there will be no reduction in the number of their representatives, in accordance with the provisions of this 21st clause. It is the interest of Lower Canada, more than of any other province, to watch with a jealous eye over the mechanism adopted for the organization of the Federal Legislature. In case of a vital question arising, we should have to counteract the votes of these five members (who ought, in justice, to be deducted from the representation of the other provinces) by those of five of our members, whose votes would thus be lost to us, as would also be the weight which their five united counties, with a total population of 114,480 (or 22,896 for each county), would throw into the scale. Other combinations of circumstances might arise which might prove even more disadvantageous to us. This subject naturally leads me to address myself to my French Canadian colleagues ; I fear that my remarks may not be well received by all, but I hope that honorable members will be good enough to excuse my frankness in consideration of the great importance of the question. I have no right to maintain that all those who are favorably disposed towards Confederation are not acting in good faith; it is not my wish to reproach them for acting according to their convictions, but in so acting they should not forget the duties which their charge imposes on them. It a well known fact that when the scheme of Confederation was laid before the public, all the newspapers, and most of the members who support the Administration, declared themselves in favor of the scheme, but, in nearly every instance, with an express reservation of the right to introduce certain amendments which they considered indispensable. But the Honorable Attorney General for Upper Canada declared, some days ago, that the Government would accept no amendment, and that the resolutions must be adopted exactly in the shape in which they were brought down. Are honorable members going to submit to this decree ? Is it not their intention at least to make an effort to have those amendments, which they looked upon as indispensable, adopted ? Their position in relation to the Government confers upon them an influence which they can never exert more usefully than at present ; it is their duty to exert that influence ; they are responsible for the results of this measure, which cannot be adopted without their concurrence. Their principal argument in support of Confederation is that we have now an excellent opportunity of obtaining; favorable conditions—an opportunity which will probably never occur again, and one of which it is their duty to avail themselves. But have the honorable members made those conditions ? Have they taken as great precautions to preserve intact the interests of nearly a million French Canadians entrusted to their care, as they would have taken in making an agreement for the sale of a farm, or even the purchase of a horse ? Have they made any conditions at all ? If they have made no conditions, do they at least know what the fate is that is reserved for us ? Do they know the nature of the form of Government which will be imposed on Lower Canada? Can they say whether we shall have Responsible Government ?

I object to the 21st clause, because it contains provisions which are unjust to Lower Canada. The full scope of that clause is not generally understood ; that proportion of five per cent, appears to be a very small affair, and yet, under certain circumstances, it might produce considerable results, which are not taken into consideration in the explanations given on that subject in the work written by the Honorable Mr. CAUCHON, which the Government has caused to be distributed (pages 72 to 87). It is difficult to foretell what the exact numerical increase of the several provinces will be from the present time to the next census in 1871. The Honorable Mr. CAUCHON assumes, as the basis of his calculations, a rate of thirty per cent. Let us suppose the case to prove that in all the provinces (with the exception of Lower Canada) the population increases, by thirty per cent, between 1861 and 1871, and that that of Lower Canada increases by thirty-four per cent. It may, perhaps, be objected to this that it is improbable. My reply is, that when we are discussing a scheme of such importance as that which is now under our consideration, we should provide for all possible contingencies; but this one is far from being impossible if the predictions of the Minister of Finance and the Attorney General, who promise to Lower Canada so brilliant a future under the Federal system, are fulfilled. If Lower Canada becomes the heart of the commercial life of the Confederation ; if the mines of copper, lead, silver, and gold which we have lately discovered should produce the same results that they produce everywhere else, that of attracting a great influx of population, I cannot be accused of any very great exaggeration in supposing that the population of Lower Canada may, between the years 1861 and 1871, increase by four per cent, more than the population of the other provinces. In the case which I have supposed the increase would be as follows :— Upper Canada 418,827 Lower Canada 377,625 Nova Scotia 99,257 New Brunswick 75,614 Newfoundland 39,000 Prince Edward Island 24,227 ——– Total increase 1,034,550 According to this calculation, Lower Canada would have, in 1871, a population of 1,488,- 289 souls, which would have to be divided by 65, that being the invariable number of representatives assigned to Lower Canada, in order to ascertain what will be the number of constituents for each representative in the Federal Parliament ; the result will be found to be 22,896. Upper Canada would have a population of 1,814,918 souls, which, divided by 22,896, would give her seventy-nine representatives instead of eighty-two. Nova Scotia would have a population of 430,114 souls, which would give her nineteen representatives as at present (eighteen and a fraction over the half). New Brunswick would have a population of 327,661 souls, which would give her fourteen representatives instead of fifteen. Newfoundland would have a population of 169,000 souls, which would give her seven representatives instead of eight. Prince Edward Island would have a population of 104,984 souls, which would give her five members as at present (four and a fraction over the half). It will be seen that if the five other provinces were represented on the same scale as Lower Canada, they would, in 1871, lose among them five members ; but as the total population of each will not have decreased by five per cent., relatively to the total population of the Confederated Provinces,

the Speech from the Throne, which expresses ” thankfulness to a beneficent Providence for the general contentment of the people of this province,” or the address voted by the Legislature in answer to the Speech from the Throne, which is the faithful echo of this grateful sentiment ! What would the members of the Ministry have said, if a member had risen to move an amendment to the Address in the words made use of by the Hon. Premier, ” That the country is bordering on civil strife, and that therefore the House cannot admit that there is general contentment among the people?” It is on reasons widely differing from these that the Speech from the Throne takes ground in recommending the adoption of the scheme of Confederation. But are we really bordering on civil strife ? Of course it is representation based on population which is the exciting cause. Do the people of Upper Canada demand representation based on population as a condition sine qua non of the continuation of our peaceful relations with them ? Has this desire to obtain representation based on population taken such deep root in the bosom of Upper Canada, that it is ready to plunge us and itself into the horrors of civil war in order to achieve it ? Or is not representation by population rather one of those political clap-traps which ambitious men, who can catch them no other way, set to catch the heedless multitude? We, Lower Canadians, who at this distance cannot judge of the sentiments of Upper Canadians by our own observation, must depend for the formation of our opinions respecting them on the Upper Canada newspapers, and on the speeches of their members in this House. They are the only sources of information which we possess. Well, in 1862, we saw the Upper Canada leaders, except the President of the Council, who was wise enough to keep aloof, who are at the same time connected with the principal newspapers there, either as proprietors, editors or co-editors, accept office under the MACDONALD-SICOTTE Government, the fundamental principle of which was equal representation of the two sections, a principle which entitled it to the cordial support of Lower Canada. These gentlemen we saw re-elected, notwithstanding their abandonment of their principles, and we found them voting against representation by population. From this I conclude that Upper Canada is much more indifferent, and its leaders much less sincere touching this question of the representation, than they would have us believe. Were it otherwise, Upper Canada would have taken the opportunity, afforded by the election, of punishing the men who had betrayed her. But who are those two men who now pitch their voices in harmony (formerly so discordant) to predict civil war, if we do not vote for Confederation ? They are the Attorney General for Lower Canada, and the President of the Council (Hon. Messrs. CARTIER and BROWN !)—the one demanding representation by population, the other refusing it : both took their stand as the champions of their sections, and became their chieftains respectively.

To sum up all in few words : all the advantages are negative, that is to say, Confederation will do no harm to our interests, military or commercial, but neither do they require it.

When you compare this circuitous route with the far more direct one of the United States, it is quite easy to understand why the United States can sell even our wheat to the Gulf Provinces at lower prices than we ourselves are able to do. I have attempted to reduce the commercial advantages we are promised to their proper proportion. I will now endeavor to show that we can secure every one of these advantages without the Confederation. I shall cite, for that purpose, the very words of the Honorable Minister of Finance :— If we look at the results of the free interchange of produce between Canada and the United States, we shall find that our trade with them increased, in ten years, from less than two millions to twenty millions of dollars. If free trade has produced such results in that case, what may we not expect when the artificial obstacles which hamper free trade between us and the provinces of the Gulf shall have disappeared ? But this fine result was not obtained by means of a Confederation with the United States. What hinders us from having free trade with the Gulf Provinces ? In support of this view, I shall quote the work of the honorable member for Montmorency, not that of 1858, but that of 1865, written in favor of Confederation, pages 32 and 33, where he shews in the most conclusive manner that we have no need of Confederation to improve our commercial relations with the Gulf Provinces. It is under this head of commercial advantages that the Intercolonial Railway fitly comes in. The Honorable President of the Council tells us that he is favorable to Confederation, because it will give us a seaport at all seasons of the year—a most powerful argument, he adds, in its favor. We stand in great need of a seaport in the winter season, more especially if the United States abolish the right of transit. Absolutely, without reference to that, we require it in order to perfect our system of defence.

ourselves sell our flour to the Lower Provinces ? For the simple reason that, instead of having to pay four millions four hundred and forty-seven thousand dollars to the United States, they would have to pay us five millions of dollars, and they would therefore refuse to buy from us. There is no such thing as sentiment in matters of business ; men buy in the cheapest market. The Gulf Provinces will buy their flour from the United States so long as they can obtain it at a lower price there than in Canada ; and the fact that they do obtain it cheaper from the United States is clearly demonstrated by their buying from the Americans and not from us.

I concur with the Government in their desire to form more intimate commercial relations between the different provinces ; but when it is attempted to use the immense advantages which would result from these relations as an overwhelming argument in favor of Confederation, it is as well to form a proper appreciation of those advantages, and see whether we cannot secure them without Confederation. The Gulf Provinces possess timber, coal and fisheries ; our own two great articles of export are timber and wheat. With regard to timber, the Gulf Provinces have no more need of ours than we of theirs. As to coal we import from England what we need for our present wants, in ballast, on board the numerous ships which come here for our timber, and we thus get it cheaper than we could import it from the Gulf Provinces. When this supply becomes insufficient to meet our growing wants, it will be necessary to look somewhere for a supply of coal. If the Lower Provinces can furnish it to us at cheaper rates than we can get it in the United States, we shall buy it from them. Upper Canada will probably get its coal from the Pennsylvania mines, which are in direct communication with Lake Erie, on the north shore of which the richest and most thickly settled portion of Upper Canada is situated. As regards fisheries, Canada has a stock of fish in its waters sufficient not only to supply all its own requirements, but to enable it to export largely from Gaspé to Europe. Now as to wheat. The Honorable President of the Council told us that in a single year the Atlantic Provinces paid $4,440,000 to the United States for flour, and that a portion of that flour came from Upper Canada ; and the honorable gentleman asks why should not we

MR. CORNELLIER—All the confederations which you have mentioned were or are republican, and had the common fate of republican institutions. You have not said a word about monarchical confederations. MR. JOLY—I have made no mention of monarchical confederations, because none have ever existed, and none can exist. The principle of a monarchy is that the power resides in one person; the principle of confederation is that it resides in all the members of the confederation. A confederation would, therefore, always be a republic, even if formed of several states subject to a monarchy; because the power would not be vested in one person, but in each of the several states, of which no one would acknowledge a head ; it would be a republic consisting of a very small number of members. Before I take leave of all the confederations, the names of which I have mentioned, I intend to say one word, at least, in their favor. We understand that states

Confederation of the United states of South America

The Confederation of Columbia

Let us begin with the Central American Confederacy or Republic of Guatemala.

Lord MACAULAY says in the first volume of his History of England

Lord BROUGHAM, who is listened to with profound respect in the Imperial Parliament, thus expresses his views in the third part of his work on Political Philosophy

The Minister of Agriculture alone has had the courage to open the volume of the world’s history, and he hastily closed it with the significant remark, especially so falling from his lips :— In all the constitutions in which the Federal principle has been adopted, it cannot be denied that the same fatal vice is to be discerned—the weakness of the central authority. This has been the fatal disease in all confederations of which I have heard, or whose histories I have read. They have died of consumption.

Remarks have also been made about the laws of divorce and marriage, and the honorable member for the division of DeLanaudière (Hon. Mr. OLIVIER) told us that the Conference had done well in transferring the power of divorce to the General Government. On his part, I think this was a wise view of the question, and I am glad to have the opportunity of now telling him so. He was, however, very uneasy about the word ” marriage.” Well, I will try to put him right and at his ease on that point; and I will give him the answer as I find it put down in writing, so that no possible misunderstanding may continue to exist. If the honorable gentleman will but take his pen, he will be able to note my answer :—” The word ‘ marriage’ has been inserted to give the General Legislature the right to decide what form of marriage will be legal in all parts of the Confederation, without in any way interfering with the rules and prescriptions of the Church to which the contracting parties belong.”

