The New Public Management challenge to bureaucracy, in short, is no challenge at all.

An irony of the New Public Management, therefore, is its quest to rid itself of unresponsive government bureaucracies actually replaces them with private sector bureaucracies that are more difficult to hold accountable.

thefundamental bias in majoritarian systems arises because, under reason-able assumptions, M has less to fear from an MH government movingright than from an LM government moving left.

Figure 1 illustrates this “robin Hood paradox”

but it could not prevent democracy, atleast for a while, and then the right representing business had a strongreason to favor proportional representation. even if it could see that amajoritarian system would guarantee a focus on the redistributive needsof the middle classes, thus pushing out the redistributive claims of low-income groups, business wanted sweeping labor-market and trainingreforms that would help modernize the economy. in a majoritarian sys-tem it had no guarantee that the median voter would support thesereforms or that the unions would be cooperative in such a setting.

Groups ofworkers are strong when they can credibly threaten to hold up employ-ers. this is a consequence not of employment or skills per se—employ-ers can in principle replace workers with general skills at low cost—butof skills that are costly to replace and whose withdrawal is costly tothe employer in lost production. thus cospecific skills cause particularproblems for employers; and for employers to invest in them, they needthe assurance that wages will be set outside the company, whether acrossthe industry or more widely.

but for us this derives from thedifferent nature of skills in different varieties of capitalism.

this is an argument about highhorizontal mobility between firms and industries; it does not imply thatvertical mobility between income groups is high.

this is an argument about highhorizontal mobility between firms and industries; it does not imply thatvertical mobility between income groups is high.

but in our view business and its political representationis as important as labor for understanding strong welfare states.

Majoritarian systems operate quite differently. the three parties arereplaced by two, a center-left (LM) and a center-right (MH) party,both competing for M.

as Moene and Wallerstein haveemphasized,33 we need to more pay attention to the insurance functionof the welfare state rather than simply to the redistributive function.

employees with spe-cific skills have an interest in wage and unemployment protection andalso, insofar as skills are firm specific, in employment protection.

We suggest instead that two factors, the extent of consensus in thepolitical system and the degree of nonmarket economic coordination,have had a similar impact on both distribution and redistribution.

we argue that the rise in inequality starting in the 1980s re-sulted from changes in technology that affected the bargaining powerof low-skilled workers—and not from an overall decline in the powerof the left.

employers and the right did not choose prbecause they feared the power of the left; rather, they chose it becauseof the opportunities this representative system created for collaborativearrangements with labor.

We proposein section ii that the correlation is indirect: two factors—the electoralsystem and the degree of economic coordination—each has an impacton both distribution and redistribution.

the exceptions to the negative relationship are France (relatively highinequality and redistribution) and switzerland (relatively low inequal-ity and redistribution), and we comment briefly on these cases below.italy is also an outlier on the Gini measure, but the pre-fisc Gini mea-sure in this case is net of taxes and therefore likely underestimates thetrue scope of redistribution.

redistribution is measured here by the percentagereduction in the poverty rate (left axis) and in the Gini coefficient (rightaxis) from before taxes and transfers to after taxes and transfers (basedon income for working-age households).

the implication is that equality in the distribution ofmarket income should be negatively correlated with government re-distribution. but as noted above, the reverse is true: data for advanceddemocracies consistently show equality in market income to be associ-ated with high redistribution.

Moreover, if we use a simple left-right conception of politics, as ad-vocated by prt, there are strong theoretical reasons to expect govern-ments to be centrist.

second, although there is mounting evidence of a fairly strong re-lationship between left partisanship and redistribution, 9 prt providesno explanation for why the left is strong in some countries and notin others.

First, if it is true that the welfare state is built on theshoulders of an unwilling capitalist class, it is hard to understand thecontinued enthusiasm of capitalists to invest in economies with large,“de-commodifying” welfare states

It is important tosee from the start, however, that on all three of the unsolvedproblems, Rawls’s theory of justice offers no principles whatso-ever. Rawls does indeed take up the international case later, us-ing separate principles

We also often think of extendingthem temporally to take account of the interests of future peo-ple—although that set of issues will be only briefly mentioned inthese pages, for reasons that I shall shortly discuss.

It may be doubtedwhether assuming the independence and rough equality ofstates makes any sense at all in a world in which a powerfulglobal economy makes all economic choices interdependent andoften imposes on poorer nations conditions that reinforce anddeepen existing inequalities

Some people with severe mental im-pairments, however, could not be included in the group of polit-ical choosers directly, however generously we assess their poten-tial for such a contribution. For those people, the failure toinclude them in the role of chooser does not seem like an injus-tice, so long as there is some other way to take their interestsinto account.

