The same vein closes up again on its own,without application of remedy of any sort. If this happened in a woman, Icertainly, like any other physician, would declare confidently that her men-struation is coming out that way
Association of any sort of periodic bleeding with menstruation
n these two stories the association of hemorrhoids and menstruationis quite clear
Both described as revitalising and creating symptoms if late
the superfluous excrements of theblood, which could not be dispersed through urination, sweating, or in-sensible perspiration, run to the testes by way of the seminal vessels andreach the neck of the bladder, to be finally evacuated through the urinarychannel.
Men who act like women with biological processes echoing women's
To his mind, somehow, both appear tobe menstruating bodies
Knows that they are different but as they occur in similar ways, able to treat them as the same
Theanalogy between this hemorrhoidal flow and female menstruation is soself-evident, in Vesalius’s eyes, that he applies the observations gatheredfrom the dissection of this male corpse to throw light on a problem con-cerning the anatomy of menstruation.
Use of male phenomena to help with common female occurances
Storer maintained correspondence with Newton from Maryland, where hewas a planter slave-owner at Prince Frederick in Calvert County
Slave trade on scientific correspondence
All this mate-rial was used in Principia.
Many different sources of information
News of these episodes reached the Royal Society via London merchants in spring1684
Merchants taking news across the oceans
The strange tidal patterns were confirmed in 1683 by an East India captainRobert Knox
Relied on numbers provided by trusted Europeans over word of mouth from the locals
Wallis reported his chats with “some inhabitants of Romney Marsh”, whosetestimony he eventually accepted because their business so depended on tidal flood-ing
Needs local knowledge. Europeans not even trusting European local knowledge
Newton faced characteristic troubles of trust in travellers’ tales
By only using other people, they may not be telling the truth, or not measuring exactly what he wanted
The problem was thus to judge select reporters’ diligent accuracy incomparison with large data collections, especially where the programme demandedexquisite exactitude from resources globally distributed in time and space
Differences in means across the world depending on place, may confound results and make them unreliable
hey faced the problems of handling widely distributeddata accumulated by astronomers and priests, academicians and mariners.
Many observations, not all of them accurate and trustworthy
Royal Africa Company, founded in 1660 and reformed in 1672, was described bythe eloquent historian Thomas Sprat as the “twin” of the Royal Society
Slave trade companies bound up in the works of the scientific societies
Alchemy provides a good case of the links between professedsolitude and ingenious commerce, since without global supply chains alchemicallabour would lack its materials.
Alchemy needs the trade routes to get the ingredients for the experiments and needs someone stationary in order to carry them out and bring them together
Horizons has a lot to say about the politics of science, but little to say about the epistemology of science
More on how science fits into a community world rather than the physical one
But the other explanations are barely mentioned here
Poskett argues for a certain understanding as best but does no comprehensive comparison
He bounced around intellectually as well, translating Arabic works into Latin while he was in Rome and introducing European clocks to a new observatory in Istanbul.
Bidirectional form of travel and knowledge transfer
Disorder-specific predictive classification of adolescents with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) relative to autism using structural magnetic resonance imaging
ADHD vs autism vs controls
wenty-nine adolescent ADHD boys and 29 age-matched healthy and 19 boys with ASD were scanned.
only male
Dynamical properties of elemental metabolism distinguish attention deficit hyperactivity disorder from autism spectrum disorder
ADHD/ Autism separately and combined
Association of Cord Plasma Biomarkers of In Utero Acetaminophen Exposure With Risk of Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder and Autism Spectrum Disorder in Childhood
Biomarker of both autism and ADHD
Progress and roadblocks in the search for brain-based biomarkers of autism and attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder
Autism and ADHD against typical rather than against each other. Review of literature.
Saliva MicroRNA Differentiates Children With Autism From Peers With Typical and Atypical Development
Not specifically ASD vs ADHD but has one sentence about it
low-functioning autistic children w
Only low-functioning autistics
All the selected participants were right-handed male.
