34 Matching Annotations
  1. Apr 2017
    1. But they went no farther, it was reserved for an American Congress, to add to the number of unalienable rights, that of enjoying liberty, and pursuing happiness; (122) — that is,— if they mean any thing, —pursuing it wherever a man thinks he can see it, and by whatever means he thinks he can attain it: — That is, that all penal laws — those made by their selves among others—which affect life or liberty, are contrary to the law of God, and the unalienable rights of mankind: — That is, that thieves are not to be restrained from theft, murderers from murder, rebels from rebellion.

      This is an interesting point. Bentham notes that for life, liberty & the pursuit of happiness to be truly unalienable, no act of government,(even in the enforcement of the laws), can suffice to take them away. I always view the declaration as a document that stands independent of the Constitution & the laws of this country, but, assuming we shouldn't, how do we reconcile the enforcement of the laws with the unalienable rights to life, liberty & the pursuit of happiness?

    2. If the exercise of powers, thus established by usage, thus recognised by express declarations, thus sanctified by their beneficial effects, can justify rebellion, there is not that subject in the world, but who has, ever has had, and ever must have, reason sufficient to rebel: There never was, never can he, established, any government upon earth.

      Bentham seems to tie the just exercise of power to the its legitimization. He cannot conceive of a situation in which the exercise of a longstanding, expressly recognized power that produces beneficial results can ever justify rebellion. Yet what the colonists were rebelling against was not merely the exercise of the power but the degree to which said power was being exercised, a point Bentham fails to consider.

    3. At the same time, to secure these rights, they are content that Governments should be instituted. They perceive not, or will not seem to perceive, that nothing which can be called Government ever was, or ever could be, in any instance, exercised, but at the expence of one or other of those rights. — That, consequently, in as many instances as Government is ever exercised, some one or other of these rights, pretended to be unalienable, is actually alienated.

      This is another example of Bentham's utilitarianism coming into conflict with the philosophic foundation of the American Revolution. The maximization of societal welfare inevitably requires, (to some extent), the negation of individual liberty and self-interest. A question I have,(considering he declares no government can simultaneously guarantee the right to life, liberty & the pursuit of happiness), is what Bentham views Government to be?

    1. That government is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, protection and security of the people, nation or community; and not for the particular emolument or advantage of any single man, family, or soft of men, who are a part only of that community, And that the community hath an indubitable, unalienable and indefeasible right to reform, alter, or abolish government in such manner as shall be by that community judged most conducive to the public weal.

      I see a lot of similarities between this paragraph and Article 4 Section 4 of the U.S Constitution which guarantees to every state, "A Republican form of Government." There is a lot of debate about what this clause means and how,(or if), it should be applied judicially. I think you could make a serious argument that the clause in question shares the same meaning as this section of the PA Constitution in that, because all government is instituted to promote the public good, the people have a right to create or modify their state governments in order to promote this end.

    1. 1. A single assembly is liable to all the vices, follies, and frailties of an individual; subject to fits of humor, starts of passion, flights of enthusiasm, partialities, or prejudice, and consequently productive of hasty results and absurd judgments. And all these errors ought to be corrected and defects supplied by some controlling power. 2. A single assembly is apt to be avaricious, and in time will not scruple to exempt itself from burdens, which it will lay, without compunction, on its constituents. 3. A single assembly is apt to grow ambitious, and after a time will not hesitate to vote itself perpetual. This was one fault of the Long Parliament; but more remarkably of Holland, whose assembly first voted themselves from annual to septennial, then for life, and after a course of years, that all vacancies happening by death or otherwise, should be filled by themselves, without any application to constituents at all.

      This passage represents a forceful argument for separation of powers and even a written Constitution. Adams contends that vesting all power in one assembly would produce the same tyranny and arbitrary exercise of power that the colonists experienced under George III. By distributing powers among multiple assemblies, tyranny and arbitrary exercise of power could be greatly mitigated. In turn, a written Constitution that explicitly delineates the structure of each assembly would act as a check against tyranny,(i.e specifying that members of the House are elected by the people in their district to serve two year terms prevents them from perpetually voting themselves into office).

