384 Matching Annotations
  1. Last 7 days
    1. The focal cost question is live on Metaculus: CM_01 — production cost per kg →. The expert-aggregation version is at CM_03 →. If you forecast on Metaculus, please share your username below so we can link your contributions.

      Add a paragraph in this fold: You may also be interested in the Animal Welfare Futures forecasting tournament we co-launched with Metaculus and Sentient futures. $3,400 in prizes and only about 25 forecasters as of June 26. It includes some cultivated-meat questions (but not the specific cost questions here), alongside other animal-welfare-relevant questions you may find interesting.

      And change the folding block title to "Public forecasting on Metaculus; Animal Futures Tournament"

    1. contributions

      Add a paragraph in this fold: You may also be interested in the Animal Welfare Futures forecasting tournament we co-launched with Metaculus and Sentient futures. $3,400 in prizes and only about 25 forecasters as of June 26. It includes some cultivated-meat questions (but not the specific cost questions here), alongside other animal-welfare-relevant questions you may find interesting.

      And change the folding block title to "Public forecasting on Metaculus; Animal Futures Tournament"

    2. Same quantity, but as of end-2027 — verifiable within a couple of years, which helps calibrate the longer-horizon estimate. If you expect no large-scale plants by then, estimate for advanced pilots and say so.

      use same lang as prev form as ,much as possible for consistency

    1. If you're a forecaster, modeler, or skeptic we've invited

      Thinking about this again. We're going to try to get the skeptics to share their beliefs right away and without seeing the beliefs specified by the workshop participants. This doesn't really need to be on this page, although you could mention it perhaps in a folding box for these people. The forum for the non-cultured meat f orecasters skeptics should probably be on its own standalone page. We also should let them know that we're going to be asking them for follow-up after they've considered the full set of beliefs, with additional compensation. So perhaps $100 for their initial belief statement plus $50 for that follow-up?

    2. What we're asking: share your beliefs on the focal cost question (CM_01) and any subquestions you have a view on, with brief reasoning, via the beliefs elicitation form. Roughly 30–60 minutes; partial responses are welcome.

      Ask them to do at least a reasonable share of the sub-questions... This seems like they are way too optional.

    3. CM Workshop · Beliefs Analysis

      At the bottom of this, put a link to the "Next Steps" page as well as a link to the "Subquestions" page, to direct people's interest towards these, which are pretty high value

    4. One contributor (a commissioned PQ evaluator, included anonymously at their request) submitted detailed answers in a written document using the original Pivotal-Questions wording, which differs from the workshop form on several questions. Their CM_14 and CM_17 map directly. Their CM_01, CM_12, CM_13 and CM_16 are shown as provisional conversions onto the workshop axes, using explicit stated assumptions:

      Put this at the bottom. It's too prominent here.

    5. Technical sub-questions and expert distribution questions. Only respondents who answered each question are shown.

      We should have aggregation for these also. -- I only see the individual responses below.

    6. CM_01: What will be the average production cost ($/kg, wet weight at harvest) of undifferentiated cultured chicken cell biomass in 2036, assuming large-scale commercial production is achieved?

      Signpost this a little bit; I'm worried people are only going to see this question. Note that this was the focal question, but there's a set of other questions that are particularly interesting - link the "subquestions" tab.

    7. Fairness note: prior workshop contributors who already submitted a detailed response are equally welcome to the same honorarium for a substantive post-workshop update.)

      Make the fairness note just the words "fairness note" and then a tooltip explaining that the difference in compensation is necessary to elicit participation from people with less inherent interest in learning about cultured meat. And that wWe hope to offer this sort of modest compensation more broadly in the future.

    8. without ties to cultured meat

      Italics not bold. Note that this helps balance (in an ad-hoc way) as people without a direct links to cultured meat may have been less likely to attend our conference. And this is also very important to help us get at the cruxes and make real progress in the public understanding.

    9. CM_01: What will be the average production cost ($/kg, wet weight at harvest) of undifferentiated cultured chicken cell biomass in 2036, assuming large-scale commercial production is achieved?

      Make the question title a bit more prominent here.

    Annotators

  2. Jun 2026
    1. This is not a conversion gate like valuation, liquidity, allocation, or deployment. It is a reason to discount or stress-test local confidence when the local social graph may benefit from optimistic expectatio

      This was a comment you didn't need to actually add literally.

    2. The stronger skeptical case is about conversion, not existence.The strongest steelman is not "there will be no AI-wealth philanthropy." That claim now looks weak. Anthropic has confidentially filed a draft S-1 S1Anthropic confidential draft S-1"confidentially submitted a draft registration statement on Form S-1"Supports the claim that an IPO/liquidity event is live, while still conditional.Open source, and OpenAI's nonprofit Foundation controls a large equity stak

      Is this really potentially a straw man here? Who was actually saying there will be no AI wealth philanthropy? Not sure we need this particular "not this, but that" Construction here.

    3. What would update this memo?

      Claude: Michael Dickens: "What would update this memo?" – as with the gates, no sense of prioritization is given. IMO by far the biggest uncertainty, about which we will get more information in the future, is: What will Anthropic's valuation be when the lockup ends? "Concrete donor vehicles" is also important evidence, but we won't get that until probably 6-24 months later.

      Source: https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/fFDM9RNckMC6ndtYZ/david_reinstein-s-shortform?commentId=JS2dmcbgfvy3xtBwj

    4. How to plan if the skeptical case is live

      Claude: Michael Dickens: The recommendations under "How to plan if the skeptical case is live" don't really make sense. AFAIK ~zero orgs are planning as if they're guaranteed to get a huge pile of donations 1–2 years from now. I believe nonprofits mainly plan based on the money they already have on their books + short-term (<1 year) fundraising expectations. "How to plan if the skeptical case is live" is just "business as usual".