Some hon. gentlemen have told us that this was not a Federal union—that the project before you, hon. gentlemen, was in point of fact a project for a Legislative union. One hon. gentleman who took this view read the 29th section, in order to show that the General Government, if it chose, could repeal any of the local acts of the different local legislatures—that the General Government, for instance, could do away with our religious and benevolent corporations, or deprive them of their property. I think the honorable gentleman must have been rather short-sighted when he read the 29th resolution, for he omitted a very important part of it ; and, if he had not omitted that part, I do not think he would have said that this Federal scheme was really a scheme for a Legislative union. I have no doubt my honorable friend acted in good faith ; but being rather short-sighted, he did not read the whole clause ; otherwise he must have arrived at a different conclusion. The 29th section says : ” The General Parliament shall have power to make laws for the peace, welfare and good government of the Federated Provinces (saving the sovereignty of England), and especially laws respecting the following subjects.” Then follows a list of all the subjects committed to the General Government. But the resolution does not finish there. There is something that comes after all that, and it is this : ” And generally respecting all matters of a general character, not specially and exclusively reserved for the local governments and legislatures.” Now I would ask honorable gentlemen if an act incorporating a religious body or benevolent society here in Lower Canada is a subject of a general character ; is it not a subject purely local ? (Hear, hear.) Take, for instance, the sisters of charity. Could the General Government, under this clause, interfere with the privileges of those ladies ? I say they could not. I suppose the honorable gentleman who used the argument advanced it conscientiously and in good faith. But I think it is quite evident from a reading of the resolution that, if Confederation takes place, the General Government will have no power to interfere with such matters. (Hear, hear.) I must say positively, if I am competent to draw any conclusion at all from what I read, that the General Government will have no right to meddle at all with those religious and benevolent corporations, none in the world. (Hear, hear.)

If we do not make those alliances with the Lower Provinces—if we do not open with them those communications, political, social, and commercial, which are essential for our own interest, we shall little by little lose some of those principles we now esteem so much ; we shall lose little by little our attachment to the Mother Country, and the interesting reminiscences which, with many of us, now give intensity to that attachment; and we shall become—you may depend upon it, hon. gentlemen—more and more democratised, before we are aware of it.

I say that, if we do not cultivate with our sister provinces—the Maritime Provinces—a close commercial, political, and social intercourse— being all of us British subjects, all of us monarchists, owing allegiance to the same Crown—if we neglect the cultivation of that intercourse, we run a great danger.

HON. MR. CURRIE—By the 6th subsection the local legislatures have the control of ” Education ; saving the rights and privileges which the Protestant or Catholic minority in both Canadas may possess as to their denominational schools at the time when the union goes into operation.” I do not know whether the representations which have been made in some portions of the country are correct—that, under this section/ the Roman Catholics would be entitled to no more schools than they have at the passing of the act ? Will the Commissioner of Crown Lands please explain ? HON. MR. CAMPBELL—By this section it is affirmed that the principle of action with reference to those schools which may be in existence at the time the Confederation takes effect, shall continue in operation. Should this Parliament and the other legislatures adopt the scheme, and if the Imperial Parliament adopts an act giving effect to it, there will be found in existence certain principles by which the minorities in Upper and Lower , Canada will be respectively protected, and those principles will continue in operation. HON. MR. CURRIE—But suppose no alteration is made in the Common School Law of Upper Canada—and, as I understand, none is promised—would the Roman Catholics be entitled to establish more separate schools ? HON. MR. CAMPBELL—The present Act would continue to operate, and the honorable gentleman knows what are the rights of Roman Catholic schools under that Act.

the Local Legislature of Lower Canada the construction and maintenance of a new Penitentiary, leaving to Upper Canada the Penitentiary now in existence in that province ? HON. MR. CAMPBELL—No doubt ; but Lower Canada may arrange with Upper Canada for the temporary use of the Penitentiary, so long as she requires it, or for its permanent use, if that is thought better.

The 9th sub-section of that clause imposes on the local governments, ” the establishment, maintenance and management of penitentiaries, and of public and reformatory prisons.” There is but one penitentiary in Canada, which is situated in Upper Canada. Does this clause impose on

HON. MR. CURRIE—The 34th sub-section of the same clause commits to the General Government ” the establishment of a general Court of Appeal for the Federated provinces.” Is that to be in lieu of the Courts of Appeal we now have ? Is it intended to do away with the present Court of Appeal and to establish a new one ? HON. MR. CAMPBELL—I do not think my honorable friend has caught the meaning of what is intended. It does not say the general Court of Appeal shall be established, but that the power to establish it shall be in the General Government. HON. MR. CURRIE—New Courts of Appeal? HON. MR. CAMPBELL—If a statute of the Parliament of the United Provinces shall be passed creating a Court of Appeal, it will state whether it is in lieu of, or in addition to, the present Courts of Appeal. I should suppose it would be in addition.

reference to the meaning of the 5th sub-section of the 29th clause, which commits to the General Parliament ” the raising of money by all or any other modes or system of taxation.” Am I to understand that he General Government are to have the power of imposing local taxation upon the lands of the provinces ? HON. MR. CAMPBELL—The general national power of taxation is to be in the General Government.

That there should be in every polity a centre of resistance to the predominant power in the Constitution—and in a democratic Constitution, therefore, a nucleus of resistance to the democracy— I have already maintained ; and I regard it as a fundamental maxim of government. If any people who possess a democratic representation are, from their historical antecedents, more willing to tolerate such a centre of resistance in the form of a Second Chamber or House of Lords, than it; any other shape, this constitutes a strong reason for having it in that shape. He admits that a check can be used, and properly used, by a House of Lords or a Legislative Council. Then he goes on to say that he does not think this the best check, and prescribes a plan of his own ; but his statement on this point is too long to enter upon now.

HON. MR. REESOR—But coal makes a manufacturing country, and there is no reason why Nova Scotia, as a manufacturing country, should not manufacture boots and shoes as cheaply as they can be manufactured at Montreal. I have lately learned from good authority that the very articles to which my honorable friend refers (boots and shoes) are now being largely manufactured in the city of St. John. Labor is quite as cheap in New Brunswick as in Canada, and there is no reason why they could not supply themselves with the articles named, and with many others, even cheaper than they can be supplied from Canada.

He would give the ministry the power ” to deluge this House with party tools.” He then went on and proved too much with regard to the trade between the provinces. He said New Brunswick and Nova Scotia would take our manufactures, that already we had large manufactures of boots and shoes, and that the Lower Provinces would take these and other manufactures from us. And then he told us that they had coal in Nova Scotia, and that where there is coal,mannfactures will spring up.

My honorable friend quoted some part of a work by Mr. JOHN STUART MILLS, a celebrated writer on Representative Government, but he did not go far enough. Mr. MILLS says :— The consideration which tells most in my judgment in favor of two Chambers (and this I do regard as of some moment), is the evil effect produced upon the mind of any holder of power, whether an individual or an assembly, by the contagiousness of having only themselves to consult. This is perfectly true. But what does my honorable friend advocate? He advocates that the whole power shall be concentrated in the General Government; that they shall have the power to create this House, so that the whole power shall be legally centred in ” one body.” The writer he quoted goes on and condemns that principle in the following words :— If the writings by which reputation has been gained are unconnected with politics, they are no evidence of the special qualities required, while, if political, they would enable successive ministries to deluge the House with party tools.

would be so very extravagant that this could not come to pass ; but in the same report, which has very opportunely come to hand, as it corroborates the remarks I made during the debate on the Address as to the fact that we should have some offset in the trade of the Lower Provinces, under Confederation, for what we should lose if the Reciprocity Treaty were to be annulled, I find the following statement :— The cost of transportation of flour from Montreal to Portland, Maine, by rail, has been reduced to the low figure of 35 cents per barrel, and from Portland, Maine, to this port, it can be conveyed for 25 cents by steamer, or 15 cents by sailing vessel, making altogether 60 cents for conveying a barrel of flour, weighing 200 lbs., by rail and steam, a distance of 585 miles, and it could be delivered at this port (St. John, N. B.) within five or six days from the time of loading at Montreal. Of course these low rates of railway freight apply to large quantities only. Well now, gentlemen, the distance from Montreal to St. John, by railway, are at a rough estimate about 600 miles.

Now, I do not think the Intercolonial Railway will be a profitable concern, all at once; but I think I can remove a few of the objections which have been raised to this part of the scheme. In the first place, I think a mistake prevails is to what will be the cost of carrying freight on this railway. I have here the annual Trade and Navigation Returns of New Brunswick for 1863, in which I find the following statement :— If New Brunswick was connected with Montreal and Quebec by direct railway communication through British territory, our importations from the States would decrease immediately, and much of our flour and other supplies would come direct from Canada ; and in the event of the Reciprocity Treaty and the bonding system of the United States, which allows British goods to pass through their territory free of duty under bond to Canada, being abolished, Saint John would probably become the Atlantic shipping port of Canada for the winter months. People may suppose the rates of freight

I must also refer to the clause which gives to local governments the right of dividing the sections of the Confederation into constituencies and electoral divisions. This power may become very dangerous and lead to great practical injustice, and should, I think, be placed in the hands opt the General Government.

Then, as to the question of education, I hope the Government will secure to Roman Catholics in Upper Canada the same rights which will be extended to Protestants in Lower Canada. To have the same privileges is only equal justice, which I trust and believe will be granted. Having been if communication with several of the Roman Catholic clergy, I can say that they desire to have every justice done to their Protestant fellow-subjects, but expect to have the same privileges granted to Roman Catholics in Upper Canada (who are the minority there,) as will be given to the Protestant minority in Lower Canada. (Hear, hear.)

Again, emigration is a subject which is left to the Local as well as the General Government to deal with. I think it should be under the care of the General Government entirely.

One of them is a matter in which Lower Canada is somewhat peculiarly interested— the system of marriage and divorce, which, I see, is to be left in the hands of the Federal Government.

filature, should be composed. But it appears to them to require further consideration whether, if the members be appointed for life, and their number be fixed, there will be any sufficient means of restoring harmony between the Legislative Council and the popular Assembly, if it shall ever unfortunately happen that a decided differ emcee of opinion shall arise between them. Now the point of this (Mr. CARDWELL’S) objection clearly is to the number being fixed, not to the principle of nomination, nor to members being appointed lord life.

The objections which have been raised to nomination by the Crown or the Executive Government are of very little effect at this time of day. For myself I should have preferred to have the nomination of legislative councillors vested in the Crown independently cu the recommendation of the Local Government, so as to have left die prerogative unfettered. They is no doubt that abuses formerly existed in Canada when the nominative system was in force—before responsible government was established and when the Colonial Office meddled a good deal with the affairs of the province; but now every honorable gentleman with any knowledge of historical events in Canada will say at once the case is altogether altered. So far from interfering in our internal matters, the Colonial Office now leaves us a great deal to ourselves and lets us do as we please. There never was a freer Constitution than ours. Under these altered circumstances, I should have preferred, I say, that in order to avoid all appearance of nominations for party purposes, the direct nomination of legislative councillors should have been left to the Crown or the Crown’s representative in the Confederation. (Hear.) There was one remark made by the hon. member for Wellington in reference to Mr. CARDWELL’S letter, which I think was made in error. He inferred from that despatch that Mr. CARDWELL was opposed to the nominative system. Now, the passage he alluded to was this : — The second point which Her Majesty’s Government desired should be reconsidered is the Constitution of the Legislative Council. They appreciate the considerations which have influenced the Conference in determining the mode in which this body, so important to the constitution of the Le-

In considering the project of Confederation, one of the principal subjects which has undergone discussion in this House has been the proposed Constitution of the Council, and the most prominent question connected with it has been the question of the elective versus the nominative, principle. Although an elected member, I voted without the least hesitation against the elective principle, and I believe that in doing so I represented the views of my constituents as well as my own—I mean the great majority of my constituents, for there may be some exceptions with regard to this point, as there are no doubt with respect to the general question of Confederation. I based my vote on what is, I think, a true principle in politics, which is that if you wish a check to be established, such as I think this Council is intended to establish on the legislation of the other branch, you must not have the two Chambers returnable by the same constituents. If the constituents of both Houses are nearly the same, you lose the power of check, or at least you will not have it effectual, because you will have the same sentiments and feelings represented in this House as in the other. I am not singular in this opinion, but were I to cite the opinions of men who are of a conservative turn of mind, and who have always upheld the privileges of the aristocracy and the prerogative of the Crown, I should, perhaps, give you opinions which would carry less weight with the opponents of this measure than will that of a gentleman whose views I will cite, who has written a great deal, and very ably, and who belongs to the ranks of the advanced Liberal party in England—I mean Mr. JOHN STUART MILL. In his chapter on the Second Chamber (Considerations on Representative Government, page 212), be says :— That there should be in every polity a centre of resistance to the predominant power in the Constitution—and in a democratic constitution, therefore, a nucleus of resistance to the democracy— I have already maintained, and I regard it as a fundamental maxim of government. If any people who possess a democratic representation are, from their historical antecedents, more willing to tolerate such a centre of resistance in the form of a Second Chamber or House of Lords than in any other shape, this constitutes a strong reason for having it in that shape.