    2. Nothing can be more fallacious than this. But poets read history to collect flowers, not fruits; they attend to fanciful images, not the effects of social institutions. Nothing is more certain, from the history of nations and nature of man, than that some forms of government are better fitted for being well administered than others.

      I think we're seeing a continuation of the "pragmatic" approach we've experienced in the last two weeks. Adams seems to reject the notion that a universal theory of government can be developed. Instead, Adams contends that the structuring of government should be done with an eye towards function over form.

    1. The powers of governing still remaining in the hands of the king, he will have a negative over the whole legislation of this continent. And as he hath shewn himself such an inveterate enemy to liberty, and discovered such a thirst for arbitrary power; is he, or is he not, a proper man to say to these colonies, “You shall make no laws but what I please.”

      I think this passage is a great example of why many Founders revered strict structural separation of powers. It is clear that Paine believed the arbitrary exercise of power was born out of extreme grants of political authority coupled wth weak structural checks. This problem is largely solved by our robust system of checks and balances which is designed to prevent any branch of government from exercising authority it was not expressly delegated.

    2. It is pleasant to observe by what regular gradations we surmount the force of local prejudice, as we enlarge our acquaintance with the world. A man born in any town in England divided into parishes, will naturally associate most with his fellow parishioners (because their interests in many cases will be common) and distinguish him by the name of neighbour; if he meet him but a few miles from home, he drops the narrow idea of a street, and salutes him by the name of townsman; if he travel out of the county, and meet him in any other, he forgets the minor divisions of street and town, and calls him countryman, i.e. county-man; but if in their foreign excursions they should associate in France or any other part of Europe, their local remembrance would be enlarged into that of Englishmen. And by a just parity of reasoning, all Europeans meeting in America, or any other quarter of the globe, are countrymen; for England, Holland, Germany, or Sweden, when compared with the whole, stand in the same places on the larger scale, which the divisions of street, town, and county do on the smaller ones; distinctions too limited for continental minds. Not one third of the inhabitants, even of this province, are of English descent. Wherefore I reprobate the phrase of parent or mother country applied to England only, as being false, selfish, narrow and ungenerous.

      This passage is an excellent example of the increased focus on distinctions between the that have emerged in the past two weeks. Earlier writers like Otis & Hopkins focused heavily on how the similarities between the colonists and those in Britain proper should lead to a particular outcome,(i.e common origin, status as English subjects should justify representation in Parliament). Burke, WIlson & Paine, however, focus heavily on how the differences between the Colonies & Britain inform a particular outcome,(whether it be reconciliation or independence).

    3. Besides what have we to do with setting the world at defiance? Our plan is commerce, and that, well attended to, will secure us the peace and friendship of all Europe; because, it is the interest of all Europe to have America a free port. Her trade will always be a protection, and her barrenness of gold and silver secure her from invaders.

      I find the increased focus on economic power . Burke spoke of the colonies' economic strength,(and the autonomy gained from said strength), as a factor that should push parliament towards reconciliation. Paine instead focuses on how the colonies' economic power highlights fundamental differences in mindset between the colonists and the British,(namely that the promotion of commerce and trade between America and other nations trump the foreign policy of the British Empire).

  2. Mar 2017
    1. In this character of the Americans, a love of freedom is the predominating feature which marks and distinguishes the whole; and as an ardent is always a jealous affection, your Colonies become suspicious, restive, and untractable whenever they see the least attempt to wrest from them by force, or shuffle from them by chicane, what they think the only advantage worth living for. This fierce spirit of liberty is stronger in the English Colonies probably than in any other people of the earth, and this from a great variety of powerful causes; which, to understand the true temper of their minds and the direction which this spirit takes, it will not be amiss to lay open somewhat more largely.

