The ‘new atheists’—by defining religion in opposition to science,

Non-Re]

including the question whether religious people are healthier than non- religious people,

20 MICHAEL STAUSBERG AND MARK Q, GARDINER ae semantic theory’), and do not promise to achieve unambiguous Solutions Some hay even argued that polythetic definitions are antithetical to theorizing religion; Phils. pher Peter Byrne argues that “No theory of the religious is appropriate if the genus the religious is simply a collection of things connected by overlapping analogies” (Bytn 1999, 384). Yet, polythetic definitions have the appeal of avoiding essentialism, Which is regarded by most scholars of religion as a pitfall and a danger (even though Most anti-essentialists have a hard time completely erasing essentialism from their own cri. tique, leaving aside the fact that some have a narrow conception of essentialism), Yet if polythetic definitions protect against essentialism, they do so in an uNcertain and costly manner. As a matter of fact, many definitions proposed by contemporary scho]. ars of religion are monothetic ones (see, for example, Frankenberry, Jensen, Schilbrack, in the appendix). The only d far apart in time, Space, or social position, siderably, whether they realize it or not, o commonality that, Davidso subject, although their un disagreement about X pres monalities are seen by thi the term religion, no matter how must as a semantic Precondition, agree con- n much of the definitional criteria.

Christianity is often, in different parts of the world, considered a prototypical exam- ple for religion

an openness to religious diversity

Some con- clude that instead of attempting to define religion the study of religion\s should focus its efforts elsewhere: to “focus on deconstructing the category and analyzing its function within popular discourse”

che topic ble attempts at de ef There are