you must find a way to relate
Again, i wonder if a process of translation does more justice to the difference involved in empathic encounter than "must find a way to relate"?
Translation is hard and demands something from all parts of the process. yet, it begins from a place of difference.
imagining what the person is going through
This seems problematic to me. Wouldn't empathy better begin with engaging the person, rather than beginning with my assumptions about what they might be experiencing?
Empathy is the ability to understand and share the thoughts or feelings of another
I wonder what Levinas says about empathy? Understanding, sharing? How do we do this without reducing difference?
All our inductive inferences—our “conclusions from experience”—are founded on the supposition that the course of nature is sufficiently uniform so that the future will be conformable to the past (EHU 4.21; SBN 37–38)
This is one of the challenges with machine learning. Most models are built with the assumption that the future will have limited novelty with respect to past data.
For the effect is totally different from the cause, and consequently can never be discovered in it. Motion in the second billiard-ball is a quite distinct event from motion in the first; nor is there anything in the one to suggest the smallest hint of the other.
To what is he responding here? A theological notion of cause and effect? Or is he simply suggesting that the relationship between any cause and effect is more probabilistic than deterministic?
Thus, Kant’s “complete solution of the Humean problem” directly involves him with his whole revolutionary theory of the constitution of experience by the a priori concepts and principles of the understanding—and with his revolutionary conception of synthetic a priori judgments.
Key - constitution of experience by the a priori categories.
Real-life examples of AI
This is a fairly funny start to a sentence, real-life AI :).
more suited to computers than people
So, if we are designing a viz to give the machine to process for further relevant data, we may want a viz that is RGB. But not for human interp. Here we see again that audience is of utmost importance.
Essentially, two sequential palettes with equal variation in lightness and saturation are merged together
This seems obvious given a bipolar dataset.
All of these palettes are appropriate for sequential data. Data that varies continuously from a high to low value; such as temperature, elevation, or income. Different palettes are suited to other types of data, such as divergent and qualitative
This is the most important part of this whole piece. Different types of datasets will demand different palettes.
In short, people aren’t computers.
Another mention of differnence.
Although our eyes see color through retinal cells that detect red, green, and blue light, we don’t think in RGB
This is very interesting. We see color differently than we think it. See in RGB and think in light, hue, and saturation.
illuminate
Is illuminate similar to interpret or something otherwise?
Project Alexandria.
libraries rule
it has no understanding of a concept like “justice,” “democracy” or “meddling.”
Is it fair to say the machine has NO understanding of concepts or simply not an understanding that we can translate yet?
Although the technique has spawned successes, the results are largely confined to fields where those huge data sets are available and the tasks are well defined, like labeling images or translating speech to text.
Ng said as much in his lecture.
uch more radically, the preceding implies the need, today, to forge another relationship to technics, one that rethinks the bond originarily formed by, and between, humanity, technics, and language
Here is where Stiegler could be our theorist for the project.
ommunicative action is progressively replaced by purposive-rational action, that is to say, by the scientific model of cybernetics as the technoscientification of lan-guage—a process that has led to the fact that "the industrially most ad-vanced societies seem to approximate the model of behavioral control steered by external stimuli rather than guided by norms" (
WOuld it be useful for us to articulate the difference between cybernetics and machinic intelligence as we understand it?
ower created by technics as efficiency and as source of legitimacy, since technics has become indissociable from the sci-ences in which efficiency and purpose merge. T
Here we return even to the explicit aristotelean language of Heidegger, with science combining the efficient and final cause in technocracy as anthropology perhaps?