This problem seems all thegraver when we recognize that many of the factors that some-times exclude people with impairments from participation in po-litical choice are social and far from inevitable

Together with rising relative wages, thepost-1950 increase in the job-market em-ployment of women is one of our major

As we noted above, poor countries (asnatural states) remain poor because they are much less able to withstandshocks than are open access countries.

In the case of China, the growth process based on catch-up, import of foreign technology, andexport of low-end manufacturing products is likely to continue for a while. Nevertheless, Chinesegrowth is also likely to come to an end, particularly once China reaches the standards of living levelof a middle-income country.

Even greater caution is necessary in drawing policy recommendations from this broad account ofthe origins of prosperity and poverty.

However, within thesebroad patterns there will be major institutional changes in the next century, with some countriesbreaking the mold and transitioning from poor to rich.

NATURALLY, THE PREDICTIVE POWER of a theory where both small differences and contingency play key roles will belimited.

Why does the path of institutional change differ across societies? The answer to this questionlies in institutional drift. In the same way that the genes of two isolated populations of organisms willdrift apart slowly because of random mutations in the so-called process of evolutionary or geneticdrift, two otherwise similar societies will also drift apart institutionally—albeit, again, slowly.

Inclusive economic institutions that enforce property rights, create a level playing field,and encourage investments in new technologies and skills are more conducive to economic growththan extractive economic institutions that are structured to extract resources from the many by the fewand that fail to protect property rights or provide incentives for economic activity. Inclusive economicinstitutions are in turn supported by, and support, inclusive political institutions, that is, those thatdistribute political power widely in a pluralistic manner and are able to achieve some amount ofpolitical centralization so as to establish law and order, the foundations of secure property rights, andan inclusive market economy

The second is our explanationfor why inclusive institutions emerged in some parts of the world and not in others

Our theory has attempted to achieve this by operating on two levels. The first is the distinctionbetween extractive and inclusive economic and political institutions.

The aristocracy was not the only loser from industrialization.

European history provides a vivid example of the consequences of creative destruction.

But this means that the choice of institutions—that is, the politics of institutions—is central to our quest for understanding the reasons for thesuccess and failure of nations

We will refer to political institutions that are sufficiently centralized and pluralistic as inclusivepolitical institutions. When either of these conditions fails, we will refer to the institutions asextractive political institutions.

Butthe key to understanding why South Korea and the United States have inclusive economic institutionsis not just their pluralistic political institutions but also their sufficiently centralized and powerfulstates

The political institutions of a society are a key determinant of the outcome of this game. They arethe rules that govern incentives in politics.

South Korea ended up with very differenteconomic institutions than the North because different people with different interests and objectivesmade the decisions about how to structure society. In other words, South Korea had different politics.

Barbados in the seventeenth century also had markets. But in the same way that it lackedproperty rights for all but the narrow planter elite, its markets were far from inclusive;

In neithertype of society was the power of the state used to provide key public services that promotedprosperity

In neither type of society was the vast mass of peopleable to make the economic decisions they wanted to; they were subject to mass coercion.

Inclusive economic institutions foster economic activity, productivity growth, andeconomic prosperity. Secure private property rights are central, since only those with such rights willbe willing to invest and increase productivity.

The health of North Koreans is in an even worse state; the average North Korean can expect tolive ten years less than his cousins south of the 38th parallel. Map 7 illustrates in a dramatic way theeconomic gap between the Koreas. It plots data on the intensity of light at night from satellite images.North Korea is almost completely dark due to lack of electricity; South Korea is blazing with light.

Hwang Pyŏng-Wŏn recalled how when they parted, his brother was ill at ease and alwaysnervous as though someone were listening

If we follow the progress of inequality in these variousrevolutions, we shall find that the establishment of lawsand of the right of property was its first term, the institu-tion of magistracy the second, and the conversion oflegitimate into arbitrary power the third and last; sothat the condition of rich and poor was authorised by thefirst period; that of powerful and weak by the second;and only by the third that of master and slave, which isthe last degree of inequality, and the term a t which allthe rest remain, when they have got so far, till the govern-ment is either entirely dissolved by new revolutions, orbrought back again to legitimacy

The savage and the civilised man differ so much in thebottom of their hearts and in their inclinations, that whatconstitutes the supreme happiness of one would reduce theother to despair. The former breathes only peace andliberty; he desires only to live and be free from labour;even the ataraxia of the Stoic falls far short of his profoundindifference to every other object.

