BCI system that utilizes non-invasively recorded EEG signals in patients with spinal cord injury to enable, and potentially even restore, movement of their paralyzed arms

Brain-computer interfaces are no longer just a gee-whiz technology, but a platform for researchers interested in immediate real-world applications for people who can think, but can't move

In essence, it's the difference between having a brain joystick and having a real telepathic conversation with multiple jets or drones about what’s going on, what threats might be flying over the horizon, and what to do about them. “We’ve scaled it to three [aircraft], and have full sensory [signals] coming back. So you can have those other planes out in the environment and then be detecting something and send that signal back into the brain,” said Sanchez.

Since the end of the Second World War, defense systems have been prioritized to deter attacks rather than actually responding to them after the fact. This has been the model for stability for the past 73 years, but that paradigm is now shifting, and the need for diplomacy is more evident than ever.

encouraging escalation and arms races and the replacement of deterrence by pre-emption

complex urban environments.

interface

hundreds of unmanned platforms simultaneously in real time

Swarming may overturn the existing order of world power

Swarm tactics depend on a devolution of power to small units and a capacity to interconnect those units that has only recently become feasible, due to the information revolution

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beginning of the 1930s, as the notion of Hispanidad developed within counterrevolutionary circles, incipient Spanish fascism had also begun taking its first steps. One important part of this process was the merger of the group led by Ramiro Ledesma Ramos and the Juntas Castellanas de Actuación His- pánica (Castilian Groups of Hispanic Action), Onésimo Redondos group. To- gether they formed JONS (Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional Sindicalistas or Unions of the National-Syndicalist Offensive) in 1931. Two years later, the young law- yer José Antonio Primo de Rivera, the son of the dictator that ruled Spain from 1923 to 1939, Miguel Primo de Rivera, and who was himself destined to become the main leader of Spanish fascism, founded the Falange Española party. In February 1934, JONS members joined the Falangists to form the Fa- lange Española de las JONS, known simply as the Falange. From that time on this party would bring together nearly all of the Spanish fascist groups.17

ispanidad was successfully introduced by the writer Ramiro de Maeztu in the magazine Acción Española a

ideological sectors within Francoism. On one hand, it was one of the key con- cepts in the discourse of National Catholicism, that is, the discourse champi- oned by the monarchists, Catholic groups, and high-ranking clergymen. H

As if to confirm this, Ideas para una filosofía de la Historia was rereleased in 1943 as a posthumous homage to its author Manuel Garcia Morente, a priest and professor of philosophy at the University of Madrid. Ideas is a compilation of philosophical texts written between 1938 and 1942, in which the author presented the idea of Hispanidad that would ultimately be incorporated into the Francoist postwar discourse. Garcia Morentes interpretation of the term borrowed from many ideas of counterrevolutionary thought in the 1930s, op- portunely insisting that there was "no legal bond" between the peoples or na- tions with Spanish roots. Therefore, there was "no limit whatsoever on their full political sovereignty, in spite of the fact that they are all Hispanic and feel united in their own similarities." Garcia Morente went on to describe "that bond which is invisible, almost imperceptible, ethereal and timeless, that which brings together all Hispanic nations on earth in such a unique way, that purely spiritual bond , that is Hispanidad in the abstract sense ... It is the very essence of the Spanish."55 As this text reveals, when this concept re-emerged, taking on hues of National Catholicism, the willpower and imperial impetus of the Falangists were abandone

. General Gómez Jordana, who replaced Serran

This was evidenced in the instructions that Jordana sent the governors regarding the celebration of 12 October in 1942, the 450th anniversary of the discovery of the Americas. In the flyer the minister instructed the governors of the importance to clarify the meaning of Hispanidad during the celebrations. The word, according to the minister, had an exclusively spiritual connotation rooted in tradition; there was no mention of the "political concept" that the Consejo de la Hispanidad had given the term in the text of its founding. As a result, the celebration should have nothing to do "with internal affairs or international politics in the countries of our de- scendants." Moreover, in order to prevent misinterpretations, it was important to avoid both the use of the word "empire" and any mention of the war in Eu- rope. In short, it was an order "to avoid anything that can be interpreted (albeit with artifice) as suggesting that Spain wishes to occupy a position of power in

stead, to take advantage of the turning of the tides in World War II by 1942, the dicta- torship began to move progressively away from fascism, cultivating a Catholic, counterrevolutionary discourse that would allow it to survive in what prom- ised to be a democratic Europe.

Two months later, there was a profound shift in the government as the result of what has been called the crisis de mayo (May crisis). The crisis arose from the extreme demands of the radical sectors of the Falange and the power that they had accumulated over the years. As a result of the crisis, this flank of the Falange - along with its goal to make the Francoist dictatorship into a fascist regime - was gravely debilitated in terms of both its power and its sphere of influence.51

8 In the decree that created the council, we can already detect certain notes of imperialism in the very concept of Hispanidad . Besides referring to Spain as the spiritual axis of the Hispanic world, the decree mentions that Hispanidad is a "political concept" that had to be sown "in visible, non-perishable fruits" in the Americas. It is not that Spain was driven by an appetite for lands or riches, explains the decree, but by the in- tention to create an institution that guided and led "the policy destined to ensure the continuity and effectiveness of the idea and works of Spanish genius."

these dreams of empire were the result of the wartime situation in Europe and aided by a Foreign Ministry overrun with Falangist fantasies. In any case, it soon became clear that these dreams of empire would never trans- late into actual territorial claim

n a speech given during the celebra- tion of the discovery of America on 12 October 1940, FET national advisor Eugenio Montes explained why Hispanic America was one of the goals of the new Spain. The Hispanic Americanism of the Falange, according to Mon- tes, was not that of the old clichés or that of archeology or rhetoric; it was a Hispanic Americanism of poetry and policy. "The Falange does not want to waste any time because it aims to win its place in history," said the advisor. "Today Spain is seized by the same impulse that led it to launch the caravels into the sea of the future."

