. The point is that institutions, including health-careinstitutions, capable of protecting opportunity can be maintained only insocieties whose productive capacities they do not undermine

The intersection approach increasesdecisiveness and articulation, but does not eliminate undecidability.That residual undeeidability—when present—would not be areason for embarrassment, since all it does is reflect the fact that withpartially dissonant valuations, agreed completeness cannot beachieved.It is important not to see the use of the capability approach as an'all or nothing* exercise. Indeed, the nature of interpersonal com-parisons of well-being as well as the task of inequality evaluation asa discipline may admit incompleteness as a regular part of therespective exercise

he ‘capability approach’ has something to offer both to the evaluation of well#being and to the assessment of freedom. Considering the former connection first, thecapability approach to well#being differs from the more traditional concentration oneconomic opulence (in the form of real income, consumption levels, etc.) in two distinctrespects: (1) it shifts the focus from the space of means in the form of commodities andresources to that of functionings which are seen as constitutive elements of humanwell#being; and (2) it makes it possible—though not obligatory—to take note of the setof alternative functioning vectors from which the person can choose. The ‘capability set’can be seen as the overall freedom a person enjoys to pursue her well#being

rimary goods. A theory of justice, I have argued, must take adequate note of thatdifference. It is for this reason that the approach presented here both draws on andcriticizes the Rawlsian theory—it draws on Rawls's illuminating analysis of fairness andof responsibility to criticize his theory's particular dependence on the holding of primarygoods (as opposed to the freedoms and capabilities the persons respectively enjoy).

he extreme viewthat says we should give complete priority to the worst off settles the matterby determining whether patients needing A are worse off than patientsneeding B. No attention is then paid to the outcomes for either group ofpatients. The other extreme view settles the matter by asking only what theoutcomes are: We should invest in whichever technology produces the netmaximum benefit, regardless of how badly off people are before they aretreated.In practice, most people reject both extreme positions. This fact emergesin both moral and empirical examinations of these kinds of cases (Nord1999; Dolan et al. 2005). Though many people end up agreeing that some,but not complete, priority should be given to those who are sickest, there isalso considerable disagreement. A distinct but small minority adheres to oneor the other extreme position

important to the protection of opportunity, it is not the only good thatis important in this way. Many things affect and protect our exercisableopportunities – education, job training, job creation – even law and order.We must make reasonable decisions about how to support all these andother opportunity-promoting measures with the resources we have.Opportunity is also not the only important social good. Basic libertiesmust also be protected, including institutions that assure people that theycan effectively exercise them, especially their right of political participation.Further, opportunity is expanded as we increase societal wealth and knowl-edge. As a result, decisions about economic growth rates and social policiesthat affect them are tightly linked to decisions that affect the levels of healthneeds and the resources available to meet them. However important healthcare is, we must weigh it against other goods and other ways of promotingopportunity. Investing in health care has opportunity costs even though ithelps to promote opportunity.Even if setting limits is in general necessary, isn’t it unfair to limit meetinghealth needs as a result of avoidable waste or inefficiency or even profits?Creating losers unnecessarily surely seems unfair. For example, some pointto the fact of profit taking, and of marketing and other overhead costs inthe United States, as sources of unfair or unjustifiable limits on resources.2Some health plans in the United States, especially for-profit plans, spend asmuch as 25 to 30 percent of every premium dollar on nonmedical benefits.These dollars go to marketing, administrative costs, and returns to investors.If so much of their premium revenue is drained into costs that deliver nodirect benefit to patients, then how can we tolerate the limits these plans seton beneficial services? This complaint has great power and resonates withmany practitioners, who believe it gives them an excuse to “game the

lthough there is something to this argument, I am inclined to besceptical. Equality of status is important among people who are indaily contact with one another, and who share a common way of lif

e.20 To preserve equality we would hacontinually to transfer resources from nations that become relativbetter-off to those that become worse-off, undermining politicaresponsibility, and in a sense undermining self-determination toinsofar as this involves choosing between alternative futures areceiving the costs and benefits that result from suc

d.19 Democratically governenations, I argued, are likely to make policy decisions that affect thresources and opportunities available to future generations of thown members, so that even if we were to imagine starting out frombaseline of equality, that equality will immediately be brokenpolitical and cultural differences between nations find expressionthe policies that they pu

o cosmopolitans who go on to argue that their cosmopolitan convictions arebest expressed through practical doctrines such as the doctrine ofhuman rights, or global equality of opportunity, need to add a substantive premise about what we owe to other human beings as such -a premise that, to repeat, is not contained in the idea of cosmopolitanism as such

y. Of course if I haveinformation that might help find that distant child, then I should giveit to the police at once. It is not that I lack any responsibilities to thedistant child. But nearly everyone thinks that I have a much greaterresponsibility to my own child, or to one I am connected to in someother way. The important point is that this is perfectly consistent withthe view that it is equally bad, equally a matter of moral concern,when any child goes missi