It was discovered in process of time which ofthese forms suited men the best. Some peoples remainedaltogether subject to the laws; others soon came toobey their magistrates. The citizens laboured to pre-serve their liberty ; the subjects, irritated at seeing othersenjoying a blessing they had lost, thought only of makingslaves of their neighbours. In a word, on the one sidearose riches and conquests, and on the other happiness andvirtue.

I must not forget that precious half of the Republic,which makes the happiness of the other ; and whose sweet-ness and prudence preserve its tranquillity and virtue.

W h a t shameful methods are sometimes practised toprevent the birth of men, and cheat nature; either bybrutal and depraved appetites which insult her mostbeautiful work-appetites unknown to savages o r mereanimals, which can spring only from the corrupt imagina-tion of mankind in civilised countries; or by secret abor-tions, the fitting effects of debauchery and vitiated notionsof honour; or by the exposure or murder of multitudes ofinfants, who fall victims to the poverty of their parents, orthe cruel shame of their mothers ; or, finally, by the mutila-tion of unhappy wretches, part of whose life, with their

The simplicity and solitude of man’s life in this newcondition, the paucity of his wants, and the implementshe had invented to satisfy them, left him a great deal ofleisure, which he employed to furnish himself with manyconveniences unknown to his fathers: and this was thefirst yoke he inadvertently imposed on himself, and thefirst source of the evils he prepared for his descendants.For, besides continuing thus to enervate both body andmind, these conveniences lost with use almost all theirpower to please, and even degenerated into real needs,till the want of them became far more disagreeable thanthe possession of them had been pleasant. Men wouldhave been unhappy at the loss of them, though thepossession did not make them happy.

W e seearound us hardly a creature in civil society, who does notlament his existence: we even see many deprive them-selves of a s much of it as they can, and laws human anddivine together can hardly put a stop to the disorder. Iask, if it was ever known that a savage took it into hishead, when at liberty, to complain of life or to makeaway with himself. Let us therefore judge, with lessvanity, on which side the real misery is found. On theother hand, nothing could be more unhappy than savageman, dazzled by science, tormented by his passions, andreasoning about a state different from his own.

I know it is incessantly repeated that manwould in such a state have been the most miserable ofcreatures; and indeed, if it be true, as I think I haveproved, that he must have lived many ages, before hecould have either desire or an opportunity of emergingfrom it, this would only be an accusation against nature,and not against the being which she had thus unhappilyconstituted. But as I understand the word miserable, iteither has no meaning at all, or else signifies only a pain-ful privation of something, or a state of suffering either inbody or soul. I should be glad to have explained to me,what kind of misery a free being, whose heart is at easeand whose body is in health, can possibly suffer.

to arise. Since domination, like alla relative phenomenon - a privilege "some eothers" (D/, 131/ OC 3, 131) - its source must beinequality and not merely nee

o do so. This would imply that if the w(in absolute terms), their being worse off than oworse off, would no longer pose a substantial ob(Of course, even if this objection were correcwould reveal an often overlooked evil of poveinequality: beyond merely having one's needs unone vulnerable to domina

ation: is what threatens universal freedomor being poor? The answer to this question is prothe right circumstances either can incr

all is to be realized. Aparmuch of the tone of the Second Discourse - its pessi"crimes, wars, . . . miseries, and horrors" that uneq(in land) brings in its wake (D/, 161/ OC 3, 164) - experence for one of two strategies for respondingendangering potenti

mulated as follows: disparitsible only when they do not pose systematic obany individual, especially to the freedom of theinequality is permissible only to the extent thatabsence of relations of dominati

That Rousseau condemns economic inequality becaquences is made clear in his discussion of the constrainations of freedom place on inequality, especially in histhat the general will has two principal aims - freedomthat equality (in wealth and power) is such an aimcannot subsist

h. This means that despite its focus on the connomic inequality, Rousseau's position is not conseqsense of seeking to maximize the sum total of thepromote regardless of how those

the Second Discourse: the first comprises interestclosely related to what the Discourse calls happinesinterests in the preservation of life, personal secuunspecified goods essential to human well-being ( PE ,second is an interest in freedom , define

g. Both sets of constraints rein-force a point already implicit in my discussion of the ethical dangers ofinequality, namely, that Rousseau's evaluation of economic inequalityhas a significant consequentialist20 strand: to the extent that economicinequality is objectionable, it is because of its objectionable conse-quences, not because it is somehow wrong "in its

From the Discourse alone it is possible to gasimply viewing social inequalities as artificiaquestion for Rousseau. This impression is reinfoconcluding paragraph, which seems to claim thalegitimate only when they are "directly proineq

This concludes my account of the two dangers of economic inequality,and it puts us in a position to reconstruct Rousseau's answer to the morespecific question of the extent to which economic inequality is illegiti-mate, or impermis

