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  1. Sep 2022
  2. Mar 2022
  3. learn-us-east-1-prod-fleet02-xythos.content.blackboardcdn.com learn-us-east-1-prod-fleet02-xythos.content.blackboardcdn.com
    1. fighting ability was one way that this prayer was answered for some

      fighting and honor and protection

    2. Most bondsmen would have to mask their honor when confronted withaffronts and wait until a potential window of opportunity to seek redress; oth-ers displayed their honor at times by resisting dishonor

      honor by resisting dishonor

    3. the code of honor among bondsmen assumed a “sacredness,”and transgressors would, among other retributions, have “their names cast outas evil from among their brethren, and being subjected to scorn, and perhapspersonal violence.”


    4. In Africa fighters often exhibited their power on behalf of the enslavedcommunity in the enforcement of honor.


    5. Others commanded respect fortheir demonstrated skill in physical contests such as climbing poles, wrestling,or knocking and kicking. Through these various forms of display, enslavedAfricans and their descendants exclaimed their individual worth and honor.The desire to seek such communal honor was clearly strong


    6. an enslaved woman could gain honor in the eyes of the communityfor her ability to sing, hypnotize the community with engaging stories, or dancewith grace

      honor for all regardless of gender

    7. black drivers who felt compelled by the honor code not to carry out orderedwhipping if the plantation owner was not immediately present.2

      how far honor goes

    8. loyalty while enslaved


    9. enslaved showed this respect toone another by hiding and feeding runaways and refusing to betray otherbondsmen

      how remained honorable

    10. honor was loyalty to fellowbondsmen.


    11. loyalty to peers, personal displays, vengeance, and resistance to dishonor


    12. honor system of Africansand their descendants in North America was most clearly exhibited through


    13. Europeans and their descendants in North America did not always recog-nize this bonded honor code, but southern elites lived by their own reflexivehonor system that led to violent gouging matches and later duels.2

      white ppl are dumb

    14. Enslaved Africans carried strong concepts of honor to North America. As wehave seen, the pastoral Angolans held a tradition of reflexive honor in whichaffronts to honor were settled in stick fights.


    15. oot doctoring and knocking and kicking acted as related sources ofempowerment


    16. tricknology


    17. However, when fighting from some physical disadvantage or when defendingoneself from a white oppressor, the ideal was to strike a butting-style headblow and finish the fight before it even developed.


    18. style worked from an opening stance in which “each contestant placed onehand on his opponent’s shoulder at or near the collar line, and with the otherhe clutched his opponent’s arm directly above the elbow.”20 This style alsoincluded groundwork and became popular in America because it gave theadvantage to skill rather than size and allowed for contests between individu-als of different sizes

      collar-and-elbow, Irish wrestling, advantage

    19. Similarly, the unarmed martial arts were living traditions that could spreadin the Americas even when only a few practitioners were introduced to aregion. As these arts had served as a base of support in difficult times in Africa,under the exceedingly horrific experience of racial slavery in the Americas evenlone martial arts masters may have been called upon to serve their new com-munities as sources of defensive leadership. These arts did not die with suchmasters but were effectively passed on horizontally (to peers rather than exclu-sively to progeny) even to those whose patrimony came from areas of Africaother than Biafra and southern Angola.


    20. could leave their cultural mark on the future generations of thegeneral bonded population.


    21. the enslaved community in a given region of the Americas, these populationscould at times call upon elements of their collective military traditions


    22. the combination of trading patterns and pref-erences of European planters in the Americas for laborers of specific Africanethnicities tended to lump together large numbers of captive Africans from cer-tain areas into particular colonies in the Americas.

      how the enslaved kept their honor, history, martial arts

    23. Biafran-derived war dances and closed soci-eties continued to act as vehicles for paramilitary actions in the Americas


    24. remembered the martial traditions that could be calledupon in times of need


    25. fight-ing styles would serve as means of setting various classes and communitiesapart

      what ethnic markers mean

    26. When he arrived on the coast some seven months later,Equiano met coastal Biafrans whose culture and language were completelyunfamiliar to him. In expressing this difference Equiano noted the foreignnessof their fighting style along with other traits: “All the nations and people I hadhitherto passed through, resembled our own in their manners, customs, andlanguage; but I came at length to a country, the inhabitants of which differedfrom us in all those particulars. I was very much struck with this difference,especially when I came among a people who did not circumcise . . . and foughtwith their fists among themselves.”5

      tell differences btwn what you know and what you dont (familiarity vs foreignness)

    27. Fighting for Honor
      1. How did martial arts serve as an ethnic marker?

      2. What were the various social contexts in North America in which martial arts were utilized by enslaved Africans and their descendants? Apart from honor, what advantages (and possibly disadvantages) did the enslaved from using martial arts in these contexts?