Marcuses second thesis is that of the need to develop a new science that would be in dialogue with nature (this is the "Heideggerian inspira-tion," which is also an error of interpretation), free from technics as a force of domination.
an error of interpretation or simply a unintended read?
tionalization re
just another word for the calculation Stiegler has been discussing earlier.
rcuses ar-gument claims that, with modern technics, the meaning and direction of technical power is inverted: once liberating for humanity in his relation to nature, it has become a means of political domination. T
can definitely see relationship to frankfurt school
nd yet the being that we ourselves are is much less placed in a situation of mastery over nature by technics than it is subjected, as an entity belonging to the realm of nature, to the imperatives of technics. So defined, modern technics constitutes the Gestell of nature and of hu-manity through calculation.
i like this notion of challenging mastery and belonging to the realm of things.
e revealing that rules in modern technics is a challenging, which puts to nature the un-reasonable demand that it supply energy which can be extracted and stored as such.
here is the obstacle notion of technic as modern in Heidegger
or Gestell also determines the co-appropriating of being and of time in terms of the "there is" (es gibt) of being and time. As a result the metaphysical determination of time is removed.
I need to read "The Principle of Identity" in the context of Levinas.
-ever, the late essays "Time and Being" and "The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking" inscribe the possibility of another thinking within the task of contemplating the belonging-together of being and time in the Gestel
So, he is arguing that the late heidegger moves from technics as obstacle to technics as possibility?
which technics in its modern guise brings subjectivity to its completion as objectivity. The modern age is essentially that of modern technics.
And this is the thesis of his read of heidegger?
f it is true that the metaphysical side of philosophy culmi-nates in the projection of a mathesis universalis that encourages a subject to establish itself "as the master and possessor of nature," where the essence of reason ends up as calculation, then this turning of metaphysics forms an entrance to the technical age of philosophical thought, as a result of
here begins a summary of Heidegger, no?
eath is not an event within existence be-cause it is the very possibility of existence, a possibility that is at the same time essentially and interminably deferred. This originary deferral is also what gives Dasein its difference to another.
Perhaps death is a major distinction between human and machine, but perhaps machines die?
asein is temporal: it has a past on the basis of which it can anticipate and thereby be
anticipation constitutes being?
originary technicity qua an originary forgetting of the origin.
so here, technicity (perhaps as hypomnesis) is forgetting, yes?
If truth is itself thought in terms of this originary forgetting, it is insofar as the determination of the meaning of alêtheia still echoes the Platonic structure of reminiscence such as it is determined in opposition to hypomnesic memory, while this memory constitutes the destiny of be-ing as the forgetting of being.
I need some help reading this. Is this struggling with the relationship between forgetting and truth as aletheia (revealing) in Heidegger?
chnicization through calculation drives Western knowledge down a path that leads to a forgetting of its origin, which is also a forgetting of its truth.
I would vote for a forgetting of origin and truth! Is Stiegler concerned about this or celebrating it?
he memory of originary ei-detic intuitions
I'm not sure what this means?
ypomnêsis
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hypomnema
material externalized memory? Notes and notebooks?
s in the inheritance of this con-flict—in which the philosophical epistêmê is pitched against the sophis-tic tekhne, whereby all technical knowledge is devalued—that the essence of technical entities in general is conceived:
Interesting that we are dealing here with another split, a split that impacted an entire history of philosophy, similar to the letter spirit split or the writing speech split.
We wanted to understand how—with what instruments, what machinery, what material, historical, anthropological conditions—it was possible to produce objectivity. And of course, without appealing to any transcendent Certainty that would have all at once and without discussion raised up Science with a capital S against public opinion.
I hear echoes of S Brent Plate here, looking for an aesthetics irreducible to Beauty, Truth or God.
Now, in its early days, in the 1980s, this field was perceived by many scientists as a critique of scientific Certainty—which it was—but also of reliable knowledge—which it most certainly was not.
This feels similar to Peters's attempts to distinguish between a robust ambiguity and simple lack of clarity.
Latour sees here the sign of a shift in philosophy of science, in epistemology, in ontology, in this appeal to trust instead of to certainty, and to the institution instead of to unmediated access.
I am not sure I am convinced that there is a significant difference between trust and certainty, other than the cultural guise of objectivity that undergirds certainty as something other than trust in simplistic views of science.