The relation economic inequality has to unhappiits relation to domination, but the connection -poses - is real

Rousseau's main claim concerning the connectinomic inequality and unhappiness is based on thenomic features of a society affect the consequenceshave in it by structuring the field of possibilities wrecognition can be pursued: how individuals seek topropre depends on the opportunities for recognpermits and encourages, and the economic sphere pldefining these o

Yet the most interesting way in which Rinequality to foster unhappiness is more comclaim of the Second Discourse is that societies with substantial eco-nomic inequality tend to produce in individuals inflamed desiresfor recognition, desires that make the society-wide satisfaction ofamour propre impossible and, so, guarantee frustration a

er, the object of Rousseau's critique is not poverty but inequality,and the two ideas must be kept separate by bearing in mind that it ipossible to be on the lower end of an unequal distribution of wealthwithout being p

' desires.18 Theconnection Rousseau draws between inequality and unhappiness ismore complex than the corresponding point regarding freedom. Therelevant claim is not that being poor makes one unhappy since it meansthat many of the poor's desires will be un

ality. One way of revealing this relevance is tconsider the relation between domination and coercion. Dominationdiffers from coercion along two dim

gal or social statuses.1cially in the modern world, because it enablesdetect and criticize forms of domination thstatuses such as "slave" or "serf but that arise instead out of conditionsof dependence and inequality among individuals who are legally recog-nized as free and equal pers

A final respect in which Rousseau's definition of domfrom that of traditional republicanism is that for Rfrom domination is not primarily a legal status - for efree citizen as opposed to a slave - but an empiricallconstituted by actual (regular and

v-xi). If laws - even good laws - are to avoid bdomination, they must actually be made by thoseBecause legislation must be a collective enterprise, I canlaws that govern me only by actively participatingprocess in which those laws are made. As a citizen, I detwhat I am to do only insofar as I am an active member oliterally makes the laws th

Traditional republican definitions of freedom as nondomination, incontrast to Rousseau's, typically do not refer to obedience at all. Insteadthey define domination in terms of the dominator's ability to "interfereon an arbitrary basis with the choices of the dominated," where "arbi-trary" signifies that the interferer "is not forced to track the interests andideas of those who suffer the interference."

or power. This is the basis for RousContract that "as for wealth, no citizen shouldanother, and none so poor that he is compeIl.n.ii). Economic inequality becomes dangeroit threatens the ability of the less advantagedrather than those

o the picture. Here, too, the idelikely that dependence will translate into a losinterdependent beings encounter one anotherif, from the start, one side has an advantage oto wealth

be legitimate. For, as The Socithere is a source of legitimacy other than naturtion" (or agreement), in which ri

1 IOC 3, 131). 2 One point of mation is to emphasize that moral inequalities are "artificsay, they are created and sustained by us, and for tresponsible for them in a way we are not responsible fties created by nature.3 Moral inequalities are, as R"established, or at least authorized" by a kind of conveultimately on human consent

The answer is that the process within the formalproperty system that breaks down assets into capital is extremelydifficult to visualize

The moment is ripe to solve the problem of why capitalism istriumphant in the West and stalling practically everywhere else.As all plausible alternatives to capitalism have now evaporated,we are finally in a position to study capital dispassionately andcarefully.

These scenes are ofcourse real, and millions of our fellow hlllllan beings demand anddeserve our help

creates the wealth of nations.

At this very moment you are surrounded by waves ofUkrainian, Chinese, and Brazilian television that you cannot see.So, too1 are you surrounded by assets that invisibly harbor capital.Just as the waves of Ukrainian television are far too weak for youto sense them directly but can, "With the help of a television set1 bedecoded to be seen and heard, so can capital be extracted andprocessed from assets

But only the West has the conversion processrequired to transform the invisible to the visible. It is this disparitythat explains why Western nations can create capital and theThird World and former communist nations cannot.

They have houses but not titles; crops but notdeeds; businesses but not statutes of incorporation. It is the unavailability of these essential representations that explains why peoplewho have adapted every other Western invention, from the paperclip to the nuclear reactor, have not been able to produce sufficientcapital to make their domestic capitalism work.

Because the rightsto these possessions are not adequately documented, these assetscannot readily be turned into capital, cannot be traded outside ofnarrow local circles where people know and trust each other, cannot be used as collateral for a loan, and cannot be used as a shareagainst an investment.

Even in the poorest countries, the poor save.The value of savings among the poor is, in fact, immense-fortytimes all the foreign aid received throughout the world since 1945·

whatis it that prevents capitalism from delivering to them the samewealth it has delivered to the West? VVhy does capitalism thriveonly in the West, as if enclosed in a bell jar?