In fact, the founders of Spanish fascism had been the first to propose bas- ing Spains foreign policy on the imperial myth. Ramiro Ledesma Ramos, for example, had written that Spains international prospects "would be infinite" once the internal Falangist revolution had taken place. It would then be pos- sible to recover Gibraltar and to bring together "the entire peninsula in a single destiny, joining us with the great Portuguese people," and then on to further expansion in Africa. This would allow Spain to approach "the grand Hispanic bloc of our Americas"42 from a cultural, economic, and even political per- spective. The expansionist ideal had thus been part of the Falangist myth of empire. However, the difference between the theories of the 1930s and the re- ality under Franco was that, with Serrano in the Foreign Ministry, it suddenly seemed possible to make the myth a reality. This was Serranos intention when he visited Germany a short time before his appointment in September 1940 to meet with the Nazi foreign minister, Joachim von Ribbentrop. At the meeting, Serrano clarified what Spain would ask for in exchange for its involvement in the war, namely, Morocco and Gibraltar. These goals of expansionism were also discussed at the infamous meeting between Franco and Hitler in Hen- daye, on the French-Spanish border, one month later.43

From that moment on, the concept and desire for empire began to change. With Serrano at the head of the Foreign Ministry, the empire was no longer just a rhetorical dream; it was an empire that went far beyond spiritual concep- tions and became a true material goal, one involving a show of power, force, and domination.40 In short, that myth - the empire - that had been an inher- ent component of the fascist ideology now began to turn within the engine of specific political action.4

he Falangists believed the con- trary: that the Spanish Empire needed a physical reality.

This empire was thus responsible for the supreme Catholiciz- ing mission of Spain without any pretensions or claims to land.

Maeztus intellectual legac

The concept of an empire defended and reclaimed by Catholic and counterrevolutionary sectors of the regime did not imply a desire for expansionism. Rather, it began and ended with praise for the Catholic essence of Spain that had allowed its Christianizing mission to be passed on to the nations of the Americas. This notion had been addressed some time earlier by Maeztu himself in an important article entitled "Misión e Imperio" (Mission and Empire) in which the author claimed that the secret to both mission and empire was found in the mission. When the empire was reduced to a mere appetite for new lands, forgetting its true transcendental pur- pose, the decadence of nations and of history was upon it. Hispanidad implied a plurality of nations independent from one another but bound by spiritual ties and by common religious principles. Nothing would damage this notion of Hispanidad more, wrote Maeztu in the magazine Hispanidad, than adding hints of imperialism to the idea of the Americas.37 T

Be careful with this. Just as we are unwilling to bask in the memory of our exploits of yore, of our ancient past, we are also unwilling to stand with our arms crossed and refuse the duties required of a future that we hold in our hands. And this is why we believe that true power must always be accompa- nied by a vigorous physical reality that imposes order on its thoughts.36

question that remains, then, is whether, in view of the inher- ent contradiction between the agendas, the notion of empire could also be the driving force behind a specific political action. A

for the Falangists, empire clearly constituted one of the groups key mobi- lizing myths.

r. What was the limit between the rhetorical empire - "merely retrospective rhetoric," as Lain had written - and the possibility for the concept to drive forward specific po- litical agendas? Where was the fine line that divided only a theoretical concept from specific policies and action based on that concep

Tovar, it must be understood that Spain had peaked as an empire in the sixteenth century and this fact should stand as a lesson for the present. Thus, history had to be used as an imperative, since "a long nightmare, a true inferiority complex" had slowed the country's march for more than two hundred years. It was high time, then, to awaken the pride of Spaniards, inviting them to have ambition today.

: "Note, comrades, that I say has and not had" Lain warned listeners not to let that will dissipate in speech, gesture, or lofty words. "As National Syndi- calists, we do not want this large, full, whole entity known as imperial Spain to become merely retrospective rhetoric. On the contrary, we will ensure that everyone is at its service through that obstinate, powerful and extreme will to serve that the Falange has imposed upon Spain.

o reintroduced the appeal to imperialism as part of the passionate discourse of war was Pedro Lain Entralgo, one of the key Falangist intellectuals from the Civil War until well into Francos dictatorsh

uring the years of the Second Spanish Republic (1931-1939), the founding fathers of Spanish fascism had warned that a revolution was stirring. Now, the war and subsequent victory of the Francoists convinced the Falangists that the true moment for their revolu- tion had arrived. The most prominent Spanish fascists died in the first months of the Civil War - Primo de Rivera was executed by a firing squad in an Ali- cante jail, and Ledesma Ramos suffered the same fate in Madrid; Onésimo Redondo fell in an ambush in the Segovia town of Labajos in July 1936. The remaining leaders of the Francoist Falange, which no longer existed as an in- dependent party but instead as part of the Movimiento Nacional (National Movement) led by Franco, invoked their fallen heroes when clamoring for the revolution and for Spain's imperial destiny

Empire is the ultimate expression of the unity of destiny . . . The unity of des- tiny transforms us from a people into a nation and from a nation into an em- pire. It moves us from local to universal. Empire is the determined vocation that arises from joint enterprise; it is the fervent affirmation of a collective conscience.3

This unity of destiny - one of the most specific formulations of Primo de Riveras thoughts - was conceived of as a shared and magical bond, one that ultimately represented the idea of nation.

imo de Rivera wrote an article called simply "Revolution." It was published in La Nación at the end of April 1934. In the opinion of the Falangists, the main problem was that Spain was trapped: above it hung historic pessimism and below it social injustice. Due to the former, life in Spain was cruelly limited. The country seemed doomed to abandon its history as a world power: "There were no longer enterprises that sparked the ambition of Spaniards, nor any pride stirring amongst them." It was up to the present-day generation to stand up and break through this limitation, because the youth could not be content unless Spain regained its true historic purpose.28

believe that a nation is not just the draw of the land where we were born, not just that overwhelming senti- ment we get when we are close to our native land. Instead, a nation is unidad de destino en lo universal [unity in the universal]."26 When Spain had remained united, when unity had reigned, the nation had been "the world s proprietor," giving "life and spirit to many lands." By the 1930s, however, Spain was living "a languid, poor and unsubstantial life, without any ambition of glory or any desire for justice." The reason for Spain's decadence was that the country was no longer a unit but instead a collection of separate fragments. According to Primo de Rivera, however, the moment had arrived to restore unity, to allow for the triumph not of any political or social class but of "Spain as a unit with future enterprise, a country where all individual wills melt into one." The goal was a challenging one and achieving it would mean transforming life as it was lived in the country, changing Spain inside and out. To put it more clearly, revolution was necessary in order to re-establish internal unity.27