To answer the question raised, the professor thus uses the notion of institution as the best instrument for measuring the respective weight of the positions. He sees no higher court of appeals. And this is why he adds that “losing trust” in this resource would be, for him, a very serious matter.
I wonder if we can hold here a tension still between the operations of institution and institute ala Lyotard?
The aim, both ambitious and modest, will be to propose an alternative for the term “modernize”, one that is compatible with the expression “ecologize” and which we sum up with the term “composition”. Learning how to compose the common world, this is what is at stake.
Here is a clear connection with our eco-translation movement. Translating 'modernize' in the direction of the ecological and grounded in making.
The idea is not to publish an up-dated version of the initial book but to publish (in the form of pamphlets, web sites, and installations as the inquiry broadens and as the mediators make decisions) reports about the state of the art.
This is a new approach to research production that seems to have vast potential in our emerging technological age. How can we incentivize participation in this model?
In this inquiry, we are keeping all the connotations of the phrase, but we are giving the two terms “mode” and “existence” stronger meanings that don’t direct attention towards human groups or individuals, but towards the beings about which humans are interrogating themselves.
extending the phrase beyond its typical connotation by looking toward what being means in a sense? The use of existence here makes me think of levinas and Existence and Existents. Here, I think we see an attempt at new language for talking about relationships between entities irreducible to subject/object or being/non.
the experience produced when there is a clash between two values.
I wonder if these crossings are attempts to enact ambiguity as Benjamin John Peter's articulates it, "coexistent incompatibility?" Not surprising that judgement is near by.
“values”—a deliberately outdated term
I am not yet sure why this is an outdated term?
there is no Earth where we can modernize “the way we used to”. So we have to think again what we mean by this term while both retaining the inheritance of the modernization project and composing it in a quite new way.
here, the term in question is 'modernize.' I appreciate the non-binary approach to reimagining, looking for new methods without the need to eradicate those from the past.
emerging technological landscape
Why do you use emerging technology here instead of new media?
content
I have annotated this bit of content and wondering if it will remain if the content goes away.
have
native environment
perhaps a gradation of types of projects and parts of projects and how to look at each - information architecture
Project narrative
this is similar to an artist statement.
Collaborator evaluations
how do we evaluate code and related parts of projects that are not typical humanities/writing based?
scholarship
is public scholarship/engagement service or scholarship? Could AAR make a statement about this emphasis?
Metrics of access and impact.
algorithms and applications that weight and analyze quality of comments and engagement.
examples/checklist for looking at access/impact
way websites get cited in print works or digital print
peer evaluators.
what would meaningful peer review look like in emerging media frameworks? comments on shared online version of work. Committees might need tangible examples of similar projects.
comments and annotations on web products/projects
evaluate level and quality of engagement and how engagement is folded into project
Collaboration
Collaboration is far from new in the study of religion, so what makes emerging media more problematic in our ability to assess and evaluate contributions in collaborative works? Do digital humanities projects bother our illusion of isolated, independent scholar producing knowledge? Or have we already abandoned that notion long ago?
What is “scholarship” in religious studies?
One of the important items we need to discuss is the particularity of emerging scholarly modes in RELIGIOUS STUDIES. How could these guidelines be better tailored to the specific challenges that arise when practicing the academic study of religion in a medium that is less familiar than print?
The skinscape of religion stands at the crux of the matter, the heart of religion: it happens at in- between, mediated places.
Is it in between or is it entangled? Maybe these are the same?
Beliefs, and conceptions of supernatural/transcendent higher powers are not possible to be disentangled from sense perceptions, nor from the media in which religious conceptions occur.
yes, entangled!
Thus, The Skin of Religion, offers a metaphor to emphasize the way religion signifies through its materiality, through contact between perceiver and object represented. It also suggests the way vision itself can be tactile, as though one were touching [religious images and objects] with one’s eyes: I term this haptic religiosity. Finally, to think of religion as a skin acknowledges the effect of [symbolic] circulation among different audiences, all of which mark it with their presence. The title is meant to suggest polemically that religion may be thought of as impressionable and conductive, like skin.
