46 Matching Annotations
  1. Jul 2026
    1. Florence (2018

      perhaps worth noting i don't think we see the actual post-florence applications etc. because most of these hadn't closed by the time they gave us the data, which was in ~2020. So Florence did occur but I don't think we see post-Florence mitigations.

    2. Eligibility for HMGP funding (defined as inundation during a presidentially-declared event in the property’s county) is applied as an analytical filter within these stages but not displayed separately.

      I think we can delete this?

    3. concentrates funding in lower-value, less-white communities

      i think we can say for sure that lots of applications are solicited from lower-value, less-white communities because the application stage is where you see the really big median change. Applied -> funded still a decline in median, but not as big. So I'd characterize it more as a function of who is applying, rather than what's being chosen within the applicant pool

    4. We also see no evidence of applicant pools dominated by high-value properties, which would be consistent with local governments selectively recruiting wealthier households for application support.

      this one also could definitely be a NC-specific thing, so i think we should call that out

    5. county-scale evidence

      i think these papers were saying it's whiter/wealthier counties, but then poorer/less white neighborhoods within them, right? so it's aligning with the neighborhood-scale evidence since we don't do an analogous county-level comparison

    6. neighborhoods

      perhaps add something like ", indicating that the selection process is not necessarily driving inequitable funding outcomes" or something like that?

    7. This

      Maybe another sentence before this, along the line sof "Many of these properties have flooded multiple times, suggesting they would likely meet cost-effectiveness requirements for federal funding"

    8. Figure

      Ah - this one has the axis adjustments I mentioned for the one above! would be good to get the font sizes closer to what the main text font looks like - right now it seems like it'll be tiny

    9. Figure

      consider font size adjustments here too... you coudl also just do one set of x-axis labels for the whole plot since those are duplicated, and one y-axis on the right.

    10. Figure

      It might be totally fine when on a normal paper layout, but it'd be nice to bump up font size for the stages on the left and the num of parcels on the bottom. You could do community applied on two lines

    11. Distribution of property values expressed as percentile ranks relative to the entire study-area sample.

      missing something about stages... "distribution of property values for parcels making it to each stage of the flooded-to-funded pipeline, expressed as percentile ranks relative to the entire area sample" ? and applies same way to panle B.

    12. Funded properties are within lower-value neighborhoods than the broader flood-exposed population, but are typical homes within those neighborhood

      Rather than "are within lower-value neighborhoods", how about "average lower property values than the broader flood-exposed population, but are typical homes for their neighborhoods" ? (more emphasis on the address-level info than neighborhood-level)

    13. buyout projects

      I see the website only refers to buyout projects for this but i think it is true for all projects. Our main contact there is now gone but I know one other guy there, let me send him an email and see if he can confirm either way. i'll also use it to share the draft with him which is a good idea to do before it goes out

    14. The federal government covers 75% of project costs; states, local governments, and in some cases homeowners are responsible for the remaining 25% non-federal match.

      I am fairly sure this is always the case for HMGP but actually not sure if it is always true e.g. for FMA, PDM, BRIC vs. it sometimes being a lower federal share. Can you double check and make sure?

    15. which leads disaster response and administers the nation’s largest property-scale risk mitigation programs, including the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP), Flood Mitigation Assistance (FMA), and Building Resilient Infrastructure and Communities (BRIC).

      Here I think we should define HMA and the programs within the HMA umbrella- https://www.fema.gov/grants/mitigation/learn

    16. After a presidential disaster declaration releases funding,

      this only applies to HMGP, so maybe just "after federal funding is released". Since even for the standing programs, they still need some trigger to be released

    17. Inequitable outcomes across the FEMA Hazard Mitigation Assistance (HMA) application pipeline.

      The application process for FEMA Hazard Mitigation Assistance funding presents different barriers to access at each stage. Diagram shows a simplified set of stages from flooded to funded (top), and the associated ways in which potentially inequitable outcomes could arise at each stage (bottom).

    18. indicating the application bottleneck is not resolved by greater flood exposure

      maybe "indicating that the application bottleneck applies even for properties for which mitigation would likely be cost-beneficial"?