      Burke makes some interesting observations in this passage. The first is that the political philosophy of the colonists is both unique and fundamentally different from that of British subjects. The second is that,in terms of approaching the question of governance, Parliament would be wise to recognize the unique characteristics & circumstances of the colonists and tailor their governance appropriately.

    2. When I contemplate these things; when I know that the Colonies in general owe little or nothing to any care of ours, and that they are not squeezed into this happy form by the constraints of watchful and suspicious government, but that, through a wise and salutary neglect, a generous nature has been suffered to take her own way to perfection; when I reflect upon these effects, when I see how profitable they have been to us, I feel all the pride of power sink, and all presumption in the wisdom of human contrivances melt and die away within me. My rigor relents. I pardon something to the spirit of liberty.

      Here again we see Burke taking a novel approach when addressing the question of equity. Otis & others argued that the disparate treatment of the colonists compared to those in Britain proper was unjust based on the colonists' status as British subjects. Burke, however, argues that the Colonies' autonomy and economic influence justify better treatment.

    3. But the population of this country, the great and growing population, though a very important consideration, will lose much of its weight if not combined with other circumstances. The commerce of your Colonies is out of all proportion beyond the numbers of the people.

      Burke takes a very novel approach here .Unlike the authors in previous weeks,(who largely made abstract arguments grounded in natural law, subtle conceptions of rights & powers etc...), Burke's argument seems to be based on connecting more "practical" considerations,(like population and economic output), to the need for appropriate governance of the colonies. I think this approach is far more effective given that Burke is able to marshall empirical evidence to bolster his conciliation argument.

    1. [16] Of all the enjoyments of the present life that of liberty is the most precious and valuable, and a state of slavery the most gloomy to the generous mind—to enslave men, therefore, who have not forfeited their liberty, is a most attrocious violation of one of the first laws of nature, it is utterly inconsistent with the fundamental principle and chief bond of union by which society originally was, and all free societies ever ought to be formed. I mean that of a general union for the common good, by which every individual is secure of public approbation so long as he acts for the public welfare

      I find Hart's argument against the practice of slavery seems to be very unique. He begins by invoking many elements of civic republicanism,(i.e that government is formed for the promotion of the public good etc.), yet makes a stark distinction when it comes to the composition of the public. Unlike many Republicans, Hart does not seem to believe that participation in political society is limited to those who possess,(and by implication had the means to develop), civic virtue. Rather, all individuals who live within civil society are members of said society, and it is thus the responsibility of government to promote the welfare of all individuals, not a certain class of people.

    1. For these plain reasons, whenever the English Government ceases to be limited, in any part of the British Dominions, it ceases to be lawful! And therefore the fatal consequences of proceeding to enforce the execution of any Acts, or Resolutions, for the es∣tablishing such unlimited and unlaw∣ful Government, is more easily con∣ceived than expressed; because the condition of all subjects would be a∣like, whether under absolute or limited Government, if it were not lawful to maintain and preserve those limita∣tions, since Will and Pleasure, and not Law, would be, alike in both, the mea∣sure of obedience; for, to have liberties and privileges, unless they may be de∣fended, and to have none at all, is the same thing as to be governed by mere Will and Pleasure (Lord Sommers, p. 24.); and misera est servitus ubi jus est vagum aut incertum.

      Granville begins by expressly tying the limited exercise of political authority to the lawfulness of said authority. I think this may provide an interesting window into why the Founders chose to establish a written Constitution over the British model, considering that an un-codified Constitution makes rule by the Will and Pleasure of Parliament far more likely. Does anyone know if this was a reason why a written Constitution was chosen?