The Falangists were well aware that Spain was diverse and pluralistic, with different languages, customs, and nuances, but it was a nation irrevocably bound in the unity of universal destiny.25

Spain is justified by a vocación imperial [imperial vocation] to bring together different languages, races, peoples and customs in a universal destiny. Spain is much more than a race and much more than a language; it is something that is expressed in a way that pleases me more and more, because it is the unity of universal destiny.2

. José Antonio Primo de Rivera, the Falangist leader, spent much time pondering these issues. The first question that he posed was whether it was possible to identify the essence that justified Spains existence

Here the revolutions purpose was defined: to regain Spains confidence and the confidence of the Spaniards, to reassure them of their ability to save themselves politically, socially, and economically. It was about "restoring national pride, which gives [Spaniards] the right to stand tall in all latitudes of the globe, well-aware that wherever they may be, Spaniards from times past have sown culture, civilization and religion." The result, according to Ledesma, was that the Falange gave "Spanish politics the firm goal of binding the values of unity and empire to the state."2

to once again give Spain a col- lective, historic totalitarian goal."

one away with culture, well-being, and the chance at an empire.

. The young blood of Spain had grown tired of the country's historic dram

In order for the nation to be renewed and for this will to find channels for its expression, it was necessary - and here we see another basic idea of fas- cism - to have a revolutio

ue: a will to create, people who would continue with the task, people who would renew the nation and forge new

The way in which these ideas were de- veloped also reflect the typical way in which European fascism proceeded,19 that is, by following the path forged by Italy. In this respect, the basis for the Falangist motivation behind their proclamations was a diagnosis of the coun- try's problems; a conviction that Spain, like Italy years earlier, had sunk into profound political and moral decadence and needed to find a way out

hope. The first was youth, "life projected onto tomorrow, onto the future";21 the second was the internal consolidation of national unity; and the third was th

sary to "go back years along the path of history to find resounding victories and hearts beating strong.

This was how Ramiro Ledesma Ramos described the matter in his well-known Discurso a las Juventudes de España (Speech to the Youth of Spain), where he emphasized that the country had spent "at least two hundred years rehearsing the best way to

d this vitalist pattern

The twenty-six resulting points addressed aspects related to the idea of the nation, the conception of the state, and economic, social, and labor union proposals. There were also direct references to the Spanish Empire. Point three, for ex- ample, stated that the Falange was inspired by the "will for empire"; therein lay the historic richness of Spain

At the beginning of the 1930s, as the notion of Hispanidad developed within counterrevolutionary circles, incipient Spanish fascism had also begun taking its first steps. One important part of this process was the merger of the group led by Ramiro Ledesma Ramos and the Juntas Castellanas de Actuación His- pánica (Castilian Groups of Hispanic Action), Onésimo Redondos group. To- gether they formed JONS (Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional Sindicalistas or Unions of the National-Syndicalist Offensive) in 1931. Two years later, the young law- yer José Antonio Primo de Rivera, the son of the dictator that ruled Spain from 1923 to 1939, Miguel Primo de Rivera, and who was himself destined to become the main leader of Spanish fascism, founded the Falange Española party. In February 1934, JONS members joined the Falangists to form the Fa- lange Española de las JONS, known simply as the Falange. From that time on this party would bring together nearly all of the Spanish fascist groups.1

6 Ultimately, Hispanidad was conceived of as empire , in the sense that it is "the auspicious agreement of peoples connected by the indestructible bonds of a shared Catholicism, a shared culture, a shared language and his- tory," to quote Pio Zabala, dean of the Universidad de Madrid, in his prologue to Casariegos book.

However, the onset of the Civil War and their subsequent victory gave even more power to the existing narrativ

discovery was approved by one of Marias oldest apparitions meant that Spain , religion , and empire were inherently united.

. The day on which Spanish ships landed in America in 1492 was also the day of Our Lady of the Pillar, patron saint of the city of Saragossa and patroness of Spain from the beginning of the nineteenth century.1

ming all the Hispanic peoples united since 12 October 1492. Since the Spanish Empire was born on the same day, Hispanidad became a substantial part of the definition of the concept of empire in Spai

permanent com- munity, whose point of identification resided in the same spiritual values that the Spanish missionaries and evangelists had taken to the Americas with the blessing of the holy Catholic kings

: the common ground of the Hispanic community, designated by the term Hispanidad , was not based on a geograph- ical or racial principle, but instead on a spiritual principle, one inextricably tied to the Catholic religion.11

In his writings, Maeztu argued in favor of finding a term that could be used to refer to "all of the Hispanic peoples," that is, the set of countries comprised of Spain and the Spanish-speaking nations of Latin America.

one that would strongly affect the work done within some of the most important areas of the dictatorship.8

From the moment in which the militant magazine of the same name was released, the collective work of the group would produce one of the most outspoken theo- ries of Spanish nationalism framed in terms of National Catholicism. It

dictatorship was forced to progressively aban- don fascism with an eye to its survival in a democratic Europe. In any case, before this internal shift, Francoism experienced several years of increasing fascistization, and this article addresses these years.

specific moments in which it was utilized from the outbreak of the Civil War in 1936 until 1942, the period of revolutionary fas- cism of the Spanish fascist party, the Falange. In 1942, as the result of a series of internal crises, the radical political project of the Falange was limited by El Caudillo , who often played referee to ensure that no political force took more than its share of power.

The appeal to empire undeniably had theoretical goals: retelling Spains history, a history marked by glory and splendor. This appeal, however, also had its use when linked to political action, where it was voiced when setting forth specific policies and projects.

history of concepts is the understanding that concepts, besides existing as mere products of the context in which they were generated, can also become politicized and ideologicizedy 4 and thus be used as part of the political struggle.