Will the representatives from the Lower Provinces allow that import duty to be imposed ? No, undoubtedly they will not. Attempt to carry it in the interest of Upper Canada and you will at once transform the whole of them into advocates for the repeal of the union. Thus you create cause for agitation in all the sections, and it will not long continue until you will again see another deadlock.

Let us then have direct taxation, and what will be the result ? If there is a large expenditure on the part of the General Government, in addition to this taxation, political agitators will arise, who will cry out that the public burdens are unequally borne —(hear)—that two-thirds of the revenue is borne by the people living west of Quebec— that is, the population west of this city will, man for man, pay twice as much to the public exchequer as the population east of it.

It is said that, as you have a responsible government, the Government of the day will be held responsible to the people, through their representatives in the lower branch of the Legislature for the appointments, it may make to this House. Admitting this to be the case, we know what the tendency is in England, and what it was in this country when the Government had the appointment of the members of the Legislative Council ; the effect will be to find a place in this House for men distinguished for the aid they have given at elections to certain men or parties, and not as a reward of true merit or legislative ability. Furthermore, if this House is to be of any value at all, it is as affording a wholesome check over hasty and unwise legislation. But if you place the whole legislation of the country in the hands of a single man or body, I care not whether it is democratic or aristocratic in its tendencies, a power like that in the hands of the Executive to create the Legislative Council is a dangerous one. Unrestrained or unchecked action by a single elected body of the most democratic character is apt to go astray if they feel they have only themselves to consult. This is what is proposed to be done under this scheme ; but let this House be elected, as before, by the people ; let them be returned for a period of eight years as at present, or even longer if desired, and then, if there is a demand for legislation of a selfish or ill-considered character—a demand which, founded on ignorance or passion, is likely to right itself after the lapse of a few years—the members of this House would take the responsibility upon themselves of rejecting it, and public opinion would eventually sustain them and acknowledge that they have done some service to the country. But inasmuch as you appoint these members for life, you have no check over them, nor are they so likely to check legislation of an immature and ill-considered character. While the Ministry of the day which appoints them remains in power, it will expect and receive a cordial support from them ; but let it be defeated, and a ministry, formed out of the opposite party, obtain office, there will certainly be difficulty —there will be a tendency to dead-locks between the two branches of the legislature, and a repetition of those scenes which were witnessed in this country some years ago, and which formed one of the principal causes that brought about the rebellion of 1837.

We would seem to have overlooked a fundamental principle of all free governments, that governments should be carried on for the good of the governed ; and the principle of responsible government, according to which government must be carried on according to the well-understood wishes of the people. HON. MR. MCCREA—As expressed by their representatives. HON. MR. REESOR—AS expressed, my honorable friend says, by their representatives.

Failing to do that, and failing to consent to any alteration in any one of the resolutions, however objectionable, I think it is our duty to refer it to the people for their decision upon it. I know I will be met with the objection that this is contrary to British practice—that a reference to the people in the manner I propose is unknown to the British Constitution.

This liberal bribe to bring New Brunswick into the union, one would think, was quite enough to satisfy the little province

I vote for Confederation because I consider it essential to the maintenance of British connection, and to preserve that, I for one am prepared to make many sacrifices.

With reference to the change doing away with our elective Legislative Council, of which we have heard so much, I for one can say that I consider the delegates came to the only correct conclusion, and this is no new conclusion, and involves no change of opinion on my part, for I can appeal to an honorable member of this House as to whether, within half an hour of taking my seat in it, I did not express the opinion that though it was not right to speak ill of the bridge over which one had crossed safely, yet that I was opposed to the elective system as applied to this House.

I refer now to the sixth clause, with reference to education. Now, hon, gentlemen, it strikes me it was decidedly wrong on the part of the delegates to place anything in reference to the education of the people of Upper and Lower Canada in this scheme. I will give my reasons for it, and I think those reasons are good. I think it should be left fully and entirely to the people of Upper and Lower Canada to decide what is best with reference to this matter. We see already that both in Upper and Lower Canada both parties are actively engaged endeavoring to press upon the attention of both Houses of Parliament the necessity of granting them greater privileges than they already enjoy. They seem to be determined to have nothing less for their Catholic education than a full staff of officers, together with model and normal schools, and all the paraphernalia which attach to the present common school system. That which in Upper Canada was regarded as a finality in school matters is now scouted at, and the advocates of separate schools go so far as to insist upon having a college ; and the object is no doubt to place themselves in a position to be wholly independent of the proposed local government of Upper Canada. So far as I am individually concerned in reference to schools, I would far rather that the school system was worked out in both provinces on the principle of the common schools. I see no reason why in any neighbourhood a portion of the children should be sent to one description of school, and a portion of the children sent to another description of school.

to vote away that right which has been granted by the Constitution of our country to those who now have the privilege conferred upon them of exercising the elective franchise so far as regards this Chamber. I feel that I should do a great wrong and perpetrate a great injury to the electors who sent me here, were I to vote for that portion of the scheme which contemplates the taking away of their franchise altogether.

When these resolutions were printed by the Government I received one from the Honorable the Provincial Secretary, marked ” Private,” and I also at the same time received a note from that honorable gentleman, stating that these resolutions were not then intended for the eye of the public. The consequence was, I felt that I could not read these resolutions, and meet my constituents and tell them that I knew nothing in reference to Confederation. Thus feeling my hands tied, I placed the resolutions in my desk, and left them there; and never did I examine them to ascertain what honorable gentlemen had done until I took my seat on the floor of the House. I could not feel free to place myself in a position before my constituents, and on being asked from time to time what were the prospects of Confederation and what were its details, give a truthful reply with the restrictions placed upon me, were I to have read the resolutions ; and therefore I did not read the resolutions, so that I might honestly say I knew nothing about them.

It is true that the elective principle is affirmed in both ; but then the motion of the Hon. Mr. SANBORN went further and applied the elective principle to the Maritime Provinces, and was favorable to the retention of the life members, and it also extended the life principle to the Maritime Provinces, and contemplated the addition of ten life members to this Chamber from those provinces. My motion simply affirms the elective principle so far as Canada is concerned, and between the two I think there is a material difference.

Under them the appointed councillors will, in Lower Canada, be required to reside in certain divisions or to hold their property there. In Upper Canada the same property qualification applies, but as to residence there is no restriction ; whilst in one of the Maritime Provinces (Prince Edward) qualification is based on personal property only. Hence there is in reality very little symmetry about the scheme.

To resolve, in amendment to the resolutions of the Hon. Sir E.P. TACHE,—That the Legislative Councillors representing Upper and Lower Canada in the Legislative Council of the General Legislature, shall he elected as at present, to represent the forty-eight electoral divisions mentioned in schedule A of chapter first of the Consolidated Statutes of Canada, and each such Councillor shall reside or possess the qualification in the division he 13 elected to represent.

years before The progress of the country requires that from time to time men should enter this House as representatives of the opinions of the day.

It was for the purpose of attaining this end that the country was broken up into divisions, that it was required that the councillors elected should be residents in the divisions, or should be the owners of real estate within their limits of the value of £2,000 ; but under the system of Crown nominations to seats in this House, the choice might fall, as it formerly did, on persons residing in the large cities ; it would not be difficult for them to acquire £1,000 worth of real estate in the divisions, and the country would not be equally represented in this House. Another reason why the elective system is preferable to that of nominations by the Crown, is that on every fresh election the newly elected member represents the opinions of the people then prevailing, whereas councillors appointed for life may sometimes represent public opinion as it existed twenty

He told us that to restore the credit of the Legislative Council it had been found necessary to make it elective ; but this was not the sole inducement for the change; there was another motive quite as reasonable for making the Council elective, and this motive was that in causing the Councillors to be elected, they would be taken from among all parties in the country, and would, therefore, represent the public opinion of the different parties in it.

changes undergone by our own Legislative Council, so that I need not recur to that subject. The Hon. Commissioner of Crown Lands has asserted that we are justified in voting on the proposed reversal of the Constitution without an appeal to the people. I beg to differ from that opinion. I know the nature of a trust, whether civil or political; they both entail very much the same duties. Well, what is the charge entrusted to us by our constituents ? That of working out the present Constitution to the best of our understanding and of our judgment.

Another provision of the project which we cannot approve is that by which the constitution of the Legislative Council is based on the nominative principle, instead of the elective principle which now prevails, as regards that branch of the Legislature, under our own Government. I have already had occasion to express my opinion as to the constitutional

the 67th resolution. I find by this resolution ” that the General Government will fulfil all engagements entered into, previous to the union, with the Imperial Government, for the defence of the country.” Now strange to say, the authors of this document do not even take the trouble to state by whom such engagements must be made. No, they simply assert the obligation in the terms of the resolution I have just quoted. Suppose our Government had entered into an engagement to the extent of fifty millions of dollars, shall we—can we—affirm that the engagement was a necessary one, by voting for the measure without knowing the nature of the engagement ?

By art. 6 of the 43rd resolution, we perceive that the local legislatures will have the power of making laws in relation to education, saving, however, the rights and privileges enjoyed by the Catholic and Protestant minorities in relation to their separate schools at the time of the union ; so that by this resolution we are to affirm that the minorities shall be bound by the school laws which will be in force at the moment when Confederation will take effect. On the other hand, we are told that a measure will be brought down for the better protection of the rights of the Protestant minority in Lower Canada, whilst at the same time we are not informed whether the same advantages will be accorded to the Catholic minority in Upper Canada. Thus these school laws form a portion of the scheme upon which we are called to vote, and if unfortunately, after we have adopted these resolutions we are unable to obtain justice for the Upper Canadian minority, shall we not be guilty of having voted for the scheme without having known all about it? We ought then to be on our guard. If, as it is pretended, the measure will not endanger the rights of the Catholic minority in Upper Canada, why are we refused the details and the information which we ask to have afforded to us before pronouncing on the merits of the plan ? I maintain that any one who desires that justice should be extended to the minorities in question, would not know how to vote as we are called upon to do. In the absence of the information which we are entitled to demand from the Government as to the nature opt the guarantees to be offered by the new Constitution to the minorities of the two provinces of Canada, I do not for one instant hesitate to declare that this Honorable House is justified, and indeed fulfils a sacred duty in demanding the delay sought for by the motion of the hoe. member for Niagara.

Yet representation by population was a question of such political importance, that its satisfactory solution would justify the bringing about such a change as this. That was a sufficient motive to induce statesmen to join together and seek some way of escape from it. I think the scheme now submitted is perhaps the best that could have been found attainable, and I give its framers all credit for it.

HON. MR. VIDAL—I am not speaking of the mode of selection. (Hear, hear.)— Twenty-one members of this Legislative Council are to be told that they are no longer wanted. Are they to be those called by Her Majesty in former times to sit here, or those representing the people? It seems to me only fair that those who hold appointments from the Crown for life are entitled to retain their seats, to go first into the new House, and the rejection will then be of the elected members. It will involve nearly half of these, and it is quite obvious that it places all honorable members of this Chamber in a very anomalous position to be called upon to vote on such a question as this.