Nobody but abeggar chuses to depend chiefly upon the benevolence of his fellowcitizens. Even a beggar does not depend upon it entirely. The charity ofwell-disposed people, indeed, supplies him with the whole fund of hissubsistence.

Among civilized and thriving nations, onthe contrary, though a great number of people do not labour at all, manyof whom consume the produce of ten times, frequently of a hundredtimes more labour than the greater part of those who work ; yet the produce of the whole labour of the society is so great, that all are often abundantly supplied, and a workman, even of the [3] lowest and poorestorder, if he is frugal and industrious, may enjoy a greater share of thenecessaries and conveniences of life than it is possible for any savage toacquire.

This separation too is generally carried furthestin those countries which enjoy the highest degree of industry and improvement ; what is the work of one man, in a rude state of society, being generally that of several in an improved one.

The division of labour, however, so faras it can be introduced, occasions, in every art, a proportionable increaseof the productive powers of labour. The separation of different tradesand employments from one another, seems to have taken place, in consequence of th\s advantage.

THE greatest aimprovementa in the productive powers of labour

Thisdynamic process was unleashed by the institutional changes thatflowed from the Glorious Revolution

THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION

Ultimately it was not concern about the fate of thosewho might become unemployed as a result of Lee’s machine that ledElizabeth I and James I to oppose his patent; it was their fear thatthey would become political losers—their concern that thosedisplaced by the invention would create political instability andthreaten their own power.

ne. In contrast, IPE argues that we need to see politics as a procethrough which people with different, and equally legitimate, views on the contestability othe existing rights-obligations structure vie with each other, rather than as a process inwhich interest groups try to change the 'natural' order of 'free markets' according to theown sectional interests.

Second, by portraying the particular boundary of the market that they are advocatin(into which, they argue, political influences should not be allowed) as the 'rational' othe neo-liberals are claiming an objectivity that no theory

To sum up the discussion in this section, understanding the market requires consiation of a much wider range of institutions than what is normally discussed by thelibera

IPE argues that politics is an institutionally structured process, not only becauseinstitutions shape people's political actions, given their motivations and perceptions, butbecause they influence people's perception of their own interests, of the legitimateboundary of politics, and of the appropriate standards of behaviour in politic

IPE treats politics not as something alien and damaging to the market but as anpart of its construction, operation and change, although it acknowledges the harmexcessive politicisation can do. It also emphasises that there is no such thing as a 'political view and therefore that no one should be able to claim the boundary betmarket and the state that he/she believes in to be the 'correct' one

m. The capitalist system is made up of a range of institutions, includmarkets as institutions of exchange, the firms as institutions of production, andas the creator and regulator of the institutions governing their relationships (whbeing a political institution), as well as other informal institutions such as socialconvention

Who has political power and where does it come from? As we noted in the Introduction(Section 1.2, point 4), political power comes from two sources. First, an individual orgroup can be allocated de jure power by political institutions. But institutions are not theonly source of power. A second type of political power accrues to individuals or groupsif they can solve the collective action problem, create riots, revolts, or demonstrations,own guns, etc. We call this type of power de facto political power

A similar problem plagues the reverse solution, whereby the dictator agrees to a vol-untary transition to democracy in return for some transfers in the future to compensatehim for the lost income and privileges. Those who will benefit from a transition todemocracy would be willing to make such promises, but once the dictator relinquisheshis political power, there is no guarantee that citizens would agree to tax themselves inorder to make payments to this former dictator. Promises of compensation to a formerdictator are typically not credible

The problem when itcomes to institutional choices is that there is no such impartial third party that can betrusted to enforce contracts. This is the origin of the commitment problem in politics.

An owner and managercan write a contract because they believe that the state, and its agents the courts, wouldbe impartial enforcers of the contract

Dependency theorists such as Williams (1944), Wallerstein(1974–1980), Rodney (1972), Frank (1978) and Cardosso and Faletto (1979) argued thatthe international trading system was designed to extract rents from developing countriesto the benefit of developed countries

Although we believe that historical accidents and persistence are important, in realitythe aspect of choice over institutions seems too important to be denied. Even if insti-tutions have a tendency to persist, their persistence is still a choice, in the sense thatif the agents decided to change institutions, change would be possible

Although Moore was not explicitly concerned with eco-nomic development, it is a direct implication of his analysis that societies may end upwith institutions that do not maximize income or growth

These models show that if different societies have different beliefs about what is sociallyefficient they can rationally choose different economic institutions.