Many aspects of political life were affected by this ideological struggle and the field of discourse was no exception: concepts, their definitions, and even the everyday use of language were also fields of struggle and combat. O

the unforeseen and necessary coexistence of these "families" sparked tensions, discrepancies, and power struggles among the different members of Francoism.3

As a result, a whole set of profoundly diverse political forces - united only by their support for the initial coup in July - were obliged to merge into a single faction during the war and later, once they won the war, be part of the same regime. The result was a national movement and a victorious Francoism comprised of political "families" with significant ideological differences.

with the dif- ferent meanings attributed to the concept of empire - imperio and Hispanidad - as part of the official discourse of the first period of Francoism

This article concerns itself with this imperial dream, that is, with the dif- ferent meanings attributed to the concept of empire - imperio and Hispanidad - as part of the official discourse of the first period of Francoism. These meanings often conflicted due to the ideological diversity that prevailed within Francos regime. I use the term "ideological diversity" because one of the main features of the Spanish dictatorship was its internal heterogeneity.

We believe there are two empires. The first is the empire that plunders, driven by material ambitions of power. The other is an empire that brims with spiri- tual and cultural advances, a giving empire. When we speak of empire in modern times, we do not think of a people subjugated or of retreating along the path of history. We neither want nor aspire to anything that belongs to anyone else. Our empire is the spiritual work of our genius . . . , our contribu- tion to a word we all share, civilization; it is not the empire that is feared and hated but the empire that is desired, yearned f

s case, empire was defined through the Catholic religion and the missionary role that Spain had played in the discovery of America, the moment that marked the beginning of the Spanish Empire. The second meaning was developed inside the Falangist party. It contained fas- cist values and was linked to an ideal of expansionism that would support specific poli

hey imagined the process of fission in terms of the nuclear liquid-drop model

neutron-induced nuclear reactions,

For instance, in the case of the transformation of the Al nucleus into a silicon (Si) nucleus, they suggested that the phenomenon takes place in two stages. First, capture of the α-particle and the instantaneous expulsion of the neutron, with the formation of a radioactive atom, which is an isotope of phosphorus (P) of

demonstrated it explicitly [88] in 1939.

But could it be actually an agent of the reaction as well? This was Enrico Fermi's idea in Rome: to use the new particle, instead of α-rays, to produce new radioactive elements.

In the suggested nuclear reactions, the neutron, unknown two years earlier, already appeared as a product of the reaction.

Now, one could separate a radioactive element simply by measuring with a radiation counter where it is found after every chemical test on this material!

Lise Meitner and her nephew Otto Robert Frisch promptly found the correct explanation: nuclear fission [61], named by Frisch in analogy to biological fission of living cells.

Thus, the drop can split into two smaller drops, which move apart due to their electric repulsion and gain a kinetic energy of some 200 MeV. The released nuclear binding energy is also some 200 MeV and the mass of the fragments is smaller than the initial U mass, as follows from Einstein's formula E=mc2<math><mi is="true">E</mi><mo is="true">=</mo><mi is="true">m</mi><msup is="true"><mrow is="true"><mi is="true">c</mi></mrow><mrow is="true"><mn is="true">2</mn></mrow></msup></math>. Otto Frisch [63], and shortly later others [64], [65], [66], [67], [68] observed experimentally the great ionizing power of the nuclear fission fragments.

We had considered the possibility of a rupture of the uranium atom, but we had rejected this idea […]”, i

roduction of transuranian nuclei

kinetic energ

An absorption of fragments in thin screens inserted between the U sample and the surface corresponded to kinetic energies estimated from the energy balance in the fission process. Measurements with Th showed the same result.

he complexity of all these features related to neutron diffusion in matter, their thermalization in matter, both as a function of neutron energy, a huge variety of nuclear reactions involved in the process, prompt and delayed neutrons, nuclear isomers [85], [86], [87] and so on and so on, was recognized or at least suspected already at that time.

neutrons over the number of protons in a nucleus increases as a function of atomic weight, it is natural that sufficiently heavy nuclei, like U, can emit not one, but a few neutrons.

production of a few neutrons per fission

For a certain finite size, it would have exploded. Francis Perrin estimated accordingly a so-called critical mass of the active zone without a reflector around it

The authors concluded that they were observing a chain of nuclear reactions.

observed in this so-called subcritical assembly a large increase in the number of neutrons emitted from the initial neutron source in the middle of the sphere.

the neutron fluxes i

increasing the number of fission events because of their back-scattering).

Frédéric Joliot already discussed the possibility of a nuclear chain reaction with important release of energy in his Nobel Prize lecture in 1935.

939, Joliot, Halban, and Kowarski filed patents on power production from a nuclear chain reaction as well as on nuclear explosion. The next year, this subject had become highly confidential.

Otto Frisch in a memorandum written

so that to produce a nuclear explosion you need several critical masses—about three.

NO-DO's newsreels conveyed an image of inauguration sites and rites as geographical symbols of and material referents to the unmitigated success of the fascist project, embodiments of a technocratic developmentalism8 and emblems of the beauty, unity and tradition of the Spanish landscape. The newsreel images celebrated the solidaristic, spir- itual and moral values of traditional Spain, the tenacity of its workers, the power of the regime and the virtues of technical modernization

These particlular targets were chosen partly because the masses of boron and nitrogen were well known. Conservation of energy applied to the combined interactions gives the following expressions:

The task which remained for Chadwick was that of determining the mass of the neutral particle.

Again, the necessary energy for the gamma ray explanation was much greater than any energy observed to be available from the nucleus, so the neutral radiation must be some kind of neutral particle.

Curie and Joliot showed that when you bombarded a paraffin target with this radiation, it ejected protons with energy about 5.3 MeV. This proved to be inconsistent with gamma rays,

from a radioactive source produced neutral radiation which was penetrating but non-ionizing.