Since representative democracy is first and foremost the name of aform of government, reference to people’s sovereignty and authorisa-tion is essential, not accessory (Habermas 1996: 462–515). Electoralrepresentation is for this reason crucial in expressing the will of thepeople, even if the claims of elected officials to act in the name of thepeople unavoidably become an object of contestation by citizens. Thistension is at the core of representation but it also accounts for the com-plexity of representative democracy. Representation is the locus of thedynamics that keep modern democracy in motion and the political pro-cess that activates the communication between state institutions andsociety.

rom this perspective, we can understand why Rousseau confineddelegation rigorously to the bounds of a principal/agent relation andstripped it of any political role. In legal usage, mandate is a fiduciarycontract that allows the principal to temporarily grant an agent herpower to take certain specified actions in order better to protect herinterests but does not alienate or delegate her will to make decisions.This was Rousseau’s substitute for ‘representation’ in the legislative set-ting. It was consistent with a voluntarist politics and a juridical notionof sovereignty. It allowed for delegation, but not representation, as thetitle of chapter 15 of book 3 of his Social Contract suggests

The democratic process of representation is the most original aspectof the form of government of the moderns. As a process, it is per-manently open to solutions that may not please us: it may encouragedemocracy’s self-creation and improvement but also forms of elitistpressure by organised interests or the populistic manipulation of thegeneral opinion by private potentates and tycoons. To fully grasp thiscomplexity and confront the problems awaiting the future of repre-sentative democracy, democratic theory has to transcend the classicalconception of popular sovereignty by which democracy has been iden-tified since the beginning of modernit

n the remainder of this chapter I shall revisit two classical argu-ments against the idea that democracy can become representative.These arguments pivot around two intertwined issues, one pertainingto the identity of the sovereign and the character of sovereign politics,and the other to the relationship of power that representation estab-lishes

If elections alone qualify representative gov-ernment as democratic then it is hard to find good arguments againstthe critics of contemporary democracy who, from the left and the right,set out from time to time to unmask the role of the people as a ‘meremyth

Through the actual provision of voice (advocacy,representation) or the production of services (for members or others), the organi-zations of civil society are developing, promoting and preserving a wide varietyof values and ideals

It means that inpursuing our interests in the public realm we ought to be aware that weare not the only ones with claims, and in pressing these claims in thepublic sphere we ought to justify them in terms that sincerely speak toour fellow citizens’ concerns. Again I argue that constitutional questionsdemand a higher level of discursive action than most day-to-day politics

We think this is not a good argument. First of all, at face value it would mean that there could be no good deliberation in parliament either when legislators make binding decisions after deliberating.

he disfranchisement of womenis certainly arbitrary and unreasonable. It obviously rests uponthe wrong conception that women are not full-fledged humanbeings and lack the ability and the interest to devote themselvesto politics. But the distinction between man and woman is notpolitically relevant in nearly the same degree as a distinctionaccording to the size of income.

n extreme instance is the form of government in whichthe people have transferred the supreme power once and forall to a single person and to his successors, as fixed by specificrules. This is still spoken of as democracy because the supremepower is still sanctioned by a popular mandate, which isconsequently regarded as the basis of "sovereignt

he characteristic which, according to this definition,should be decisive for democracy is not described in such a waythat it is clear what facts are intended.

uch an extent that perception of sociostructural conditions may no longer be aligned with “objective”sociostructural conditions

Rather, as Study 2 shows, craftyPRWP leaders will also go to great lengths to shape voters’ understanding of social reality, and this to

inally, study 2 showed that PRWP leaders interpret social reality creatively and that it may notbe the objective economic situation that matters most but the way that the economic situation isappraised and interpreted.