      3. In what ways did martial arts serve as a useful resource in pursuing/defending honor?

    1. little empirical research

      below is places where there are gaps in research

    2. Relatively small minorities of unusually active and opinionated individuals often animate online debates, even as the vast majority of internet users pay little or no attention to these partisan discussions.

      i could prob say something regarding to this

    3. In summary, the picture on polarisation is complex and research is often limited outside the United States. Overall, ideological polarisation has, in the long run, declined in many countries, but affective polarisation has in some cases, but not all, increased. News audience polarisation is much lower in most European countries, including the United Kingdom. Much depends on the specifics of individual countries and what point in time one measures change from, and there are no universal patterns, suggesting country-specific factors drive national developments, including most importantly the behaviour of political elites and social dynamics.

      summary of media use and polarization

    4. broader changes in both news supply and media use, suggesting a relative decline in coverage of and attention to local politics and more focus on often more divisive national politics, also seems to be a possible contributor to polarisation in the United States (Martin and McCrain 2019).

      possible explanation for US polarization

    5. using like-minded partisan media in the US can increase anger toward the ‘other side’ and make people more willing to share political information on social media (Hasell and Weeks 2016)

      psychological effects

    6. US studies find that exposure to like-minded partisan media under experimental conditions can strengthen the views of already partisan individuals (Levendusky 2013)


    7. most people tend to congregate around a few popular news outlets and that all news sites – including partisan ones – attract reasonably ideologically diverse audiences


    8. news media use is increasingly fragmented and polarised


    9. refers to the structure of aggregate public attention to news media, to whether a country is home to large news outlets with both strongly left- and strongly right-leaning audiences, as opposed to outlets with mostly mixed or centrist audiences


    10. find that levels of affective polarisation vary greatly by country (complicating the notion that polarisation is pronounced everywhere) and document considerable variation in patterns over time (belying the notion that a single universal cause – for example the spread of the internet – is driving polarisation everywhere)

      affective polarization study

    11. affective polarisation clearly seems to be on the rise – as one team of researchers find that ordinary Americans increasingly dislike and distrust those from the other party


    12. refers to how much opposing partisans dislike one another


    13. Left/Right polarisation has decreased in many high-income democracies and electoral volatility increased, even as other divisions, sometimes over so-called “post-material” issues, have become more important

      ideological polarization definition/explanation

    14. a range of different kinds of polarisation of the public, including ideological polarisation, affective polarisation, and news audience polarisation.

      types of polarization

    15. Polarisation, in social science, refers to divisions between groups


    16. In summary, studies in the UK and several other countries, including the highly polarised US, have found very similar results whether relying on survey data or passive tracking data. Most people have diverse media diets, those who rely on only one source typically converge on large sources with politically diverse audiences such as commercial or public service broadcasters, and only small minorities, often only a few percent, exclusively get news from partisan sources.

      summary of evidence for/against echo chambers

    17. “most social media users receive information from a diversity of viewpoints.”


    18. many more internet users consume no online news at all than rely solely on partisan sources


    19. Whether Democrat, Republican, or independent, the large bulk of these individuals’ media diets cluster around the center of the ideological spectrum


    20. Using network analysis and combining TV and internet tracking data, Webster and Ksiazek (2012) find high degrees of audience overlap across news sources and concentration of audiences on large mainstream outlets.


    21. potential size is limited by the fact that many people do not consume much online news in the first place


    22. 2013 election, estimate that 3% of people were in an entirely one-sided partisan media echo chamber

      little evidence to support echo chambers

      • so they really aren't much of a problem, at least in terms of news
    23. Echo chambers, filter bubbles, and polarisation: a literature review


    24. proportion of people in like-minded echo chambers in the UK during the election was 2% among Labour voters and 4% among Conservative voters – very similar to the results of survey-based work in the UK cited above

      another study

    25. the notion that large numbers of people are cocooned in pure ideological news echo chambers, cut off from other points of view, is exaggerated and wrong


    26. United States, researchers have long found that echo chambers are smaller and less prevalent than commonly assumed

      research continues to show that echo chambers are not as prevalent or important as we may think

      • reminds me of how facebook is known for this (Zucked)
    27. formation of echo chambers was largely undercut by people’s common use of relatively impartial public service broadcasting


    28. did not find strong evidence for widespread news echo chambers and observed that most people accessed “non-like-minded media” at least sometimes

      research is not showing support for news based echo chambers, it shows the opposite