A rough scale of the energy required for the confinement of a particle to a given dimension can be obtained by setting the DeBroglie wavelength of the particle equal to that dimension. For example, if we presume that the dimension of a hydrogen atom is about 0.2 nm, then the corresponding confinement energy is about 38 eV, the correct order of magnitude for atomic electrons. But to confine an electron to a nuclear dimension of about 5 fermis requires an energy of about 250 MeV. The maximum available confinement energy from the electrical attraction to the nucleus is given by

anks to its immediacy, theatre has always proven to be an effective meansof politicizing audiences. From a theoretical perspective

Then they were put in separate divisions and sent into camp, Cassius on the boundary of Bithynia and Galatia, Maniusnote[Manius Aquilius.] on Mithridates' line of march to Bithynia, and Oppius,note[Quintus Oppius was propraetor of Cilicia.] the third general, among the mountains of Cappadocia. Each of these had about 40,000 men, horse and foot together. They had also a fleet under command of Minucius Rufus and Gaius Popillius at Byzantium, guarding the mouth of the Euxine. Nicomedes was present with 50,000 foot and 6,000 horse under his command. Such was the total strength of the forces brought together. Mithridates had in his own army 250,000 foot and 40,000 horse, 300 ships with decks, 100 with two banks of oars each, and other apparatus in proportion. He had for generals Neoptolemus and Archelaus, two brothers. The king took charge of the greater number in person. Of the allied forces Arcathias, the son of Mithridates, led 10,000 horse from Armenia Minor, and Doryalus commanded the phalanx. Craterus had charge of 130 war chariots. So great were the preparations on either side when the Romans and Mithridates first came in conflict with each other, about the 173d Olympiad.

] After they had finished speaking they did not wait to hear what the Senate and people of Rome would think about such a great war, but began to collect forces from Bithynia, Cappadocia, Paphlagonia, and the Galatians of Asia. As soon as Lucius Cassius, the proconsul of Asia,note[The first name of the proconsul of Asia was not Lucius, but Gaius.] had his own army in readiness all the allied forces were assembled.

 "The Bithyniansnote[Speech of Pelopidas in 88 BCE.] were not wrong in what they told you lately about the kings of Egypt and Syria. Not only are these likely to help us if war breaks out, but also your newly acquired province of Asia, and Greece, and Africa, and a considerable part of Italy itself, which even now wages implacable war against you because it cannot endure your greed.note

] Mithridates, having been denied justice by the Romans in this public manner, sent his son Ariarathes with a large force to seize the kingdom of Cappadocia.note[88 BCE.] Ariarathes speedily overpowered it and drove out Ariobarzanes. Then Pelopidas returned to the Roman generals and said: "How patiently king Mithridates bore injury from you when he was deprived of Phrygia and Cappadocia not long ago you have been told already, o Romans. What injuries Nicomedes inflicted upon him you have seen - and have not heeded. And when we appealed to your friendship and alliance you answered as though we were not the accusers but the accused, saying that it would not be for your interest that harm should come to Nicomedes, as though he were the injured one. You therefore are accountable to the Roman republic for what has taken place in Cappadocia. Mithridates has done what he has done because you disdained us and mocked us in your answers. He intends to send an embassy to your Senate to complain against you. He summons you to defend yourselves there in person in order that you may do nothing in haste, nor begin a war of such magnitude without the decree of Rome itself. You should bear in mind that Mithridates is ruling his ancestral domain, which is 350 kilometers long, and that he has acquired many neighboring nations, the Colchians, a very warlike people, the Greeks bordering on the Euxine, and the barbarian tribes beyond them. He has allies also ready to obey his every command, Scythians, Taurians, Bastarnae, Thracians, Sarmatians, and all those who dwell in the region of the Don and Danube and the Sea of Azov. Tigranes of Armenia is his son-in-law and the Arsacid king of Parthia is his ally. He has a large number of ships, some in readiness and others building, and apparatus of all kinds in abundance.

Look at his great preparations. He stands in complete readiness, as for a great and predetermined war, not merely with his own army, but with great force of allies, Thracians, Scythians, and many other neighboring peoples. He has formed a marriage alliance with Armenia, and has sent to Egypt and Syria to make friends with the kings of those countries. He has 300 ships of war and is still adding to the number. He has sent to Phoenicia and Egypt for naval officers and steersmen. These things, that Mithridates is collecting in such vast quantities, are not designed for Nicomedes, nay, o Romans, but for you. He is angry with you because, when he had bought Phrygia by a corrupt bargain from one of your generals, you ordered him to give up his ill-gotten gains. He is angry on account of Cappadocia, which was given by you to Ariobarzanes. He fears your increasing power. He is making preparations under pretense that they are intended for us, but he means to attack you if he can. It will be the part of wisdom not to wait till he declares war against you, but to look at his deeds rather than his words, and not give up true and tried friends for a hypocrite who offers you the fictitious name of friendship, nor allow your decision concerning our kingdom to be annulled by one who is equally the foe of both of us."

[10] At any rate a king of Pontus, the Mithridates surnamed Euergetes,note["Benefactor".] who was the first of them inscribed as a friend of the Roman people, and who even sent some ships and a small force of auxiliaries to aid them against the Carthaginians,note[During the Third Punic War (149-146).] invaded Cappadocia as though it were a foreign country. He was succeeded by his son, Mithridates, surnamed Dionysus, and also Eupator. The Romans ordered him to restore Cappadocia to Ariobarzanes, who had fled to them and who seemed to have a better title to the government of that country than Mithridates; or perhaps they distrusted the growing power of that great monarchy and thought it would be better to have it divided into several parts. Mithridates obeyed the order, but he put an army at the service of Socrates, surnamed Chrestus, the brother of Nicomedes, king of Bithynia, who overthrew the latter and usurped the government. (This Nicomedes was the son of Nicomedes the son of Prusias, who had received the kingdom of Bithynia as his patrimony at the hands of the Romans.) Simultaneously Mithraas and Bagoas drove out Ariobarzanes, whom the Romans had confirmed as king of Cappadocia, and installed Ariarathes in his place.note[90 BCE.]