A second view is that economic institutions differ across countries because of ide-ological differences – because of the similarity between this and the previous view,Acemoglu (2003a) calls this the Modified Political Coase Theorem.

In sum, we need a framework for understanding why certain societies consis-tently end up with economic institutions that are not, from a social point of view, in theirbest interests. We need a framework other than the Political Coase Theorem.

For example, Southand North Korea did not adopt very different economic systems because they had dif-ferent needs, but because different systems were imposed on them for other exogenousreasons

in thisview, economic institutions are chosen efficiently, and all societies have the best possi-ble economic institutions given their needs and underlying structures

The notion that a Coasian logic applies in political life as well as in economics is re-ferred to by Acemoglu (2003a) as the Political Coase Theorem.

Williamson and North and Thomas do not specify how different parties will reachagreement to achieve efficient economic institutions, and this may be problematicalin the sense that many economic institutions relevant for development are collectivechoices not individual bargains

Similarly,if the current economic institutions benefit a certain group while creating a dispropor-tionate cost for another, these two groups can negotiate to change the institutions

A farmer, who suffers from the pollutioncreated by a nearby factory, can pay the factory owner to reduce pollution

According to this view, societies will choose the economic institutions that are sociallyefficient. How this surplus will be distributed among different groups or agents does notaffect the choice of economic institutions.

Once the lists were shown to be unambiguous and valid, they werestored online and saved as recognition stimuli for the next wave ofdata collection

We thus implementeda first follow-up measurement approximately 5 months after so-journers’ arrival in their host countries (T2) and scheduled anotheroccasion of data collection by the end of the academic year (T3).

The available support rela-tionships will thus be partly replaced by new and most likelyinternational relationships. Therefore, we suggest that internationalrelationship gains constitute an important mediator in explainingpossible sojourn effects on personality development.

Individuals who move to another country are particularly facedwith relationship fluctuation

For the case of inter-national mobility, we propose the mechanisms of relationshipfluctuation as being particularly relevant. Caspi and Roberts(1999) suggested that the role of relationships in personality de-velopment can be conceived of as learning from relevant others byeither modeling their behaviors or by incorporating their feedback.

This idea also works as a utopian horizonor regulative ideal. Kant calls it a ‘future-shaping perspective’ (Kant 2013, p. 63)that could be used as a guideline for the actions of men.

the biological life of men, does not have a declining phase. Mankind, he con-cludes, “is always going towards a greater perfection” (Turgot 1808, p. 54).

The idea of progress can be interpreted inthree different senses: the concept can refer (i) to advances in the knowledgeof an area—a methodological approach; (ii) to the necessary course of history—an ontological characteristic; or (iii) to a regulatory ideal—a normative aspect.

The notion in its modern sensecomes from a metaphorical use of that Latin root.

he idea of progress is not a univocal term

The framework of this paper is as follows: firstly (i), I will reconstruct thecriticisms of the idea of progress that occurred throughout the twentieth century

Aristotle may have had somesimilar gregarious faculty in mind when he said that man was bynature a political anima1. 27

In its most casual form, the traditional view is that private organi-zations and groups are ubiquitous, and that this ubiquity is due to afundamental human propensity to form and join associations. As thefamous Italian political philosopher Gaetano Mosca puts it, men havean "instinct" for "herding together and fighting with other herds."This "instinct" also "underlies the formation of all the divisions andsubdivisions ... that arise within a given society and occasion moraland, sometimes, physical conflicts."

Our task is to attempt to discover why a firm emergesat all in a specialised exchange econom

The purpose of this paper is to bridge whatappears to be a gap in economic theory between the assump-tion (made for some purposes) that resources are allocatedby means of the price mechanism and the assumption(made for other purposes) that this allocation is dependenton the entrepreneur-co-ordinat

he undertaker busies himselfwith the division of labour inside each firm and he plansand organises consciously," but " he is related to the muchlarger economic specialisation, of which he himself is merelyone specialised unit. Here, he plays his part as a single cell in alarger organism, mainly unconscious of the wider rle he fiUS.

It can, I think, be assumed that the distinguishing markof the firm is the supersession of the price mechanism.

. It is hoped to show inthe following paper that a definition of a firm may be obtaiwhich is not only realistic in that it corresponds to whatis meant by a firm in the real world, but is tractable bytwo of the most powerful instruments of economic analysis

Economists in buildingup a theory have often omitted to examine the foundationson which it was erected

d. Common practices are the pressure of opinionand the exclusion from intercourse by the associates of the individualwhich thereby require him to conform if he would live and prosper.And the common law is the protection by the courts, by means of thephysical penalties and immunities of government, of approved practicesand the exclusion of disapproved practices.