Only male
Estimation of biomarkers for autism and its co-morbidities using resting state EEG
Autism & ADHD combined much different activity than Autism alone
orty-four predominantly medication-naïve male adolescents with ADHD, 19 medication-naïve male adoles-cents with ASD and 33 age-matched healthy male controls
Only males
Disorder-specific grey matter deficits in attentiondeficit hyperactivity disorder relative to autismspectrum disorder
Brain structure differences between autism and ADHD
Electroencephalography (EEG) power represents amount of activity in certain frequency bands of the signal while coherence between different electrodes reflects the degree to which connections are present across brain regions [
Definition of EEG power
Do patterns of synaptic pruningunderlie psychoses, autism andADHD?
Very similar but distinct patterns of synaptic pruning in ASD/ADHD
Biomarker-Guided Interventions of ClinicallyRelevant Conditions Associated with AutismSpectrum Disorders and Attention DeficitHyperactivity Disorder
Most of the biomarkers the same, some distinct to autism but not ADHD (Table 1)
24 8-month-oldinfants from an American-English language
Small sample size
32full-term infants, assigned randomly to one of two groups: 16(eight boys) to the Mandarin exposure group and 16 (eight boys)to the English control group
Fairly small sample
One group of 8–10-month-old children (7 females and 5 males, ranging in age from 8 months, 3 days, to 9 months, 10 days, with an average age of 8 months, 20 days) was tested on the Hindi contrast. A second group of 9 females and 5 males (ranging in age from 8 months to 9 months, 12 days with an average age of 8 months, 18 days) was tested on the Salish contrast. (An additional 3 infants were dropped from further analysis for failing to reach for failing to reach criterion on /ba/-/da/.) One 10–12 month-old group (5 females and 5 males, ranging in age from 10 months, 2 days, to 11 months, 15 days, with an average age of 10 months, 20 days) was tested on the Hindi contrast. A second group of 5 males and 5 females (ranging in age from 10 months, 2 days to 12 months, 4 days, with an average of 10 months, 29 days) was tested on the Salish contrast. (Data from 12 infants aged 10–12 months had to be discarded because they failed to reach criterion on the /ba/-/da/ contrast).
Small number of participants
42 children (later grouped as from "welfare," "working," and "professional" families),
Fairly small sample
Sixty-three mothers and children were drawnfrom two socioeconomic strata.
Fairly good number
We eventually found two sets of corpora, in twolanguages (Hebrew and English; see Table 1
Hebrew and English
Qualifying families were invited tojoin the study if the child was not regularly exposed to alanguage other than English
Only exposed to English
eported ethnicity of participants was non-HispanicWhite (66%), Asian (13%), Alaskan Native/AmericanIndian (10%), Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander (6%), orAfrican American (4%).
Range of ethnicities, still American
48 English-learning children (26females), recruited through birth records and day carecenters at Site 1 (n = 20) and Site 2 (n = 28).
Low but not bad amount of participants, good gender ratio
One possibility isthat infants with greater exposure to learning materials and opportunities in theirhome environments may develop stronger language skills. Alternatively, more linguisti-cally advanced infants may engender richer home language environments and/or inter-actions
Two different interpretations of why home environment has an effect
Because the home environment was only assessed at15 months, we were unable to directly test this possible interpretation
HOME assessment quite a bit later than the task
Seventy-five full-term infants (27 male) were enrolled at 9 month
Good participant number and gender ratio, all Amercian though and mainly Caucasian (p48)
discriminate betweentwo perceptually similar sounds, retroflex alveolar stop [ɖ] and dental alveolar stop [ḓ],two phonemes that are common in the Hindi language but that are indistinguishableto native English speakers.