HON. MR. VIDAL—In compelling the first selection of legislative councillors from the members of the Chamber, the Conference have put a restraint on the prerogative of the Crown which they had no right to impose. I am unwilling for a moment to suppose that any low or unworthy motive actuated the Canadian delegate?, who alone are responsible for this detail, or that they did this in hopes of securing the votes of any members of this House in favor of their scheme, which they could not otherwise have been sure of; still that part of the scheme has an awkward appearance, and some honorable members may feel with the member from Wellington (Hon. Mr. SANBORN), that if it be not a bribe, it looks something very like it. I, however, do not see it in that light.

I cannot see that the nomination system was forced on them by the wishes of the Lower Provinces. It may have been the desire of some of the Maritime Provinces to maintain their nomination system, but the change in ours was one which obviously met the wishes of the members of this Government, and no effort appears to have been made by them to preserve to the people of this country the privilege they now enjoy of electing members of this House.

We have heard much about the proposed new constitution of the Legislative Council. We have been told it was political necessity that first forced the elective system of minds that were by no means enamoured of it, and this, I think, has been fully established. Now, it would ill become me, as an elected member, to dwell on any merits or excellences the elective system may have possessed as applied to this branch of the Legislature— it is a subject we can none of us touch upon with the same freedom which we might if we were not ourselves elected—but I may call the attention of the House to this, that none of the evils that were dreaded, as likely to flow from the elective system, have yet shown themselves, and I do not think it at all reasonable, much less necessary, that they should be anticipated in time to come. My own views were in perfect accord with those of hon. gentlemen who protested against the system when it was first introduced. I did not then consider it an improvement, and my views have not changed since ; I have, consequently, no personal predilections for an Elective Council, but far prefer a Chamber nominated by the Crown.

What, therefore, do honorable gentlemen ask, when they ask that the scheme be submitted to the people ? They ask us as a Government to leave that which we consider the safe, sound, British constitutional mode of procedure, and resort to the American system of obtaining assent to constitutional alterations, by taking the votes, yea and nay, of the individual members of the whole community. What sort of a conclusion could be arrived at by that mode of procedure ? Is it possible that any hon. member of this House desires that the people should have the opportunity of saying yea or nay to each clause of these resolutions ?

Well now, can any honorable gentlemen in his senses believe that the removal of the obstacles to intercourse between the provinces, the doing away with the customs duties, and the developing the trade of the St. Lawrence, is no advantage to Canada ?

Now, I would like to ask him whether or not, in the remarks he made this afternoon, he stated that there had been no demand on the part of the people for an elective Legislative Council since the union. HON. MR. ROSS—What I said was, that there had been no general demand for the change on the part of the people of Upper Canada. I am well aware that there was agitation on the subject in Lower Canada. HON. MR. DICKSON—Well, I find here in the Journals of the Legislative Assembly for 1855, that on the 21st of May, when the second reading of the Bill to make this House elective was defeated, the following was entered on the Journals by eight honorable members, in the shape of reasons for their dissent from the vote, viz. :— DISSENTIENT—Because public opinion has long and repeatedly been expressed on the necessity of rendering this branch of the Legislature elective ; because the almost unanimous vote of the Legislative Assembly, irrespective of party, has, in the most unequivocal manner, ratified the opinion of the people as hereinbefore expressed ; because the opposition of this House to the universal desire of the inhabitants of Canada, unsustained either by a party in the other branch of the Legislature or out of it, is unprecedented, and of a nature to cause the most serious apprehensions. The first name, honorable gentlemen, signed to that protest is the Honorable JOHN ROSS, and the second is my honorable and gallant friend, Sir E. P. TACHÉ. Then there are the Honorable Messrs. PANET, BELLEAU, ARMSTRONG, PERRY, LEGARÉ, and CARTIER.

Gentlemen, if the principle is good in one case, it is good in another ; let us make the Speaker elective. No, no, they said, that will not do ; that is republicanism.

Because the introduction of the elective principle into the Constitution of the Upper Chamber gives an undue preponderance to the popular element ; diminishes the proper influence of the Crown, and destroys the balance that has acted as a proper check upon both since representative institutions were given to the colony.

But why need we go there for fish, when in our own waters we can have for the catching as fine fish as the world produces ? But Confederation will give us no privileges over the fisheries which we do not at present enjoy. Canadian fishermen can as well go, and have as much the right to go, and fish in the waters below before as after Confederation. We will continue to go there if we desire it, not because we are members of the Confederacy, but because we are British subjects. But I was going to speak of the trade of these countries. We derive now little or no duty from the trade of the Lower Provinces, at the same time much of the revenues of the Lower Provinces is derived from exports from those provinces to each other, all of which will be lost to the General Government, as the Confederation will only be entitled to collect duties on goods imported from foreign countries. We are told, too, that our tariff is to be greatly reduced under Confederation. I am sorry to hear that statement, because it is impossible that it can be correct, and there is too much reason to fear that it was done with a view of influencing legislation elsewhere, by holding out the hope in Newfoundland and in the other provinces, that if they joined us, the tariff would be less burdensome than it is at present.

A simple question was put to the Hon. Commissioner of Crown Lands as to the manner in which the members of the Legislative Councils of the various provinces were to be appointed. The Hon. Commissioner informed us that the appointments were to be made by the local governments, and he was confirmed in that view by the hon. and gallant Premier, who had the dignity conferred upon him of presiding over the Conference of delegates held in this city. HON. MR. CAMPBELL—I do not think that my hon. colleague said anything on the subject.

He said that a House appoiuted by the Crown would be more responsible to the people than the present House. That, hon. gentlemen, is cor.ainly a new doctrine to me. If such would be the case, why, I ask, do you not apply the same system to the other branch of the Legislature ? In such an event I feel assured that the Government of the day would have a much more comfortable and pleasant life of it than even the present Government, strong and talented as they undoubtedly are.

My recollection is that the Council under the nominative system was a standing grievance in Lower Canada as well as in Upper Canada. HON. MR. McCREA—That was before the union. HON. MR. CURRIE—The demand arose that the Council should be elective. HON. MR. McCREA — Not alter the union. HON. MR. CURRIE—My hon. friend is, I can assure him, mistaken in stating that there were no petitions in favor of an elective Legislative Council at the time of the change. If my hon. friend will consult the Journals of Parliament, he will find there petitions for the change

Speaking of the Conference at Quebec, he stated that “the delegates unanimously resolved that the United Provinces of British North America shall be placed at the earliest moment in a thorough state of defence.” Hon. gentlemen, I was not aware that the Imperial Government had ever cast off the burden of the defence of this province.

what is meant by the regulation of the law of divorce ; but what is meant by the regulation of the marriage question ? Is the General Government to be at liberty to set aside all that we have been in the habit of doing in Lower Canada in this respect ? Will the General Government have the power to determine the degree of relationship and the age beyond which parties may marry, as well as the consent which will be required to make a marriage valid ?

There is a provision that the nomination of the judges of the superior courts shall be vested in the General Government, but it would seem that the constitution of the courts is to be left to the local governments ; and I put the question, What does this mean ? Do you mean that the local governments are to establish as many courts as they please, declare of how many judges they will be composed, and that the General Government will have to pay for them ? Is a local government to say, here is a court with three judges ; we want five, and those five must be appointed and paid by the General Government ?

In the Upper House doubts were expressed as to who should recommend the appointment of the members composing the Legislative Council. It was thought in many quarters that the appointment of these members was to be made by the local governments after the scheme should come into operation.

I contend that the local constitutions are as much an essential part of the whole as the general Constitution, and that they both should have been laid at the same time before the House. (Hear, hear.) We ought, besides, to have a clear statement of what are the liabilities specially assigned to Upper and Lower Canada.

Hon. Mr. BROWN’S paper further stated:— The line, in fact, will leave us just where we are now. In the summer, when navigation is opened, we can send produce down the river and gulf, and, to some extent, compete with the Americans. But in the winter, to suppose we can send flour and wheat over this long land route cheaper than the Americans can send it from the eastern ports, is au absurdity which no man acquainted with the trade will commit.

After speaking of the visit of Mr. WATKIN to this country, he closes with the following :— If our Government were to rush into the railway project, expend a large sum of money upon the road, and form a compact immediately with Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Prince Edward Island, both the alliance and the road would be carried out mainly for the benefit of the dominant power in this province at this moment ; we need hardly say we mean Lower Canada. The important question to Upper Canada—her connection with the North-West Territory—would be altogether ignored, Quebec would be made the capital of the Federation, representation by population would form no part of the compact, and, instead of having one leech draining her of her resources, Upper Canada would have three. Before entering into new alliances, it should be the effort of Upper Canadians to regulate the affairs of their own province, to obtain representation by population, and to open the North-West Territory, so that when the Federation of all the British American provinces does come, it may be found with Upper Canada as the central figure of the group of states, with western adjuncts as well as eastern. Not even the most ardent supporter of the union of all the provinces can allege that there is any absolute necessity for haste in carrying out the project. Nobody is being hurt by the provinces remaining in their present condition ; no one single material interest, either in Canada or the Lower Provinces, would be enhanced in value by the union. This appeared in the Globe in 1863.

And when we are making arrangements calculated to last for all time to come, is it not vastly more important that the same safe and equitable principle should be recognized? (Hear, hear.) The honorable gentleman recognized it himself in the most marked manner, by placing in the resolutions guarantees respecting the educational institutions of the two sections of Canada. The Roman Catholics of Upper Canada were anxious to have their rights protected against the hand of the Protestant majority, and, where the Protestants are in a minority, they are just as anxious to have their rights permanently protected. But, sir, the whole scheme, since it must be taken or rejected as

That is a glorious doctrine to instil into society.

Experience shows that majorities are always aggressive, and it cannot well be otherwise in this instance. I t therefore need not be wondered at that the people of Lower Canada, of British origin, are ready to make use of every means to prevent their being placed at the mercy of a preponderating population of a different origin. I agree with them in thinking that they ought to take nothing on trust in this matter of entering upon a new state of political existence, and neither ought we of French origin to do so, in relation to the General Government, however happy our relations to each other may be at present.

Sir, if a legislative union of the British American Provinces is attempted, there will be such an agitation in this portion of the province as was never witnessed before—you will see the whole people of Lower Canada clinging together to resist by all legal and constitutional means, such an attempt at wresting from them those institutions that they now enjoy.

We have the history of the Greek race, having at one time a population of six millions, dwindling down to seven hundred thousand, and we find them even then, after several centuries of oppression, rising up and asserting their rights. (Hear, hear.) We have the same circumstance in the history of Belgium, which was united to Holland with a view to secure the assimilation of the two countries, but fifteen years of trial had hardly elapsed when the whole of the Belgium people and Government rose en masse to protest against that union, and to assert their separate nationality.

I can tell those gentlemen that the people of Lower Canada are attached to their institutions in a manner that defies any attempt to change them in that way. They will not change their religious institutions, their laws and their language, for any consideration whatever. A million of inhabitants may seem a small affair to the mind of a philosopher who sits down to write out a constitution.

this scheme proposes a union not only with Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, and Newfoundland, but also with British Columbia and Vancouver’s Island. Although I have not been able to get the information from the Government—for they do not seem to be very ready to give information— yet I understand that there are despatches to hand, stating that resolutions have been adopted in the Legislature of British Columbia asking for admission into the Confederation at once.