      Source: https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/fFDM9RNckMC6ndtYZ/david_reinstein-s-shortform?commentId=JS2dmcbgfvy3xtBwj

    5. Notional company equity value, not spendable cash.

      Claude: Michael Dickens: My downward adjustments to the model aren't even the pessimistic case. The pessimistic case* is that the AI field collapses (investor funding dries up or something) and Anthropic stock is worth $0. Base rate says there's like a 50% chance that that will happen. Even optimistically, you should expect at least a 10–20% chance that Anthropic stockholders get nothing.

      *this is pessimistic for donations but I would actually prefer that this happen because it would lengthen timelines. so in a way it's the optimistic outcome

      Source: https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/fFDM9RNckMC6ndtYZ/david_reinstein-s-shortform?commentId=JS2dmcbgfvy3xtBwj

    6. The steelman could be too pessimistic if founders or employees treat liquidity as an urgent moral obligation

      Claude: Michael Dickens: "The steelman could be too pessimistic if founders or employees treat liquidity as an urgent moral obligation" – TBH the BOTEC as written seems to me like it's already pricing in that founders/employees will treat donations as urgent, e.g. it's implying that Anthropic money will be disbursed faster than FTX Foundation money, which itself was disbursed at historic speed. IMO most likely reason why the model will end up underestimating is that Anthropic market cap ends up being like 10x higher than predicted.

      Source: https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/fFDM9RNckMC6ndtYZ/david_reinstein-s-shortform?commentId=JS2dmcbgfvy3xtBwj

    7. Field absorption ceiling

      Claude: Michael Dickens: "Field absorption ceiling" is structured more sensibly than "Grantmaker capacity multiplier", but these two seem redundant because they're closely related. If orgs have more capacity to expand, grantmakers can deploy money faster by giving to those orgs. If there are more grantmakers, they can create more and bigger RFPs. etc. I would include one variable or the other, but not both.

      Source: https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/fFDM9RNckMC6ndtYZ/david_reinstein-s-shortform?commentId=JS2dmcbgfvy3xtBwj

    8. it scales raw potential funding by the available people, institutions, judgment, and legal plumbing needed to make good grants.

      Claude: Michael Dickens: Also this would make more sense as a dollar amount, not a multiplier. Like there's a fixed total amount that grantmakers can reasonably disburse. You could model it in a more complicated way but IMO a simple cap is the way to do it. Or maybe don't use this parameter at all. I think it's probably worth including, but keep it simple.

      Source: https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/fFDM9RNckMC6ndtYZ/david_reinstein-s-shortform?commentId=JS2dmcbgfvy3xtBwj

    9. Grantmaker capacity multiplier

      Claude: Michael Dickens: "Grantmaker capacity multiplier" seems nonsensical as written. Shouldn't the capacity max out at 1x? If grantmakers are a complete non-bottleneck, then the other parameters will dictate the amount disbursed; if they're a bottleneck, then the amount disbursed will be less. There's no way for grantmaker capacity to have a multiplier >1x.

      Source: https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/fFDM9RNckMC6ndtYZ/david_reinstein-s-shortform?commentId=JS2dmcbgfvy3xtBwj

    10. Founder deployment by end-2026

      Claude: Michael Dickens: IMO "Deployment by end-2026" should use a different date. IPO 3-6 months from now plus 6 months lockup means no money will be deployed in 2026, unless Anthropic does a fast IPO + early lockup release. Even by the end of 2027, you're talking about a 3-9 month turnaround time on lockup ending -> grants being disbursed. FTX Foundation donated $190 million (pre-clawbacks) in about 6 months, which was ridiculously fast compared to a typical foundation, and that was still a pretty small % of its long-term budget (or at least, what was believed to be its long-term budget before FTX collapsed).

      Source: https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/fFDM9RNckMC6ndtYZ/david_reinstein-s-shortform?commentId=JS2dmcbgfvy3xtBwj

    11. Conversion gates

      Claude: Michael Dickens: This model is supposed to illustrate how a lot of people are being too optimistic, but even then, I think most of the point estimates in the model are too optimistic. Consider that e.g. the median self-reported earner-to-give only donates (IIRC) 3% of their income.

      Source: https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/fFDM9RNckMC6ndtYZ/david_reinstein-s-shortform?commentId=JS2dmcbgfvy3xtBwj

    12. Gate 8: Bay social incentives make optimistic funding rumors self-reinforcing

      Claude: Michael Dickens: Gate 8 ("Bay social incentives") seems uninteresting since it's not a claim in the same category as the others. It's more like a meta-level reason why people might not think about the other 7 gates.

      Source: https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/fFDM9RNckMC6ndtYZ/david_reinstein-s-shortform?commentId=JS2dmcbgfvy3xtBwj

    13. A late-2026 IPO could still imply mid-2027 or later insider liquidity because of lockups.

      Claude: Michael Dickens: Gate 1 says IPOs have lock-ups. That's true but I basically don't think that matters because lock-ups are very predictable: they will announce how long it is, and that's exactly how long it will be. There's no uncertainty. The main reason it's relevant is that a lockup gives more time for AI valuations to fluctuate or collapse, but the text doesn't even mention this.

      Source: https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/fFDM9RNckMC6ndtYZ/david_reinstein-s-shortform?commentId=JS2dmcbgfvy3xtBwj

    14. Read these as sequential gates. Realization handles liquidity and legal availability; follow-through handles intent; allocation handles cause choice; deployment handles the timing of actual grants by the deadline.

      where do the defaults come from? Explain, reference, link (maybe as tooltips)

    15. This may leave legally awkward, politically controversial, or non-lab-compatible work underfunded.

      this needs fleshing out -- not sure what this is about

    16. People who could puncture the rumor may also be financially incentivized not to alienate future donors.

      I don't see how this would 'alienate future donors'?

    1. main Hi Quick hello Suggest 5 min Call Phone call Suggest 15 min Video FaceTime / video Suggest 30 min Drive Drive-time call Suggest 20 min Msg Async text Suggest 1 hour

      What does the room mean here

    1. 4. Are you or your coauthors especially exposed to a durable negative public signal?

