Is there a way to consider how the transition from analog systems of information (like card indexes) to digital information impacted the idea of deterrence? As in, if computers and simulations helped to provide the mathematical language of deterrence, how are humans supposed to employ and enact that way of logical processing?

What does it change when humans are supposed to think like computers?

This tension reminds me of Friedman's consideration of "will." Part of the sign of the credible threat was the clear willingness to use it when pressed, which led to the "rationally irrational" stances that occurred within deterrence exchanges. So the tension between sign and peaceful intentions is further complicated by the tension between credibility and will.

Because of the small number of cases and the ability to identify particular actors and leaders within particular historical moments of deterrence, should critics take into consideration the particular personalities that are necessarily involved in a particular case?

While this has the potential to bleed into psychoanalysis, would close scholarly analysis of history, culture, and individuals constitute another way out of the problem of abstracting state leaders as necessarily "rational"? Put another way, wouldn't the study of the rhetorical system of deterrence require a close attention to the historical contingencies?