of the imagination
Is "the imagination" a technical term for a faculty here for Hume? Does the imagination as a faculty apply to sounds and feelings as well as images and sights?
9 Matching Annotations
- Jan 2020
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davidhume.org davidhume.org
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that after a repetition of similar instances, the mind is carried by habit, upon the appearance of one event, to expect its usual attendant
in reference to my note above - the only way for this not to be circular is if what we're supposing or feeling here is just an idea copied from the secondary impression we get from observing the way the appearance of one event psychologically leads us to imagine or expect the appearance of the other
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We suppose, that there is some connexion between them; some power in the one, by which it infallibly produces the other, and operates with the greatest certainty and strongest necessity.
Is there some circularity going on here? How can we suppose some power or infallible connection between the Cause and the Effect if we don't already have a coherent concept of necessary connection?
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these words are absolutely without any meaning, when employed either in philosophical reasonings, or common life.
Radical concept empiricist claim: when an idea is not copied from an impression it is completely without meaning.
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It may be said, that we are every moment conscious of internal power; while we feel, that, by the simple command of our will, we can move the organs of our body, or direct the faculties of our mind.
cf Schopenhauer: the world as will and representation
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Solidity, extension, motion; these qualities are all complete in themselves
what about dispositional qualities like: fragility, solubility, malleability?
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The mind feels no sentiment or inward impression from this succession of objects
Why isn't the feeling of necessary connection an inward impression or sentiment?
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copies of our impressions
cf (Treatise: 1.1.1.7)
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If the mind, with greater facility, retains the ideas of geometry clear and determinate, it must carry on a much longer and more intricate chain of reasoning, and compare ideas much wider of each other, in order to reach the abstruser truths of that science. And if moral ideas are apt, without extreme care, to fall into obscurity and confusion, the inferences are always much shorter in these disquisitions, and the intermediate steps, which lead to the conclusion, much fewer than in the sciences which treat of quantity and number.
This reminds me of Thinking Fast and Slow
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