And the forty-fifth resolution says :—” In regard to all subjects over which jurisdiction belongs to the general and local legislatures, the laws of the General Parliament shall control and supersede those made by the Local Legislature, and the latter shall be void so far as they are repugnant to or inconsistent with the former.” What will be the operation of this provision ? The Local Legislature will pass a law which will then go to the General Government ; the latter will put its veto upon it, and if that does not answer, it will pass a law contrary to it, and you have at once a conflict.

to impose export duties on these articles. This provision, it seems, was too favorable to Lower Canada ; for it would have allowed Lower Canada to impose an export duty upon Upper Canadian timber. HON. MR. HOLTON—AS New Brunswick does upon American. HON. MR. DORION—And by this means raise a sufficient revenue, at the expense of Upper Canada, to meet its local expenditure. This mistake seems to have been corrected, for, in this respect, the resolutions before the House have been changed, but hardly amended. HON. MR. HOLTON—Changed in a sense hostile to Lower Canada. (Hear.) HON. MR. DORION—The clause of the resolutions to which I refer now reads, that the General Parliament shall have power to make laws ” respecting the imposition or regulation of duties of customs on imports and exports—except on exports of timber, logs, masts, spars, deals and sawn lumber from New Brunswick, and of coal and other minerals from Nova Scotia.” That is, the General Government may impose a tax for its own benefit upon all timber and minerals exported from Upper or Lower Canada, but not from New Brunswick or Nova Scotia. (Hoar, hear.) Then, among the powers granted to local legislatures, we find the power to pass by-laws imposing direct taxation. (Hear, hear.) That is the first power they have, and I have no doubt that, before many months have passed after they are constituted, they will find it necessary to resort to it. But, in addition to this, I find that New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, which, no doubt, are the favored children of the Confederation, have powers not granted to the other provinces. New Brunswick, the resolution declares, shall have the power to impose an export duty on timber, logs, masts, spars, deals and sawn lumber, and Nova Scotia on coal and other minerals, for local, purposes ; so that while our timber and minerals exported from Upper and Lower Canada will be taxed by the General Government for general purposes, the timber and minerals of New Brunswick and Nova Scotia will be exempt, the revenue derived from them going to the benefit of the local governments, to be expended on local objects. (Hear, hear.) This is one of the results of the Conference in which, of course, New Brunswick counted as much as Upper and Lower Canada, and Nova Scotia and the other Lower Provinces had the balance of influence.

Then sir, I find that in addition to all the other sums that are to be paid by the general to the local governments, there are provisions in favor of New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, which must strike the House as being of a rather extraordinary nature. In the document, which was sent by the Provincial Secretary to the members of this House marked “Private,” there appears to have been a mistake. It was therein stated that the General Government would have no right to impose an export duty on timber, logs, masts, spars, deals and sawn lumber ; but that the local governments would have the power

Now, knowing that the General Government will be party in its character, may it not for party purposes reject laws passed by the local legislatures and demanded by a majority of the people of that locality. This power conferred upon the General Government has been compared to the veto power that exists in England in respect to our legislation ; but we know that the statesmen of England are not actuated by the local feelings and prejudices, and do not partake of the local jealousies, that prevail in the colonies. The local governments have therefore confidence in them, and respect for their decisions; and generally, when a law adopted by a colonial legislature is sent to them, if it does not clash with the policy of the Empire at large, it is not disallowed, and more especially of late has it been the policy of the Imperial Government to do whatever the colonies desire in this respect, when their wishes are constitutionally expressed. The axiom on which they seem to act is that the less they hear of the colonies the better. (Hear, hear.) But how different will be the result in this case, when the General Government exercises the veto power over the acts of local legislatures. Do you not see that it is quite possible for a majority in a local government to be opposed to the General Government; and in such a case the minority would call upon the General Government to disallow the laws enacted by the majority ? The men who shall compose the General Government will be dependent for their support upon their political friends in the local legislatures, and it may so happen that, in order to secure this support, or in order to serve their own purposes or that of their supporters, they will veto laws which the majority of a local legislature find necessary and good.

This I contend, then, that if the military and naval defences of all the provinces are to be provided for by the General Government, and if you have to increase the militia for this purpose, the Lower Provinces will pay only their proportion of two-twelfths, and Canada, while obtaining no greater defensive force than at present, will have to pay five times as much as we are now paying.

The Speaker of the Legislative Council is also to be appointed by the Crown, this is another step backwards, and a little piece of patronage for the Government. We have heard in a speech lately delivered in Prince Edward Island or New Brunswick, I forget which, of the allurements offered to the delegates while here in the shape of prospective appointments as judges of the Court of Appeal, Speaker of the Legislative Council, and local governors

a Constitution with the Upper House as proposed, without knowing what sort of local legislatures we are to have to govern us ? Suppose, after we have adopted the main scheme, the Government come down with a plan for settling the local legislatures upon which great differences of opinion will arise, may it not happen then that the majority from Lower Canada will unite with a minority from Upper Canada and impose upon that section a local Constitution distasteful to a large majority of the people of Upper Canada.

two branches of the Legislature ? Suppose the Lower House turns out to be chiefly Liberal, how long will it submit to the Upper House, named by Conservative administrations which have taken advantage of their temporary numerical strength to bring about such a change as is now proposed ? Remember, sir, that, after all, the power, the influence of the popular branch of the Legislature is paramount. “We have seen constitutions like that of England adopted in many countries, and where there existed a nobility, such as in France in 1830, the second chamber was selected from this nobility. In Belgium, where the Constitution is almost a facsimile of that of England, but where there are no aristocracy, they adopted the elective principle for the Upper House, and no where in the world is there a fixed number for it, unless it is also elective. It must be fresh in the memory of a great many members of this House how long the House of Lords resisted the popular demand for reform, and great difficulties were threatened. At last in 1832 the agitation had become so great that the Government determined to nominate a sufficient number of peers to secure the passage of the Reform Bill. The members of the House had to choose between allowing the measure to become law, or see their influence destroyed by the addition of an indefinite number of members. They preferred the first alternative, and thereby quieted an excitement, which if not checked in time, might have created a revelation in England. The influence of the Crown was then exerted in accordance with the views of the people ; but here we are to have no such power existing to check the action of our Upper Chamber, and no change can be made in its composition except as death might slowly remove its members. I venture to prophesy, sir, that before a very short time has elapsed a dead-lock may arise, and such an excitement be created as has never yet been seen in this country. (Hear, hear.) Now, if this Constitution had been framed by the members of our Government, we could change some of its provisions—this provision would most certainly be altered— there is not a man in the Liberal ranks who dare vote for such a proposition as this, that could go before his constituents and say, ” I have taken away the influence and control of the people over the Upper Chamber, and I have created an entirely independent body, to be chosen by the present governments of the several provinces.” But no, the Constitution is in the nature of a compact, a treaty, and cannot be changed. (Hear.) But, sir, the composition of the Legislative Council becomes of more importance when we consider that the governors of the local legislatures are to be appointed by the General Government, as well as the Legislative Council ; their appointment is to be for five years, and they are not to be removed without cause. I will venture upon another prediction and say we shall find there will be no such thing as responsible government attached to the local legislatures.

If the two Canadas were alone interested, the majority would have its own way—would look into the Constitution closely—would scan its every doubtful provision, and such a proposal as this about the Legislative Council would have no chance of being carried, for it is not very long since the House, by an overwhelming majority, voted for the substitution of an elected for a nominated Upper Chamber. In fact, the nominated Chamber had fallen so low in public estimation—I do not say it was from the fault of the men who were there, but the fact is, nevertheless, as I state it— that it commanded no influence. There was even a difficulty in getting a quorum of it together. So a change became absolutely necessary, and up to the present moment the new system has worked well; the elected members are equal in every respect to the nominated ones, and it is just when we see an interest beginning to be felt in the proceedings of the Upper House that its Constitution is to be changed, to return back again to the one so recently condemned. Back again, did I say ? No, sir, a Constitution is to be substituted, much worse than the old one, and such as is nowhere else to be found. Why, even the British House of Lords, conservative as it is, is altogether beyond the influence of the popular sentiment of the country. Their number may be increased on the recommendation of the responsible advisers of the Crown, if required to secure united action or to prevent a conflict between the two Houses. From the position its members occupy, it is a sort of compromise between the popular element and the influence or control of the Crown. But the new House for the Confederation is to be a perfectly independent body —these gentlemen are to be named for life— and there is to be no power to increase their number. How long will the system work without producing a collision between the

to be believed that, as promised in the document we are considering, such a Government as we have ” will take care of the Opposition, or consider their right to be represented in the Council?” (Hear, and laughter.) Sir, I thank the delegates for their kind solicitude for the Opposition, but I do not believe they will do anything of the kind. Have we not heard the Honorable Attorney General West, a few nights ago, state, turning to his followers, ” If I were to advise the nomination, I should advise the selection of the best men I could find—and of course of my own party ?” (Hear.) So it will be, sir ; and, if this precious scheme is carried, we shall have a Legislative Council divided in the following proportion :—For Upper Canada, we should probably have liberals in the proportion of three to nine ; for I suppose the honorable member for South Oxford has made sacrifices enough to deserve at least that consideration, and, as his friends compose one-fourth of the Executive Council, I dare say we should get one fourth of the Upper Canada Legislative Councillors liberal too. HON. ATTY. GEN. MACDONALD—Hear, hear HON. MR. HOLTON—Just 25 per cent. HON. MR. DORION—Just 25 per cent, of liberals for Upper Canada. Then, in addition, we should get from Nova Scotia ten conservative, from Prince Edward Island four more, and four from Newfoundland. Thus we shall have eighteen conservatives from the Lower Provinces, which, added to thirty-six from Canada, would make fifty-four conservatives against twenty-two liberals, taking the ten New Brunswick councillors to be all liberals. Now, supposing three per cent, as the average number of deaths per annum—the average proportion of change— it would take nearly thirty years to bring about a change in the character of a majority of the Council, even supposing all the additions made to it to be from the liberal ranks. But, sir, that will hardly be the case. In some of the Lower Provinces there will be Conservative governments now and then, and there may occasionally be conservative governments in Canada. (Hear, and laughter.) So this generation will certainly pass away before the views of the Liberal party will ever find expression in the decisions of the Upper House.

Were we not expressly told that it was the Lower Provinces who would not hear of our having an elective Legislative Council ? If, instead of going into Conference with the people of the Lower Provinces, our Government had done what they pledged themselves to do, that is, to prepare a Constitution themselves, they would never have dared to bring in such a proposition as this which is now imposed upon us by the Lower Colonies —to have a Legislative Council, with a fixed number of members, nominated by four Tory governments. Why, taking the average time each councillor will be in the Council to be fifteen to twenty years, it will take a century before its complexion can be changed. For all time to come, so far as this generation and the next are concerned, you will find the Legislative Council controlled by the influence of the present Government. And is it

Memorandum—Confidential. The Government are prepared to state that immediately after the prorogation, they will address themselves, in the most earnest manner to the negotiation for a Confederation of all the British North American Provinces. That failing a successful issue to such negotiations, they are prepared to pledge themselves to legislation during the next Session of Parliament for the purpose of remedying the existing difficulties hy introducing the Federal principle for Canada alone, coupled with such provisions as will permit the Maritime Provinces and the North-western Territory to be hereafter incorporated into the Canadian system. That for the purpose of carrying on the negotiations and settling the details of the promised legislation, a Royal Commission shall be issued, composed of three members of the Government and three members of the Opposition, of whom Mr. BROWN shall be one, and the Government pledge themselves to give all the influence of the Administration to secure to the said Commission the means of advancing the great object in view. This was the first memorandum communicated to the member for South Oxford, but that hon. member did not accept of it. This memorandum proposed the scheme which is now brought to the House, and I repeat, that scheme was not accepted by the honorable member for South Oxford, but an understanding was come to, which is to be found in the next memorandum, which was communicated to the House in these terms :— The Government are prepared to pledge themselves to bring in a measure next session for the purpose of removing existing difficulties, by introducing the Federal principle into Canada, coupled with such provisions as will permit the Maritime Provinces and the North-West Territory to be incorporated into the same system of government. And the Government will seek, by sending representatives to the Lower Provinces and to England, to secure the assent of those interests which are beyond the control of our own legislation to such a measure as will enable all British North America to be united under a General Legislature based upon the Federal system. There is a vast difference, Mr. SPEAKER, between these two propositions. The first was that the Government would pledge themselves to seek a Confederation of the British American Provinces, and if they failed in that to Federate the two Canadas, and this was rejected ; the second, which was accepted by the President of the Council, pledged the Government to bring in a measure for the Confederation of the two Canadas with provision for the admission of the other provinces when they thought proper to enter.

Lower Canada in the position of having to trust for the protection of their rights to the people of Upper Canada, who would thereby have the majority in the Legislature.