From this point of view it can be seen, I believe, how close is therelation between Economics and Law

They identify custom with the common law., whereas, fromthe economist's approach, the common law is a special case of Darwin's"artificial selection," by the courts in this instance, of what are deemedto be good customs, and the rejection and penalization by the courts ofwhat are deemed to be bad custom

Thus the practices of tradeunions may be deemed to be bad customs, but the similar practices ofbusiness men may be said to be good custom

er two. But Scarcity, also, forthe jurist is fundamental to his concept of property, since the onlsignificance of any sometimes alleged right of property attachingobjects whose quantity is unlimited in supply and can therefore be uby all persons, like air or sunlight, is in their appurtenance to objewhose quantity is limited in supply and can, therefore, be excluded. fromuse by other persons, like radio stations and

This model oflicensing is the most important institutional innovation of the free softwaremovement. Its central instance is the GNU General Public License, or GPL.

The most successful and obvious regulatedcommons in contemporary landscapes are the sidewalks, streets, roads, andhighways that cover our land and regulate the material foundation of ourability to move from one place to the other.

Mostof the early growth was in English, but more recently there has been anincrease in the number of articles in many other languages: most notably inGerman (more than 200,000 articles), Japanese (more than 120,000 articles),and French (about 100,000), but also in another five languages that havebetween 40,000 and 70,000 articles each, another eleven languages with10,000 to 40,000 articles each, and thirty-five languages with between 1,000and 10,000 articles each.

high modularization of the task.The organizers broke a large, complex task into small, independent modules.

“Commons” refers to a particular institutional form of structuring therights to access, use, and control resources. It is the opposite of “property”in the following sense: With property, law determines one particular personwho has the authority to decide how the resource will be used. That personmay sell it, or give it away, more or less as he or she pleases.

It suggeststhat the networked environment makes possible a new modality of organ-izing production: radically decentralized, collaborative, and nonproprietary;based on sharing resources and outputs among widely distributed, looselyconnected individuals who cooperate with each other without relying oneither market signals or managerial commands. This is what I call“commons-based peer production.”

allows disparate impact and statistical weight, as opposed to “intent” to inferdiscrimination

We conclude that more research is needed thatlinks environmental inequalities with public health outcomes

Moreover, the domestic policy of dumping on the poor andcommunities of color in the United States should not be exported abroad bydumping on the poor and communities of color in Third World nations

Because of the inherent inequities associated with waste facility siting, thefederal government should place a moratorium on the construction of newcommercial, municipal, and hazardous waste incinerators in communitiesalready saturated with environmental problems.

Federal, state, and localgovernments can address these problems by providing small and minoritybusinesses with incentives to explore the pollution prevention and hazardabatement field as a form of economic development.

For example, theCommission for Racial Justice was a major force behind the EnvironmentalJustice Act, a legislative initiative introduced by Congressman John Lewis andSenator Albert Gore in 1992 that will have to be reintroduced since its Senatesponsor has become Vice-President.

Despite repeated healthcitations, fines, and citizen complaints against the smelter, Dallas was clearlylax in its enforcement of health and land use regulations in the AfricanAmerican community that had involuntarily hosted the smelter

Pressure from grassroots groups, academicians, and environmental justiceactivists regarding environmental issues ranging from lead pollution to thesiting of landfills and incinerators also prompted the EPA to take severalpositive steps in addressing the equity question

Although African Americans made up only one-fifth of the region's totalpopulation, they represented three-fourths of the population in communitieswith offsite landfills

The demonstrations also prompted District of Columbia Delegate WalterFauntroy, who was chairman of the Congressional Black Caucus and an activeparticipant in the protests, to initiate the 1983 U.S. General Accounting Office(GAO) study of hazardous waste landfill siting in EPA Region IV, whichincludes Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina,South Carolina, and Tennessee.

the first Earth Day. in 1970

Theproject, later attacked in an article entitled Dances with Garbage,49 wasthwarted by a grassroots group known as the Good Road Coalition, which ledto a recall election of the Tribal Council government and the proposal'srejection.

In the same year, aConnecticut company that had never before operated a municipal landfillproposed building a 6,000 acre landfill on Sioux lands in South Dakota

Other Native American communities have had greater success in blockinggarbage imperialism

agreed

Economic conditions on reservations -such as poverty, high unemployment, and few business developmentopportunities - make reservations especially vulnerable to garbage imperial-ism, particularly when government and industry promote the construction ofa waste facility as economic development

As federal and state environmental regulations have become more stringent inrecent years, Native American reservations have become prime targets of

Native American lands pose a special case for environmental protec-tion.45 Few reservations have environmental regulations or waste manage-ment infrastructures equivalent to those of the state or federal governments.