Hindi discrimination task
ingleparticipating clinic site in Sioux Falls, South Dakota
Very specific pace of recruitment
English was the only languagespoken in the home
Only English
association persisted when controlling for 9-month expressive languageabilities, rendering it less likely that infants with better expressive language skills weresimply engendering higher quality home interaction
Not infants who were already better making more opportunities to get better
All ofwhich shows that 'This piece of copper, at such and such times and places, fails toexpand when heated' however well-corroborated, cannot on its own, conclusivelyrefute 'All bits of copper expand when heated'
Not in practice, but in Popper's theory.
t. That this might be a legitimate decision, in these circumstances, indicatesthat the singular statement 'This piece of copper, for a time, fails to expand whenheated' cannot, however well-corroborated, in itself conclusively refute 'All bitsof copper expand when heated'
It's more a case that in a perfect world, it would falsify the theory, but as it can't be explained, in practice the theory still stands as if every theory was falsified by a singular instance, then science would not be able to successfully move on unless there was infinite time and resources to develop the theory which explains the falsification.
, 'At all times, and in all places, this piece of copper fails to expand whenheated'
Just because it falsified the theory in that particular instance, does not mean that there couldn't be an instance that still makes it corroborate with the theory.
Although it does show that there is an instance where the theory does not stand if the theory is as broad as this example, thus the theory must be adapted.
In this case, if all hypotheses areequally improbable, why not regard the conglomeration of theories as refutingthe experimental hypotheses, instead of the other way round? If all that we have istwo sets of hypotheses that contradict each other, we can have no reason for pre-ferring the conjecture that error has been detected in one set rather than in the otherset.
Can't accept the claim that it has been falsified, as those experiments may be wrong. If it's about how much corroboration, then the theories give more standing.
uxiliary hypotheses, that have been developed subsequently, considerably increasethe empirical content of the theory
Refuted theories can only be revived if amended by related theories which give it more empirical evidence.
Again, don't feel that this is something Popper is completely against- just part of the developmental cycle of theories. Although an exact theory cannot be revived, it does not mean that a related one, that has been developed through other theories cannot be.
. In general it will not be in our interests to reject atheory that, in the past, has had considerable empirical success until there is analternative more promising theory on the horizon
A heuristic rather than full science
the new theory may solve severe outstanding problems, and thus promise to lead toa theory which in the end explains all that the old theories explained, and muchmore beside
This is true, but I feel it's more a case of a new theory that is meant to build on old theories rather than explain things outside the realm of the old theory, or explain a certain part in more detail that needs to explain all.
e. In certain circumstances it will be in our interests to accept anew theory which initially has far less empirical content than its predecessors,precisely because the new theory promises, with development, with the additionperhaps of auxiliary hypotheses, to lead to a theory of far greater empirical contentthan its predecesso
Some theories may have a lot of evidence towards them (having failed to be falsified many times), but that does not necessarily make them better than a theory that has yet to be tested.
I agree with this criticism.
. It may well be against our interests to test severely, and per-haps eliminate, a promising theory which has not been allowed to come to fullfruition
If we falsify a theory too early, it may be given up upon, when it actually had the ability to grow and create a better one.
Popper: need the dogmatic approach to keep going even if it is refuted so this criticism doesn't stand.
But more generally, it is due to the factthat in order to refute with certainty any scientific theory we must establish withcertainty the truth of some falsifying hypothesis-and, this, we may take it, cannotbe don
Theories can't necessarily be certainly falsified by observations. The observations themselves must be proved to be true in order for them to truly falsify the theory.
Although we seek theories with ahigh degree of corroboration, as scientists we do not seek highly probable theories but explanations
Not looking for a high likelihood of success in small areas, but for a chance of success in wider areas.
because the falsified theories are known or believed to be false,while the non-falsified theories may still be true.
While falsified theories may serve as an adequate heuristic, we prefer non-falsified theories as they have the possibility of being true, not definitively false. They are also more often than not, built on the backs of falsified theories and thus should not have those errors in that the falsified theories had.
the justification for this is the purely logical relationship of deducibility whichallows us to assert the falsity of universal statements if we accept the truth of singular ones.
The method of falsifying universal theories by providing singular observations that counteract it is why "trial and error" science is appropriate and not inductive.
Not everybody is able to do this; but there is no other way
Have to create "good" theories from eliminating bad theories. no other way of doing science.