      This framing feels too negative and definitive for my taste. As some of the modeling and discussion gets at, a single 'negative public signal' should not be so damning as people seem to think.

    1. Three explicit flags that would substantially revise the estimates: (1) better proxy validity research (reversal learning, parental care as welfare indicators); (2) new data on understudied invertebrates; (3) theoretical advances o

      can these be restated as questions?

    2. The load-bearing belief is that neuron counts are only a defensible proxy for moral weight if they reliably correlate with the welfare-relevant capacities organisms actually posse

      Better stated as a question ... something like "Do neuron counts reliably correlate with the welfare-relevant capacities organisms actually possess?" (of course 'reliably' probably would need operationalization, and this elides the possibility that it may "reliably correlate" but the correlation may be low)

    3. Three explicit cruxes structuring the entire cross-cause model: (1) animals' moral weights relative to humans; (2) expected value of the long-run future; (3) preference for making a difference vs. expected value. Cause rankings reve

      these are good, but can they be separated out and flexhed out and made more explicit?

    4. The load-bearing belief is that any significant moral weight for animals, combined with Rethink Priorities' finding that corporate animal welfare campaigns are ~1000x more cost-effective than top global health interventions (e.g. AMF), implies Open Phil should prioritize animal welfare in neartermism. The author's position would change if the moral weights / welfare-range estimates favoring animals were substantially lower, or if a defensible reason were given for valuing human welfare units far above animal welfare units purely on species membership. The author explicitly asks what would have to change in OP's views to NOT prioritize animal welfare.

      Not sure this one is an actual crux, rather an attempt to draw out Open Phil (now CG) on their moral weighting

    5. the moral-weighting framework for suffering: whether one prioritizes duration of welfare improvement or the intensity/severity of suffering averted.

      'prioritizes' is not clear here. Do they better operationalize this ... how would it be decided/measured?

    6. What belief changes would actually alter donations or work — and what are the poster's actual cruxes? Author foregrounds room for more funding and marginal value.

      meta -- not an actual crix

    7. The load-bearing belief is that no compelling cost-effectiveness case exists for the alternatives; a promising cost-effectiveness estimate for institutional meat reduction campaigns would make the author excited about (and supportive of reallocating funding toward) them. To me, to be excited about such campaigns I'd need to see a promising cost-effectiveness estimate. High Shortlist EA Forum Did corporate campaigns in the US have any counterfactual impact? A quantitative model verified No — published 2019, before 2024 window Karolina Sarek 2019-06-24 Key uncertainty

      clarify -- hard to read this

    8. The estimated counterfactual impact of US corporate cage-free campaigns (2.1-10%) is load-bearing on the price elasticity of egg demand, a parameter drawn from a literature review with only ~13 observations.

      this is a fairly well-defined operationalized crux. It's old, but I guess 'we still are not confident'!

    9. He would be persuaded toward global health if shown a defensible rationale for valuing one unit of human welfare so much more than animal welfare that it justifies Open Phil funding GH ~6x as much as AW —

      this latter bit is closer to being a specific 'crux'. remember we want these stated as operationalizable questions,if possible. And try to find the single question crux that seems most important or most correlated to the others. You can have another column listing other cruxes raised.

    10. y The author's recommendation hinges on whether furnished-cage advocacy is actually more cost-effective per unit welfare than cage-free advocacy. He remains skeptical despite his own estimate (2.84x), and his position would shift on whether advocacy costs scale linearly with producer costs, whether infrastructure lock-in blocks later cage-free transitions, and whether furnished-cage campaigns would undermine the cohesiveness of global laying-hen advocacy.

      This one is getting good. It seems pretty relevant, but I want you to state it as an explicit opertionalizable question here.

    11. The author's position that shrimp welfare rests on a weak evidentiary base

      State the actual crux. Your description here is more about the implications of the crux.

      You can state somewhat general grounds, but then give a specific instantiation if possible. E.g., something about whether one form of slaughter is more painful to shrimp than another, or whether analgesia is good evidence, etc.

    12. Would update on: timelines, public/model concern for animals, indirect normativity, moral-circle expansion, and simulated-animal welfare.

      this is too general/vague. I want explicit defined crixes. What is the specific question they are uncertain about, how would you measure it, and what decision would it change?

    1. Would update on: timelines, public/model concern for animals, indirect normativity, moral-circle expansion, and simulated-animal welfare.

      What exactly is the crux here? You haven't explained it.

    2. What are the most important questions you'd want answered before deciding how, where, and when to give $20M?

      It's also not that explicit. It's kind of meta.

    3. Outlines eight cruxes that would change the ideal balance among cause, within-cause, and cross-cause prioritization.

      ok but too meta -- maybe name ONE crux here and/or flesh out rows?

    4. What belief changes would actually alter donations or work — and what are the poster's actual cruxes? Author foregrounds room for more funding and marginal value.

      This is more like meta. I don't think it's an actual crux

    5. Whether safety interventions and welfare interventions conflict or create synergies.

      This feels a bit vague and could be explained and specified better

    6. Coverage by cause area — click to filter · amber = legacy AI cluster · green = Unjournal core & in-scope AI

      Allow more sophisticated sorting, e.g., by relevance and then by date, or by some combination.

    1. These are illustrative examples. Final tournament questions are being finalized with Metaculus.

      these have now been finalized. Maybe integrate some of them in?

    2. Predict the Future of Animal Welfare

      Put in the link here, make it clear it's live, make it prominent, and perhaps use some of the style and language from there and incorporate it into this page.

    3. his will be Metaculus' first tournament focused entirely on animal welfare. Questions will cover topics like:

      We should adjust this - it's the first funded tournament that focuses broadly on animal welfare (there was an unfunded tournament as well as one focused on cultured meat).