[9] Not long afterward dissensions broke out among the Macedonians. Antigonus expelled Laomedon from Syria and assumed the government himself. He had with him one Mithridates, a scion of the royal house of Persia. Antigonus had a dream that he had sowed a field with gold, and that Mithridates reaped it and carried it off to Pontus. He accordingly arrested him, intending to put him to death, but Mithridates escaped with six horsemen, fortified himself in a stronghold of Cappadocia, where many joined him in consequence of the decay of the Macedonian power, and possessed himself of the whole of Cappadocia and of the neighboring countries along the Euxine.note[Mithridates I, surnamed Ktistes, "founder", was a member of a local branch of the Achaemenid royal family, and gained independence in the crisis after 302, which culminated in the Battle of Ipsus and the end of Antigonus Monophthalmus.] This great power, which he had built up, he left to his children.note[266/265 BCE.] They reigned one after another until the sixth Mithridates in succession from the founder of the house, and he went to war with the Romans. Since there were kings of this house of both Cappadocia and Pontus, I judge that they divided the government, some ruling one country and some the other.

Who were the rulers of Cappadocia before the Macedonians I am not able to say exactly - whether it had a government of its own or was subject to Darius.note[Persian king Darius I the Great.] I judge that Alexander left behind him governors of the conquered nations to collect the tribute while he hastened after Darius.note[Darius III Codomannus.] But it appears that he restored to Amisus, a city of Pontus, of Attic origin, its original democratic form of government. Yet Hieronymus says that he did not touch those nations at all, but that he went after Darius by another road, along the seacoast of Pamphylia and Cilicia. But Perdiccas, who ruled the Macedonians after Alexander, captured and hanged Ariarathes, the governor of Cappadocia, either because he had revolted or in order to bring that country under Macedonian rule, and placed Eumenes of Cardia over these peoples. Eumenes was afterward adjudged an enemy of Macedonia and put to death, and Antipater, who succeeded Perdiccas as overseer of the territory of Alexander, appointed Nicanor satrap of Cappadocia.

[4] As Prusias was hated by his subjects on account of his extreme cruelty they became greatly attached to his son, Nicomedes. Thus the latter fell under the suspicion of Prusias, who sent him to live in Rome. Learning that he was much esteemed there also,note[In 149 BCE.] Prusias directed him to petition the Senate to release him from the payment of the money still due to Attalus. He sent Menas as his fellow ambassador, and told him if he should secure a remission of the payments to spare Nicomedes, but if not, to kill him at Rome. For this purpose he sent a number of small boats with him and 2,000 soldiers. As the fine imposed on Prusias was not remitted (for Andronicus, who had been sent by Attalus to argue on the other side, showed that it was less in amount than the plunder), Menas, seeing that Nicomedes was an estimable and attractive young man, was at a loss to know what to do. He did not dare to kill him, nor to go back himself to Bithynia. The young man noticed his delay and sought a conference with him, which was just what he wanted. They formed a plot against Prusias and secured the cooperation of Andronicus, the legate of Attalus, that he should persuade Attalus to take back Nicomedes to Bithynia. They met by agreement at Bernice, a small town in Epirus, where they entered into a ship by night to confer as to what should be done, and separated before daylight.[5] In the morning Nicomedes came out of the ship clad in the royal purple and wearing a diadem on his head. Andronicus met him, saluted him as king, and formed an escort for him with 500 soldiers that he had with him. Menas, pretending that he had then for the first time learned that Nicomedes was present, rushed to his 2,000 men and exclaimed with assumed trepidation, "Since we have two kings, one at home and the other going there, we must look out for our own interests, and form a careful judgment of the future, because our safety lies in foreseeing correctly which of them will be the stronger. One of them is an old man, the other is young. The Bithynians are averse to Prusias; they are attached to Nicomedes. The leading Romans are fond of the young man, and Andronicus has already furnished him a guard, showing that Nicomedes is in alliance with Attalus, who rules an extensive dominion alongside the Bithynians and is an old enemy of Prusias." In addition to this he expatiated on the cruelty of Prusias and his outrageous conduct toward everybody, and the general hatred in which he was held by the Bithynians on this account. When he saw that the soldiers also abhorred the wickedness of Prusias he led them forthwith to Nicomedes and saluted him as king, just as Andronicus had done before, and formed a guard for him with his 2,000 men.

So much by way of preface concerning Bithynia. Of the forty-nine kings who successively ruled the country before the Romans, it does not concern me to make special mention in writing Roman history. Prusias, surnamed the Hunter, was the one to whom Perseus, king of Macedonia, gave his sister in marriage. When Perseus and the Romans, not long afterward, went to war with each other, Prusias did not take sides with either of them.

The Greeks think that the Thracians who marched to the Trojan War with Rhesus, who was killed by Diomedes in the nighttime in the manner described in Homer's poems, fled to the outlet of the Euxine sea at the place where the crossing to Thrace is shortest. Some say that as they found no ships they remained there and possessed themselves of the country called Bebrycia. Others say that they crossed over to the country beyond Byzantium called Thracian Bithynia and settled along the river Bithya, but were forced by hunger to return to Bebrycia, to which they gave the name of Bithynia from the river where they had previously dwelt; or perhaps the name was changed by them insensibly with the lapse of time, as there is not much difference between Bithynia and Bebrycia. So some think. Others say that their first ruler was Bithys, the son of Zeus and Thrace, and that the two countries received their names from them.

He then marched boldly against Spartacus himself, vanquished him in a brilliant engagement, and pursued his fleeing forces to the sea, where they tried to pass over to Sicily. He overtook them and enclosed them with a line of circumvallation consisting of ditch, wall, and paling.

Crassus accomplished his task within six months, whence arose a contention for honours between himself and Pompey. Crassus did not dismiss his army, for Pompey did not dismiss his. Both were candidates for the consulship. Crassus had been praetor as the law of Sulla required. Pompey had been neither praetor nor quaestor, and was only thirty-four years old, but he had promised the tribunes of the people that much of their former power should be restored. When they were chosen consuls they did not even then dismiss their armies, which were stationed near the city. Each one offered an excuse. Pompey said that he was waiting the return of Metellus for his Spanish triumph; Crassus said that Pompey ought to dismiss his army first. The people, seeing fresh seditions brewing and fearing two armies encamped round about, besought the consuls, while they were occupying the curule chairs in the forum, to be reconciled to each other; but at first both of them repelled these solicitations. When, however, certain persons, who seemed prophetically inspired,38 predicted many direful consequences if the consuls did not come to an agreement, the people again implored them with lamentations and the greatest dejection, reminding them of the evils produced by the contentions of Marius and Sulla. Crassus yielded first. He came down from his chair, advanced to Pompey, and offered him his  p227 hand in the way of reconciliation. Pompey rose and hastened to meet him. They shook hands amid general acclamations and the people did not leave the assembly until the consuls had given orders in writing to disband their armies. Thus was the well-grounded fear of another great dissension happily dispelled. This was about the sixtieth year in the course of the civil convulsions, reckoning from the death of Tiberius Gracchus.

