Globalisation is not the convergence, not that development and equality, but indeed inequality

This book was written over 20 years ago; this is still insightful, you see, this can explain why the UK claimed free market approach 100 years ago, why the US claimed free market 30 years ago, and why China is trying to do so recent years. At the same time, also why the US argued against that when the UK was for that, and why China was against that when the US was for that.

其他条件不变，一个国家距离技术前沿越远，就越当制定政策来影响（国内的）来自国际市场的经济信号（包括相对价格和可盈利性）

熊彼特的经济增长和发展，不仅仅是新古典的资源配置

发展政治经济学的一个令人遗憾的悖论是，本当负责领导发展战略的人，恰恰是在现状中拥有巨大既得利益并从中获取巨额租金的人——因此incentives就无法解释，制度主义就必不可少

Give them the power, the discretion and the discretionary power, this is I can call it as some freedom to motivate the grassroots producers with a tight link with supporting institutions. In Chinese, it is 放权. Like Vietnam, some well-planned or unintentional decentralisation.

For reference. China, a bigger agrarian economy with more entrenched practices, after its land reform, was it successful in eradicating the customary land tenure practices and informal exchange? According to my knowledge, YES, at least for about 30 years, the informal transaction was almost (or indeed) forbidden, and the customary practices were resisted and minimised (maybe very locally and rarely surviving, to be prudent) by the majority directed by CCP, who well directed and mobilised the people, the rural populations and worker class. The differences can be explained and interpreted by our political settlements framework, which unpacks the underlying power relations within the superficial policy settings (policy is researchable, but something behind it might be more incisive to the point). And see the prior chapters, it is a very strong and robust (I can say, loyal to the party, either talking about rents/interests when it is the post-semi-neoliberal-reform stage or ideological mission that is their source of self-efficacy) intermediate class that coordinated the reform on the ground.

许多研究将80年代以来的腐败归咎于精英通过执政党在经济中的主导地位而实现的国家俘获，然而Hazel论证了，推动腐败的力量并非仅仅是中央集权国家不受制约的权力，相反，是因为经济危机驱动的新积累策略以及集体经济制度对于生产转型的失败。正式制度的失败使被驱动的非正式的变化被嫁接到现有的政治制度上，成为政治秩序的核心。

Since the Ming and Qing dynasties, China has possessed a substantial class including the scholar-gentry and modern intellectuals, who played a crucial role in state governance, social coordination, and local administration. In the late Qing and early Republican eras, with the development of industry and commerce, the spread of modern education, and the establishment of a new civil service system, there emerged a new intermediate class comprising modern bureaucrats, merchants, professionals, and intellectuals. Regions such as the southeastern coastal areas and the Yangtze Delta have witnessed the rise of large numbers of industrial and commercial classes, local entrepreneurs, and professional managers. Owing to its longstanding tradition of state intervention, the regional differentiation characteristic of its agrarian society, and the spread of urban-rural markets and education, China has developed a vast intermediate class. This group, endowed with significant capacity for social mobilisation, a solid economic foundation, and strong organisational capabilities, constituted the backbone of nationalist movements, party mobilisation, and national modernisation.

经济变革远不止GDP的高速增长，更是结构转型，劳动力进入制造业通过“第一次分配”促进减贫，而采掘、服务收效甚微（可能和税收有关，在第一章我可以提出猜想，假设patron-client networks广泛存在的political settlements回阻碍对富豪，尤其是对矿产大亨、酒店大亨的征税）；虽然市场自由化促进一定程度的变革，但在就业和减贫上，更要考虑国家推进的制造业扩张、工资提高和结构转型，而不仅仅是比较优势和自由市场