Native American lands pose a special case for environmental protec-tion.45 Few reservations have environmental regulations or waste manage-ment infrastructures equivalent to those of the state or federal governments.

Kettleman City is a small farmworker communityof nearly 1,200 residents, 40% of whom speak only Spanish. Yet KingsCounty, where Kettleman City is located, conducted public hearings andprepared environmental impact reports and other written materials in Englishonly.

hey also formed the Northeast Community ActionGroup (NECAG) and filed one of the first class action lawsuits challengingthe siting of a waste facility as a violation of civil rights. In this case, Beanv. Southwestern Waste Management Corp., a federal judge failed to finddiscrimination.3

Like landfills, hazardous waste incinerators tend to be located incommunities with large minority populations, low incomes, and low propertyvalues.

identified race as a more accurate predictor than income, home ownershiprates, and property values of the location of abandoned toxic waste sites.3

Blacks and whites do nothave the same opportunities to vote with their feet and escape unhealthyphysical environments.2

Followingthe NIMBY principle - "not in my backyard" - white homeowners haverepeatedly mobilized against and defeated proposed sitings of so-called"locally unwanted land uses" (LULUs) - such as garbage dumps, landfills,incinerators, sewer treatment plants, garbage transfer stations, and recyclingcenters - in their neighborhoods.

Why do some communities get dumped on while others do not?

As one scholar has putit, these policies create an American apartheid that, "while lacking overt legalsanction, comes closest to the system even now being reformed in the land ofits invention.

If we consider what inappropriable usage would look like in practice, Dardot and Laval’s anti-statism runs into further difficulties. For instance, they celebrate the Aqua Bene Commune in Naples as a concrete example of how local users, ecological and social movements, as well as worker asso-ciations participate in its cogovernance alongside experts and city represen-tatives. However, it remains unclear why their participatory inclusion is “non-statist” in any meaningful sense. On the contrary, since these com-moners used public law

Law due to its control by legal experts intent upon preserving private prop-erty, as well as of Marx’s discussion of the customary right of the poor because of its anchorage of social poverty within the physical scarcity of nature.42 Instead, they propose to draw on the French tradition of associative socialism (advanced, amongst others, by Marcel Mauss and Jean Jaurès) in

Conceiving the common as praxis excludes an understanding of obligation that is rooted in a notion of belonging, which is not itself condi-tional on active participation (thus denying obligations based on membership in terms of nationality, race, ethnicity, sex, etc.).

Dardot and Laval define the common as “the political principle of co-obligation of all who are engaged in the same activity.”

Consider, for instance, a crowded metropole in which residents yearn for more public spaces like a city park.53 It may be supposed that a greater share of municipal territory should be parceled out at the expense of those reserved for private housing, shops, or business offices. It is not clear why, in this scenario, the newly created city park should be instituted as an inappropri-able commons rather than a public good.

First, the political conception of the common is obscured by “recourses to ‘the common good,’ which are accompanied by a certain number of perfectly anti-democratic postulates which entrust to the state, or to ‘sages’ or ‘experts in ethics,’ or again to the Church, the care of telling what it is.”

By contrast, the commons are provided and enjoyed through active participation in a myriad of voluntary relation-ships from which dissociation is in principle possible.

Moreover, usage of these means ought to be subject to control by its members

Unlike the commons, public goods refer to objects around which per-sons are related in an association of ineluctable and inescapable political authority—notably, but not exclusively, states.

By contrast, any good that is capable of being purchased and sold, is not in itself a commons.

A “commons” is first and foremost an institutional affair and, more specifically, an institutional space defined by collectively developed practical rules.

cooperation among states has to happen voluntarily

If a good possesses only one of theseproperties, it is impure public

The standard economics definition of public goods fails to distinguish be-tween a good’s potential publicness and its de facto publicness.

Thus, GPG provision may not fit easily into conventional governance sys-tems that were created during, and thus often for, a world order of sovereignstates that, until not too long ago, pursued a policy of relatively closed nationalborders, and organized policy affairs mainly along geographic and sector lines.

Only a few international organizations, among them the UnitedNations Security Council and the World Trade Organization (WTO) havebeen endowed with limited coercive powers.

he list includes: dual—economic and political—market failure in thepresence of public goods; fairness and efficiency deficits in the political mar-kets, that is, in the international negotiation processes; organizational orpublic-management constraints; policy-change stalemates; and incompatibil-ity among GPGs

Public goods, in contrast, are goods that are non-excludable, meaning thatthe goods’ effects (benefits or costs) are there for all. If a good is non-excludableand non-rival in consumption so that one person’s use of the good or one per-son’s being affected by it does not diminish its availability for others, the good issaid to be pure public.

Goods that can be parcelled out and made excludable, so that clear prop-erty rights can be attached to them, are categorized as private goods.

We might notice first the strong connections between discontinuity (the polarization condition of dualism) and instrumentalism-the view that the excluded sphere is appropriately treated as a means to the ends of the higher sphere or group, that its value lies in its usefulness to the privileged group that is, in contrast, worthwhile or significant in itself

There are two parts to the restructuring of the human self in relation to nature-reconceptualizing the human and reconceptualizing the self, and especially its possibilities of relating to nature in other than instrumental w

This view of self-in-relationship is, I think, a good candidate for the richer account of self deep ecologists have sought and for which they have mistaken holistic accounts.

st critiques. The critique of anthropocentrism is not sacrificed, as deep ecologists argu