Study 1was an experiment in which we manipulated the future economic performance of Australia. We foundthat endorsement of an anti-immigration message was higher when participants expected affluence(“relative gratification”) rather than economic downturn (“relative deprivation”). Although we aremindful that this effect might be more likely observed at a time and against the backdrop of economicprosperity, our findings provide nonetheless clear evidence that it is possible that economic prosperity,just like economic downturn, provides “fertile ground” for PR

n sum, when considering the way in which these PRWP leaders reinterpret socioeconomic con-ditions, it becomes clear that they do so creatively and in such a way as to arouse fear for unrecog-nized problem

we were open to findingeither that a politician voicing anti-immigrant sentiments will be more persuasive when a country isexpecting economic prosperity (RG) or wh

with a controlled laboratory experiment in which we systematicallyexamined the way economic prosperity affects the persuasiveness of a leader with an anti-immigrantagenda

nterestingly, this suggests that feelings of relative deprivation (RD) are often most pronouncedamong those who are relatively well off—those who experience Relative Gratification.

What has thus been neglected is the possibility that PRWP support can also be motivated by abelief that one’s group is better off than other groups and fears that recent gains could be lost—socalled Relative Gratification (RG; Grofman & Muller, 1973). Consistent with this, sociologists havefound that acquiring wealth can trigger “status anxiet

how do PRWP leaders sustain or enhance the appeal of their party in timesof economic prosperity, when objective socioeconomic conditions can be regarded as not a cause forconcern? How do PRWP leaders manage to keep threat perceptions alive? And how do they justifyharsh treatment of immigrants and asylum seekers? To answer these questions, we first need to reviewresearch theorizing the relationship between economic conditions and receptiveness to PRWP anti-immigrant messages more closely

The second fundamental assertion of political psychology is that toexplain the political preferences, choices and actions of individuals andgroups, we need to study their characteristics and relationships empiri-cally, with due attention for context-specific group dynamics

rational choice theorists have, in practice, learnt how torelax

ErnestoLaclau and Chantal Mouffe, discourse theory, the so-called Essex School,combines a theoretically sophisticated grasping of the processes through whichsocial meaning is articulated with an emphasis on the political and oftenantagonistic character that different discourses acquire through their articulationaround distinct nodal point

an we identify, after all, ‘a central core present in allthe manifestations of populism?

populism. In most available accounts, both journalistic and academic, the label‘populist’ is applied in a manner that takes its meaning for granted and fails toprovide any concrete and/or persuasive justification for its use. This is not the caseonly with regard to Tsipras and SYRIZA, but a systemic feature of the publicdebate around populism internationally. Surprisingly enough, it is also typical ofthe discussion around Chavismo in Venezuela. 11 Indeed—just as with Tsipras—‘many scholars, journalists and policy makers use the word populist to describeChavez and his movement,’ however, ‘none of these observers really clarify themeaning of this term or why it applies to Chavez.’12 We will claim that it is indiscourse theory, in the analyses of populism initiated by the so-called EssexSchool, 13 that one can locate the most methodologically consistent andtheoretically supported formulation of such criteria; as a result it is by utilizinga series of discourse-theoretical tools that we will conduct our analysis. This is amove that becomes increasingly appealing even to analysts operating within moremainstream research paradigms; in Kirk Hawkins’s words:Ironically, for better guidance we must turn to the constructivists and discourse theorists[ . . . ] including especially those who study populist discourse [ . . . ]. Their work here is muchmore advanced and provides most of the descriptive material we need to create a betterdefinition and measurement of populis

n this essay, we attempt to test this prevailing (journalistic as well as academic)assumption according to which SYRIZA constitutes a populist force. This issuecannot be adequately discussed and no consistent ‘verdict’ can be reached withouta clear formulation of criteria, without, that is to say, a rigorous theory o

We have argued that the classic model of electionsas mechanisms for sanctioning and selection offers a helpful framework tounderstand defection from mainstream to challenger parties

Challenger parties are the political success story of the aftermath of the eurocrisis. Both on the left and the right it is parties that have not recently been ingovernment that have benefited from the exodus of voters from mainstreamparties. The decline in the vote shares of mainstream parties since the onset ofthe financial crisis in 2008 is around 12 percentage points. With the exceptionof Greece, mainstream parties have remained the dominant actors in govern-ment in Western Europe, yet those defections have nonetheless transformedchallenger parties from often very marginal political players to repositories ofa substantial proportion of people’s vote

ple who left the mainstream to join the challenger right-wing partiesare much more anti-immigration and anti-EU than mainstream loyalists, butthey differ very little in terms of their views on the environment and redistri-bution, and are only very slightly more in favour of restricting governmentspending. Defectors to the challenger left are a little more anti-EU and a littlemore pro-environment and immigration than mainstream party loyalists, butthese are not big differences. The big difference between loyalists and defectorsto the challenger left is attitudes towards redistribution

