On 2025-02-12 20:00:36, user Aron Troen wrote:
Review Part III
Results and Discussion<br />
Quantity of food trucked in: No source is cited for the figure of a pre-war baseline of 150-180 food-transporting trucks per day. This number is inconsistent with Israeli and UN sources. According to a document published in June by the Food Security Cluster, only 23% of UN recorded incoming goods to Gaza (not including fuel) before 7 October were food or food production inputs ( https://fscluster.org/sites/default/files/2024-06/Gaza%20imports%20and%20food%20availability%2015_may_V2%202.pdf) "https://fscluster.org/sites/default/files/2024-06/Gaza%20imports%20and%20food%20availability%2015_may_V2%202.pdf)") . If one is to rely on those UN statistics, the pre-war monthly average of trucks carrying food into Gaza was 2,288 (an average of approximately 100 trucks per working day in a normal month). Another UN source is the OCHA online Gaza crossings dashboard according to which during Jan-Sep 2023 a total 27,434 trucks carrying food entered Gaza, representing a monthly average of 3,048 trucks. <br />
The comparison in Figure 1 between the mean daily number of trucks for each week during the war with the "pre-war number of food-carrying trucks" per working day is highly misleading since it assumes that the number of working days remained steady. The distortion is significant because between 21 October and 5 May the crossings were open almost every day, as opposed to the 5-day work week in the period before the war. The following chart shows the monthly figures of UNRWA and COGAT compared to the monthly pre-war average of 2,288 trucks carrying food.
Compare it with Figure 1 from the article, which tells an entirely different story for the same period (blue columns represent trucks carrying food) in which is all but one week at the end of April the number of trucks carrying food was below the pre-war average:
Contribution of different food sources [to the northern and southern regions] (Table 1 & Figure 4)<br />
The result and discussion devote substantial attention to the relative distribution of food between the northern and southern regions. The governates designated as North and South Gaza are not explicitly defined. The only explanation for how the author determined the distribution of food deliveries between Northern and southern-central Gaza is as follows:<br />
"Until Israel re-opened the northern Erez and Erez West crossings, trucks had to leave south-central Gaza to resupply the north. We reconstructed the number of these trucks over time based on published information and data shared by WFP. As no data on content were available, we simulated their caloric equivalent by repeatedly sampling from the empirical distribution of calories per truck obtained from the UNRWA dataset (see below and Figure S1, Annex). The remaining trucked food was attributed to the south-central region."
The breakdown of that amount between northern and central-southern Gaza is based on an incomplete dataset (Commodities Received.xlsx) that appears to be missing the bulk of supplies by the private sector, appearing in the COGAT data ( https://gaza-aid-data.gov.il/main/) "https://gaza-aid-data.gov.il/main/)") , and which provided a significant share of supplies to the north. The dataset shows that during January and February 84 trucks were delivered to the north (according to the Logistics cluster). According to the same file, during March and April there only 20 private sector trucks delivered aid to the north. However, according to COGAT, deliveries to the north at that time were carried out mostly by the private sector, which are not fully covered by UN data. The flow of aid within Gaza and its regional distribution is difficult to ascertain. Media sources have provided conflicting reports from different sources. But they underscore the need to clarify precisely how the study assigned the regional food supply. For example, a story by the Associated Press from February 28 2024, reported that the UN had not been involved in aid deliveries to the North that month. According to one of COGAT's reports, during the first half of March they "facilitated over 150 aid trucks to the north" ( https://gaza-aid-data.gov.il/media/qtvbs5u0/humanitarian-situation-in-gaza-cogat-assessment-mar-15.pdf) "https://gaza-aid-data.gov.il/media/qtvbs5u0/humanitarian-situation-in-gaza-cogat-assessment-mar-15.pdf)") . In addition, COGAT claimed in a tweet from March 25 that UNRWA had not submitted a single request for delivering food to northern Gaza in six weeks ( https://x.com/cogatonline/status/1772316633605812511) "https://x.com/cogatonline/status/1772316633605812511)") . Thus, the methodology for determining the distribution of aid between northern and southern-central Gaza appears to be flawed since it almost entirely disregards aid deliveries by the private sector, which had a significant share of the total deliveries to the north during that period. Findings and conclusions that are contingent on this issue cannot be fully evaluated until this is corrected.
