- Dec 2017
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mmcr.education mmcr.education
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(1982)
The date should be under the "legal citation" not the "case name".
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14th Amendment to the Constitution
The issue was asking if the school voucher program violates the Establishment Clause, not the 14th Amendment.
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- Nov 2017
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mmcr.education mmcr.education
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Texas has argued that Johnson's actions are a form of "fighting words" and that the Court has let governments regulate such actions.
In the book it mentions that Johnson's expressive conduct does not fall within that small class of "fighting words" that are "likely to provoke the average person to retaliation, and thereby cause a breach of the peace."
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Does an act of Congress prohibiting the burning of the American flag violate the Second Amendment freedom of expression?
The legal issue was, "Does a state statute that criminalizes the burning of an American flag in political protest violate the First Amendment?" I was not the Second Amendment freedom of expression.
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Dissent by Justince Kennedy
Justice Kennedy was "concurring"
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491 U.S. 397
The year that the case was decided should be included in the citation. (1989)
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mmcr.education mmcr.education
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Here, the program is not one of true private choice. It is not neutral in all respects toward religion and is part of an attempt to channel funds to wealthy citizens who send their children to religious schools. Only certain religious groups are free to participate.
In the case, Justice Rehnquist writes that "Ohio program is entirely neutral with respect to religion. It provides benefits directly to a wide spectrum of individuals, defined only by financial need and residence in particular school district. It permits such individuals to exercise genuine choice among options public and private, secular and religious. The program is therefore a program of true private choice." So this is saying the opposite.
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Reasoning
The reasoning cannot be word for word what the court says. It should be an explanation of the decision made.
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O'Connor: dissenting
O'Connor: concurring
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No. By a vote of 7–2 the Court ruled in favor of Zelman.
There is no name of the justice who wrote the majority opinion. Also the wording of the statement should provide the explanation of what the decision was, not just "no".
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No. By a vote of 7–2 the Court ruled in favor of Zelman.
U.S. Supreme Court ruled (5-4) that an Ohio school-couched program did not violate the establishment clause of the First Amendment.
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The Baltimore school district faced a crisis, as studies found it to be one of the worst-performing districts in the country. It failed to meet eighteen state standards, only 10 percent of ninth graders passed proficiency exams, and more than two-thirds of students dropped out before graduation. To improve performance, the district set up a program whereby students could choose from among five options: (a) stay in the Cleveland public schools as before, (b) receive a scholarship to go to a nonreligious private school, (c) receive a scholarship to go to a religious private school, (d) stay in the district and receive $500 in tutorial assistance, or (e) attend a public school outside the district. Simmons-Harris sued, charging that the voucher program violated the First Amendment's free exercise clause because only 10 percent of the private schools available were religious, and only 5 percent of students used their vouchers at private schools.
In the facts section, this should be a brief statement, only a few sentences, that explain what events took place that lead to the issue.
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Epstein and Walker, p194
The citation should be a legal, U.S. report citation for the case. It can't be a secondary source, such as our book. There also should be the year in which the case was decided.
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- Oct 2017
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mmcr.education mmcr.education
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It has also been insisted that, as the power of taxation in the General and State Governments is acknowledged to be concurrent, every argument which would sustain the right of the General Government to tax banks chartered by the States, will equally sustain the right of the States to tax banks chartered by the General Government.
I'm not sure if I am understanding this correctly, is Marshall offering a counter argument, saying that if the national government has the right to tax a state bank then the state government should be able to tax a national bank as well?
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That the power to tax involves the power to destroy; that the power to destroy may defeat and render useless the power to create;
I am a little confused here. Marshall is saying that the power to tax can also destroy. I'm just curious to what he is referring to in this argument. I realize that taxes can definitely destroy, but is he talking about the attempt Maryland made to tax banks not charted in Maryland? I just don't understand the argument or what he is trying to say in relation to the case.
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the choice of means implies a right to choose a national bank in preference to State banks, and Congress alone can make the election.
This statement confuses me. Earlier Marshall mentioned that "among the enumerated powers, we do not find that establishing a bank or creating a corporation." Then, if I'm correct, he is stating that congress is the only one who can make the election of the right to choose a national bank, other than a state bank. I guess I am confused because I thought he was saying that since this is not in the enumerated powers, they can't make the decision, yet they still are?
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mmcr.education mmcr.education
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But as a fact which has existed cannot be made never to have existed, the appointment cannot be annihilated; and consequently if the officer is by law not removable at the will of the President; the rights he has acquired are protected by the law, and are not resumeable by the President. They cannot be extinguished by executive authority, and he has the privilege of asserting them in like manner as if they had been derived from any other source.