There isclearly an effect of poor economic circumstances on defection to mainstreamopposition parties—they get more defectors from those severely affected by thecrisis. But so do challenger parties. In fact the effect on defection to challengersis greater. More importantly though, the right-hand figure shows defectionfrom mainstream opposition parties given different economic experiences

e samples ofvoters from all EU member states (Schmitt et al. 2015).8 We focus on whycertain individuals have switched support between parties over the electoralcycle in different countries in Western Europe. Specifically, we look at peoplewho previously cast a vote for a mainstream party in the last national election,but by 2014 supported a challenger party. Before looking at the reasons behinddefection, it is important to note how defection from the mainstream has beencrucial to challenger party success on both the left and right.

uilding on this literature, we thus expect that individuals whoreject a pro-European mainstream consensus and who favour more restrictiveimmigration policies are more likely to defect to challenger parties on the right,while those opposed to neo-liberal economics and austerity are more likely toturn to challenger parties on the left. This leads to the following two hypotheses:H2a: People who are Eurosceptic and more opposed to immigration are morelikely to defect from mainstream parties to a right-wing challenger party.H2b: People who strongly favour more economic redistribution are more likelyto defect from mainstream parties to a left-wing challenger par

This is about the prospectiveselection of specific parties, rather than retrospective sanctioning of the govern-ment. Our argument is that the convergence among mainstream parties duringthe crisis has led to defection to challenger parties from people who are dissat-isfied with that consensu

Voters do not see elections as simply sanctioning devices, but alsoas opportunities to choose a political representative with the right set of pref-erences and qualities

First,country-level studies using aggregate data make it difficult to disentangle theindividual-level motivations for defection. Second, although perceptions of theeconomy are normally highly correlated with party choice, there is increasingconcern that the direction of causality is actually from party support to eco-nomic evaluations

e need to examine the motivations of voterswho defected from the mainstream to challenger parties over the last few years

Could the success of chal-lenger parties simply be a product of the secular decline of the mainstream leftand right parties, or what some have called the end of the ‘age of party democ-racy’ (Mair 2013; Dalton and Wattenberg 2002)

efection is also likelywhen individuals are disconnected from mainstream party policy, not leastregarding three issues that are closely tied to the EU and the euro crisis: EUintegration, austerity measures and immigration

In this article we examine the causes of the rise of these challenger parties,focusing on the individual-level motivations of voters

his paper also seeks to identify parties that challenge the mainstream partypolitical consensus, but we adopt a novel approach to the measurement thatfocuses on participation in government. We argue that measuring whetheror not parties ordinarily participate in government has the advantage that itindirectly captures many of the features of niche and populist parties (the mobi-lisation of new issues and/or extreme positions on existing issues as well as therejection of the political establishment), yet with greater parsimony and sim-plicity than measuring what qualifies as ‘niche’, ‘populist’ or ‘extreme’.

voting matters to people’s decision to defect from the mainstream to challengerparties: people who were personally adversely affected by the crisis are morelikely to defect

To test these propositions we examine who defected from mainstream par-ties after the onset of the crisis. First, we track the changes in the success ofchallenger parties since the beginning of the crisis and show that there hasbeen a sharp increase in support across Western Europe since 2010. Then weuse the 2014 European Election Study to show that retrospective econom

Our second explanation thus focuses on the specific appealof different challenger parties. Our argument is that defectors choose chal-lenger parties because they offer a rejection of, and an alternative to, themainstream response to the crisis.

Why did certain voters defect from mainstream political parties and optfor challenger parties in the aftermath of the crisis?

l services’ which they now had an almost unlimitedlicense to sell. But the poor also prospered, at least some of them andfor a while. Subprime mortgages became a substitute, however illusoryin the end, for the social policy that was simultaneously being scrapped,as well as for the wage increases that were no longer forthcoming at thelower end of a ‘flexibilized’ labour market. For African-Americans in par-ticular, owning a home was not just the ‘American dream’ come true butalso a much-needed substitute for the old-age pensions that many wereunable to earn in the labour markets of the day and which they had noreason to expect from a government pledged to permanent austerity