. One can say first that the jump is not from anobservation statement, but from a problem-situation, and that the theory must allow us to explain theobservations which created the problem
Observations come from expectations, so even if a theory seems to come from an observation, it comes first from the "problem-situation" in which the observation was made.
it is accepted; if it does not, it is rejected. But it isnever inferred, in any sense, from the empirical evidence.
A law is only ever accepted or rejected in terms of how it plays out in accordance with other laws, not in an absolute sense (inferred). Acceptance or rejection is more shorthand than absolute.
which is to say that all laws andtheories are conjectures, or tentative hypotheses
This makes them scientific as they can be proven wrong but never proven right by observation, so if observation is used as the main tool of science, none of the laws can be truly irrefutably "laws".
Induction, i.e. inference based on many observations, is a myth. It is neither apsychological fact, nor a fact of ordinary life, nor one of scientific procedure.
Where it seems to be the case in "everyday life", it is based on expectations and observations, not merely observations alone. Sometimes can be just one observation which becomes an expectation.
They believed (to put it in my own terminology) that onlythe inductive method could provide a satisfactory criterion of demarcation
Scientists often believe that induction is the method of science.
The difference lies not somuch in the trials as in a critical and constructive attitude towards errors; errors which the scientistconsciously and cautiously tries to uncover in order to refute his theories with searching arguments,including appeals to the most severe experimental tests which his theories and his ingenuity permithim to design
It is not trail and error that makes science, but the adherence to critiquing and improving scientific theories through providing evidence they are wrong.
From the point of view here developed all laws, all theories, remain essentially tentative, orconjectural, or hypothetical, even when we feel unable to doubt them any longer.
The laws may seem irrefutable, but it is by remaining dogmatic in allowing them to be refuted, rather than turning to dogma in believing in it, that it is science.
If we have made this our task, then there is no more rational procedurethan the method of trial and error--of conjecture and refutation
To truly understand the world, trial and error type observations are what need to happen to find out if our theories stand up. "This assumption we made in this theory is wrong by this observation, therefore our theory is wrong" is a deductively valid statement and is how science should work.
then Hume was wrong.
Beliefs which are able to be criticised are not irrational things to uphold as long as we remain critical of them, only by not allowing them to be criticised do they become Hume's irrational "beliefs".
e only by purely deductive reasoning is it possible for us todiscover what our theories imply, and thus to criticize them effectively
Can't use inductive reasoning as it doesn't show exactly what is implied by the theory, only what has so far been observed to work with the theory. Deductive reasoning is the only true way of establishing conclusions, and the only true way of being able to criticise them.
Thedemand for rational proofs in science indicates a failure to keep distinct the broad realm ofrationality and the narrow realm of rational certainty: it is an untenable, an unreasonable demand.
Whilst things can be rational, many things cannot be certain. Observations can be made but certain conclusions cannot be drawn from them.
Like the latter, it passes on its theories; but it also passes on a criticalattitude towards them
Science is like the unscientific, in that it passes on theories and dogmatic ones, but rather than accepting them wholeheartedly, it passes with them an air of criticism.
A critical attitude needs for its raw material, as itwere, theories or beliefs which are held more or less dogmatically.
Critical attitudes need theories to base themselves from, they need theories that people are interested in exploring and extending and getting more right.
ncreasing experience and maturity sometimes create an attitude ofcaution and criticism rather than of dogmatism
Strong beliefs can be due to experience or inexperience. Often experience creates the criticism that is needed more than a weak belief in the unexperienced.
Moreover, this dogmatism allows us to approach a good theory instages, by way of approximations: if we accept defeat too easily, we may prevent ourselves fromfinding that we were very nearly right.
Need to persevere with theories, they need to be testable but also need the strength to keep tweaking them, not just throw it out if it's wrong, even if sticking to usual expectations does make us prone to wrongness. Sticking to stuff is not the problem, sticking unwavering to stuff and tweaking observations to fit theory rather than theory to fit observations is the problem.