    2. It is INIQUITOUS for any one to be a Judge in his own cause. Par∣tiality is, therefore, such an abomination in the eye of the law, that no Power on earth can make it LAWFUL: for even an Act of Parliament (says the learned Judge Hobart, Rep. 87.) made a∣gainst NATURAL EQUITY, as to make a man judge in his own case,(the ex∣ample, observe, is the very point in ques∣tion) “is VOID in itself;” for jura na∣turae sunt immutabilia, and they are “leges legum.”Every King of England (apparently for the same reason) is restrained by the Law from changing or making new Laws without the assent or consent of his WHOLE KINGDOM in Parliament ex∣pressed.And the whole King∣dom, even of Great-Britain itself, is only a part of the British Empire; and there∣fore, by a parity of reasoning, cannot justly or equitably be permitted to make laws for the whole;

      Granville's conception of Parliament is extremely unique. He seems to agree with Lord Coke's view that any Act of Parliament that runs contrary to principles of natural law is inherently void, yet he differs on what that voidness entails. Unlike Coke, Granville believes that any unlawful act of Parliament cannot be enforced,(legitimately or illegitimately), as natural rights retained by British subjects preempt all Acts that interfere with their exercise.

    1. The system of slavery, fabricated against America, cannot at this time be considered as the effect of inconsideration and rashness. It is the offspring of mature deliberation. It has been fostered by time, and strengthened by every artifice human subtilty is capable of.

      I think we're really seeing the end of the passive submission and optimism espoused by Otis and Hopkins. Unlike the aforementioned authors, Hamilton clearly believes that Parliament has deliberately violated the rights of the colonists. In addition, Hamilton also believes that Parliament will capitulate only "out of necessity" and not when they discover the error of their ways,(as Otis and Hopkins believed).

    1. And the wretched criminal, if he happen to have offended on the American side, stripped of his privilege of trial by peers of his vicinage, removed from the place where alone full evidence could be obtained, without money, without counsel, without friends, without exculpatory proof, is tried before judges predetermined to condemn. The cowards who would suffer a countryman to be torn from the bowels of their society, in order to be thus offered a sacrifice to parliamentary tyranny, would merit that everlasting infamy now fixed on the authors of the act!

      Jefferson contends that this Act of parliament further encroached on the colonists' right to self-governance by depriving them of many procedural protections that are fundamental in ensuring the fair & impartial administration of justice. I find this passage interesting given that many of the procedural protections that the colonists were deprived of,(namely a right to an impartial jury, a right to be tried in the area where the crime allegedly occurred, right to be assisted by counsel etc..), were codified in the Bill of Rights. Does anyone know if this particular act influenced the framers to enumerate these rights in the Constitution?

    2. That these exercises of usurped power have not been confined to instances alone, in which themselves were interested, but they have also intermeddled with the regulation of the internal affairs of the colonies. The act of the 9th of Anne for establishing a post office in America seems to have had little connection with British convenience, except that of accommodating his majesty’s ministers and favourites with the sale of a lucrative and easy office.

      Jefferson is making an interesting foray into the question of self-governance. Instead of arguing for the necessity of colonial self-governance on practical grounds, Jefferson contends that it is a power retained by, and whose exercise is governed by, the colonists themselves. Implicit in this argument is that the colonists have a right to govern their own internal affairs and should not be subject to the whim of British officials appointed on the basis of the King's political favoritism.

  3. Feb 2017
    1. Shall we depend on their veneration for the dictates of natural justice? A very little share of experience in the world—a very little degree of knowledge in the history of men, will sufficiently convince us, that a regard to justice is by no means the ruling principle in human nature

      I think Wilson presents an interesting counter to Otis on the question of Parliament's function. To WIlson, Otis' suggestion that Parliament was fundamentally motivated by a desire to conform to the "dictates of natural justice" ,(and as such would correct the injustices levied against the colonists upon their discovery), was unrealistic. Parliament was composed of men, driven not by natural law but by their own motivations and interests. For Wilson, this translated into Parliament levying taxes on the colonies as a purposeful response to their desire to benefit their constituents,(those in Britain proper) over the interests of others not directly represented in parliament,(i.e the colonists).