    19. Increasing application rates among flooded households is the largest leverage point our data identify for expanding access to federal mitigation assistance.

      perhaps "increasing application rates, and ideally funding rates, particularly among repetitively flooded households..."

      maybe "expanding funding, coupled with efforts to increase application rates among repetitively flooded households, could yield significant long-term risk reduction benefits" ?

      trying to get at: 1) don't think we want to imply that every flooded property should get federal funds to mitigate 2) also don't want to imply that we should just have lower funding rates 3) i think "there are opportunities to expand cost-effective mitigation investments" is a more productive framing than "how to expand access" though i agree that the subtle implication of the latter is that the selection process (e.g. cost-benefit ratio) is not actually a huge program for marginalized households, at least not in our data.

  2. Jun 2026
    1. Discussion

      my thoughts on the outline of this section: - pinch point recap, opportunity to increase funding + meet more demand - one para on lower-value, less-white - one para on repeat vs. not; perhaps targeting could factor in a property's flood history more than just if they flooded really badly in one event (which is how most HMGP works) - what we learn about mechanisms - limitations in methods - limitations conceptually in terms of not knowing if what we see is "good for people" or not

    2. ).

      there is no discussion in here about the repeat-flooded panel. it's notable tha the share applying is still small, but at least is double the share in the "all-flooded" group. Also notable that their success rate in applying is about the same as in the all-flooded group.

    3. and we discuss any sensitivity of our results to this distinction in the Supplementary Materials.

      flagging since we do not currently do this

    4. located

      I don't know where this should go ,but i think we should acknowledge that we don't know if this distribution is equitable in that we don't know if people are better off after being mitigated than before (especially in the case of buyouts). i would want to head off people reading this and going "oh ok everything looks fine" when there could be elements of coercion into applying into buyouts + ending up worse off than before. So I think we want to frame it as "we can rule out some procedural issues, but we're not saying that just because lower-value properties are getting the money, there are no issues"

    5. The neighborhood-scale selection we observe could reflect several mechanisms: cost-benefit analysis criteria that favor lower-cost properties, programmatic concentration of buyouts to enable contiguous open-space conversion, or differential outreach by local governments to particular neighborhoods. Disentangling these is an important direction for future work.

      I think we should have a stand-alone paragraph that addresses what we DO learn about mechanisms from this analysis. we see no evidence that the CBA is skewing selection to HIGHER value properties, and in theory that should apply across states (since it's a federal rule). We also don't see evidence that a bunch of communities are just choosing to not apply - but the state match could have a lot to do with that. It doesn't look like the communities are only going to expensive properties and asking them to apply, otherwise we'd see a more expensive applicant pool.

    6. Among the small fraction of properties that do receive funding, the composition shifts toward less expensive properties and lower-value neighborhoods. Funded properties sit at the th percentile of the study-area property-value distribution, compared to the th percentile of all flooded properties. The shift occurs primarily between neighborhoods rather than within them: within-block-group percentiles for funded properties differ only modestly from those at the flooded stage, indicating that funded properties tend to be typical homes in lower-value neighborhoods rather than the cheaper homes within any given neighborhood.

      this feels like too much text to dedicate to recapping results; let's compress

    7. applicants

      One aspect it'd be good to bring in here is that the mitigations have been repeatedly found to be cost-effective, so expanding the funding could likely translate to more cost-effective mitigations -- basically, there are good reasons to expand the pool, not just make the pool more competitive

    8. .

      Insert text here about the 25% match. something like "providing the 25% non-federal share can also be a barrier. in some states, the state government covers the matching share. If not, the funding has to come from local government budgets or individual homeowners, which can significantly constrain participation"

    9. A

      1) i would move this paragraph down to the next section where we describe all the possible reasons why disparities might arise. we already have a line on CBA at the end, so let's just put it all in one place

      2) I would call this a potential driver of the disparity -- we don't actually know for sure this is happening. projects are also cheaper when they are for lower-value homes, so the cost side goes down in addition to the benefit side. Also, there are "exemptions" to the CBA rule -- things like "if an elevation costs less than X and the property was substantially damaged, it passes". So i'd frame it more as CBA might be one driver but that's not known.

    10. The

      Suggest restructuring this paragraph the fed gov't is the primary source of public assistance for disaster risk mitigation and post-disaster relief and recovery. Many federal agencies are involved in these efforts, including XYZ. We focus our analysis on FEMA...

      is it true that FEMA's mitigation spending > USACE? Probably depends on how you define it