But it is at the strategic level where the effects of this erosion of military ethics may be the most dangerous. To take one important example, Wong and Gerras were frequently told that the readiness assessments of partner forces in Iraq and Afghanistan were an example of ethical deception. These critically important assessments rated the ability of Iraqi and Afghan forces to fight on their own, without U.S. assistance. Yet these ratings usually depended more on the U.S. rotational unit deployment cycle than on the actual capabilities of those partner forces. In other words, partner units received low ratings when a new U.S. unit arrived, better ratings over time, and high ratings right before that unit left – only to plummet once again when a new unit arrived. This rollercoaster annual cycle would almost seem comical were it not for the fact that U.S. strategy in both Iraq and Afghanistan rested heavily on turning over the battlefield to these very same local national forces.
Personally, I think this article is pretty absurd, there findings are no where near method based. They could not have possibly analyzed the fullest extent of research on the strategic or operational level. The tactical level explanation I thought was pretty standard which is typical coming from intellects. On this operational, but more so strategic interpretation, when I look at it they point to the U.S. military as carving out weak assessments for their allies and adversaries. I mean, I am sorry but the Afghan and Iraqi forces are just objectively horrible at their military tactics. If you read the book "Armies of Sand" by Kenneth Pollack we see that the Arab militaries are just inferior and that is nothing against them but they just do not have a superior command structure to the United States military. We are not in an ethical dilemma as most realist would state, I am more on the American Exceptionalism argument of this debate so this study is subpar and lacking.