An interesting paradox mentioned by Marx. I'm interested to know the context behind his proposed "utopia" and if they were truly similar to those hypothesized by Plato and Aristotle.

Reiterating that values are fluid and simply a product of the society that deemed these "values" to exist in the first place.

A solution to Descartes's position

It seems like during this philosophical "jump," philosophers tended to portray people who still held religious beliefs as naive or even idiotic.

In a way, power, life, and existence could be considered values. When Nietzsche claims to use values to govern these basic pillars of human existence, it just seems like he is using values to protect values.

It seems like he is basically summarizing that every revolution that has ever occurred was violent.

There is a delicate balance between theory and practice, in which theory is influenced by practice but also the fact that theory only has purpose in the presence of practice (and vice versa).

Are social relationships not products? Marx asserts that values are not products until society deems it so, but leads us to question about what produces and defines a society and social relationships.

In some views, labor was empowering due to the opportunity for economic prosperity, but it also gave way to an increase in the wealth gap between the wealthy and working class. I wonder if what Marx thought about the concept of labor as economically empowering and what that would look like in his ideal society.

It is interesting that the author suggests it is impossible to revert back to a political thought. It seems that challenging "traditional" thought only pushes us forward, and not backward.

What does "things" refer to here?

I think the transformations brought about by nineteenth century philosophers were considered radical because they were defined in terms of traditional thought. I wonder at what point revolutions in political thought become the new "tradition".

Could this connect to Marx's empowerment of the working class in which everyone would have the leisure to engage in philosophical thought?

It seems like the distinction between the free man and the slave lies in the use of violence. Does this mean that, in this definition, violence is an irrational action devoid of any deliberate thought?

I wonder if Aristotle's definition of leisure time reflects the stark class divide present during that time period, where there was no consideration of the servant class. Marx challenges this by focusing on the working class

I wonder if the shift towards secularism in later periods also influenced political philosophy, or what the relationship is between religious thought and political thought since they are historically often intertwined.

This could also reflect that antique political thought did not fully apply to the societal problems faced during the Marxian era, which is why Marx sought to revolutionize political thought and "flip it upside-down".

I found the phrase "precisely in them" an interesting contrast from the previous understandings of political thought from Plato and wonder if this also connects to his emphasis on the working class.

Karl Marx, my historical and dialectical materialist GOAT

Saying that violence is the midwife of history does not equal violence is the most dignified of all forms of human action.

The answer is hobbies. If there is no need to labor for survival, people would pick up hobbies.

I think this reading of Marx as glorifying violence is not sound. If associating an analysis on how violence is historically used and will very likely be used by future revolutions is a glorification, I must have a very different definition on glorifying violence.

The idea that the city-state of Athens was not held together by a monopoly of state violence is silly in my opinion.

This Marx guy is speaking facts. But yes, if there is no overseeing force to enforce laws through the use of violence, then there is no government. If your town is violently controlled by ISIS, ISIS is now the government. If your town is violently controlled by a cartel, that cartel is now the government.

Ehh, it depends on how we define labor. Are/Were hunter gathers laborers? If so, considering that this is humans in their "most natural" state, why wouldn't any other animal doing the same be considered laboring?

These advances only came about after the threat of socialization by a very militant labor movement.

I mean Marx's idea of labor abolishing itself stems from the rapid automation and accumulation he was seeing. He thus presumed that a socialist society with continued automation will lead to very little work.

Throughout the history of nations and societies, they have all come about though the exercise of violence.

Seems incredibly ironic

When things begin to change what traditions can still apply? Is it slightly out of tune or needs a lot of fixing to bring harmony

Juxtaposition of the words glorify and violence shows radical nature of Marx's vision for change

Leisure is seeming to have a different definition here than what I originally thought it meant. It wasn't just a break from labor and work but a time to find yourself and for development

Excited to see how this plays out when reading the different thinkers

Leads me to think who would even want this? I feel like it almost takes away purpose - at least for me it would

Furthering this argument, I am curious what Marx would say to some people in society who are not able to provide labor. According to his argument, such people would be considered animals.

Is this not just money? I feel like I am missing something.

I viewed this as saying that as ideas are fresh and new they are "pure". However similar to a song, when played out of melody (or in modern times), the song sounds wrong (the older ideas don't fit).

The abolition of the true world ends the idea that life has meaning. Since there is no true world, our current world of appearances is flawed and meaningless.

This quote jumped out at me because man created labor, not the inverse. Clearly what Marx was getting at was the productivity of goods man produces defines human development. This deviates from traditional philosophy, where humans are the centerpiece.

Both the inception and conclusion of tradition provide us with some sort of clarity relating to fundamental political problems. It forces us to reflect and think of what potential transformation would look like.