    2. What has been already advanced will suffice to show, that it is repugnant to the essential maxims of jurisprudence, to the ultimate end of all governments, to the genius of the British constitution, and to the liberty and happiness of the colonies, that they should be bound by the legislative authority of the parliament of Great Britain. Such a doctrine is not less repugnant to the voice of her laws. In order to evince this, I shall appeal to some authorities from the books of the law, which show expressly, or by a necessary implication, that the colonies are not bound by the acts of the British parliament; because they have no share in the British legislature.

      This passage seems to represent a fundamental change in how the colonists view their connection to Great Britain. Like Otis and Hopkins, Wilson believes that taxation of the colonies by Parliament is repugnant to the British Constitution but differs sharply when it comes to their authority to do so. Instead of adopting the views of Otis & Hopkins,(that the authority of parliament was granted at the time of the express compact), Wilson expressly tied legislative authority to direct representation in Parliament. Because the colonists had no representatives in Parliament, Britain had no legislative authority over their affairs.

    1. The matter being thus stated, the assembly of New York either had, or had not, a right to refuse submission to that act. If they had, and I imagine no American will say they had not, then the parliament had no right to compel them to execute it

      This passage represents a sharp departure from the last two weeks readings on the question of obedience to Parliament. For Otis and Hopkins, the question of complying with an act of parliament was wholly separate from the question of whether Parliament had a right to pass said act. Dickinson recognizes no such distinction, claiming that the New York retained the right to refuse submission to any act of parliament.

    1. That grand and august legislative body must from the nature of their authority and the necessity of the thing be justly vested with this power. Hence it becomes the indispensable duty of every good and loyal subject cheerfully to obey and patiently submit to all the acts, orders, and regulations that may be made and passed by Parliament for directing and governing all these general matters.

      After reading further, it is becoming clear that Hopkins is not taking stances that are much different from those of Otis. In this passage, Hopkins is echoing,(albeit in a much more clear, succinct manner), Otis' view of Parliament's legitimate authority as a product of the general delegation of power established in the express compact. Thus it becomes the duty of all British subjects to submit to any act of parliament, unconstitutional or not, designed to further the public good.

    2. This glorious constitution, the best that ever existed among men, will be confessed by all to be founded by compact and established by consent of the people. By this most beneficent compact British subjects are to governed only agreeable to laws to which themselves have some way consented, and are not to be compelled to part with their property but as it is called for by authority of such laws. The former is truly liberty; the latter is really to be possessed of property and to have something that may be called one’s own.

      In this passage Hopkins presents a view of the British Constitution that stands in stark contrast to that of Otis. Unlike Otis, Hopkins believes that Parliament's legislative authority did not originate from a broad delegation of power by British subjects at the time of the compact. Rather, Hopkins seems to believe that British subjects retain their sovereignty and choose to delegate power to Parliament on a case by case basis.

    1. econdly. The supreme national legislative cannot be altered justly till the commonwealth is dissolved, nor a subordinate legislative taken away without forfeiture or other good cause.

      I find this an interesting departure from this discussion about legislative power. Up until this point Otis has essentially affirmed Locke's views regarding the supremacy and fiduciary nature of the legislature but departs significantly when discussing the role of subordinate legislatures. Otis seems to delegate subordinate,(in this case colonial), a great deal of autonomy by presenting only a very narrow range of scenarios under which said legislature could be dissolved. Locke however took a far more expansive view, stating that subordinate legislatures "have no manner of authority, any of them, beyond what is by positive grant and commission delegated to them, and are all of them accountable to some other power in the commonwealth."

    2. What could follow from all this that would shake one of the essential, natural, civil, or religious rights of the colonists? Nothing.

      Otis seems to strongly rebuke the notion that the rights colonists enjoy are simply privileges codified under the terms of a corporate charter that could be revoked by an Act of Parliament. Does anyone know whether he was responding directly to the Author of "The Administration of the Colonies"or some other event? Or was he simply trying to contextualize his broader point about how the colonists enjoy the same rights as those in Britain proper?