I always stated that the difference existing in the religious faith of the people of the two sections, in their language, in their laws, in their prejudices even—for there are prejudices which were respectable and ought to be respected—would prevent any member from Lower Canada, representing a French constituency, from voting for representation by population, pure and simple, and thereby placing the people of

Hon. Finance Minister, who then sat on the cross-benches, made a speech of two or three hours’ duration, in which, with all that force and ability for which he is distinguished, he expounded and advocated the Confederation of the whole of the British North American Provinces. He was then assisted in its advocacy by the present Hon. Minister of Agriculture ; and, subsequently, on becoming a member of the CARTIER-MACDONALD Administration, he went to England and drew the attention of the Imperial authorities to the scheme of Confederation of all those provinces. The Hon. Finance Minister received an answer not very encouraging ; and that which he received from this country was still less encouraging. There was not even an answer to his speech, able though it certainly was —

are essential for the ends of the Confederation and consequently we ought to reserve for the subdivisions as ample powers as possible. Customs, finance, laws regulating the currency, patent rights, Crown lands and those public works which are of common interest for all parts of the province, ought to be the principal, if not the only subject submitted to the control of the Federal Government, while all that belongs to matters of a purely local character, such as education, the administration of justice, the militia, the laws relating to property, police; &c, ought to be referred to the local governments, whose powers ought generally to extend to all subjects which would not be given to the General Government. The system thus proposed would in no way diminish the importance of the colony nor impair its credit—

To return to the Toronto Convention. I was invited to attend it, but though I was unable to do so, certain communications took place, and a meeting of the liberal members of the House from Lower Canada was held, and a document issued, signed by the present Minister of Agriculture (Hon. Mr, MCGEE) , Hon. Mr. DESSAULLES, Hon. Mr. DRUMMOND, and myself. The document was given to the public for the purpose of setting forth the views which we held as to the settlement of the difficulty. Pretended extracts have been given from that document, as from my speech, to attempt to prove all sorts of things as being my views, but I can show most clearly that the proposition made in it was just that which had been made in 1858, viz, the Confederation of the two provinces, with some joint authority for both. Both at that time, and at the time of the formation of the BROWN-DORION Administration, various suggestions were made as to the carrying out of the plan of confederating the two Canadas. Some thought that two entirely distinct legislatures should be formed ; one local for Lower Canada, another local for Upper Canada, with a general legislature acting for both. Others suggested the idea that the same legislature might fulfil all purposes; that the same body might meet and deliberate on questions of common interest, and that the members for each section might then separate and discuss all matters of a sectional character. Others, again, said the same result might be obtained by having but one legislature, and insisting that no laws affecting either section of the province should be carried, unless with the support of a majority from the section affected by them. These three plans were suggested—the first to have two entirely distinct legislative bodies, one for general purposes, others for local ones ; the second, to have one legislature, of which the parts should have the right to act separately for local objects, after general business had been disposed of; the third, to have but one body, but to resolve that no legislative act of a local nature should pass without the consent of a majority of the representatives from that locality. (Hear, hear,) The document to which I have just referred, issued in October, 1859, contained this language on the subject :— Your Committee are impressed with the conviction that whether we consider the present needs or the probable future condition of the country, the true, the statesman-like solution is to be sought in the substitution of a purely federative for the present legislative union ; the former, it is believed, would enable us to escape all the evils, and to retain all the advantages, appertaining to the existing union. * * * * * The proposition to federalize the Canadian union is not new. On the contrary, it has been frequently mooted in Parliament and the press during the last few years. It was no doubt suggested by the example of the neighbouring States where the admirable adaptation of the federal system to the government of an extensive territory, inhabited by people of divers origins, creeds, laws and customs, has been amply demonstrated; but shape and consistency were first imparted to it in 1856, when it was formally submitted to Parliament by the Lower Canada Opposition, as offering, in their judgment, the true corrective of the abuses generated under the present system. The document further went on to say : — The powers delegated to the General or Federal Government ought to be those only which

Confederation of the two provinces or by representation according to population, with such checks and guarantees as would secure the religious faith, the laws, the language, and the peculiar institutions of each section of the country from encroachments on the part of the other. The subject came up again in the latter part of 1850, when the Toronto Convention took place. I should, however, first say that, when the BROWN-DORION Administration was formed, the Hon. the President of the Council urged very strongly that representation by population should be taken up as the method by which to settle the constitutional question ; while, on the contrary, I saw the difficulty of so taking it up, even with such checks and guarantees as were spoken of, and made the counter-proposition that a Confederation of the two provinces should be formed.

When on the first question, I trust I shall be permitted to go a little into the history of the agitation of representation by population, for I owe it to myself, to my constituents and the country. My name has been used in various ways. It has sometimes been said that I was entirely favorable to representation by population—at other times that I was entirely favorable to the Confederation of the provinces, and I will now endeavor, once more, to state as clearly as possible what my real views have been and still are. (Hear.) The first time representation by population was mooted in this House, on behalf of Upper Canada, was, I believe, in the Session of 1852, when the Conservative party took it up, and the Hon. Sir ALLAN MACNAB moved resolutions in favor of the principle. We then found the conservatives arrayed in support of this constitutional change. It had been mooted before on behalf of Lower Canada, but the Upper Canadians had all opposed it. I think two votes were taken in 1852, and on one of these occasions the Hon. Attorney General West (Hon. J . A. MAODONALD) voted for it ; it came up incidentally. In 1854 the MACNAB-MORIN coalition took place, and we heard no more of representation by population from that quarter—that is, as mooted by the Conservative party, who from that moment uniformly opposed it on every occasion. It was, however, taken up by the present Hon. President of the Council, the member for South Oxford, and with the energy and vigor he brings to bear on every question he takes in hand, he caused such an agitation in its behalf as almost threatened a revolution. As the agitation in the country increased, so did the vote for it in this House increase, and on several occasions I expressed my views upon the subject. I never shirked the question—I never hesitated to say that something ought to be done to meet the just claims of Upper Canada, and that representation based on population was in the abstract a just and correct principle. I held, at the same time, there were reasons why Lower Canada could not grant it ; I entreated Lower Canadian representatives to show themselves disposed to meet the views of Upper Canada by making, at any rate, a counter proposition ; and in 1856, when Parliament was sitting in Toronto, I, for the first time, suggested that one means of getting over the difficulty would be to substitute for the present Legislative union a Confederation of the two Canadas, by means of which all local questions could be consigned to the deliberations of local legislatures, with a central government having control of commercial and other questions of common or general interest. I stated that, considering the different religious faith, the different language, the different laws that prevailed in the two sections of the country, this was the best way to meet the difficulty ; to leave to a general government questions of trade, currency, banking, public works of a general character, &c, and to commit to the decision of local legislatures all matters of a local bearing. At the same time I stated that, if these views should not prevail, I would certainly go for representation by population, and such checks and guarantees as would secure the interests of each section of the country, and preserve to Lower Canada its cherished institutions. (Hear, hear.) This speech, sir, has been twisted in all sorts of ways. I have heard it quoted to prove that I was in favor of representation by population, pure and simple ; that I was in favor of a Confederation of the provinces and for several other purposes, just as it suited the occasion or the purpose of those who quoted it. (Hear and laughter.) The first time the matter was put to a practical test was in 1858. On the resignation of the MACDONALD-CARTIER Administration, the BROWN-DORION Government was formed, and one of the agreements made between its members was that the constitutional question should be taken up and settled, either by a

This scheme, sir, is submitted to us on two grounds ; first, the necessity for meeting the constitutional difficulties which have arisen between Upper and Lower Canada, owing to the growing demands on the part of Upper Canada for representation by population ; and, secondly, the necessity for providing more efficient means for the defence of the country than now exist. These are the only two grounds we have heard

I find that whether they be purely political ones, such as the proposal to restrict the influence and control of the people over the Legislature of the country by substituting a Chamber nominated by the Crown for an Elective Legislative Council, or whether they are purely commercial in their character, such as that regarding the Intercolonial Railway, or the larger question of Confederation itself, I still hold the same views that I held, in common with others who have now changed their opinions, when the subjects were first mooted. (Hear, hear.) And as I have not heard, since the first opening of this debate, any reason for substituting a nominated for an elective Upper Chamber that was not fully argued out in 1856, when, by an overwhelming majority of this House, it was decided that the elective principle should prevail—as I have not heard any reason why we should pledge our credit and resources to the construction of the Intercolonial Railway, even previous to any estimate of its cost being made, that was not urged in 1862 when the question was before the country—nor any reason for intercolonial union that was net raised in 1858, when the present Hon. Finance Minister pressed the question on the attention of the Imperial authorities—I do not see on what ground these several subjects which were then so unpopular, and those views which were then almost universally repudiated, should now be more favorably considered by the people of this country—I fail to perceive why those once unpalatable measures, now

What I had reference to was the appointment of Legislative Councillors for divisions, and their having property qualifications in those divisions. I am sure the Honorable Premier did not desire to attribute to me anything I did not say.

Whoever may compose the Local Government, I think they must see the importance of the lumber trade, and will do what they can to foster and encourage that which is essential to the good of the whole country.

If a check is in any way put upon the lumber trade, as the consequence of its being placed under the separate control of each local government, it would be a result much to be regretted.

Honorable gentlemen composing the Government will permit me to repeat that our lumber trade deserves their earnest and best attention on account of the employment it gives to so large a number of persons, the way in which it swells the exports of the country, the market it affords for the produce of the agricultural portion of the community, and the manner in which it forwards the settlement of our wild lands.

I would even say that the scheme of the delegates to the Quebec Conference does not go far enough. I contend that, instead of merely taking in the provinces to the east of us, the scheme should have embraced British Columbia and the whole of the territory to the west.

I find that I took a wrong view of the proportions of appointed members that were to be allotted to each province, in case the amendment of my honorable friend from the Wellington Division should pass. I have since been convinced that I was wrong, and that it was really carrying out the principle of distribution adopted in the scheme, to allot to the Lower Provinces other ten members. I am glad to admit that my honorable friend was right in correcting me. But I still maintain that he was wrong—very wrong—in bartering old men for young ones, because, no doubt, the old men would soon disappear from their seats, while the young men from below would long retain their places, and we would thus destroy the equilibrium upon which the whole fabric of the proposed Constitution is based. I say the honorable gentleman was wrong in that, and that, if his proposal were adopted, it would certainly be no improvement on the scheme as it has come from the Conference.

The elective principle, kept within proper bounds, is very good indeed, and hitherto, no doubt, has worked well in this House. But I doubt whether, in the course of time, this House would not lose its present high status if the elective principle was continued in it for ever. As regards this, however, I merely state my own opinion, and other honorable gentlemen may hold contrary opinions, as they are perfectly entitled to do. (Hear, hear.) Having thus, honorable gentlemen, explained the reasons which induced the Government, m 1856, to propose that the elective principle should be extended to this House, with the concomitant circumstances which assisted in bringing that about—and having also explained the reasons which have induced the Government now to look for another state of political existence, as we may call it, by Confederation with the Maritime Provinces, I think I am clear from any imputation of inconsistency or levity of purpose.

state of things in the United States, which has resulted from carrying the elective principle too far ; and the fact that that principle, carried too far has worked much mischief, ought to place us on our guard. Some years ago, in Canada, there was quite a rage for the elective principle, and an agitation was got up with the view of rendering the judiciary elective.

But, as I was remarking, what I am afraid of is, that men who are well qualified for the position, after having gone through one or two elections, in which they have lost one-half, or two-thirds, or the whole of their fortune, are not likely to stand another contest, and we lose the happiness of meeting them here again. And I fear that the longer the elective system is continued, the greater would be the difficulty in that respect. Let us take a lesson from history, and from what goes on around us. I recollect that, in 1855, when on board the Canada, going to Europe, I made the acquaintance of some most respectable American families, and particularly of a most interesting American woman. (Hear, hear, and laughter.) Honi soit qui mal y pense. (Continued laughter.) I met with a very interesting American woman, and, as she was conversing with me and mentioning some very preposterous laws that had been passed in her state, I said—” Madame, have you not some people of good common sense and respectability to oppose such absurd laws ?” She replied, ” Sir, I am an American woman, and —I am ashamed to say it—the respectable people, the people of standing in our state, have no voice in the government of their country.” (Hear, hear.) Many of you, honorable gentlemen, are familiar with the

No, honorable gentleman—but circumstances forced the Government in 1856 to bring on their measure for rendering this House elective ; and the circumstances of the country in 1864 required that we should have recourse to some other means to put an end to the dead-lock in which the Province was placed.