Inflation was conquered after 1979 (Figure 1) when Paul Volcker, newlyappointed by President Carter as chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank,raised interest rates to an unprecedented height, causing unemploy-ment to jump to levels not seen since the Great Depression. The Volcker‘putsch’ was sealed when President Reagan, said to have initially beenafraid of the political fallout of Volcker’s aggressive disinflation policies

ith inflation no longer available for closing the gap between thedemands of citizens and those of ‘the markets’, the burden of securingsocial peace fell on the state. Public debt turned out, for a while, to bea convenient functional equivalent of inflation. As with inflation, pub-lic debt made it possible to introduce resources into the distributionalconflicts of the time that had not yet in fact been produced, enablinggovernments to draw on future resources in addition to those alreadyon hand. As the struggle between market and social distribution movedfrom the labour market to the political arena, electoral pressure replacedtrade-union demands. Instead of inflating the currency, governmentsbegan to borrow on an increasing scale to accommodate demands forbenefits and services as a citizen’s right, together with competing claimsfor incomes to reflect the judgement of the market and thereby helpmaximize the profitable use of productive resources.

was re-elected in 1984. Thatcher, who had followed the American lead,had won a second term in 1983, also in spite of high unemployment andrapid de-industrialization caused, among other things, by a restrictivemonetary policy. In both the us and the uk, disinflation was accompaniedby determined attacks on trade unions by governments and employ-ers, epitomized by Reagan’s victory over the Air Traffic Controllers andThatcher’s breaking of the National Union of Mineworkers. In subse-quent years, inflation rates throughout the capitalist world remainedcontinuously low, while unemployment went more or less steadily up(Figure 2, overleaf). In parallel, unionization declined almost every-where, and strikes became so infrequent that some countries ceased tokeep strike statistics (Figure 3, overleaf).The neoliberal era began with Anglo-American governments castingaside the received wisdom of post-war democratic capitalism, whic

n its early stages, inflation was not much of a problem for workersrepresented by strong trade unions and politically powerful enoughto achieve de facto wage indexation. Inflation comes primarily at theexpense of creditors and holders of financial assets, groups that do notas a rule include workers, or at least did not do so in the 1960s and1970s. This is why inflation can be described as a monetary reflectionof distributional conflict between a working class, demanding bothemployment security and a higher share in their country’s income, anda capitalist class striving to maximize the return on its capital. As thetwo sides act on mutually incompatible ideas of what is theirs by right,one emphasizing the entitlements of citizenship and the other those

o the extent that economic theory becameaccepted as a social theory, it would ‘come true’ in the sense of beingperformative—thus revealing its essentially rhetorical nature as aninstrument of social construction by persuasion

n the second dimension,supranational influence has tended to enhance the legal rights andopportunities of individuals and firms in relation to the state. In fact, muchof the ECJ’s case law can be read as a crusade to pro

En annan invändning mot en obligatorisk arbetslöshets-försäkring är att dagens frivilliga system hjälper till att upprätthållaett högt fackföreningsdeltagande. Som framgår av diskussionen ikapitel 5 är ett högt fackföreningsdeltagande något som är värt attsträva efter. Vi ser dock inte att detta argument är speciellt starkt idagens läge då kopplingen mellan a-kassemedlemskap och fack-föreningsmedlemskap har blivit allt mindre tydlig

En andra fråga är om arbetslöshetsförsäkringen bör görasåldersberoende; det vill säga att äldre arbetslösa får en högreersättningsnivå och/eller en längre ersättningsperiod än yngre. Densvenska arbetslöshetsförsäkringen innehåller i dagsläget vissasådana inslag i och med att ungdomar under 25 år omfattas avspeciella regler speciellt vad gäller aktiveringskrav, men i övrigtberor inte ersättningen på de arbetslösas ålder.

Det kan man göra genom ettsystem där varje ytterligare månad i arbetslöshet medför en kost-nad i termer av en längre kvalificeringsperiod för ersättning iframtiden. Detta kan exempelvis utformas så att man ersätterdagens sex månaders kvalificeringstid med att upp till fyra måna-ders arbetslöshet ger ett krav på fyra månaders arbete, sju månadersarbetslöshet ger ett krav på sju månader och så vidare

Sammantaget föreslår vi att ett systemmed varningar och låga sanktioner införs tillsammans med tydligainstruktioner om att dessa ska tillämpas redan vid små avvikelser frånregelverket

I Sverige fokuserar dessutom kontrollen i stor utsträckning påom de arbetslösa accepterar lämpliga jobberbjudanden snarare änhur aktivt de söker efter jobb. En sådan övervakning riskerar attminska de arbetssökandes incitament att söka arbete aktivt då denmedför att arbetslösa som söker många jobb, men får dåligajobberbjudanden, löper en större risk att bestraffas än arbetslösasom inte söker några jobb alls