One fun part about this is that it behaves a great deal like my friend Piotr Blumczynski's use of interdisciplinary substitutions to illustrate the process of translation. I imagine we could do a second layer substitution, putting interface in place of skin.
Computer systems will have to learn to forget as well
This is a profound observation that deserves treatment all on its own, both for its questions about the relationship between memory in the brain and memory in computing and for its willingness to admit the limits of technologies.
filtering
Filtering does seem so crucial - curation as scholarship, selection as translation, and judgement as meaning?
What must be stressed is that the sense organs are openings between the being and world, but they are not wide openings that would allow all forms of information to pass through. Instead, they function in quite particular ways. The senses filter information about the outside world, letting in some data (heat, pressure, brightness, loud sounds) but ignoring other data. The filtering processes of the senses have endlessly more complex functions than the simplicity of, say, a coffee filter.
here, sense organs sound a lot like skin, with its porosity built on active transmembrane apparatuses rather than on just passive holes in a boundary.
instead, meaning reaches deep down into our corporeal encounter with our environment.
even without the 'more primary' argument, this image of meaning reaching deep down into the entanglement of materiality is so compelling and seems so counter to everything I have ever learned about meaning.
how we perceive
Maybe the HOW here is as important as the perceive?
taste
Is there perhaps an important connection between the materiality of taste and the kind of material aesthetics of the body we are working with here? perhaps 'taste' was appropriated into the so-called theoretical realm just as aesthetics was pulled out of the body?
the ins and outs of information and sensation pulsing through the skin of the body
what is the relationship between this information and sensory data and the skin?
Instead, space is a production, a process, and our bodies form its basis.
Yes. again, interface is also process as is translation and perhaps human personhood? Yet, our bodies form one basis of space, no? There are other physical limits that constitute the process that is the production of space?
Skin is deep
Yes! The water image emerges again and the bothering of the distinction between interface and database.
the skin becomes a screen by which identity images are projected onto each other’s bodies
This is such an interesting cinematic image, skin as screen and identity images projected onto the screen. I wonder if the process might be more collaborative than this, where skin is performed AND projected upon, more like an interface?
importance of the surface
I hear Johanna Drucker here and her notion of interface as zone of encounter, which for me operates as a surface. Because Levinas always lurks for me, I wonder about the relationship between surface and face.
Aesthetics cannot be bound to a theory of art
perhaps the verb in this sentence is of utmost importance?
But this is a misrecognition of the active role that the skinscape plays in the construction of body, self, other, world, as well as social-sacred space.
I love this. in one sentence, Brent has signaled the value of new media objects - bothering the silly distinction between database and interface, content and expression. As Tim Beal and I have discussed often, water offers a fantastic material example of this, where contact with the surface is always entangled with the body of water.
The skin is media
is it possible that interface is a more precise term here? granted, I might agree that all media is interface all the way down, but it might make a difference here. Many conceptions of media are related to content and container, rather than the complex production of experience that occurs in interface.
between
is it between or entangled? maybe it can be both?
fixed-but-still-moving
is the boundary moving in place and there is movement across the membrane? why both fixed and moving? fixed in a moment, like a particular reading of a liturgy on the day after a nation elects a bafoon as president? fixed like a particular encounter in a particular time and place? moving, such that each time and place will move the boundary?
sensual body
Does the sensual body operate in web spaces? Or is this a different kind of mediation?
religion in and through its skin
So, this is kind of a use of the genitive question in Greek - what is the difference between the skin of religion and religion, which is skin? is religion an interface between self and world?
Virtual Browse
It is interesting that this media translation of stack browsing allows some notion of serendipity that people feel is lost in the discovery search engine. Yet, in a way, it expands this browsing because we see covers, not just spines.