This is the textbook location. The legal citation is 536 U.S. 639

The case took place in 2002.

The program was designed to help parents who were in need of help to afford these schools and the tuition amount was not enough to cover the full cost of tuition.

The program is one of choice since the money is provided to help parents afford the tuition of these private schools if they so choose to send their children there.

All neighboring school districts around the Cleveland district were eligible choices.

It is neutral.

A violation of the establishment clause was the one in question.

The vote was 5-4.

Justice Stevens did not write a separate dissenting opinion, but joined with the opinions written by Justice Breyer and justice Souter.

O'Connor: Concurring

The school district was Cleveland, not Baltimore.

I'm a little confused by this part. It never seems as though Maryland questioning Congress's ability to tax state banks isn't relevant since it was the one doing the taxing.This is because since, unless my reading of the case background is wrong, the issue was Congress creating a bank themselves, not taxing state-made banks.

I need a bit of clarification here, is Marshall saying that all the issues with the bank could be solved if Maryland, has confidence in their federal government and vice versa?

Marshall's wording is confusing me here since the case is about a bank, not a corporation. While banks operate like a business, I fail to see the interchangeability of the two terms.The only thing I can think of is that Marshall was considering future prospects that the federal government might try to take part in, but that does not make sense either.

Despite Truman's justification, the Court ruled that his authority as commander-in-chief could not be applied to a private industry.

The Court ruled in favor of Youngstown Sheet & Tube.

The facts portion of this brief is too long. It contains a lot more background information to the case instead of pure legal information. These include things such as the actions President Truman took, what grounds he had for taking them, and why his actions legally came into conflict.

The Korean War, not Vietnam.

Congress never set such policies, in fact, they passed The Taft-Hartley Act over his veto.

Congress's ability was not in question here. Instead, it was whether the President could take over an industry to prevent a labor stoppage?

Truman argued that the necessity of the Korean War made such a move necessary to keep troops supplied.

Justices Jackson, Frankfurter, Douglas, Burton, and Roberts did not submit separate opinions, only Justice Clark and Justice Vinson, with the dissenting opinion did.

There is no mention of Justice Black who delivered the Opinion of the Court.

Jackson actually was among the concurring Justices.

Roberts was another concurring Justice.

This seems counter-intuitive to the reasoning so far, but it seems like he is arguing that even those that see the Constitution as paramount law must close their eyes to it and see only the law. Am I mistaken?

To clarify, is Justice Marshall saying that the writ of madamus, which allowed this case to be brought to the Supreme Court in the first place, is not permitted by the Constitution? Or is there another definition of warranted that should be used here?

The wording in this section is somewhat confusing. From my understanding, Justice Marshall is lamenting that the Supreme Court is somewhat at a disadvantage because the legislature can appropriate power between the Supreme Court and the inferior courts and it makes some powers useless. Perhaps I'm wrong,but that seems like what Justice Marshall is saying.

Throughout this section Justice Breyer doesn't seem convinced that this case needs the Court's input since the states have already ruled on the matter. He's looking for more than just a fear of change in political opinions to justify taking action.

Justice Alito is trying to force the State to answer the question about why it's so different to give to churches for this particular reason when religiously affiliated schools can receive public funds which supports the Lutheran Church's argument.

As Justice Sotomayer points out a few times there is still a playground at the church, it just can't be financed by this grant due to the ruling in the lower courts. That said, nothing is stopping the playground from existing, and nothing is stopping the church from putting money into the playground either. This makes it different than the clerk McDaniel example because he was stopped from doing both.

The way Cortman says this is rather confusing. Does he mean that the State doesn't believe there is a Federal Establishment Clause, or that the ruling wasn't in conflict with it?

Chief Justice Roberts, as well as other Justices who are leaning toward the majority, have pointed out several times that the playground and the church building itself are different entities, Therefore, there is no violation because so long as the money is used for repairing the playground and not repairing the church itself, the state is not using religion with state funds. By pointing out the distinction Locke drew, Chief Justice Roberts further supports his view.

Cortman's insistence of it being wrong that you're denied public funds when you run a business, in this case a school, as a part of a larger religious organization is wrong is confusing when it's clearly a potential violation of the separation of church and state.It seems like a weak point to center your whole argument around.

Is this brief another type of amicus brief, or just what the brief is about?