When Spartacus learned that Lucullus had just arrived in Brundusium from his victory over Mithridates he despaired of everything and brought his forces, which were even then very numerous, to close quarters with Crassus. The battle was long and bloody, as might have been expected with so many thousands of desperate men. Spartacus was wounded in the thigh with a spear and sank upon his knee, holding his shield in front of him and contending in this way against his assailants until he and the great mass of those with him were surrounded and slain. The Roman loss was about 1000. The body of Spartacus was not found. A large number of his men fled from the battle-field to the mountains and Crassus followed them thither. They divided themselves in four parts, and continued  p225 to fight until they all perished except 6000, who were captured and crucified along the whole road from Capua to Rome.

On account of this vote Crassus tried in every way to come to an engagement with Spartacus so that Pompey might not reap the glory of the war. Spartacus himself, thinking to anticipate Pompey, invited Crassus to come to terms with him. When his proposals were rejected with scorn he resolved to risk a battle, and as his cavalry had arrived he made a dash with his whole army through the lines of the besieging force and pushed on to Brundusium with Crassus in pursuit.

Spartacus tried to break through and make an incursion into the Samnite country, but Crassus slew about 6000 of his men in the morning and as many more towards evening. Only three of the Roman army were killed and seven wounded, so great was the improvement in their moral inspired by the recent punishment. Spartacus, who was expecting a reinforcement of horse from somewhere, no longer went into battle with his whole army, but harassed the besiegers by frequent sallies here and there. He fell upon them unexpectedly and continually, threw bundles of fagots into the ditch and set them on fire and made their labour difficult. He also crucified a Roman prisoner in the space between the two armies to show his own men what fate awaited them if they did not conquer. But when the Romans in  p223 the city heard of the siege they thought it would be disgraceful if this war against gladiators should be prolonged. Believing also that the work still to be done against Spartacus was great and severe they ordered up the army of Pompey, which had just arrived from Spain, as a reinforcement.

Some say that Crassus, too, having engaged in battle with his whole army, and having been defeated, decimated the whole army and was not deterred by their numbers, but destroyed about 4000 of them. Whichever way it was, when he had once demonstrated to them that he was more dangerous to them than the enemy, he overcame immediately 10,000 of the Spartacans, who were encamped somewhere in a detached position, and killed two-thirds of them.

When he arrived at his destination he received also the two legions of the consuls, whom he decimated by lot for their bad conduct in several battles.

When the election of new praetors came on, fear fell upon all, and nobody offered himself as a candidate until Licinius Crassus, a man distinguished among the Romans for birth and wealth, assumed the praetorship and marched against  p221 Spartacus with six new legions.

this war, so formidable to the Romans (although ridiculed and despised in the beginning, as being merely the work of gladiators), had now lasted three years.

He prohibited the bringing in of gold or silver by merchants, and would not allow his own men to acquire any, but he bought largely of iron and brass and did not interfere with those who dealt in these articles. Supplied with abundant material from this source his men provided themselves with plenty of arms and made frequent forays for the time being. When they next came to an engagement with the Romans they were again victorious, and returned laden with spoils.

Spartacus changed his intention of marching on Rome. He did not consider himself ready as yet for that kind of a fight, as his whole force was not suitably armed, for no city had joined him, but only slaves, deserters, and riff-raff.

For these he manufactured weapons and collected equipment, whereas Rome now sent out the consuls with two legions. 117 1 One of them overcame Crixus with 30,000 men near Mount Garganus, two-thirds of whom perished together with himself. Spartacus endeavoured to make his way through the Apennines to the Alps and the Gallic country, but one of the consuls anticipated him and hindered his flight while the other hung upon his rear. He turned upon them one after the other and beat them in detail. They  p219 retreated in confusion in different directions. Spartacus sacrificed 300 Roman prisoners to the shade of Crixus, and marched on Rome with 120,000 foot, having burned all his useless material, killed all his prisoners, and butchered his pack-animals in order to expedite his movement. Many deserters offered themselves to him, but he would not accept them. The consuls again met him in the country of Picenum. Here there was fought another great battle and there was, too, another great defeat for the Romans.

After this still greater numbers flocked to Spartacus till his army numbered 70,000.

They overcame the guards and ran away, arming themselves with clubs and daggers that they took from people on the roads, and took refuge on Mount Vesuvius. There many fugitive slaves and even some freemen from the fields joined Spartacus, and he plundered the neighbouring country, having for subordinate officers two gladiators named Oenomaus and Crixus. As he divided the plunder impartially he soon had plenty of men. Varinius Glaber was first sent against him and afterwards Publius Valerius, not with regular armies, but with forces picked up in haste and at random, for the Romans did not consider this a war yet, but a raid, something like an attack of robbery. They attacked Spartacus and were beaten. Spartacus even captured the horse of Varinius; so narrowly did the very general of the Romans escape being captured by a gladiator.

At the same time Spartacus, a Thracian by birth, who had once served as a soldier with the Romans, but had since been a prisoner and sold for a gladiator, and was in the gladiatorial training-school  p217 at Capua, persuaded about seventy of his comrades to strike for their own freedom rather than for the amusement of spectators.