Main findings
The authors insinuate that the shortfall in the adequacy of food aid is solely due to intentional Israeli actions. For a subtle example of this the authors write that “Patterns in the diversity and caloric value of food trucked-in suggest that humanitarian actors may not have optimised the selection of what aid was allowed into Gaza.”. The food diversity findings suggest the humanitarian actors, who are responsible for deciding what is supplied to Gaza may not have optimized the selection of the aid. However, the use of the word “allowed” insinuates that the fault for this lies with Israel. The correct word should be “delivered”. Israel is responsible under international law for facilitating the entry of humanitarian aid. It is not responsible for selecting, procuring or delivering the aid. The fact that there was a considerable decline in food availability the first months of the war should not be surprising. Israel did not initiate the war, and should not be expected to have in place the logistics capacity for providing food to over 2 million conflict-affected people immediately after a strategic surprise attack. These major efforts, facilitated by the international community acting together with Israel, eventually yielded results as demonstrated by the study’s findings (eg. “a steep increase in food availability occurred from late April 2024, coinciding with the reopening of crossings into northern Gaza, and by June acute malnutrition prevalence appeared to be relatively low…”. [As noted above, “reopening” is a misleading term for the conversion of the Hamas-damaged Erez crossing from a pedestrian to a trucking terminal].
Similarly, one might ask why the Hamas failed to prepare for the needs of the Gazan civilian population under its governance, while it demonstrably prepared meticulously for the attack that was intended to provoke retaliation.
The authors seem intent to find Israel alone at fault, to encourage political pressure on Israel. They criticize “operations to deliver food via air or sea [as] cost-inefficient and a poor substitute for diplomatic pressure to merely reopen crossings”, stating in passing that “the 230M USD cost of the JLOTS operation [43] was higher than the entire humanitarian aid budget for the Central African Republic in 2024”. A back of the envelope calculation examining this assertion, and using WFP statements that their “emergency response [in Gaza] requires USD 740 million to provide support for up to 1.1 million people monthly” ( https://www.un.org/unispal/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/WFP-Palestine-Emergency-Response-External-Situation-Report-18-23-April-2024.pdf) "https://www.un.org/unispal/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/WFP-Palestine-Emergency-Response-External-Situation-Report-18-23-April-2024.pdf)") , shows that USD 740 per 1.1 persons monthly translates to 22.4 dollars per person per day. This means that the cost of the air-dropped food was only 29% higher than the delivery of land-based humanitarian food-aid. Thus, an equally plausible alternative interpretation of the resource expenditure might be that the air and sea operations, involving cooperation of USA, Jordanian, Israel and other Arab militaries to assist the Palestinian civilian population, could be considered a valuable attempt to circumvent the challenges to land-based humanitarian aid-operations during fierce fighting between Hamas and the IDF, as well as a means of exerting diplomatic pressure on the combatants. The policy implications and cost effectiveness of political pressure to increase food influx via land crossings are not obvious.
Comparing the resources allocated by the international community to the Palestinian population versus the long list of other pressing humanitarian crises, out of proper concern for emergency-affected civilian populations, is indeed a vexed question. Clearly, a critical and balanced discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this paper. However, if one insists on raising this important question, one might also question the efficiency of the billions of dollars donated to Gaza over the past decade by the international community, including from UNRWA, and how the funds, which were intended for civil and humanitarian development, were misappropriated by Hamas for a massive military buildup to the attack including the construction of hundreds of kilometers of military tunnels and the stockpiling tens of thousands of rockets and launchers, embedding them in their civilian population ( https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/hamas-gaza-humanitarian-aid-diverted-cf356c48; https://govextra.gov.il/unrwa/unrwa/#:~:text=Update%206%2F8%2F24%3A,massacre%20are%20credible%20and%20true; https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/08/world/middleeast/hamas-unrwa-schools.html?unlocked_article_code=1.f04.lcW3.n2kj8akEfM-M&smid=nytcore-ios-share&referringSource=articleShare; https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/how-to-reform-unrwa-to-improve-palestinian-lives-and-israeli-security/) "https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/how-to-reform-unrwa-to-improve-palestinian-lives-and-israeli-security/)") .