Are there different laws the president has to consider when appointing and removing people from offices? I'm sure there are, I am just not familiar with them. Does one law indicate that the president can remove someone he has appointed, but another law state actually protects an individual from possible extinction? What constitutes the difference?
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The conclusion...is, that where the heads of departments are the political or confidential agents of the executive, merely to execute the will of the President, or rather to act in cases in which the executive possesses a constitutional or legal discretion, nothing can be more perfectly clear than that their acts are only politically examinable. But where a specific duty is assigned by law, and individual rights depend upon the performance of that duty, it seems equally clear that the individual who considers himself injured, has a right to resort to the laws of his country for a remedy.
So if he resorts to the laws of his country, the laws are considered 'original' or specific, so would the court have to consider whether the law is applicable? If the court decided the law was not applicable and sided with the injured would they move to create an amendment? (Much like asking the parent if the child could watch the new video?)
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The government of the United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right.
A government of laws is absolute. Is it being though that discussion among men is needed to consider different dynamics that arise in individual cases?
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- Sep 2017
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mmcr.education mmcr.education
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I guess rather long ago now in the Everson case back in 1947, this Court said in no uncertain terms what the Framers didn't want was tax money imposed to pay for building or maintaining churches or church property. And doesn't that fit this case?
In this statement, I think Justice Ginsburg makes it seem as though she might be one of the justice's that dissented. She makes a point that they have already had a case in 1947 with the same underlying circumstances, in which they came to the conclusion that the Framer's didn't want tax money to go to the churches. She makes it seem as though this is the same thing, shouldn't they make the same decision?
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What if you had a program at the -- the State capital? You had tours for school groups, and you had someone who, you know, coordinated, tied it into the social studies program; school groups can come in, but no religious schools. Is that okay?
I think this is showing that Justice Roberts is siding with the church. Like Justice Breyer, Roberts is trying to look at it from a different perspective. Saying that it isn't fair for a religious school to not be able to do something that all other public schools are doing. By saying that public schools would be able to go to this hypothetical "social studies program" at the capital, but no religious schools are. I think he is trying to help Layton see this from a different point of view.
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I'm asking, does the Constitution of the United States permit a State or a city to say, we give everybody in this city police protection, but not churches? We give everybody fire protection, but let the church burn down. We give everybody public health protection, but not a church. That's -- that's the law in my imaginary State. And I'm saying, does the Constitution, which guarantees free exercise of religion, permit such laws?
In this quote here, I think Justice Breyer is showing his favor toward the church. He is asking really great questions, and showing that it sounds a little ridiculous. If this is something that the government is requiring, to fix the playground to make it a safer environment for the children to play, yet they are giving money to public organizations. His argument makes sense and was a good comparison to other public protection the church is supported with. (i.e. police protection and fire department). Why should this be any different?
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The State of Missouri has excluded The Learning Center from a recycling program that provides a safer playground for children solely because the preschool is operated by a church rather than a secular not-for-profit.
Right from the beginning I was puzzled with the argument. My dad is the principal of a private school, and I know whenever they are in need of new playground/school/church equipment there are fundraisers that are developed by the families at the school. They end up donating the money that would be needed. Since this is private, it wouldn't be funded by the state. Wouldn't this be the same for this case too? Unless my understandings are incorrect, aren't churches private organizations as well?
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Again, under the traditional view in Missouri, if -- if this was actually a cash grant, money leaving the public treasury to go to a church, it would not be permissible. Now, that doesn't mean that a religious-affiliated school could not qualify.
This is something that is also confusing me as well. In the previous statements, Layton is saying how they would not be able to affiliate and/or support a church or a religious building. Yet, in his very next statement he says that this isn't true for a religious-affiliated school. What is the difference? He seems to contradict himself, unless there is an underlying principle that I don't understand.
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you didn't ask for money, did you?
I guess this is where I got confused. I was thinking that Cortman was asking for support from the state of Missouri to provide a safer playground at The Learning Center. Here, they state that he didn't ask for money. So he was there for an injunction, but what exactly will that get him? I realize that it is a judicial order that prevents someone from invading the legal right of another... but what will this do for Cortman/The Learning Center?
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And the essence of that history is, basically, we don't want to, as a country -- well, the vast majority of States, to fund houses of worship. One would think that if there's play in the joints, that that would include the concept that States are free to say we don't want to spend money from the public FIs on houses of worship. Now, you say this affects free exercise. We seem to be confusing money with religious practice.
I think that Justice Sotomayor is making it clear here, that this goes back to our history. I think she is proving that she might be one who dissented from the decision. She says, "We seem to be confusing money with religious practice." I think here she is stating that Cortman's argument isn't valid. In general, she states that even in our history, the state doesn't fund houses of worship.
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