The state also says that it has an interest in preserving the flag as a symbol of national unity. The Court agrees and argues that the most important principle behind the First Amendment is that government may always
The Court did not agree with this, they found that Johnson's conduct did not threaten to disturb the peace, also that this preserving the flag as national unity does not justify in his (Johnson) conviction.
Looking at Johnson's actions, there is no evidence of an expressive element in his actions.
This is false, the Court found that Johnson's actions showed evidence of an expressive element in his actions.
491 U.S. 397
This citation is correct for the most part; it is just missing the year (1989)
Does an act of Congress prohibiting the burning of the American flag violate the Second Amendment freedom of expression?
This is not about an act of Congress, but it more so involves whether or not a State law (flag desecration) prohibiting the burning of the American flag violate the first amendment right of freedom of speech.
Yes
This is wrong, because Texas asked the Supreme Court to hear the case, so it should be no, because the Court found in favor of Johnson
Dissent by Justince Kennedy
Justice Kennedy was not dissenting, but rather he had concurring opinion.
Holding
This is not about the holding, but for the case brief assignments, you want us to add the Justice who wrote the opinion of the court, and in this case it would be Justice Brennan.
he Second Amendment freedom of expression?
This case was not about the Second Amendment freedom of expression, but rather it was about the First Amendment right of freedom of speech.
an American flag on his bare chest, but painted it upside down.
This case is about the American flag, but it is not about the flag being painted on a man's bare chest, but upside down. This case is about Gregory Lee Johnson burning the American flag, and being arrested under Texas flag desecration law.
Arthur Smith
This case does not focus on a man named Arthur Smith, but rather Gregory Lee Johnson. There could have been a man named Arthur Smith at the protest, but this case does not pertain to him.
drawn a consistent
I feel like it should mention the cases in which they are drawing their consistent distinctions from, how it is laid out in the textbook.
provide aid directly to schools
It should say religious schools, because schools can mean a lot of thing, private, public, religious, etc.
r most schools in the program are religious.
The court's respect to constitutionality is not of direct aid program or religious schools, but rather if it is a true private choice program.
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris (1982)
This case name should be Zelman v. Simmons-Harris (2002). They just got the year incorrect, because the case was decided in 2002 not 1982,
Here, the program is not one of true private choice. It is not neutral in all respects toward religion and is part of an attempt to channel funds to wealthy citizens who send their children to religious schools. Only certain religious groups are free to participate.
Again in the textbook case brief it states that this program is a truly private choice and that it is a neutral, and that it is consistent with the following cases.
most likely violates the establishment clause.
It does not violate the Establishment Clause, because it notes in the textbook case brief, because the individuals made their decisions on their genuine and independent private choice, does not violate the Establishment Clause.
we have faced challenges
They should note what the challenges were, and in this case it would be Establishment Clause challenges to neutral government.
free exercise
I do not know if this is just different wording for this phrase, but it was about the First Amendment's establishment clause.
only 10 percent of the private schools available were religious
The percentage of private schools available that were religious is false, it was closer to 80% of the schools that opted into this program was religious.
only 5 percent of students used their vouchers at private schools
This percentage of students who used the vouchers at private schools is false, it was 96.75% of students.
Does the voucher program offend the 14th Amendment to the Constitution?
This case does not involve the 14th Amendment to the Constitution, but rather does this voucher program violate the First Amendment 's establishment clause.
favor of Zelman.
This is nothing wrong with the holding section itself, which I already pointed out what was wrong with this holding, but for the case brief assignment, within the specification you asked us to include the Justice who wrote the majority or the plurality opinion. In this case, Rehnquist wrote the majority.
y a vote of 7–2 the Court
This vote count is wrong, rather it was 5-4 in favor of Zelman.
The Baltimore school district faced a crisis
This is inherently, it was not a Baltimore school district involved with this case, but rather a Cleveland School District.
O'Connor: dissenting
O'Connor was not a dissenting opinion, but rather he was apart of the concurring opinions. Which included Thomas.
Epstein and Walker, p194
This citation is wrong, you do not cite the textbook, but rather the legal citation. This would be 536 U.S.S 639
That the power to tax involves the power to destroy;
I'm confused by the wording and meaning of this statement. I do not believe they mean that the power to tax involves the power to destroy. Do they mean that the power to tax will unleash "Pandora's Box" in a way. Once they have the ability to tax a national bank, then they, the State of Maryland and other States, will have the ability to impose taxes on other federally operated entities, and as a result "unravel" or "destroy" what the federal government is working towards to achieve. Or does it mean something else completely..
leaving the question whether the particular power which may become the subject of contest has been delegated to the one Government, or prohibited to the other, to depend on a fair construction of the whole instrument.
I need some clarification here. Is this saying that any power that is not delegated by the Constitution, whether that power is delegating an action to another or prohibiting something, has to created so that it does not conflict with any of other powers delegated by the Constitution. Or am I missing something entirely.
The Constitution of our country, in its most interesting and vital parts, is to be considered, the conflicting powers of the Government of the Union and of its members
This is not a question about the opinion, but rather a question about the conflicting powers of the Government and its members. Is there a way to somehow resolve or amend any conflicts of power between the Government and its members, or is conflict always going to be there, regardless of what we do?
Can Congress take over an industry in order to prevent a union from striking?
The legal issue of this case is, whether or not the President has the constitutional power to take over an industry, in this case steel, in order to prevent a union from striking.
Truman's action can be upheld as an exercise of the president's inherent military power as commander-in-chief.