Limitations
The authors acknowledge several of the more obvious limitations and assumptions described above. However, they minimize or arbitrarily dismiss these weaknesses and proceed to make tendentious interpretations in support of their preferred policy implications. For example, they write that they relied heavily on a single UNRWA dataset “which appears highly complete and well-curated” without explaining how they make that subjective and unsupported assertion. The authors are demonstrably aware of the controversy and limitations of the data, yet they feign ignorance and avoid placing the data in the context of the known controversy writing that the data “may be biased by systematic under- or over-reporting UNKOWN TO US”. This knowingly downplays and misrepresents the CERTAIN under-reporting of UNRWA trucking data which the official disclaimer states clearly on the online dashboard and in the dataset that they provide for review: “We [UNRWA] are unable to provide comprehensive monitoring of cargo for the following reasons: i) safety and security concerns, which continue to prevent UN staff from maintaining constant presence at Kerem Shalom, therefore severely impacting our ability to cross-reference UN cargo, and record data from INGO, Red Cross and commercial trucks, and ii) delays and/or denials in approvals for UN to retrieve, count and move UN humanitarian aid from Kerem Shalom to other parts of the Gaza Strip, which mean that we are unable to fully verify all trucks which have transited the land crossings. We will resume presentation of comprehensive data once the situation at the crossing allows.” Similarly, the acknowledgement of “considerable uncertainty about population denominators” does not logically lead to the conclusion that this would “…have only marginally affected our estimates”.
Policy Implications
The conclusion of the article makes politicized recommendations that are disconnected from the findings. The authors’ recommendation to “reinstate UNRWA’s role as an independent and experienced on-the-field monitor” is unsupported, and the summary dismissal and evaluation of COGAT data as “not of sufficient quality to guide decision-making”, reflects bias rather than a balanced analysis. Considerations relating to the role that international actors can and should play is determined by far more complex factors that are the partial shipping data analyzed here.
The claim that Israel, “as the de facto occupying power”, did not ensure sufficient food availability to Gaza (while acknowledging the relatively short period of deficiency), vastly oversimplifies the complex dynamics of the conflict and the multifaceted factors affecting food availability. This claim appears intended to promote the use of the study as “evidence” supporting “forensic efforts” (in the courts) to prove allegations that “Israel deliberately has starved Gaza’s population”, presenting as fact a disputed interpretation of Israeli combat operations in Gaza as constituting occupation, and hence its obligations under international law, while ignoring weighty arguments to the contrary. This view also ignores corresponding obligations of Hamas as the governing power in Gaza, and the role of international humanitarian actors. The legal questions on this point are far beyond the scope of this review, but there is no basis in the data provided to make this claim – it is simply presented as an unsubstantiated assertion. In order to evaluate the morality, legitimacy or legality of the Israeli military strategy in response to the Hamas attacks and terror infrastructure, including its impact on food availability, it is necessary to examine and understand the strategy challenges in conditions of military asymmetry, the large-scale use of human shields to protect Hamas forces, and urban warfare as exist in Gaza. The authors of this article appear to be unaware of this central dimension in the issues they are claiming to address. Given the slanted narrative, the selective and biased use of data and their interpretation, and the far-reaching and unsupported conclusions, it is difficult to escape the impression that this study is aimed at providing a prosecution with ostensibly credible academic findings, rather than advancing open-ended research in support of humanitarian efforts.
Timely and reliable data are crucial to address the critical needs of the war-affected civilian population of Gaza. There is no doubt that data “on the civilian impacts of the war in Gaza”, and “situational awareness on food security in Gaza” are “important to inform appropriate humanitarian response”. It is also undoubtedly true that “humanitarian actors should review whether there is adequate coordination and technical expertise in place to ensure that what food is allowed into Gaza is both calorically efficient and diverse enough to maintain the best-possible diet, especially for population groups most vulnerable to malnutrition”. How a retrospective simulation of the food supply informs “situational awareness” is less obvious. Slanted, simplistic and politicized framing of the findings that ignore complexity, place the onus on Israel alone, and overlook the role of Hamas, the agency of Palestinian civil society, and the responsibility and obligations of the international community, do not advance scholarly discourse, nor will it strengthen the cooperation that is urgently needed to strengthen humanitarian efforts to benefit the civilians of Gaza.