    1. When we evaluate a paper, the pieces — the paper itself, two or three evaluations, the ratings, the authors' response, any follow-ups — end up on separate pages, and you have to jump between them to follow the thread. I've been trying out ways to put the whole thing on one page instead. These are rough prototypes. The idea is a reading layer that sits alongside PubPub (which stays the system of record for DOIs, indexing, and so on), not a replacement — though I realise splitting things across two homes has its own costs. I'm honestly not sure any of this is better, and that's mostly what I'd like your help with.

      this but at the top is a bit long and even though it condenses a bit it's still a bit bulky and keeps popping up again as we scroll down.

      Also, I want this to clearly state at the top that most of this content, including the explanations, has been generated using AI, although I have been looking over it and adjusting

    1. I think that alternative proteins may fall into this bucket. While it doesn’t meet my personal donation bar for an evidence-based intervention, I understand why it has absorbed large amounts of philanthropic money earmarked for animal welfare. It might just eventually work.

      GPT5.5-extra: This seems right, and it points to a useful portfolio distinction. Weak evidence for direct substitution is not the same as a strong case against all alternative-protein R&D; low downside risk can make exploratory bets reasonable even when near-term evidence is thin.

      The decision-relevant question is not just "is this evidence-based now?" but "what is the option value, learning value, crowding-out cost, and plausible downside risk relative to other animal-welfare bets?"

    2. We (the EA animal welfare community) should be using significant resources to generate useful evidence. But simply funding the broad field of animal welfare science is likely to create scattered research results that are difficult to translate into action.

      GPT5.5-extra: I agree with this direction. A useful design distinction is between (1) decision-question elicitation, (2) study design and data collection, (3) independent review/replication, and (4) translation into funding or implementation decisions.

      "Taking ownership" should not mean collapsing these roles into a single interested evaluator. The highest-value infrastructure may be a pipeline with clear handoffs, independent review, public evaluation packages, and explicit decision thresholds.

    3. All three intervention examples I give have been extensively discussed, recommended by charity evaluators, and financed by major funders.

      GPT5.5-extra: This is an important point, but I would separate "widely recommended/funded" from "best marginal opportunity." A field can converge on interventions because they are legible, scalable, fundable, or coalition-friendly, not only because they have the strongest evidence.

      That distinction matters for diagnosis: the problem may be less "people made bad calls" and more "the field lacks institutions that can generate, audit, and translate decision-relevant evidence before interventions become large funding defaults."

    4. R&D should be the #1 priority right now, ahead of scaling existing work.

      GPT5.5-extra: This is plausible, and I am sympathetic, but the post does not fully close the argument for "#1 priority." To make the case, I would want an explicit value-of-information comparison: how much better could targeted R&D make future funding decisions, how soon, at what cost, and relative to the best marginal scaling opportunities?

      This is exactly the kind of question that seems well suited to animal-welfare evidence infrastructure: pre-specified decision-relevant questions, rapid review, and evaluation packages rather than scattered academic outputs.

    5. The report is a few years old now, but even then we already had multiple strong studies showing that the availability of equivalent substitutes does not lead to major changes in meat consumption.

      GPT5.5-extra: I would soften "equivalent substitutes" here. Peacock's review is mainly about current plant-based meat and hypothetical improvements in price/taste/convenience; it does not establish that actually equivalent future substitutes, cultivated meat, or precision-fermentation products would fail to substitute. It is stronger as evidence that current plant-based availability and many current interventions have weak or uncertain effects.

      Source: https://rethinkpriorities.org/research-area/price-taste-and-convenience-competitive-plant-based-meat-would-not-currently-replace-meat/

    6. However, we have little evidence for this substitution effect.

      GPT5.5-extra: I agree with the direction, but would phrase this as "limited and hard-to-interpret evidence" rather than simply "little evidence." There is evidence from current plant-based meat and meat-reduction interventions, but it is hard to generalize to future products or to settings where price/taste/convenience are genuinely competitive.

      This is also a measurement problem: substitution across animal products, plant-based products, eating occasions, and longer-run market responses is difficult to estimate with standard demand data.

      Related Unjournal/PQ context: https://uj-pba-workshop.netlify.app/

    7. I do not feel comfortable supporting a blanket push for cage-free reforms, given the currently available data on what happens when farms/countries switch.

      GPT5.5-extra: This conclusion depends on what "blanket push" means. I would distinguish: (1) poorly managed or abrupt transitions, (2) regulatory/corporate cage-free commitments with weak implementation support, and (3) mature higher-welfare cage-free or free-range standards. The evidence against (1) or (2) is not automatically evidence against (3).

      This seems like a good place for a decision-relevant decomposition: mortality, painful morbidity, behavioral deprivation, transition costs, and implementation quality should be modeled separately rather than compressed into "cage-free yes/no".

    8. A counterpoint I sometimes hear is that the difference in mortality between caged and cage-free systems disappears as farmers gain experience with cage-free systems.

      GPT5.5-extra: The 2021 meta-analysis does more than gesture at this counterpoint: it analyzes 6,040 flocks and 176M hens and finds mortality in cage-free aviaries decreases with experience; in recent years it finds no significant mortality difference among indoor systems. That does not prove all cage-free transitions improve welfare, but it weakens the inference from early/high-mortality transitions to mature cage-free systems.

      Source: Schuck-Paim et al. 2021, https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-021-81868-3

    9. These aren't sudden, painless deaths. Increased vent pecking itself is also a sign of increased environmental stress. Overall, this suggests that hens in the cage-free systems generally experienced more distress.

      GPT5.5-extra: This is a reasonable concern if the CSES aviary result is representative, but I would avoid leaning too hard on this single-farm comparison as evidence about cage-free systems overall. The linked CSES system was one implementation at one commercial site, and the broader Schuck-Paim et al. 2021 dataset suggests mortality in aviaries falls substantially as producers gain experience.

      The stronger statement is: transition quality and management can matter a lot, and mortality/vent pecking are important welfare proxies, but this particular comparison does not by itself settle overall cage-free welfare.