Kettleman City is a small farmworker communityof nearly 1,200 residents, 40% of whom speak only Spanish. Yet KingsCounty, where Kettleman City is located, conducted public hearings andprepared environmental impact reports and other written materials in Englishonly.

hey also formed the Northeast Community ActionGroup (NECAG) and filed one of the first class action lawsuits challengingthe siting of a waste facility as a violation of civil rights. In this case, Beanv. Southwestern Waste Management Corp., a federal judge failed to finddiscrimination.3

Like landfills, hazardous waste incinerators tend to be located incommunities with large minority populations, low incomes, and low propertyvalues.

identified race as a more accurate predictor than income, home ownershiprates, and property values of the location of abandoned toxic waste sites.3

Blacks and whites do nothave the same opportunities to vote with their feet and escape unhealthyphysical environments.2

Followingthe NIMBY principle - "not in my backyard" - white homeowners haverepeatedly mobilized against and defeated proposed sitings of so-called"locally unwanted land uses" (LULUs) - such as garbage dumps, landfills,incinerators, sewer treatment plants, garbage transfer stations, and recyclingcenters - in their neighborhoods.

Why do some communities get dumped on while others do not?

As one scholar has putit, these policies create an American apartheid that, "while lacking overt legalsanction, comes closest to the system even now being reformed in the land ofits invention.

If we consider what inappropriable usage would look like in practice, Dardot and Laval’s anti-statism runs into further difficulties. For instance, they celebrate the Aqua Bene Commune in Naples as a concrete example of how local users, ecological and social movements, as well as worker asso-ciations participate in its cogovernance alongside experts and city represen-tatives. However, it remains unclear why their participatory inclusion is “non-statist” in any meaningful sense. On the contrary, since these com-moners used public law

Law due to its control by legal experts intent upon preserving private prop-erty, as well as of Marx’s discussion of the customary right of the poor because of its anchorage of social poverty within the physical scarcity of nature.42 Instead, they propose to draw on the French tradition of associative socialism (advanced, amongst others, by Marcel Mauss and Jean Jaurès) in

Conceiving the common as praxis excludes an understanding of obligation that is rooted in a notion of belonging, which is not itself condi-tional on active participation (thus denying obligations based on membership in terms of nationality, race, ethnicity, sex, etc.).

Dardot and Laval define the common as “the political principle of co-obligation of all who are engaged in the same activity.”

Consider, for instance, a crowded metropole in which residents yearn for more public spaces like a city park.53 It may be supposed that a greater share of municipal territory should be parceled out at the expense of those reserved for private housing, shops, or business offices. It is not clear why, in this scenario, the newly created city park should be instituted as an inappropri-able commons rather than a public good.

First, the political conception of the common is obscured by “recourses to ‘the common good,’ which are accompanied by a certain number of perfectly anti-democratic postulates which entrust to the state, or to ‘sages’ or ‘experts in ethics,’ or again to the Church, the care of telling what it is.”

By contrast, the commons are provided and enjoyed through active participation in a myriad of voluntary relation-ships from which dissociation is in principle possible.

Moreover, usage of these means ought to be subject to control by its members

Unlike the commons, public goods refer to objects around which per-sons are related in an association of ineluctable and inescapable political authority—notably, but not exclusively, states.

By contrast, any good that is capable of being purchased and sold, is not in itself a commons.

A “commons” is first and foremost an institutional affair and, more specifically, an institutional space defined by collectively developed practical rules.

cooperation among states has to happen voluntarily

If a good possesses only one of theseproperties, it is impure public

The standard economics definition of public goods fails to distinguish be-tween a good’s potential publicness and its de facto publicness.

Thus, GPG provision may not fit easily into conventional governance sys-tems that were created during, and thus often for, a world order of sovereignstates that, until not too long ago, pursued a policy of relatively closed nationalborders, and organized policy affairs mainly along geographic and sector lines.

Only a few international organizations, among them the UnitedNations Security Council and the World Trade Organization (WTO) havebeen endowed with limited coercive powers.

he list includes: dual—economic and political—market failure in thepresence of public goods; fairness and efficiency deficits in the political mar-kets, that is, in the international negotiation processes; organizational orpublic-management constraints; policy-change stalemates; and incompatibil-ity among GPGs

Public goods, in contrast, are goods that are non-excludable, meaning thatthe goods’ effects (benefits or costs) are there for all. If a good is non-excludableand non-rival in consumption so that one person’s use of the good or one per-son’s being affected by it does not diminish its availability for others, the good issaid to be pure public.