By the summer of 1991, Taubman writes, “Gates and Cheney were already salivating at the thought of the Soviet Union broken up;” as happened, following an abortive hardline coup, by the end of the year. Until the end, Gorbachev pleaded for the scale of aid he needed, telling Bush in advance of a G-7 meeting in London in June: It’s very strange. A hundred billion gets thrown at a regional conflict [the Gulf War], but not for the transformation of the Soviet Union from an adversary and threat to a member of the world community and international economy.

not invented by the individual

all talk of ‘Global Zero’ – the world without nuclear weapons sought by both Gorbachev and Reagan – stopped

Moreover, Gorbachev added bitterly in 2014 interviews, the Americans began to betray him even before he left office.

By November, the risible sum of $1.5 billion was on offer, with Baker telling Gorbachev: “It’s hard cash. Take it before we change our mind.”

“To hell with that! We prevailed. They didn’t. We can’t let the Soviets clutch victory from the jaws of defeat.”

Had Gorbachev known of this back-to-the-future ‘containment policy,’ he might have acted less trustingly when the issue of German reunification arose

Gorbachev’s “longevity in office,” Taubman writes, “may well have been extended if he had received more help.”

And while Bush (acting more out of concern for American than Iraqi lives) was right not to pursue Saddam’s Army back to Baghdad, his encouragement of insurrection by Iraqi Shi’a and Kurds provoked only a brutal crackdown and abiding sense of betrayal