      Sources: https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-021-81868-3 and https://welfarefootprint.org/laying-hens/

    10. When shrimp first hit the ice slurry, they perform sudden full-body contractions (tail flips), but this also happens if you first cut their head off (check the supplementary material for a video).

      GPT5.5-extra: I read this as evidence that the tail flip is a ventral-nerve-cord reflex, not as a proposal to decapitate shrimp as a slaughter method. Weineck et al. 2018 transected shrimp and found that isolated abdomens began tail-flipping in ice slurry; cutting the segmental roots prevented the movement. Their interpretation is that this is locally neural and involuntary, not driven by higher central brain centers.

      So the evidential role is narrow: tail flips alone should not be treated as strong evidence of either conscious distress or insensibility, because a similar movement can be generated after separation from the head. It does not show that ice slurry is humane; it weakens one simple behavioral proxy.

      Source: Weineck et al. 2018, section 3.7, https://www.mdpi.com/2076-2615/8/9/158

    11. Additionally, both studies implanted conductive electrodes in the test animals. It is plausible that this significantly affects how current flows through the shrimp's body.I also feel confused about what a signal from an electrode on a heart or a ganglion actually tells us. The plots of the recorded “power” are hard to interpret without a control signal to assess what the noise floor is.

      GPT5.5-extra: Clarification after checking: Weineck et al.'s "ECG" was not a mammalian-style electrical ECG. It was an impedance measure of movement or fluid between leads over the heart, so amplitude tracks contraction/flow rather than subjective experience directly. The 2026 Somerville et al. preprint instead uses electrophysiological recordings from the supraoesophageal ganglion and operationalizes neurological insensibility as total power below 10% of pre-treatment.

      That is a meaningful proxy for neural activity, not a direct welfare readout. The electrode/current-path concern remains reasonable for external validity, but I would phrase the issue as partial proxies with unclear thresholds/noise floors and weak industrial translation, not as "the signals tell us nothing".

      Sources: Weineck et al. 2018 https://www.mdpi.com/2076-2615/8/9/158; Somerville et al. 2026 https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=6315379

    12. n conclusion, evidence for electrical stunning is extremely limited and we shouldn't feel comfortable recommending anything with confidence.

      GPT5.5-extra: Steelman from the current sources: the evidence does not seem to imply "electrical stunning is bad" or "ice slurry is fine". It implies parameter sensitivity.

      The 2026 Somerville et al. preprint reports that lower-voltage/shorter electrical shock followed by cold shock sometimes left substantial neural activity or behavioral response, while higher-voltage/longer shock plus cold shock confirmed insensibility in the no-response group; below-0C ice slurry alone also reduced time to low neural activity. SWP's 2026 review interprets the wider decapod evidence as electrical stunning having greater potential than chilling to induce insensibility, while saying species-specific electrical parameters and operational standards remain uncertain.

      Sources: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=6315379 and https://www.shrimpwelfareproject.org/humane-stunning-white-paper

    13. We have mixed evidence on whether transitioning egg producers to cage-free improves welfare overall.

      GPT5.5-extra: I would narrow this. The record supports "mortality evidence during cage-free transitions is mixed and confounded"; it is less clear that evidence on overall welfare is mixed in the same way.

      Schuck-Paim et al. 2021 cover 6,040 flocks and 176M hens and find cage-free aviary mortality falls as producers gain experience, with no recent mortality difference among indoor systems. WFI's welfare model estimates lower cumulative pain in cage-free aviaries than cages, while noting important research gaps. The comment thread also matters: Cynthia Schuck-Paim argues the CSES study is a weak basis for mortality/welfare conclusions because the aviary was poorly managed and not a fair mature-system comparison.

      Sources: https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-021-81868-3 and https://welfarefootprint.org/laying-hens/

    14. We have evidence that the substitution effect of alternative proteins is weak, at best.

      GPT5.5-extra: I would soften/generalize this claim. The strongest public evidence I found supports: current plant-based meat and many meat-reduction interventions have weak or uncertain substitution effects.

      Peacock's RP report explicitly focuses on plant-based meats because cultivated meats are not widely available; it is not a direct test of future cultivated meat or precision-fermentation products. Green, Smith & Mathur 2025 meta-analyze RCTs of behavior-change interventions and find a very small pooled effect; they also say many promising interventions await rigorous evaluation. That is evidence of a gap and weak current intervention effects, but not yet evidence that all alternative proteins, once genuinely cheaper/tastier/more convenient, would have weak substitution.

      Sources: https://rethinkpriorities.org/research-area/price-taste-and-convenience-competitive-plant-based-meat-would-not-currently-replace-meat/ and https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0195666325003861

    15. GPT5.5-extra: I added a small evidence-audit pass on this post. The detailed notes are threaded under David Reinstein's Hypothes.is annotations, but the main takeaways are:

      1. Shrimp stunning: the evidence seems parameter-sensitive, not a blanket case that electrical stunning is bad or that ice slurry is fine. Current Whiteleg-shrimp evidence supports more R&D and machine validation rather than confident deployment standards.

      2. Tail flips in ice slurry: Weineck et al. 2018 suggests this behavior can be a ventral-nerve-cord reflex, so tail flips alone are a weak proxy for either conscious distress or insensibility.

      3. Electrode and neural/heart signals: the measurements are meaningful proxies, but not direct welfare readouts. Instrumentation, thresholds, and industrial translation remain important uncertainties.

      4. Cage-free hens: the strongest narrower claim is that mortality evidence during cage-free transitions is mixed and confounded. That should not be collapsed into a claim that overall cage-free welfare evidence is equally mixed.

      5. Alternative proteins: the public evidence I found supports weak or uncertain current plant-based substitution effects, but does not directly settle future cultivated meat, precision-fermentation, or genuinely cheaper/tastier/more convenient alternatives.