    3. No. Nor on force? No. Nor on compact? Nor property? Not altogether on either. Has it any solid foundation, any chief cornerstone but what accident, chance, or confusion may lay one moment and destroy the next? I think it has an everlasting foundation in the unchangeable will of GOD, the author of nature, whose laws never vary. The same omniscient, omnipotent, infinitely good and gracious Creator of the universe who has been pleased to make it necessary that what we call matter should gravitate for the celestial bodies to roll round their axes, dance their orbits, and perform their various revolutions in that beautiful order and concert which we all admire has made it equally necessary that from Adam and Eve to these degenerate days the different sexes should sweetly attract each other, form societies of single families, of which larger bodies and communities are as naturally, mechanically, and necessarily combined as the dew of heaven and the soft distilling rain is collected by the all-enlivening heat of the sun. Government is therefore most evidently founded on the necessities of our nature. It

      I found this passage interesting given the contrast to what Otis views to be the reason why people enter political society compared to others we have read. Unlike Hobbes or Locke, whose theories take the form of rational actors choosing to enter into an agreement based primarily on self preservation and protection of property respectively, Otis contends that the formation of government is a natural phenomena that is a product of God's Will. Much like God willed gravity to govern the motion of celestial bodies, God willed that people enter into political society.

    1. To prevent this abuse, it is necessary, from the very nature of things, power should be a check to power. A government may be so constituted, as no man shall be compelled to do things to which the law does not oblige him, nor forced to abstain from things which the law permits.

      Montesquieu seems to be invoking separation of powers more explicitly here. He begins by making a fundamental assumption that political actors will exercise their authority to the farthest reaches possible making abuse likely without structural constraints on their power. To Montesquieu, it's clear that "power checking power" seems the best way to preserve political liberty which makes sense as the concept of separation of powers has long been thought of as a bulwark for liberty.

    2. It is not enough to have intermediate powers in a monarchy; there must be also a depositary of the laws. This depositary can only be the judges of the supreme courts of justice, who promulge the new laws, and revive the obsolete. The natural ignorance of the nobility, their indolence, and contempt of civil government, require there should be [22] a body invested with a power of reviving and executing the laws, which would be otherwise buried in oblivion. The prince’s council are not a proper depositary: they are naturally the depositary of the momentary will of the prince, and not of the fundamental laws. Besides, the prince’s council is continually changing; it is neither permanent nor numerous; neither has it a sufficient share of the confidence of the people; consequently it is incapable to set them right in difficult conjunctures, or to reduce them to proper obedience.

      Montesquieu begins by noting the importance of a robust judiciary and then proceeds to apply conditions under which said robustness could form. What is really fascinating to me is that these conditions all seem to stem from a fundamental belief in separation of powers. In Montesquieu's eyes, the judiciary cannot be formed from the nobility as it would lack the independence necessary to both revive and execute the laws. Furthermore, the prince's council cannot compose the judiciary as they too lack independence, but also stability and popular legitimacy.

    3. We must therefore acknowledge relations of justice antecedent to the positive law by which they are established: as for instance, that, if human societies existed, it would be right to conform to their laws; if there were intelligent beings that had received a benefit of another being, they ought to shew their gratitude; if one intelligent being had created another intelligent being, the latter ought to continue in its original state of dependence; if one intelligent being injures another, it deserves a retaliation; and so on.

      Montesquieu seems to suggest that natural law carries just as much weight as positive law. I think this is interesting given the longstanding debate around whether natural law should factor into our legal system. Early proponents,(most notably Justice Samuel Chase), strongly believed that laws which failed to conform to what he described as "the first principles of the social compact" were expressly unconstitutional. Modern proponents like Randy Barnett often interpret the Ninth Amendment as affording substantive protections to individual natural rights. It would be interesting to know what Montesquieu thought about all of this...