The metaphor of the "fundamental chord" is an interesting one. It explains the influence of foundational ideas in Western thought and how it has remained relevant throughout history.

I can't help but wonder what challenges might arise if we attempt to achieve this dual idea of a classless and stateless society. One that involved leisure from labor and leisure from politics.

Does this mean the possibility of positive new beginnings? I like how Arendt's also sees the potential that comes with the loss of tradition. In a way, this system change creates space for new meaning and understanding of our world.

Arendt's thoughts on the impact of modernity, specifically the way it challenges the traditional ways of thinking is eye opening. It forces us to reevaluate the concept of truth in relation to thought.

If labor is essential to human identity and overall societal function, how can it be abolished without undermining the idea of human life and freedom?

I enjoy how Arendt sees this an opportunity. The modern detachment from tradition is maybe not that bad!! In some ways, it allows for fresh engagement with the past.

I had never thought about the role of authority when talking about tradition before this. With the decline of tradition, the term authority is harder to define and sustain, consequently making us question the legitimacy of tradition.

fgdfgdgdfgdfgdfg

Does this posit that there can only ever be modernity? If it is ever-changing, will this new time period of philosophy/politics always be modernity? I feel as though the definition of modernity is too vague and is exaggerated in order to make new theories stand out more than traditional theories.

I agree with this perspective. A lot of modernists see no place for religion in the future--Marx especially. It seems as though philosophers go to extremes with their views of modernity and change because I don't see how religion can't coexist with modernity. I think Theodor Adorno gives some valuable insight into this as well.

On the bottom of page 12 it says tradition still have power over the minds of men, but here it says through these philosophers tradition has lost its authority. This appears to be contradictory but I may be missing something.

I agree strongly with this sentence. Every time I read Marx's work, it seems so far of and based on such aggressive assumptions. This gives insightful background into the nature of Marx's work and provides basis for his predictions.

I think the gap between philosophy and results is not to be blamed on traditional philosophy, but rather on the failure to act of society. Change requires trial and error, not just theories and conversation.

I am somewhat confused with this statement. If tradition still holds power in our minds, will we potentially see a reversion from modernity to tradition. Will this be a struggle for ideological power like Hegel's master-slave dialectic?

This is an interesting point, but I think it fails to capture the scope of "being ruled." I think that in some sense every state's ruler[s] are actually ruled behind the scenes. Examples that come to mind are politicians chasing money, support from influential people, and foreign powers. While there is a hierarchy to ruling, I don't think there is any one true ruler[s].

Is this necessarily true? I feel as though humanity has evolved to some extent, and some changes happen without said violence. And if this is true, can this be changed?

I've heard this idea a lot, especially in reference to how communism played out in the U.S.S.R where people grew to be apathetic and lose their political individuality within a communist system.

I didn't know this. I realize that Marx found violence necessary to make change, but I've never thought of it as a hostility to speech.

So Marx is a sort of "activist philosopher" where he writes theory to convince people to practically change and form the system instead of stepping back and observing.

I feel like Arendt is constraining the role of labor in Marx's work. From my cursory understanding of Marx, labor itself isn't bad but the extracting of alienated labor that makes someone an "animal laborans"

Arendt basically is saying here: there's a reason why Athenian society excluded politicians from being laborers: because political work is legitimate. Marx's ideal stateless society where a cook could manage it is impractical

My best guess to what Arendt is saying is that Marx changed the tradition of political theory by focusing on practical aspects like human action and interaction—the practice of politics rather than broad theoretical frameworks that aim to achieve a higher truth on the human condition.

Basically modern's society focus on efficiency has deprived its sense of "wonder" and practice of philosophizing. I guess capitalist culture has made us focus on what is in front of us rather than broader senses of understanding, but idk...I often feel that the philosophizing of Plato's time only existed on the backs of the rampant slavery and exploitation in Ancient Greece. Not to detract from Arendt's broader point, but I feel like there is some implicit glazing of Ancient Greece here.

They all sought to reverse and twist the traditions that preceded them in a convergent manner—a tradition within itself.

If totalitarian movements are the true catalysts for breaks in tradition, is it fair to say that anti-traditionalist political thought may buttress these totalitarian movements, or do these movements stand on their own, only nominally tied to the movements that precede them?

I don't completely understand this. How can traditions become more oppressive as they lose relevance? Why didn't the growth of anti-traditionalist thinking from Kierkegaard, Marx, and Nietzche cause a break in tradition? I feel like these things would naturally follow.

It is interesting that through Kierkegaard's attempt to defend religion in a modern context, he goes against the tradition of relgion and opens the door for modern religious scrutiny.

I agree with this. If we policed work that break tradition, enforcing a singular traditionalist view, we support current and past oppressive structures for the future.