      Detailed threaded notes: - Tail-flip reflex: https://hypothes.is/a/hyqLCmP9EfG-yj97z6fOYA - Electrode/proxy clarification: https://hypothes.is/a/jBrRpmP9EfGf93sIx5Tvwg - Shrimp-stunning evidence: https://hypothes.is/a/kSFQ5GP9EfGIt0f_B-4m3g - Cage-free welfare distinction: https://hypothes.is/a/lhR3FmP9EfGfBDupz9xTgw - Alternative-protein substitution scope: https://hypothes.is/a/nFLdSGP9EfGlirtHBhD0AQ

    1. Layer 1 · The paper

      this is a 'layer', yes, and that's relevant for thinking about now, but in the ultimate display I don't think we should call it a 'layer'

    2. The paper's findings bear directly on whether scanner-data demand estimates can be trusted for policy analysis — including animal-welfare-motivated policies that hinge on meat / plant-based substitution elasticities. If observational methods systematically differ from true experimental estimates, cost-effectiveness conclusions built on scanner-data elasticities could be unreliable.

      OK your language is good, but why not use direct quotes from evaluation manager's report/summary

    3. Note on the title: The published evaluation summary uses the title "cannot reproduce." The authors subsequently softened the paper title to "does not reproduce" to better reflect the scope of the evidence.

      some things like this could should be tooltips

    4. This paper tests whether standard observational demand estimation with rich scanner data recovers the price elasticities revealed by a randomized pricing experiment — and finds they diverge substantially.

      link the paper and provide DOI, bibliometrtics etc -- OK, you do that below, but the paper link should really be at the top too.

    5. Using data from a large grocery retailer's pricing experiment, Bray, Sanders & Stamatopoulos (Robert Bray, Robert Evan Sanders, and Ioannis Stamatopoulos) ask whether standard observational demand-estimation methods — applied to rich scanner data — recover the "true" price elasticities revealed by a randomized price experiment. They find the answer is no. The observational methods shift own-price elasticities substantially relative to the experimental benchmark:

      this is an AI generated summary. Not sure we want that. Perhaps better to lead with content from the Evaluation Manager's summary ... .although I admit this overview seems very useful, as long as it's accurate

    6. The Unjournal · Evaluation package Observational Price Variation in Scanner Data Does Not Reproduce Experimental Price Elasticities

      bit at the top a bit too persistent. I can't seem to fold or dissapear it as I scroll down

    7. Roemheld: The paper documents a striking divergence, but the experimental estimates face a plausibility challenge — they imply profit opportunities far exceeding observed industry margins. Contribution is valuable, but headline conclusion requires stronger foundations.

      make it clear when things are quotes vs AI-generated paraphrases

    1. void hosting papers unless there is a clear reason; SSRN, journal sites, institutional repositories, and author pages can remain the paper source. Allow papers to be curated by our team, partner organizations, workshops, funders, or external nominators, not only submitted by authors.

      these are not legal-specific -- we do this in the standard model too

    2. Working papers, workshop drafts, and preprints could benefit from fast structured feedback before journal placement, policy uptake, or citation in public debate.

      This is sort of generic -- why is this especially relevant to legal scholarship?

    3. , and improve it.

      remove 'and improve it' because the 'it' here is vague. The idea is to help us improve this curation and it's usefulness. We should also invite experts and practitioners to suggest additional research.

    1. Claude: Deep-research update (June 2026) — new sources added on omnivore fraction of PBM consumers.

      Three high-confidence new findings integrated:

      1. GFI US Consumer Snapshot (Jan 2025, Morning Consult Dec 2024, n=3,079): 72% of past-year US PBM eaters are active meat-eaters (57% omnivore + 15% carnivore); only 11% veg*n/pescatarian. Retail panel corroboration: 87% of US retail PBM dollars come from meat-buying households ($970M of $1,118M, NielsenIQ Homescan 2023). Now shown as primary chart in §04.5, replacing the less-precise Hartman Group range.

      2. Neuhofer & Lusk (2022, Scientific Reports — already at src-29) details added: 85.97% of PBMA-buying households also purchased conventional ground meat; only 2.79% were exclusive PBMA buyers. Peer-reviewed, IRI scanner panel, n=38,966 households — the strongest methodological data point in the set.

      3. Bryant Research UK (July 2023, n=1,000, new src-48): Occasional UK PBM consumers ~67% omnivore (consistent with prior claims). Key nuance: frequent UK PBM buyers split ~1/3 each (omnivores, flexitarians, non-meat-eaters). The ≥50% arithmetic lower bound for weekly consumers still holds regardless of frequency segmentation, but the 70–80%+ claim is better supported for occasional buyers or all-buyers combined than for the most committed frequent buyers specifically. This caveat is now added to the §04.5 evidence table and §08.

      Stat card updated: '≥50%' replaced by '72%' (US direct survey) as the headline figure, with UK lower bound in the tooltip. TLDR and §08 paragraphs updated accordingly.

  3. May 2026
    1. Product label + independent confirmation from: Food Navigator, Bloomberg Intelligence, SPINS/NielsenIQ, or academic publication

      these should be checked -- this is AI suggestions

    1. Give both tools the same one-hour task: create a sample template_map.csv from three approved, non-confidential documents and produce a lawyer-readable Markdown summary. Compare setup friction, edit quality, citations to source files, and how easy it is to resume the work later.

      this seems like a good test

    1. Unjournal Pivotal Questions — Annotate this page via Hypothes.is (select any text to comment). This working note assesses whether current PBM market evidence is informative enough to study substitution and welfare impact — input to the workshop's research-value question. Produced by David Reinstein with iterative AI prompts.

      make it clearer that this is a living document, under active adjustment, and responsive to suggestions

    2. hicken, shrimp, fish, beef, pork, eggs — since welfare weights differ sharply across them

      link or tooltip support for this, for people not familiar with welfare weights etc

    3. (c) which animal types bear that displacement and in what proportions,

      Put the 'which animal products, and their welfare burden' as the fourth item (d instead of c), because that weighting acts on 'the net reduction in production of each animal product'

    4. supply

      I'd make (c) 'how much the production of each animal product adjusts in response in market equilibrium' [tooltip: this may not be 1 for 1, e.g., with scarcity or increasing marginal costs, if some consumers purchase less of an animal product, other consumers may pick up the slack. For example, with an ~inelastic supply of wild fish, if some consumers switch to plant-based equivalents, this may drive prices down, getting other consumers to buy more wild fish]

    5. This is a relatively lenient threshold (a product can be marginally worse for the median consumer and still cross it

      I don't see how this follows -- if 50%+ rate it as as good or better than the conventional product, that should imply that the median consumer finds it 'as good or better'. Correct?