The gentlemen from the Lower Provinces were opposed to the elective principle, and went strongly for the system of appointments by the Crown.

The Government for the time being were thus, by the force of circumstances, obliged to bring forward the measure for altering the constitution of the Legislative Council. The measure was passed by a pretty large majority; and I think that until now the elective principle has worked remarkably well indeed, and that the electors have sent to this House gentlemen who would do honor to any deliberative body in the world—I care not where, whether in England, or on the continent of Europe, or in America. But difficulties have arisen since the passing of the Act of 1856, and the Government of the country came almost to a dead-lock. Some remedy had to be found, and gentlemen of opposite parties wisely came together with the view of devising a plan which would not only cure our domestic difficulties, but give greater power and force to the British North American colonies.

This was not, as I have stated already, because of any predilection on our part for the elective principle. I t was not because we thought that the elective principle was much better than the system of appointment by the Crown—at all events before the introduction of responsible government. Before that, the gentlemen who nominated members of this House were responsible to no one. The appointments then were all made on one side. Even after the union, but before responsible government was established, or before it was put in a thoroughly practical working state, the appointments had been made in a partial manner. (Hear, hear.) And it is not surprising that we experienced the difficulties we did until that period. After the establishment of responsible government the position was very different—the resolutions of the 3rd September, 1841, having declared that no Government could be carried on except by heads of departments having the confidence of the representatives of the people in the lower branch of the Legislature. If, from that moment, bad appointments happened to be made to the Legislative Council, then the Government for the time being was responsible to the people for those appointments. And, when the people wanted an elective Council at that time, they did not base the demand upon constitutional principles, but were led by their passions, which had been excited by their recollections of the past. They did not reason the thing out ; and, in fact, the great majority of the people here, as everywhere else, are not able to reason out constitutional points—they are led by those who are at the head of the different parties.

to serve ; such members shall he appointed by the Crown at the recommendation of the General Executive Government, upon the nomination of the several local governments, and in such nomination due regard shall be had to the claims of the members of the Legislative Council of the Opposition in each province, so that all political parties may, as nearly as possible, be fairly represented. This shows you the spirit in which these resolutions were framed. Certainly the gentlemen who composed the Conference were, like ourselves, liable to err, but there is no doubt in my mind that they acted conscientiously from beginning to end. Well, honorable gentlemen, after the burning of the Parliament House in Montreal, the greatest possible excitement was created all over the province. Those who were most displeased at the passing of the Rebellion Losses Bill, condemned in the most violent terms the swamping, as they called it, of the Legislative Council, though after all it was nothing to be condemned, seeing that it simply, to some extent, re-established the equilibrium. But it was called, in the furor of the moment, the disgraceful swamping of the Legislative Council, and there was great agitation all over the country. Well, by means of the press constantly hammering away upon what had been done by the Government, and representing those who had been appointed as mere machines and tools of the Executive, although they were really among the most respectable and intelligent in Canada—but party passion does not reason— the people were led to believe that the Legislative Council had been disgraced by the appointment of these twelve additional members. But during the time that the conservatives were, on the one hand, thus battering down the Legislative Council, what had we on the other hand ? We had the old Reform party in Lower Canada beginning to recall their old hatred to the Legislative Council. Although there was no reason to complain after the introduction of responsible government, yet people followed not their reason but their prejudice. So that the Legislative Council received a cross-fire from both sides. I t was being battered down by public opinion on either hand, and what could it do ? Nothing, but come down lower and lower in public estimation. Although the consciences of the members reproached them nothing—although they could walk the streets with their heads erect, yet the Legislative Council had been so much reduced in public opinion, that those gentlemen were really, I will not say ashamed, but reluctant to attend in their places. But, besides, they came not to receive remuneration or salary. From the time they were appointed in 1841, they sacrificed their time and their money, and gave their services gratuitously to the public ; and they were met, as I have already stated, by this universal deluge of abuse which was levelled against them. (Hear, hear.) There was therefore no great encouragement for them to attend in their places in the Legislative Council. But what have we seen since? Session after session, day after day, week after week, we saw the Speaker come into the Council with great pomp, as the Speaker always does come into the Council—(hear, hear, and a laugh)—preceded by the mace ; and after the Speaker had made his usual dutiful bow to the Throne, he would take his seat and remain quietly in the chair for the space of one hour. At the end of the hour, he would consult his watch, and saying there was no quorum present— although surely the quorum was a very small one, being ten members only—he would declare the House adjourned until the following day.

Well, honorable gentlemen, to understand how we stood in 1856 it is necessary we should take the history of the Legislative Council a little further back—from the time of its formation immediately after the union. We had not responsible government at the time of the union, but then it was that the whole system was put in practice. The first batch of councillors were appointed in 1841, and were 25 in number ; but two of them never attended. Out of these 25 there were 18 conservatives and five reformers. In 1842 seven new councillors were added, five conservatives and two reformers. In 1843 the Government changed, and the change made a little difference in the political bearing of the appointments, so that in 1843, there were appointed one conservative and five reformers. In 1844- 45 there were two appointments—two reformers. In 1846 there was one conservative. In 1847 there were four conservatives. Therefore, in 1848, when the Liberal Government came into power—the LAFONTAINE-BALDWIN Administration—the fact was that their partisans in the Legislative Council were fifteen less than the opposite party. (Hear, hear.) What were the Reform Government to do ? They were forced to appoint a large batch this time. They appointed no less than twelve gentlemen. But still it left a majority to the conservative party of three. And if the conservatives had been true to themselves —and I wish to God they had been, and I will tell you, by and by, why — they could have prevented a good deal of trouble and a good deal of agitation in the country. Supposing that what is called the Rebellion Losses Bill had not been passed in 1849, would the country have suffered a great deal .from it? But if the conservatives had been true to themselves they would have stopped the bill. It would have been discussed in all the public prints. The Montrealers would not have been entirely reconciled to the measure, but they would have waived their opinions as dutiful subjects of the Queen, and we should not have witnessed the scandal we had in Montreal—the burning of the Parliamentary buildings and the Representative of the Queen pelted with stones and almost murdered, followed by the annexation movement. But I say if the conservatives had resisted and just postponed the bill for another year, all this trouble might have been avoided. Now, honorable gentlemen, what was the spirit which actuated the appointments to the Council from 1841 to 1848 ? It was a spirit of partisanship, and where there is partisanship there can be no justice. (Hear, hear.) Where there is partisanship there can be no stability — you can depend upon nothing. (Hear, hear.) It is only when justice is rendered to all parties that you can reckon upon stable and permanent governmental institutions. (Hear, hear.) To show the difference between the spirit which actuated these nominations, from 1841 to 1847, and the spirit which exists now, it is only necessary to refer to the resolutions of the Conference. The fourteenth resolution says : The first selection of the members of the Legislative Council shall be made, except as regards Prince Edward Island, from the Legislative Councils of the various provinces, so far as a sufficient number be found qualified and willing

But, honorable gentlemen, I think that when I shall have explained the circumstances which then forced the Government to bring forward the measure to render this House elective, you will agree with me that it was not on account of any fancy or predilection on their part that the elective system was proposed, but that it was necessitated by the circumstances in which the country found itself placed. It is from no levity in the minds of the members of the Government, or in my own mind ; nor is there any inconsistency in what I then did and in what I am now doing. But we will have something more on that point in the course of a few moments.

Many of us have been appointed for life in this House, and some of us were so appointed many years back. Here, for instance, is my honorable friend on the left (Hon. Mr. HAMILTON) who has been a member of the House some twenty-four years—who was among the first appointed by Lord SYDENHAM; and I see on the other side, honorable gentlemen also far advanced in years—men who, in the ordinary course of life, cannot expect to be very long with us. Will the honorable gentleman propose to give to the provinces below the right to appoint old gentlemen ? Not a bit of it. They would send here young men—men who are in the prime of life—and when we shall have gone to our last home, these young men from below will be found sitting in your places and in my place. Where, then, would be the equilibrium ? The equilibrium would be lost, and lost for ever. (Hear, hear.) And the honorable gentleman thinks that his amendment would be a great improvement to the scheme of the Conference. Well, for my part, honorable gentlemen, I believe it is a great failure in the way of improving the scheme of the Confederation— a very great failure indeed.

HON. SIR E. P. TACHÉ—The elective members are a fact accomplished. On the elective principle it is proposed to give a third of the members of the Legislative Council of the Federal Government to the Maritime Provinces. But there are twenty-one life members of this House, and you want to give the Maritime Provinces an equivalent for them.

position—I am sure it was not pressed upon him by the delegates from the Maritime Provinces— comes forward and says, ” I will give you ten members as a set-off against the twenty-one members who are now members for life in the Canadian Legislative Council.” If I am not wrong in my arithmetic, ten are not a third of twenty-one. If the honorable gentleman had given seven members to the Lower Provinces as a set-off against the life memo. ers of this House he would have acted with strict justice, but he is generous enough to give them three more—ten, or nearly one half.

I have just said the agreement was that there should be equality in the representation in the Legislative Council. But the honorable gentleman has moved that the elective members as they now stand should form the Legislative Council in the Federal Government, and that also the life members should continue for the remainder of their days ; and, as a set-off against the life members, he proposes to allow the other provinces a certain number of new members who should have the right to sit in the Legislative Council of the Federal Government. But what does he do ? Does he preserve the proportion as laid down at the Convention ? Not a bit of it. The proportion agreed upon at the Convention was one-third to the Maritime Provinces ; the Lower Provinces grouped together had a right to send one-third of the representatives. The honorable gentleman, however, I suppose out of the fullness of his good dis-

When the gentlemen who composed the Conference met, they had to lay down a broad basis, as it were, for the foundation of their superstructure. Well, it so happened that the corner-stone was that which concerned the representation in both Houses. It was agreed on the one hand that in the House of Commons of the Confederate Government representation should be according to numbers, and that in the other branch of the Legislature it should be fixed that this representation should be equal for all the provinces—that is to say, Upper Canada, and Lower Canada, and the Maritime Provinces, grouped into one, should each be allowed to send the same number of representatives, so as to secure to each province its rights, its privileges, and its liberties. We acted upon this principle, because we felt that if the House of Commons’ representation was based upon population, equality should be secured in the other branch of the Legislature.

It will secure to the people of Upper Canada the entire control of their local affairs, which I regard as being of the utmost importance. It will put an end to the system of duplicating in one section of the province large amounts of money granted to the other for colonization roads and other local objects, on which vast sums have been squandered. It will secure to the people of Upper Canada representation by population in that branch of the Federal Legislature which controls the purse-strings. It will also give to them all the unsold Crown lands in the western section of the province. And I trust the promises made with reference to the widening and deepening of our canals, and the opening up of the North-West Territory will be carried out in good faith.

I need hardly remind honorable gentlemen that nothing could be more unsatisfactory than the state of our public affairs for a long time past. The Legislature has been called together year after year, and the usual sessional expenditure incurred—which is always very large—but the sectional majorities arrayed against each other in the other Chamber, rendered useful legislation almost, if not altogether, impossible. Whatever government was in power lived, as it were, by the day, and being engaged in a constant struggle for existence, the very natural desire to obtain increased strength frequently led to the distribution of patronage and the expenditure of public money in a way that could not be justified.

The change proposed in the constitution of the Legislative Council, by which the nominative is to be substituted for the elective system, I cannot but regard as a retrograde movement

HON. MR. MOORE—It will be conceded that the question of the veto power was very ably discussed, at one time, in the United States Congress, and that discussion led to a qualification of the veto power in the Constitution of the United States, so that now any bill passed by both Houses may be vetoed by the President within ten days thereafter, by assigning reasons for doing so. Both Houses may then, however, again take up the measure, and if they pass it by a two-third vote, it becomes the law of the land, independent of the President’s will. Now, I would have the veto power applied in a similar way in our new Constitution. Exercising it in an arbitrary manner, as the Federal power is privileged to do, it must, from the very nature of things, create dissatisfaction and difficulty between the two governments.