    29. while some people did engage in selective exposure to partisan news sources, rates were low overall, “suggesting a pattern of cross-cutting exposure more than isolated echo chambers.”

      study findings

    30. around 10% in the UK said they almost never see political content on social media that they disagree with

      may hint at how algorthims work

      but also implies most ppl see content they don't agree with so not necessarily a filter bubble or echo chamber

    31. US is the main outlier among the seven and the only one where more than 10% of the respondents are estimated to rely only on partisan news sources

      america is special <3

    32. a minority of around 5% of people only use news sources with ideological slants in one direction

      general stat

    33. In the UK, the proportion of people estimated to be in a left-leaning echo chamber is around 2% and the proportion in a right-leaning echo chamber is around 5% (Fletcher et al. 2021b).

      study findings

    34. Across a range of different countries, including the highly polarised United States, several cross-platform studies – both those reliant on survey data and those reliant on passive tracking data – have found that few people occupy politically partisan online news echo chambers.

      across countries, few ppl are in left/right leaning news echo chambers

    35. only surveys and tracking data can give a broader sense of what media space people occupy, as findings based on data from a single social media platform – virtually never used in isolation – cannot establish whether people inhabit a bounded, enclosed media space that magnifies messages while insulating them from rebuttal

      regarding echo chambers

    36. it is important to recognise that (a) there is no single-source ground truth that captures all media use (online tracking data struggles to capture behaviour inside apps such as Facebook, does not capture offline use, and can have a hard time separating meaningful from superficial engagement), (b) surveys in particular are dependent on respondents accurately remembering and describing their media use (something many people struggle to do), and (c) news and information involve an irreducibly subjective component, as there is no objective standard for what does or does not constitute, for example, news as opposed to opinion or impartiality as opposed to partisan news, and sometimes no broad-based inter-subjective consensus either, complicating measurements

      important to note

    37. Differences in news use are partially aligned with differences in age, gender, education, and income

      reason for differences in news intake

    38. large minority of news lovers, about 22% of UK internet users, engaging with many different news sources on a regular basis across many different offline and online platforms, a majority of daily briefers (55%) who use a few different sources of news and a large minority of more casual users (23%) who often do not access news daily


    39. differences in individuals’ active choices and regular habits play a defining role in the overall distribution of news use, tending towards greater inequalities

      descriptive feature

    40. half of UK internet users in 2021 reported they had gone directly to a news website or app (e.g., BBC News, Guardian, Mail Online, HuffPost) in the past week, with the rest relying on offline sources and/or news accessed via platforms such as search or social media (Newman et al. 2021)


    41. Second, there is an abundant supply of news online, but on average, people spend a limited amount of time with it and many internet users do not regularly actively seek out online news

      descriptive feature

    42. we live in increasingly digital, mobile, and platform-dominated media environments

      descriptive feature

    43. suggests echo chambers are much less widespread than is commonly assumed, finds no support for the filter bubble hypothesis and offers a very mixed picture on polarisation and the role of news and media use in contributing to polarisation

      main conclusion

    44. documents the important role of self-selection, elite cues, and small, highly active communities with strong views in shaping these debates and highlights the role especially political elites play in shaping both news coverage and public opinion on these issues

      what current research shows

    45. In the specific context of the United States where there is more research, it seems that exposure to like-minded political content can potentially polarise people or strengthen the attitudes of people with existing partisan attitudes and that cross- cutting exposure can potentially do the same for political partisans.

      US research --> exposure to like-minded content/filter bubbles and echo chambers may cause more polarization and further strengthen partisan attitudes

    46. News audience polarisation is much lower in most European countries, including the United Kingdom. Much depends on the specifics of individual countries and what point in time one measures change from and there are no universal patterns.

      specifics for polarization

    47. ideological polarisation has, in the long run, declined in many countries but affective polarisation has in some, but not all, cases increased

      polarization conclusion

    48. forms of algorithmic selection offered by search engines, social media, and other digital platforms generally lead to slightly more diverse news use – the opposite of what the “filter bubble” hypothesis posits – but that self-selection, primarily among a small minority of highly partisan individuals, can lead people to opt in to echo chambers, even as the vast majority do not.

      algorithms used by platforms and search engines actually lead to more diverse news being present on a feed (not filter bubble) but self-selection changes this

    49. most people have relatively diverse media diets, that those who rely on only one source typically converge on widely used sources with politically diverse audiences (such as commercial or public service broadcasters) and that only small minorities, often only a few percent, exclusively get news from partisan sources.

      study finding to reference