    6. Market-share premium: categories with better average taste vs. worse-tasting categories²⁴ 10× more market share

      This wotks better as a note than a quantitative report. Same for "Most favorable public category result" -- perhaps put those at the bottom in a few sentences rather than a tabular format

    7. The strongest indicator for self-consumption is the lapsed-buyer taste data:

      I don't think this is 'the strongest evidence'. To me the GFI Germany/UK surveys seems particular strong at least for the EU.

    8. How to read the evidence for the Pivotal Question

      This should be a folding box folded by default, but also I'm not sure these explanations are particularly helpful here.

    9. his is about the information content of share data — not an argument against studying displacement rates directly through scanner panels or field experiments

      I don't think this sentence is necessary. It's deeply confusing as well. You should probably remove this.

    10. he retail market-share, consumer-panel, and taste-comparability data compiled here give partial evidence on term (a). They give weak or no direct evidence on (b), (c), or (d).

      I don't think I agree with this. I don't see how retail market share or taste comparability data tell you about the impact of interventions on plant-based consumption, for example. . Maybe leave these last two sentences out. Or put them in a very speculative tool tip.

    11. but price is the most studied and arguably the most tractable intervention

      I'm not sure that either of these things are true. Cut the last part of the sentence, maybe. We're focusing on price because it's something economists are familiar with studying, and there potentially is actual data and variation in prices. (And also, we try to focus on one thing at a time rather than an overwhelmingly large set of questions. )

    12. d the consumer surveys that establish omnivore dominance do not ask whether the purchase was for the respondent's own

      However, we've reported on this -- doublecheck it and rethink/revise

      In Germany and the UK, the consumer survey story is also broader than a vegn niche. GFI Europe’s late-2024 survey found that 47% of German adults and 41% of UK adults said they were already reducing meat or following a meatless diet, and that 60% in Germany and 56% in the UK reported at least monthly consumption of some plant-based product category. For plant-based meat specifically, 25% of Germans and 23% of Brits reported consuming it in the last month. [DR: That’s an interesting and high level! Consuming (eating?) or just buying it? – digging in here – https://gfieurope.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/UK-Understanding-plant-based-category-dynamics-motivations-and-consumers.pdf it seems like we are talking about omnivores actually consuming PBM (regularly), which is important for our question about ‘is it mostly vegns eating PBM’? ] That supports a “mainstream-adjacent but imperfectly integrated” story much better than either a niche-vegan story or a full-substitution story. [13]

    13. within

      I'd change the order of the channels. Start with the taste parity, then the PBM buyers mostly being omnivores, and finally, the greater penetration in the natural/specialty channel as well as for some particular products like breakfast patties (the "greater penetration in some products and channels" can be bundled together as point three).

    14. The welfare mapping is unresolved

      this is a complication but not an insurmountable barrier. Some products are indeed individually distinguished in the relevant data.

    15. Market share is at best a ceiling on displacement.

      this is true but it doesn't justify "not studying discplacement through scanner data, experiments, etc." The market share we're looking at here is meant to help us understand how plausible it is that substitution patterns currently matter.

    16. displacement ratio × displaced animal mix

      This 'X' is not quite clear ... it would have to be some sort of vector multiplication or summed multiplication for the 'mix' part

    17. Consumer surveys and purchase panels consistently show that the large majority of PBM buyers are omnivores or flexitarians who also purchase conventional meat. The category is not, and has never been, predominantly a vegetarian market.

      Dig in on this more carefully -- are we sure these are 1. 'regular PBM buyers?' and 2. They are not just buying it for veg*n friends and relatives ?

    18. households would have bought on the specific PB occasions.

      "Would have bought otherwise, over the relevant period". Note that displacement need not occur in the exact same shopping trip. Intertemporal concerns could cut both ways. E.g., the 'within-trip substitution' would overstate the total substitution if people commpensate for having purchased PBM on one trip with "now let's eat more real meat" on the next trip or in a restaurant.

    19. Rough conventional meat + aquatic-animal food flow, before a retail price conversion³¹³²

      Do the rough price conversion, and also give the 'food flow' for the PBA -- we need a like-for-like comparison

    20. No public source here gives a like-for-like global conventional retail denominator. A rough calibration is still possible: 365 Mt of global meat plus roughly 165 Mt of aquatic animals used for direct human consumption implies about 530 Mt of conventional animal-product flow before retail conversion. At illustrative retail-equivalent prices of $3, $5, and $8/kg, the denominator would be about $1.6T, $2.7T, and $4.2T, making the $6.6B PB meat/seafood category roughly 0.4%, 0.25%, or 0.16% of that broad scale. This is not a matched market-share estimate.

      make this estimate a bit more prominent

    21. s where most of the value and animal-suffering of conventional meat sits,

      Can you provide a source for 'where most of the animal-suffering of conventional meat sits'? E.g., what share of chicken consumption is 'whole cut'? What share is on-bone? What about shrimp consumption globally -- whole vs ground up/paste.

    22. Current PB buyers are mostly dual-buyers, not substituters. GFI/SPINS data shows 96% of US plant-based meat buyer households also buy conventional meat, and they buy conventional meat far more frequently. Plant-based meat is functioning as an addition to existing diets in most cases, not a replacement. This complicates the welfare arithmetic: each dollar of PB sold may displace much less than a dollar of conventional.