Nederländerna och Schweiz har man väl utvecklade system förkontroll och sanktioner som verkar ha betydande positiva effekter.I båda länderna är sanktionsgraden betydligt högre än i Sverige,men sanktionerna är i allmänhet mycket små. Man använder ävenformella varningar, vilka tycks ha positiva effekter

Det har dock rests krav påatt sådana regler bör införas. I Utredningen om rätt till heltid före-slogs att arbetsgivare bör begränsas till att ha maximalt en sjunde-del av sina anställda på deltidstjänster (se SOU 2005:105). Ett skältill att införa begränsningar i arbetsgivares rätt att anställa personerpå deltid är att arbetslöshetsförsäkringens regler om ersättning tilldeltidsarbetslösa i realiteten innebär en subvention av arbetsgivaresom väljer att organisera sin verksamhet med många deltidsanställ-ningar då de sysselsatta får en del av sin inkomst finansierad medoffentliga medel

yvärrsaknas i stort sett relevant forskning om hur ett samhällsekono-miskt effektivt ersättningssystem för deltidsarbetslösa bör ut-formas. I bilaga 10 diskuteras resultaten från en formell modell-analys av arbetslöshetsersättningens optimala utformning i ensituation där deltidsarbetslöshet förekommer. Analysen tycks varaden första i sitt slag, något som gör den värdefull, men ocksåantyder att resultaten bör tolkas med viss försiktighet

eltidsarbetslösa – trots att de i inte alls vill arbeta mer. Ersättningtill deltidsarbetslösa innebär också i realiteten en subvention avarbetsgivare som väljer att organisera sin verksamhet med mångadeltidsanställningar eftersom de sysselsatta får en del av sininkomst finansierad med offentliga medel.

Den genomsnittliga ersättningsgraden från arbetslöshetsför-säkringen påverkas också av att antalet medlemmar i a-kassornaföll kraftigt under 2007 och har varit mer eller mindre oföränd-rat sedan dess

De första utvärderingarna av de finska reducerade momssatsernas effekter visar att ungefär hälften av momssänkningen på frisörverksamhet övervältrades på konsumentpriserna och varken efterfrågan på frisörtjänster eller sysselsätt-ningen inom branschen påverkades av momssänkningen under en uppföljnings-period på 2,5 år. Sänkt restaurangmoms minskade priserna på kort sikt med ungefär en tredjedel av momssänkningen. För restaurangbranschen finns ännu inga resultat för effekterna på efterfrågan på restaurangtjänster eller sysselsätt-ning, men eftersom priseffekterna tycks likna de för frisörbranschen går det i alla fall inte att utesluta att sysselsättningseffekterna kommer att bli lika små. Det är viktigt att samla in data för utvärdering innan liknande reformer genomförs i Sverige

Like Chinathe rising United States also adopted a policy of military restraint, favouringeconomic development over the pursuit of world class military power. Andlike China, the United States resisted taking on leadership responsibilitiesuntil global events forced it to

sum, the slow mobilization mechanism does not appear to function as claimed. Democratic leaders fre- quently decide that protecting what they deem to be the national interest requires swift and decisive ac- tion.

he Gulf War provides a recent example. Bush administration officials decided to launch Operation Desert Shield without consulting Congress and repeat- edly put off a congressional vote fearing that it might go against them. The decision for Desert Storm was also made unilaterally. Bush argued that he did not need a congressional resolution and was determined to avoid asking for authorization lest this imply that the Executive did not have the final say on matters of war.

There was no doubt whatever about the enthusiasm of British public opinion, as expressed by every conduit open to it." The protests of Cobden and Bright, leaders of the British Peace Movement, "were howled down in the House of Commons, in the Press, and at meeting after public meeting

Third, there is good evidence that support for democ- racy was often sacrificed in the name of American economic interests. At least some of the impetus for intervention in Iran came in response to the national- ization of the oil industry, the United Fruit Company pressed for action in Guatemala, International Tele- phone and Telegraph urged successive administrations to intervene in Brazil and Chile, and Allende's efforts to nationalize the copper industry fueled demands that the Nixon administration destabilize his government

First, all the regimes that the United States sought to un- dermine were democratic. In the cases of Guatemala, British Guyana, Brazil, and Chile democratic pro- cesses were fairly well established. Iran, Indonesia, and Nicaragua were fledgling democracies but Mossadeq, Sukarno, and the Sandinistas could legitimately claim to be the first proponents of democracy in their re- spective countries. Every government with the excep- tion of the Sandinistas was replaced by a succession of American-backed dictatorial regimes.