They resolved to decide the contest by one engagement — Pompey because he despised the generalship of Perpenna; Perpenna because he did not believe that his army would long remain faithful to him, and he was now engaging with nearly his maximum strength. Pompey, as might have been expected, soon got the better of this inferior general and disaffected army. Perpenna was defeated all along the line and concealed himself in a thicket, more fearful of his own troops than of the enemy's. He was seized by some horsemen and dragged towards Pompey's headquarters, loaded with the execrations of his own men, as the murderer of Sertorius, and crying out that he would give Pompey information about the factions in Rome. This he said either because it was true, or in order to be brought safe to Pompey's presence, but the latter sent orders and put him to death before he came into his presence, fearing, it seemed, lest some startling revelation might be the source of new troubles at Rome. Pompey seems to have behaved very prudently in this matter, and his action added to his high reputation. So ended the war in Spain with the life of Sertorius. I think that if he had lived longer the war would not have ended so soon or so easily.

As Metellus had gone to other parts of Spain — for he considered it no longer a difficult task for Pompey alone to vanquish Perpenna — these two skirmished and made tests of each other for several days, but did not bring their whole strength into the field.

When the will of Sertorius was opened a bequest to Perpenna was found in it, and thereupon still greater anger and hatred of him entered into the minds of all, since he had committed such an abominable crime, nor merely against his ruler and commanding general, but against his friend and benefactor. And they would not have abstained from violence had not Perpenna bestirred himself, making gifts to some and promises to others. Some he terrified with threats and some he killed in order to strike terror into the rest. He came forward and made a speech to the multitude, and released from confinement some whom Sertorius had imprisoned, and dismissed some of the Spanish hostages. Reduced in this way to submission they obeyed him as general (for he held the next rank to Sertorius), yet they were not without bitterness toward him even then.

The soldiers straightway rose in tumult and anger against Perpenna, their hatred of Sertorius being suddenly turned to affection for him, as people generally mollify their anger toward the dead, and when he who has injured them is no longer before their eyes recall his virtues with tender memory.  p213 Reflecting on their present situation they despised Perpenna too as a private individual, for they considered that the bravery of Sertorius had been their only salvation. They were angry with Perpenna, and the barbarians were no less so; and above all the Lusitanians, of whose services Sertorius had especially availed himself.

At this juncture many of the soldiers of Sertorius deserted to Metellus, at which Sertorius was so exasperated that he visited savage and barbarous punishment upon many of his men and became unpopular in consequence. The soldiers blamed him  p209 particularly because wherever he went he surrounded himself with a body-guard of Celtiberian spearmen instead of Romans, and gave the care of his person to the former in place of the latter. Nor could they bear to be reproached with treachery by him while they were serving under an enemy of the Roman people. That they should be charged with bad faith by Sertorius while they were acting in bad faith to their country on his account was the very thing that vexed them most. Nor did they consider it just that those who remained with the standards should be condemned because others deserted. Moreover, the Celtiberians took this occasion to insult them as men under suspicion. Still they did not wholly break with Sertorius since they derived advantages from his service, for there was no other man of that period more skilled in the art of war or more successful in it. For this reason, and on account of the rapidity of his movements, the Celtiberians gave him the name of Hannibal, whom they considered the boldest and most crafty general ever known in their country. In this way the army stood affected toward Sertorius, and on this account the forces of Metellus overran many of his towns and brought the men belonging to them under subjection. While Pompey was laying siege to Palantia and slinging logs of wood along the foot of the walls36 Sertorius suddenly appeared on the scene and raised the siege. Pompey hastily set fire to the walls and retreated to Metellus. Sertorius rebuilt the part of the wall which had fallen and then attacked his enemies who were encamped around the castle of Calagurris and killed 3000 of them. And so this year went by in Spain.

Not long afterward Sertorius fought a great battle near Seguntia, lasting from noon till night. Sertorius  p207 fought on horseback and vanquished Pompey, killing nearly 6000 of his men and losing about half that number himself. Metellus at the same time destroyed about 5000 of Perpenna's army. The day after this battle Sertorius, with a large reinforcement of barbarians, attacked the camp of Metellus unexpectedly towards evening with the intention of boldly cutting it off with a trench, but Pompey hastened up and caused Sertorius to desist from his contemptuous enterprise.

Sertorius had a white fawn that was tame and allowed to move about freely. When this fawn was not in sight Sertorius considered it a bad omen. He became low-spirited and abstained from fighting; nor did he mind the enemy's scoffing at him about the fawn. When she made her appearance running through the woods Sertorius would run to meet her, and, as though he were consecrating the first-fruits of a sacrifice to her, he would at once direct a hail of javelins at the enemy.

While the fight was going on flashes of lightning came unexpectedly from a clear sky, but these trained soldiers stood it all without being in the least dismayed. They continued the fight, with heavy slaughter on both sides, until Metellus defeated Perpenna and plundered his camp. On the other hand, Sertorius defeated Pompey, who received a dangerous wound from a spear in the thigh, and this put an end to that battle.

When spring came they resumed hostilities, Metellus and Pompey coming from the Pyrenees, where they had wintered, and Sertorius and Perpenna from Lusitania. They met near the town of Sucro.

cut in pieces a whole legion of his army,

In this siege a woman tore out with her fingers the eyes of a soldier who had insulted her and was trying to commit an outrage upon her. When Sertorius heard of this he put to death the whole cohort that was supposed to be addicted to such brutality, although it was composed of Romans.

not with the expenditure of labour of Hannibal, but by opening another passage around the sources of the Rhone and the Eridanus. These issue from the Alpine mountains not far from each other. One of them runs through Transalpine Gaul and empties into the Tyrrhenian sea; the other from the interior of the Alps to the Adriatic, its name having been changed from the Eridanus to the Po.

After Sulla died, and Lepidus later, he obtained another army of Italians which Perpenna, the lieutenant of Lepidus, brought to him and it was supposed he intended to march against Italy itself, and would have done so had not the Senate become alarmed and sent another army and general into Spain in addition to the former ones.

He had an army from Italy itself and he raised another from the Celtiberians, and drove out of Spain the former praetors, who, in order to favour Sulla, refused to surrender the government to him. He had also fought nobly against Metellus, who had been sent against him by Sulla. Having acquired a reputation for bravery he enrolled a council of 300 members from the friends who were with him, and called it the Roman Senate in derision of the real one.