Thus we are born with expectations; with 'knowledge' which, although not valid a priori, ispsychologically or genetically a priori, i.e. prior to all observational experience. One of the mostimportant of these expectations is the expectation of finding a regularity. It is connected with aninborn propensity to look out for regularities, or with a need to find regularities, as we may see fromthe pleasure of the child who satisfies this need
The need for regularity is innate
It is quite true that any particular hypothesiswe choose will have been preceded by observations--the observations, for example, which it isdesigned to explain. But these observations, in their turn, presupposed the adoption of a frame ofreference: a frame of expectations: a frame of theorie
Hypotheses are often made of the back of other observations, but the earliest observations would still have been made from frames of reference and expectations, even if not hypotheses.
I thought that it would apply inthe field of science also; that scientific theories were not the digest of observations, but that theywere inventions--conjectures boldly put forward for trial, to be eliminated if they clashed withobservations; with observations which were rarely accidental but as a rule undertaken with thedefinite intention of testing a theory by obtaining, if possible, a decisive refutation
Science does similarly, makes claims about the world and then tests these claims and adjusts them if they're wrong rather than creating claims that fit previously observed phenomena as previously observed phenomena may not reflect observations made in the future.
Without waiting, passively, for repetitions to impress or impose regularitiesupon us, we actively try to impose regularities upon the world
We make the repetitions we want to see, rather than just experiencing them and make conclusions about these artificial repetitions which may or may not have to be updated.
Thus they are repetitions only from acertain point of view
Where inductive reasoning is borne from habit, it is from extrapolation of similarity not of complete sameness, and is different for each person, and thus comes from a point of view. A point of view cannot be borne out of repetition if repetition is borne from point of view and so the argument breaks down.
(a) the typical result of repetition; (b) the genesis of habits; andespecially (c) the character of those experiences or modes of behaviour which may be described as'believing in a law' or 'expecting a law-like succession of events'.
Inductive reasoning is not because of custom or habit as Hume put it, because the reasoning can hold when an experience is only done once (c), custom and habits are not necessarily borne from repetition as repetition is a main feature of a custom or habit (b) and that repetition often creates unconscious processes and thus no longer needs reasoning to be performed (a).
He held that there can be no valid logical 9 9arguments allowing us to establish 'that those instances, of which we have had no experience,resemble those, of which we have had experience
Logic does not dictate that extrapolation is possible
There can never be anything like a completely safe observation, free fromthe dangers of misinterpretatio
Every observation has a chance that it was interpreted wrong no matter how much precision you put into it
In fact Newton's theory of gravity, and especially the lunar theory ofthe tides, was historically speaking an offspring of astrological lore
Non-scientific theories can give rise to scientific ones so they are not necessarily useless
This does notmean that Freud and Adler were not seeing certain things correctly
Unfalsifiable theories are not necessarily untrue, but merely unscientific as they have no way of telling for certain that they are untrue
It is a typical soothsayer's trick to predict things so vaguely that thepredictions can hardly fail: that they become irrefutable
It is a feature of non-science to not allow the possibility of being wrong. No "scientific" theory should not have a conceivable way of being wrong (conclusion 4)
The theory is incompatible with certain possible results ofobservation
It can be falsified, you can't use the theory to explain the observations in every situation unless it is correct, unlike other theories that cannot have distinct experiences that prove it wrong
Onceyour eyes were thus opened you saw confirming instances everywhere: the world was full ofverifications of the theory. Whatever happened always confirmed i
Can mould experiences to fit with the theory rather than other theories where you cannot, makes it unfalsifiable
What I had in mind was that his previous observations may not have been much sounder than thisnew one; that each in its turn had been interpreted in the light of 'previous experience', and at thesame time counted as additional confirmation
Conclusions based on inductive reasoning can have problems where the premise has been shaped by previous experiences and thus new conclusions are not even true in their premises
The lattermethod may be exemplified by astrology, with its stupendous mass of empirical evidence based onobservation--on horoscopes and on biographies.
Uses astrology as an example of something that most, if not all, scientists consider unscientific, but really uses the same methods of reasoning