wujud does not possess mental existence; and what does not possess mental existence is neither universal nor neither general nor specific
mystical / experiential
wujud does not possess mental existence; and what does not possess mental existence is neither universal nor neither general nor specific
mystical / experiential
Every cause will be either matter or form or agent, i.e., that from which motion begins; or final, i.e., that for the sake of which the thing is. Scientific inquiries are four, as we have determined elsewhere in our philosophical treatises
Al-Kindi likens the matter, the form, and the agent, separating them from the concept of the final cause. The former causes are said to be where kinetic motion begins, while the latter is the impetus for this motion, the reason the thing is what it is. Obviously these causes are borrowed from Aristotle, though their distinct meanings are somewhat skewed by Al-Kindi. Al-Kindi frames these ‘causes’ as forms of scientific inquiry, which is definitely noteworthy because he fails to talk about religion in this short passage.
d from this.
I think Al-Kindi’s words in this passage create a concept of philosophy that only adds credibility to religion itself. Because this religion, this true one, as well as philosophy, is universally accessible, it proves the truth and validity of First Philosophy through its expression as an immediate and all-encapsulating concept. However, the method in which Al-Kindi has presented and composed this text directly contrasts with his ideas about accessibility. His language and sentence structure are often obscure, so that surely it is not totally understandable to most who read it. Al-Kindi’s text is attempting to bring a seemingly grandiose idea down to earth-- and although there are clear faults, it is certainly impossible to land on a solid and correct answer within the topics he is exploring nonetheless.
(We should be grateful) particularly since it has been clear to us and to the distinguished philosophers before us who are not our co-linguists, that no man by the diligence of his quest has attained the truth, i.e., that which the truth deserves, nor have the (philosophers as a) whole comprehended it. Rather, each of them either has not attained any truth or has attained something small in relation to what the truth deserves. When, though, the little which each one of them who has acquired the truth is collected, something of great worth is as
Al-Kindi exercises humility on his own part and regarding all philosophers when he proclaims that even philosophers have failed to reach any truth entirely or failed to do justice to what the truth deserves. Al-Kindi stresses that every small insight into the truth by a philosopher is useful when taken in coherence with all other past knowledge. This cumulative process of knowledge towards truth is very noble, for clearly Al-Kindi recognizes that no single person is powerful enough to establish the truth themselves, nor should be powerful enough so as not to come close to the might of the True One. I find Al-Kindi’s democratic ideas about collaboration on truth to be contested by those of Aristotle and Al-Farabi. Both offer an exclusive view on those who should be able to participate in the art of philosophy and/or intellect. In Al-Farabi’s book of religion, not only does he contest that “the two parts of which religion consists of are subordinate to philosophy” (97), but he also maintains the belief that there is a lowest class of people that are incapable of deep contribution to society and therefore closeness to God: “the last beings, namely, the ones that perform servile actions. There is nothing more inferior in existence to these, nor is it at all possible for them to perform ruling actions”(110). There is a notion that philosophy is a high-strung art that is even above religion. Al-Kindi cleary disagrees with both of these things, for philosophy and theology are effortlessly fused and rely on one another for existence, and both should be accessible in some way to everyone.
The truth requires that we do not reproach anyone who is even one of the causes of even small and meagre benefits to us; how then shall we treat those who are (responsible for) many causes, of large, real and serious benefits to us? Though deficient in some of the truth, they have been our kindred and associates in that they benefited us by the fruits of their thought, which have become our approaches and instruments, leading to much knowledge of that the real nature of which they fell short of obtaining
Al-Kindi maintains that the truth requires a holistic approach to human interaction. He pushes the agenda of treating others equally, no matter whether their presences affect us in large or small ways, whether a person is at the helm of many ‘causes’ or few. This principle that Al-Kindi puts forward attempts at unifying humanity, just as God has a unified existence. This truth is fundamentally the True One, meaning that God and religion require a certain acceptance of others to genuinely participate in. These peaceful ideals are directly in opposition to the Poem of Antar, which is one of the key poems part of a larger set known as The Muʿallaqa. These poems were composed during pre-islamic Arabia, much before Al-Kindi’s lifetime. This poetry openly promotes a type of self-absorbedness that includes no regard for the plight or success of others. The main actor in said poem follows his personal desires to the extent that it brings misfortune to others, which is totally unlike Al-Kindi’s plea to recognize everyone for their contributions, no matter the size. Al-Kindi asks that all input from all people be given due consideration, even if these contributions are somehow lacking in truth, because every small fragment of truth is of value. Whatever truth a person was unable to obtain reveals partly that which they strove to obtain.
he first cause is, therefore, the first in nobility, the first in genus, the first in rank with respect to that the knowledge of which is most certain; and the first in time, since it is the cause of time.
The first cause is not only a fixed certainty, but is the precedent in the order of time. This is so because the first cause is the very cause of time, just as it contains all of philosophy and is a part of philosophy. The unity of God is paralleled by these concepts - as the True One is simultaneously a facet of something and also the creator of it.
Knowledge of the first cause has truthfully been called “First Philosophy”, since all the rest of philosophy is contained in its knowledg
Recognition of the aforementioned first cause, which is the True One, is named “First Philosophy” because it is not only the first step in the philosophical practice, but it also carries all remaining philosophy within itself. Al-Kindi solidifies the place of God and religion in the sphere of Philosophy with these remarks,arguing indirectly that the True One is the cause and creator of philosophy itself. The very first sect of philosophy is concerned with the recognition and respect of God themselves, and the continuation of the study of philosophy must be contained within First Philosophy and therefore the True One.
evident that when we obtain full knowledge of its matter we thereby obtain full knowledge of its genus; and when we obtain full knowledge of its form we thereby obtain full knowledge of its species, knowledge of the specific difference being subsumed within knowledge of the species. When, therefore, we obtain full knowledge of its matter, form and final cause, we thereby obtain full knowledge of its definition, and the real nature of every defined object is its definition.