Agenda setting Agenda setting

ermany was economically highly developed, but suc-cumbed to nazi dictatorship in 1933.

unimportant

Men som sagt så tillåter inte Tännsjös tolkning av Parfits teori för en så enkel slutsats, även om det initialt kan kännas som en tilltalande och övertygande kritik.

då Arrhenius har kritiserat Tännsjös pessimistiska antagande genom att anmärka på hur han (Tännsjö) komplicerar teorin genom att framhäva idén att scenario A skulle vara så långt bortom vår förmåga att förstå

Dock så har Arrhenius bortsett från det faktum att Parfits teori angående den motbjudande slutsatsen implicerar att A-världen ska utgöras av 10 miljarder människor, vilket skulle betyda att Z-världen skulle implicera en befolkning långt utöver vad som skulle få plats på jorden. Och om ’vi’ då lever i Z-världen just nu, så skulle det innebära att A-världen i relation till vår Z-värld skulle ha en obetydligt liten befolkning, som oavsett deras glädjenivå ej skulle kunna överglänsa våran västerländska värld

Vad det gäller Arrhenius och kritiken gällande avståndet mellan A och Z, så avvärjer sig pessimisterna detta genom att hänvisa till Parfits grundteori, där varje steg har stor inverkan från det tidigare vilket då inbegriper att det med nödvändighet måste vara ytterst stor skillnad mellan A och Z.

Nej, Tännsjö insisterar att om vår levnadsstandard ligger i linje med scenario Z och skillnaden mellan Z och livet strax under är så pass drastisk, så måste steget från Z till A vara så ofattbart mycket större än spannet en enskild individ är kapabel uppnå

nledningen till att jag tar upp detta argument är för att förtydliga hur stor skillnaden mellan scenario A och Z nödvändigtvis behöver vara, då Arrhenius har kritiserat Tännsjös pessimistiska antagande genom att anmärka på hur han (Tännsjö) komplicerar teorin genom att framhäva idén att scenario A skulle vara så långt bortom vår förmåga att förstå. Arrhenius förstår inte varför Tännsjö inte kan tillåta teorin grundas i en mer mänsklig skala, där A representerar högsta möjliga

En kritiker som inte delar Tännsjös position är Nils Holtug. Han som anser att det pessimistiska antagandet inte rimligen kan vara korrekt, då det i hans mening inte är alls svårt att föreställa sig att vi privilegierade västerlänningar skulle kunna leva ett avsevärt mycket sämre liv än det vi lever nu, och fortfarande leva liv värda att leva

Med fältet öppet för tolkning så kan Tännsjö formulera en tes som grundas i originalkällan utan att behöva dra fram premisser ur tomma intet, vilket bidrar med en viss tilltro och vikt som teori. Särskilt när den nya teorin kan läggas över och passas in i verkliga scenarion, och inte enbart som ett tankeexperiment.

Z så skulle det enbart betyda att världen är försjunket i ett sämre tillstånd än vi tidigare trott. Problematiken i resonemanget angående A’s uppenbara överlägsenhet till Z kvarstår (Arrhenius: 67). Men Tännsjö gräver ner klackarna och tar sig ann kritiken, glad att Arrhenius (åtminstone för argumentets skull) kan acceptera att vi lever i scenario Z, och att den motbjudande slutsatsen inte är direkt influerad av vad Z representerar utan snarare relationen mellan A och Z, och specifikt det faktum att Z skulle vara bättre

nbart

Trots att Tännsjös position är kontroversiell

slutsatsen är motbjudande endast om den är uppenbart felaktig, men om den genomsnittliga västerländska existensen är representerad i scenario Z så kan motbjudande slutsatsen inte rimligen vara uppenbart felaktig

arfits ståndpunkt är således att totalprincipen (och därmed den motbjudande slutsatsen) kräver att vi accepterar att den totala mängden lycka, där den är som störst, för flest antal personer, är att föredra. Även om det inbegriper att befolkningen i snitt kommer må sämre. Parfit utgår från det utilitaristiska kravet som uppmanar till att i varje given situation prioritera det alternativ som maximerar lyckan hos flest antal personer. Om detta alternativ blir på individens bekostnad kan det göras upp med kvantiteten, när kvaliteten är otillräcklig (Parfit 1984: 386-387). Detta resonemang gjorde att Parfit drog slutsatsen att man som utilitarist/hedonist bör avfärda detta argument, då kvantitet omöjligen i någon form kan överväga bristen på kvalitet på välståndet, då det är kvalitet som hedonisten bör sträva efter.