      See previous discussion. This actually makes it MORE interesting to study, and offers more potential for displacement, the case in which it seemed that only prior vegetarians were buying this stuff

    23. Trajectories from current data may be misleading for projecting future adoption with better products.

      this doesn't seem to follow from the previous sentence

    24. Quality at parity hasn't unlocked majority adoption. Plant-based nuggets — the format that has reached sensory parity in blinded testing — still hold only 2 to 3% of the conventional nugget category. If matching taste isn't sufficient, then taste investments alone may have lower returns than the parity-headroom argument suggests.

      Think about this more and state in a a more reasoned logical way. Note that we're largely thinking about price here (as well as taste, nutrition and availability). We're largely focused on the the impact of cost and price on consumption and substitution. In fact, skeptics were saying that "we don't care too much about substitution and price impacts because 1. it has such a low market share and 2. it's not taste or nutrition comparable."

    25. Foodservice growth is real where products work. EU plant-based burger servings grew 90% from 2019 to 2023 in the Big 5 according to Circana. In channels where the product fits the use case and the price gap is hidden in menu pricing, adoption looks very different from retail. This is itself a quality-of-format finding.

      Looks like circular reasoning here. I'm not sure that this 'finding' is meaningful. It might need rephrasing

    26. because most PB buyers are dual-buyers, but the category is not literally too small to matter.

      At the end, it doesn't quite make sense. If all PBM buyers (or consumers) were previously vegetarians, then the displacement would be close to zero. If they all only ate meat or PBM and consumed the exact same amount of protein every day, the displacement would be 100%. So it's not the 'dual buyers' that makes displacement less than 100% per se. The question is to what extent consumers, whether vegetarians or omnivores, are buying PBM 'instead of meat' or 'instead of other vegetarian/vegan food'.

    27. evidence that taste is one binding constraint.

      I'd say "evidence suggesting that it may be a binding constraint" ... people may report one thing, but actually something else could be fundamentally behind their decision, perhaps even something ~subliminal that they can't identify themselves.

    28. NECTAR 2024 sensory study: category-level parity with conventional²⁰ Nuggets only

      An important fact, but a little bit strange to mix in here. It really belongs in the section below. ... tit's not quantitative either

    29. closest international analogu

      ? Have you really checked all other countries? Are you saying the US is a leader as well as Germany? That doesn't comport with my casual empiricism.

    30. but the cleanest topline is not the 6 to 7% US patty figure; it is the combination of low overall share with selective format-level strength and partial taste parity.

      skip This last bit, it's tpo AI, "not this but that" and the patties are a distraction.

      Consider whether this is really overlapping the bit in italics just after the title.

    31. Public format-level summaries suggest much higher penetration in a few reformed categorie

      "reformed categories" Is not clear here. Give an example number (other than patties)

    32. Germany at 3.1% with similar product quality to the US's 1.4% shows that non-product factors (sausage culture, retailer strategy, private-label investment)

      "Shows" It is too strong. Maybe quotes suggest, but even then you're not really providing transparent reasoning here.

    33. Roughly 9% of US households tried plant-based meat and stopped.

      That's just a simple subtraction of 20% -11%? Because it's also possible that more than 9% stopped but some new users entered.

    34. n the US it reaches 6 to 7% of conventional packaged patty dollar sales². The category-average understates penetration in the formats where taste and texture gaps are smallest, but the patty figure is itself an overstatement of plant-based meat's share of all hamburger consumption (see caveat below).

      Leave the 'patty' figure out -- put that whole discussion in a tooltip. Add back some numbers about EU or German share of some other relevant categories like sausage (or what's the highest penetration category other than patties?)

    1. The sceptical concerns are partially but not fully supported. Overall share is genuinely low (US retail: 1.4%; Germany: 3.1%) and most products lag on taste. But three patterns make the evidence more informative than a simple dismissal implies: within the US, channel-level penetration varies widely — natural/specialty retailers such as Whole Foods reach ~8% of packaged-meat dollars vs 1.4% in mainstream multi-outlet retail; most buyers are omnivores or flexitarians rather than prior veg*ns, though whether they buy for their own consumption or as proxy for a veg*n household member remains open (§04.5); and better-tasting product categories capture 10× more market share, suggesting taste improvements have measurable adoption effects. Whether these patterns extrapolate to higher-quality, larger-market conditions is the central unresolved question.

      Most of this is given in the 'a quick take' below. Just make this 2 sentences and flag 'unfold below for a quick take on the evidence'. And incorporate " better-tasting product categories capture 10× more market share, " with the reference tooltip into the fold below. -- Everything else here is basically already covered in that fold!

    2. versus 1.4% in mainstream multi-outlet.

      wait -- 1.4% is also the OVERALL -- are you sure 1.4% is 'mainstream"? The natural organic channel is virtually none of the market!

    3. Each footnote in the dashboard links to a numbered row here. The full quote (or specific evidence) is shown in italics. URLs are direct links to the cited page or PDF where available.

      some numbers are missing -- e.g., where is 36-39?

    4. here someone has published

      "where someone has published" -- this language is a bit too informal and amateurish. Improve it ... something like "where we could find a published cross-tabulation..."

    5. in formats, channels, and geographies to study?

      not sure we need this type of variation .. more like 'is there sufficient available relevant data to permit meaningful statistical analysis.

    1. r: how much do plant-based products actually replace animal products? This is the focus of The Unjournal's Plant-Based Substitution Pivotal Question.

      We are expanding this focus a bit for the workshop to consider substitution issues more generally, and perhaps more.

    2. Background note: a first-pass Claude summary of evidence on PBA penetration and taste-comparability is available for sharing. It is exploratory rather than a vetted literature review.

      "Background: Is the PBA market mature enough for substitution measures to matter" -- make that the italiicized header for this but