  4. Jan 2017
    1. Absolute arbitrary power, or governing without settled standing laws, can neither of them consist with the ends of society and government, which men would not quit the freedom of the state of nature for, and tie themselves up under, were it not to preserve their lives, liberties and fortunes, and by stated rules of right and property to secure their peace and quiet. It cannot be supposed that they should intend, had they a power so to do, to give to any one, or more, an absolute arbitrary power over their persons and estates, and put a force into the magistrate’s hand to execute his unlimited will arbitrarily upon them. This were to put themselves into a worse condition than the state of nature

      The true contrast between Locke and Hobbes political philosophies is evident in this passage. Locke believes that what man is looking for when entering political society is not only preservation of self, but also the security of one's rights & liberties; something that results from the drafting & enforcement of positive law. As a result, Hobbes theory, (in which the people form a social contract to give absolute authority to the sovereign), cannot possibly exist in practice as man would never voluntarily relinquish the limited autonomy and protections of their rights retained in the state of nature to the will of a man with absolute power.

    2. First, It is not, nor can possibly be absolutely arbitrary over the lives and fortunes of the people: for it being but the joint power of every member of the society given up to that person, or assembly, which is legislator; it can be no more than those persons had in a state of nature before they entered into society, and gave up to the community: for no body can transfer to another more power than he has in himself; and no body has an absolute arbitrary power over himself, or over any other, to destroy his own life, or take away the life or property of another.

      In this passage Locke seems to argue for the existence of natural law in so far as it encompasses the rights inherent to all people before they entered political society. Thus it is the function of the legislature, in making positive law, to respect and work within the boundaries set forth by the laws of nature. This passage really stood out to me given the parallels between Lock's argument and one of the central interpretations of the Ninth Amendment: That it protects the enumerated and unenumerated natural rights of all free men; rights that our federal government was never given authority to violate or disparage.

    3. And thus every man, by consenting with others to make one body politic under one government, puts himself under an obligation, to every one of that society, to submit to the determination of the majority, and to be concluded by it; or else this original compact, whereby he with others incorporates into one society, would signify nothing, and be no compact, if he be left free, and under no other ties than he was in before in the state of nature.

      Locke seems to suggest that majoritarianism is a necessary condition for the preservation, and even existence, of political society. This belief stands in stark contrast with the views of many of our Founders, including John Adams, who viewed the so called "tyranny of the majority" as the biggest danger to the preservation of our rights & liberties. This passage really fascinated me considering that Locke, through his belief in the existence of individual & collective rights and the primacy of consent in the origin of governmental authority, had a profound impact on the Founders, yet held a central belief that is antithetical to our system of government.

    1. So much for the ends of parliamentary power. I come now to the true nature of it – public consent. We see consent as well as counsel is requisite and due in Parliament, and that being the proper foundation of all power (for omnis potestas fundata est in voluntate [all power is founded on the will]), we cannot imagine that public consent should be anywhere more vigorous or more orderly than it is in Parliament.

      I find this passage notable for its use of popular consent in describing the origin of parliamentary power. Parker clearly believes that governmental authority is derived from the consent of the governed and that the divine power Charles I claims to possess violates this fundamental principle. Parker was truly ahead of his time on this given that Locke, (writing forty years after Parker), is typically credited with tying popular consent to the existence of governmental power.

    2. This directs us then to the transcendent”DPZ [final cause] of all politics, to the paramount law that shall give law to all human laws whatsoever, and that is Salus Populi [the public good]. the law of prerogative itself is subservient to this law, and were it not conducing thereunto it were not necessary nor expedient

      I find Parker's invocation of civic republicanism interesting to say the least. He seems to suggest that the title of King brings with it certain fiduciary responsibilities, all tied to promoting the public good. Accepting this premise inevitably leads to one viewing the King's prerogative power constrained by natural law concepts that fall under the banner of salus populi est suprema lex