välfär

Parfit talar om olika scenarier för hur ett liv kan levas och upplevas, från scenario A till Z där scenario A innebär att alla individer har högsta möjliga glädjenivå. Men i scenario A utgörs befolkningen av ytterst få individer med högsta möjliga levnadsstandard, medan i B är befolkningen dubbelt så stor med en något lägre levnadsstandard. Detta fortsätter hela vägen till Z där befolkningen är enorm och med en levnadsstandard som ligger strax ovan en existens inte värd att leva. Den totala mängden lycka i scenario B överstiger alltså scenario A enbart i kvantitet. Den individuella glädjenivån är lägre eftersom den blir tunnare spridd över den större befolkningen

roblemet grundas i utilitarismens kontraintuitiva krav att acceptera det scenario som bidrar till störst mängd lycka till största möjliga antal människor

ccording to this system, then, every animal that has sense, and appetite, and will; that is, every animal, must be susceptible of all the same virtues and vices, for which we ascribe praise and blame to human creatures. All the difference is, that our superior reason may serve to discover the vice or virtue, and by that means may augment the blame or praise: But still this discovery supposes a separate being in these moral distinc- tions, and a being, which depends only on the will and appetite, and which, both in thought and reality, may be distinguish’d from the reason.

For he that renounceth or passeth away his right giveth not to any other man a right which he had not before, because there is nothing to which every man had not right by nature, but only standeth out of his way that he may enjoy his own original right without hindrance from him, not without hindrance from another. So that the effect which redoundeth to one man by another man's defect of right is but so much diminution of impediments to the use of his own right original.

Klargör noga skillnaden mellan motivationsinternalism och skälinternnalism. Hur är denna skillnad viktig för Garners resonemang?

ur underbygger Garner påståendet att “It is not just that we don’t need moral properties to explain our moral experience, their queerness would undermine any explanation of moral experience that appealed to them”

Klargör Mackies (eleganta) argument mot naturalister och non-kognitivister. Fundera över om det finns något lovade sätt att bemöta argumentet

Diskutera om det verkligen stämmer att “the thought that we are inescapably bound is an indispensable part of the institution of morality”

Vilken är Garners huvudtes? Formulera den så klart och enkelt som möjligt

Hur bemöter Garner Brinks argument att moraliska egenskaper supervenierar på naturliga egenskaper

Garner identifierar något av ett dilemma för den som vill undvika besynnerlighetsargumentet genom att acceptera naturalism. Formulera dilemm

Hur bemöter Garner motargumentet från den moraliska realisten att det inte är något konstigt med konstiga moraliska egenskaper eftersom det finns många konstiga saker i världen

Hur funkar Garners jämförelse mellan hur vi lär oss färgord och hur vi lär oss moraliska uttryck i den epistemologiska delen av besynnerlighetsargumentet?

Hur leder the argument from relativity över till the argumentfrom queerness menar Garner

Varför menar Garner att Brinks version av the argument from relativity är “terrible

Klargör skillnaden mellan (1) att bryta mot (“offend”) moralens eller etikettens regler och (2) att känna sig tvungen (“feel bound”) att lyda reglerna och (3) att det finns något utöver reglerna som kräver (“requires”) agenten att åtlyda reglerna. Varför understryker Garner att (3) är speciellt intressant.

*Försök beskriva den generella formen av argument som Ayer riktar mot utilitarism och subjektivism.

20.*Vilken eller vilka invändningar mot Ayers emotivism och hans analys av vad moralfilosofi” (“ethical philosophy”) är viktigast enligt dig, och varför?

13.Vad menar Ayer med “pseudobegrepp”?

2.*Hur argumenterar Ayer för att “intellektuell intuition” är “värdelöst” som test av värdeomdömen?

In fact we may define the meaning of the various eth-ical words in terms both of the different feelings they are ordi-narily taken to express, and also the different responses whichthey are calculated to provoke

It is worth mentioning that ethical terms do not serve only toexpress feeling. They are calculated also to arouse feeling, andso to stimulate action.

ometimes they occurin sentences which record ordinary empirical facts besides ex-pressing ethical feeling about those facts; sometimes they occurin sentences which simply express ethical feeling about a cer-tain type of action, or situation, without making any statementof fact.