This is wrong, within Justice Black's opinion, it states, The order cannot properly be sustained as an exercise of the President's military power as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces... we cannot with faithfulness to constitutional system hold that the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces has the ultimate power as such to take possession of private property in order to keep labor disputes from stopping production." Basically, it means that even though Truman is Commander in Chief, he cannot take possession of private property, that is more so a duty for the Nation's lawmakers to decide.
Roberts: dissenting
I do not know if this is one of the errors or not, but I could not find a Justice Roberts in this case, the Justices that were apart of this case was, Justice Black, Justice Burton, Justice Clark, Justice Douglas, Justice Frankfurter, Justice Jackson, Justice Minton, Justice Reed, and Justice Vinson. Unless Roberts was an amici curiae, I could not find anything regarding a Roberts in the text.
Jackson: dissenting
This is wrong, because Justice Jackson was not among those who dissented from this case, he was among those who had concurring opinions.
Clark: concurring in the judgment of the Court
I do not know if this is matters or not, but Justice Jackson was the one who wrote the concurring in the Judgement and opinion of the court, not Justice Clark, but he was on the side of the concurring opinions.
Holding
Also, for the holdings, within the case brief specifications document, you want us to include the Justice who wrote the majority opinion. In this case that would be Justice Hugo Black.
Yes. By a vote of 6-3 the Court ruled against Youngstown Sheet & Tube.
The Court held in favor for Youngstown Sheet & Tube, so it should read; Yes. By a vote of 6-3 the Court ruled for Youngstown Sheet & Tube.
The Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 forbade this type of action by the president.
I do not know if this is correct or not, but I do believe it is wrong. The Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 does not completely forbids this type of action by the president, but it allows the president to impose an eighty-day cooling off period as a way to postpone any strike that seriously threatens the public interest. Considering were at war, and steel is a huge aspect for the war economy, this strike would threaten public interest.
involved in the Vietnam War
Again, this is inherently wrong, during this time period the United States were not involved with the Vietnam War. Also, the reason why this case occurred was do to the strike from the steel manufacturing industry which would have affected the Korean War, not Vietnam.
a labor dispute began in the sugar manufacturing industry
This is inherently wrong, the Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.. Sawyer is about a steel manufacturing industry calling for a strike, not a sugar manufacturing industry.
The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford that protection....
Throughout this opinion is uses the word "injury". Is Chief Justice Marshall using the term "injury" in place of violation, because, personally, that is what it seems like, it could not be referring to a physical injury, but rather a violation of their rights. Maybe I'm just misinterpreting what Justice Marshall is saying.
repugnant to the constitution, can become the law of the land, is a question deeply interesting to the United States; but, happily,
Wouldn't the fact that the act is repugnant to constitution cannot become the law of the land. It would be understandable if the act went through the amendment process, but the constitution is the law of the land, and anything in conflict with that is not law. Maybe, I'm mistake or confused.
The oath of office, too, imposed by the legislature, is completely demonstrative of the legislative opinion on the subject. It is in these words, "I do solemnly swear that I will administer justice without respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich; and that I will faithfully and impartially discharge all the duties incumbent on me as according to the best of my abilities and understanding, agreeably to the constitution, and laws of the United States."
Are these the words that Supreme Court Justices have to say when they are being sworn into the position, or is it for another position? Maybe I missed something in the opinion.
Well, the -- the -- the State does, and I think for a couple of reasons. One is that we are not actually taking money from the State treasury and giving it to the church. And this Court has seldom, if ever, actually said it's okay to write a check from the public treasury to a church. So this -- we're providing a service. And the service there is not being provided solely for the benefit of the church. The service is being provided for police and fire for the benefit of the public safety --
Maybe I just missed something completely, but I do not understand how someone can compare providing funding for a playground, which is not really a necessity, to public safety departments. Those two things are not really comparable.
And Missouri Supreme Court case law says the way we decide those questions is -- is -- is how much religious influence is there in a church? In other words, are they serious about their faith?
What and how does one measure how religious a church is, or how much religious influence there is in a church. That does not make sense in a way, it seems that it would be impossible to measure how religious a church is.
So this church could say, we will take only Lutheran children.
Even though the church has the right to decide who their members are, wouldn't that make them a private organizations, and does that make them unqualified to receive public funding?
Let's suppose that the public school sometimes uses its playground for things other than children playing, whatever they're going to have, a -- you know, an auction or anything else. Isn't it the consequence of your argument that the church can use the playground for more religious activities if the public school can use the playground for other non-playground activities?
Justice Roberts brings up a great point. A public school could use a non-playground activity, which could be a religious activity, does that mean they do not deserve funding from a public program. Even though, the church is a religious organization it does not necessarily mean that the playground is going to be used for religious activities.
I don't think it does. Everson also said that we have to be careful in not establishing a church not to deprive religious people or organizations of general government benefits
I believe that what Justice Cortman is saying is that the Court cannot deprive a church or any organizations of general government benefits. Which means that the program money could go towards the church, because it would be discriminatory towards the church, and in turn would make it harder for this church to provide for their community. Which might led to the church from performing its religious duties. A clear violation of Free Exercise Clause.
On that -- on that question, I guess rather long ago now in the Everson case back in 1947, this Court said in no uncertain terms what the Framers didn't want was tax money imposed to pay for building or maintaining churches or church property
I believe that what Justice Ginsburg is stating here is that that, because the Framers did not want tax money from a program implemented by a government institution to go towards a church. Which makes me believe that she was one of the dissenters.
And the essence of that history is, basically, we don't want to, as a country -- well, the vast majority of States, to fund houses of worship.
Well from the statement Justice Sotomayor made, it is clear that she does not agree with funds from this government program to fund a church