On 2025-07-03 15:36:38, user Iraq Body Count wrote:
We commend the authors of the Gaza Mortality Survey (GMS), and in particular their Palestinian survey colleagues, for producing the first rigorous estimate of violent deaths in Gaza since 7 October 2023 which is completely independent of deaths documented and collated by Gaza’s Ministry of Health (GMoH). Also significant is that it contains the first data-driven attempt to estimate non-violent deaths, which has so far been lacking from any other source.
Also welcome is that, while the GMoH’s numbers are notably lower than those in GMS, its authors recognise that “By naming individual victims one by one, the GMoH endows each person with a measure of human dignity.”
In their concluding section titled “The Future”, the authors go on to state that “Undercounting of violent deaths by the GMoH is likely to persist.” However the level of this undercount cannot be consistently derived from a single snapshot survey, for the simple reason that the GMoH documentation is continually being backfilled, as we have discussed extensively elsewhere: https://iraqbodycount.substack.com/p/gazas-internal-list-of-the-killed .
The number the authors provide for the “comparable” period to GMS is one which the GMoH put out in early January 2025: 45,650. However in the GMoH’s list published March 2025, which the authors refer to elsewhere, this number had grown to 48,440. Latest GMoH data (15 June 2025) show that they have further increased their number of verified violent deaths for the period to 49,048 individuals.
In addition to the deaths listed by GMoH, another 4122 identified dead were known to them by 10 April 2025 but had yet to be verified for addition to their list. (See: https://iraqbodycount.substack.com/p/gazas-victim-details-and-victim-deniers ) On past evidence, most if not all of these names will eventually be included too.
In fact, had the GMS been conducted a year earlier (January 2024) the gap between its estimates and deaths listed by GMoH would have been markedly wider, as the GMoH has increased its numbers for that early period from an initial 14,121 to 26,987 (an increase of 91%). As the backfilling has progressed, the shortfalls have become appreciably smaller. A notable and predictable pattern has been that the higher the intensity of killing, the more has needed to be completed later. At any rate, these efforts by the GMoH have been constant (not to say noble and brave) and are likely to continue to reduce the difference between competently estimated and actually-recorded casualties.
So any figure given for the level of difference between a survey and the GMoH is temporary, provisional, and dependent on the date at which the GMoH data was accessed.
This exemplifies some of the difficulties in comparing a snapshot view such as is obtained by a survey with an ongoing casualty recording effort conducted on a daily basis. Any such comparison needs to be done with appropriate caveats which, if not included, might have the unintended effect of setting in stone a particular estimate of official “undercounting”, thus undermining essential casualty documentation efforts, particularly where such efforts are already being impeded by the most awful circumstances on the ground.
Hamit Dardagan and John Sloboda, Iraq Body Count, London, UK<br /> 3 July 2025