All of these questions create a chain reaction-- going from matter, to genus, to species and form-- in which the final cause and therefore the true definition of a thing is uncovered. The definition, most importantly of a defined object, is the most true statement about a thing. The articulation that only defined objects have definitions seems like a briefly mentioned afterthought in this paragraph, though it may allude to the idea that God is a being which cannot be defined. This is similar to Al-Ghazali’s ideas that God is totally unknowable and that God is one. Because God cannot be known, God has no definition, nor can he be split up into different causes or have scientific inquiries cast upon him because he is one.
“whether”, “what”, “which”, or “why”. “Whether” is an investigation only of the existence (of something); “what” investigates the genus of every existent which has a genus; “which” investigates its specific difference; “what” and “which” together investigate its species; and “why” its final cause, since it is an investigation of the absolute cause.
These scientific inquiries each serve their own purpose to aid in the arrival at the absolute cause, and are as follows: ”Whether” answers the question of existence of something, “what” questions the genus, or type, of the thing, “which” questions what makes the thing particular and what makes it different, “which” and “what” work in cooperation to question the larger class or species of the thing, and finally, the “why” serves to answer to the thing’s final cause, or its ultimate and natural purpose.
for the knowledge of the cause is more noble than knowledge of the effect, since we have complete knowledge of every knowable only we have obtained full knowledge of its cause.
Al-Kindi does away with the overpowering importance of the effect within the practice of philosophy, as he asserts the power of the cause. Knowing the cause is the most noble action a philosopher is able to take is to honor the cause by recognizing that every effect has its root in the cause, which is the True One. Therefore, every effect can only be uncovered if the only universal cause is acknowledged.
The noblest part of philosophy and the highest in rank is the First Philosophy, i. e., knowledge of the First Truth Who is the cause of all truth. Therefore it is necessary that the perfect and most noble philosopher will be the man fully understands this most noble knowledge;
Philosophy may be the most noble art in the human continuation, though the most nobility within the actual art of philosophy comes from First Philosophy. First Philosophy is a recognition of the First Truth, which stems from the first cause, i.e, the cause of all truth. The capitalization of the phrase “First Truth” and the exposition from the previous paragraphs are enough to suggest that not only is the True One the first and singular cause of everything, but also that the First Truth is in reference to God. One of Allah’s ninety nine names is Al Haqq, meaning “the truth” or “the real”.
We do not find the truth we are seeking without finding a cause; the cause of the existence and continuance of everything is the True One in that each thing which has being has true. The True One exists necessarily and therefore beings exist.
Philosophy's principle goal is to probe for the truth, yet this truth is unable to be found without the existence of a cause. This cause, and the cause of everything and its sustenance, is the True One. Therefore, every philosopher’s pursuit is grounded in the True One. Al-Kindi strays from Aristotle yet again, as Aristotle's four causes-- material, formal, efficient, and final-- seem to matter naught, as the authentic cause of everything is the True One.
The aim of the philosopher is, as regards his knowledge, to attain the truth, and as regards to his action, to act truthfully; not that the activity is endless, for we abstain and the activity ceases, once we have reached the truth.
Goals of a philosopher are naturally to procure the truth, though Al-Kindi makes an interesting distinction by additionally mentioning how a philosopher should act, which is truthfully. Already Al-Kindi is making unobtrusive references to religion and the True One, as he hints at the inferiority of man to God when he says that man can never attain the whole truth, or when he calls for the philosopher to act truthfully in order to maintain some sort of morality within the practice. Al-Kindi seems to find it necessary to mention that this activity of truth-seeking ends once we have found the truth, though clearly his previous statements recognize man’s inability to do so. His reference to this means that philosophy is a life-long enterprise for man, as man should eternally chase down this inexplicable truth.
Indeed, the human art which is highest in degree and most noble and rank is the art of philosophy, the definition of which is knowledge of the true nature of things, insofar as is possible for man.
Declarations that assert Philosophy to be the highest human art follow suit with Aristotle’s ideas about Philosophy being some lofty undertaking. There is a limit to the greatness of this art form, however, as man is only able to attain fragments of the truth, for he is just a man.
When it performs its action and falls under our eyes, its mighty wonderful power is apparent, which of necessity could not stand still in itself without traveling along the ways of genesis and action:
beauty makes you remember the true one
ere this so, she would not know the power of the soul and would not know her nobility, for action is but the indication and manifestation of the hidden power, and if the power of the soul lay
soul needs corruption/movement to remain perfect
Empedocles
prophet
It is the true first essence that pours forth life, first upon mind, then upon soul, then upon the natural things, this being the Creator, who is absolute good.
first true essence = creator = absolute good
he cause of the true essences, which are bodiless, and of the sensible things, which have bodies, is one and the same, and that is the first true essence, meaning by that, the Creator, the Maker
cause of everything, both form and matter is the Creator
described the soul and has said many beautiful things about her,
interesting that soul is a she
Were they not certain that the soul survives and does not die, this would not be their custom and would not be as it were a natural, necessary, obligatory practice.
if the soul dies then the sins do not matter
the souls of plants are all living, for all souls are emitted from one beginning, though each of them has a life appropriate and suited to her
this kind of reminds me of buddhist principles
when the mind is informed with the form of desire, it desires to bring out into actuality the form that is in it, and it longs greatly for that, and the birth pangs seize it and it brings it [the form] forth into actuality because of its desire for the sensible world.
is it desire or a bodily need? is there a difference? does the form, aka the baby, the one which desires the 'sensible world'?