I think that the engrafting of this system of government upon the British Constitution has a tendency to at least introduce the republican system. It is republican so far as it goes, and that is another reason why I do not approve of it. If we commence to adopt the republican system, we shall perhaps get the idea of continuing the system until we go too far. I t is also said that we are to have a new nationality. I do not understand that term, honorable gentlemen. If we were going to have an independent sovereignty in this country, then I could understand it. I believe honorable gentlemen will agree with me, that after this scheme is fully carried into operation, we shall still be colonies. HON. SIR E. P. TACHÉ—Of course. HON. MR. MOORE—NOW, that being the case, I think our Local Government will be placed in a lower position than in the Government we have now. Every measure resolved upon in the Local Government will be subject to the veto of the Federal Government—that is, any measure or bill passing the Local Legislature may be disallowed within one year by the Federal Government. HON. SIR E. P. TACHÉ—That is the case at present as between Canada and the Imperial Government. HON. MR. MOORE—I beg to differ slightly with the honorable gentleman. Any measure passed by this province may be disallowed within two years thereafter by the Imperial Government. But the local governments, under Confederation, are to be subjected to having their measures vetoed within one year by the Federal Government, and then the Imperial Government has the privilege of vetoing anything the Federal Government may do, within two years. The veto power thus placed in the hands of the Federal Government, if exercised frequently, would be almost certain to cause difficulty between the local and general governments. I observe that my honorable friend, Sir ETIENNE P. TACHÉ, does not approbate that remark. HON. SIR E. P. TACHÉ—You understand me correctly.

But in regard to a change effected in the manner in which this is proposed, by the united wisdom of the several governments, without any convulsion

It is very true that the scheme of a Federal union of all the provinces has been spoken of for a quarter of a century by eminent men of all shades of politics. We may refer to the convention that was held at Kingston, at which the British American League was formed. That convention was convened by the Conservative party of Upper Canada. Subsequently, the great meeting— if I may use that expression—that was convened in the city of Toronto, referred to the same question. But I go back and appeal to the fact that at the last general election, it was not one of those questions that were referred to the arbitrament of the people to decide by their votes as to the desirability of union.

In the discussion of so important a question as the change of the Constitution of the country, the laying aside of the old Constitution and the adoption of a new and very different one, we all ought to endeavor to find common ground of agreement.

the proposed Federal Parliament is not in fact an abandonment of the elective principle, because the appointments are to be by the Ministry of the day, who must have the confidence of the people. That is certainly a most extraordinary argument. If it held good at all, it should apply equally to both Houses, and the Legislative Assembly should be appointed by the Ministry, because the Ministry have been selected by those who have been elected by the people. This is the clear, logical deduction from my hon. friend’s argument, if it is good for anything —because, if appointment by the Ministry is not an abandonment of the elective principle, you would still have an elective Legislative Assembly, although its members were appointed by the Government (Hear, hear.) But this was also well answered on a former occasion by my hon. friend behind me (Hon. Mr. AIKINS.) It is not simply the first appointment that we oppose. I t is the appointments afterwards, as the first members die out or resign, and their successors are appointed on the nomination of the future local governments. Instead of this producing a favorable result, it appears to me it will have just the opposite effect. The reason is plain. If, in the very first instance, the prerogative is exercised, not by the Sovereign or the Sovereign’s representative, unbiased, but is exercised by a party government, you have a House constituted at its very first meeting of a party character. In the other branch that particular Government has a majority. But it is possible, that that party may not long retain power. In the nature of things it is not probable that they will. No party does. But the Upper House remains permanent, and you provide by your very first operation for that dead-lock—that conflict between the Upper and the Lower House, which has been spoken of.

Now, these rights, at the very least, ought certainly to be confided to the highest legislative authority. I go further and maintain that guarantees for those rights ought to be placed in the written Constitution, that they ought to be beyond the power of interference by the legislative authority, and that they should be guarded by the judicial decisions of the highest courts in the country. In that case there would be a protection for property, but in this Constitution there is no such protection for property either in Upper or Lower Canada.

the people of Upper Canada in 1859—and I find here what they conceive to be the true remedy thus stated :— ” The true remedy !” What then is the remedy best adapted to deliver the province from the disastrous position it now occupies ? We answer —dissolve the existing legislative union. Divide Canada into two or more provinces with local executives and legislatures having entire control over every public interest except those, and those only, that are necessarily common to all parts of the province. Let no public debt be incurred by the legislatures, until the sanction has been obtained by direct vote. Establish some central authority over all, with power to administer such matters, and such only as are necessarily common to the whole province. Let the functions of this central authority be clearly laid ; let its powers be strictly confined to discharging specified duties. Prohibit it from incurring any new debt, or levying more taxation than is required to meet the interest of existing obligations, discharge its own specified duties, and gradually pay off the national debt. Secure these rights by a written constitution, ratified by the people, and incapable of alteration except by their formal sanction.

If we gained anything by introducing the elective principle, we propose to keep that advantage, by retaining it just in the same form, and bear: ing the same relation to the proposed Legislative Council as it is retained in and bears relation to this House. HON. MR. CAMPBELL—But, under the present union, there is no federative necessity tor relative equality of numbers in the Legislative Council, as there will be under the proposed union. HON. MR. SANBORN—I admit no necessities of the kind. These necessities are entirely artificial. In that respect, I think hon. gentlemen are entirely in error in the position they take. And, though I concede to my hon. friend from Erie Division (Hon. Mr. CHRISTIE) every credit for great candor and soundness of judgment, still L must say that, when he enters into the province of law, he is travelling a little, as we say in the profession, out of the record—and that any one who is familiar with the doctrine of trusts eould not fail to see the falseness of his reasoning in that particular. As regards a trust, of course, the person who has a mandate given to him, must aet according to his discretion under the circumstances. But then he must do so within the trust that is given him, and not beyond the trust. HON. MR. CHRISTIE—Of course. HON. MR. SANBORN—My hon. friend cites the act empowering the Legislature of Canada to change the constitution of the Legislative Council, and on this act he bases his whole argument. If I convince him that that act does not cover his argument, will he then concede the point ? That act, to which my hon. friend refers, was passed for a specific purpose, to enable Parliament to reconstruct this House. It had answered its purpose when the constitution of this House was changed, but it cmnot properly be invoked as giving authority with reference to bringing in other provinces to form a new Confederacy. HON. MR. CHRISTIE—But my hon. friend will observe, that we are not legislating now—that we are merely passing an Address.

given to the elective principle, and the House remains now a visible memento of the carrying out of the very position which I take on the present occasion.

the election of members to the Legislative Council—and that it was of no consequence to the other provinces how those members were elected, if they had relatively the same number as we. My hon. friend accuses me of being inconsistent in taking ground in favor of the elective principle, while proposing still to retain the nominated members in their seats, and also to add ten new members from the Maritime Provinces. To this, I would answer that it is an exceptional condition in which we are placed. We cannot obviate the difficulty. A similar difficulty presented itself to those who sought the change when the elective principle was introduced into this House, and they met it just in the same manner in which we propose to meet it here. The life members were retained while recognition and sanction were

There will be no more difficulty in excising the nominative principle from the future Legislative Council, than there was in excising it from the former body. I might say there were greater difficulties in the one case than in the other. (Hear, hear.) Looking then at the advantages likely to result from the adoption of the resolutions—the establishment of peace and harmony among the people of this country— the getting rid of those terrible difficulties and conflicts which have beset our path, we ought not to hesitate. Whatever hon. gentlemen may say now, they did not estimate them slightly when they were complaining of the conduct of the governments of the day, and my hon. friend from Niagara (Honorable Mr. CURRIE) inveighed against the evils which then existed as strongly as any man could do. Looking, then I say, at the abuses and difficulties which have arisen under a legislative union; and, thence arguing the impracticability of going on with that kind of union, and believing that the great advantages likely to result from this scheme of Federal union will much more than counterbalance the evils likely to arise from it, I do say it is our duty as honest and patriotic men to adopt the resolutions presented to us by the Conference. (Cheers.)

And as I have said, the process of submitting any statute to the popular vote, in order to give it the force of law, is unheard of in British constitutional practice.

According to that position he is bound to the elective principle, and he is therefore on principle bound to do all in his power to remove obstructions to its well-working. He is bound even to remove the present nominated members from the House. What does his resolution propose ? It proposes not merely to allow the nominated members to remain tor life, but to add ten to their number ! This is surely not giving free scope to the elective principle. Were the Lower Provinces to have the power which my hon. friend proposes to give them, they would appoint ten of their youngest men to seats in this House, who might be hero for years after those to whom they were an offset had been removed from the House. (Hear, hear.) Besides, he proposes to give the present elected members seats for eight years, and then, of course, the whole of them would go back for re-election at once. I am not convinced by any argument which I have heard that the elective principle, exercised in some way, is not the best mode to compose this House. I t has worked well so far. All the fears which were entertained in reference to it have proved groundless, and I believe it would continue to work well, and therefore, I disapprove of the change proposed in the resolutions.

My hon. friend from Wellington admits that under the Constitution we have the power to alter the constitution of this House in so far as it relates to Canada, but he says we are not authorized to extend our action to the other provinces, in a scheme of Federal union. That is begging the question. I answer his objection that any change affecting the elective principle is a breach of trust. Besides, we do not propose to enact a system of Government embracing all British North America We have not the power to do so. We merely propose to address Her Majesty on the subject. The Imperial Parliament alone has that power ; but if we have power without a breach of trust to alter the constitution of the Legislative Council of Canada (and my hon. friend admits this), then, certainly, we cannot be guilty of a breach of trust in suggesting a change embraced in a Constitution for the various provinces.

and dissent from others, of his opinions. The essential conditions of a valid trust to express particular opinions in Parliament are then wanting. The persons nominating him to his office, do not concur as to the opinions which he is to express. How then can a trust exist which it is impossible to define. The real trust imposed on the representative is co-extensive with those obligations, which alone the trust-makers can generally confer on him,—namely, to exercise his representative power honestly and discreetly. This argument, of course, assumes that the candidate has not defined his parliamentary obligations by unconditional pledges.

That the elective members had received a sacred trust to exercise ; that they were seut here by their constituencies to represent them, and to do that only. Under these circumstances, how could they conceive they had the power to vote away the rights of their electors? That was not their mandate, and if they did, they would be doing that which they had no authority to do ; they would be doing that which they could not do without going beyond the authority con faded to them. Now, it must be frankly admitted that if the hon. gentleman’s position’ be correct, then his objection would be fatal to any elected member giving his concurrence to the scheme of the Conference. But , hon. gentlemen, let us enquire what is the position of a representative. Two elements enter into the idea of representation— namely, power and duty. A representative derives the former from his constituents acting by their majority, under the Constitution. From what source does he derive the latter ? Obviously not from his constituents, because even the majority are not agreed on all points connected with the discharge of his duty. My hon. friend (Hon. Mr. SANBORN) has spoken of the position of a representative, as being that of a trustee. I shall quote from a very able work on the British Commonwealth, in which that position is, to my mind, very fully and very satisfactorily proved to be incorrect. Cox says :— Any trust, to be obligatory in conscience, must be defined by the self-same persons who appoint the trustee, or the person who is to fulfil the trust. His powers and duties must be derived from identically the same authority, for it obviously would be contrary to morals, as it is to law, that a man would be bound in conscience to exercise, in a particular way, powers delegated to him by several others, when trey themselves, while delegating those powers, differ as to the mode in which they are to be exercised. For, which of the different ways is the trustee to choose? By whom of those who appoint him is he to be guided in preference to the rest ? At the most he is bound to exercise his trust in a particular way in those particulars only respecting which the trust makers are agreed. Let us now apply this abstract principle of equity to the relations between a representative and his constituents. Regard him as their trustee. With respect to the source of his power there is no ambiguity ; it is derived from his constituents acting by their majority. But from whom does he derive the duty of expressing this or that opinion in Parliament ? In what particular are the trust-makers agreed? The very majority who voted for him are rarely, perhaps never, all agreed on any one point on which their opinions have been compared with his. Some of them differ from him on some points, some on others, but they all voted for him, from personal consideration, or because of their agreement with him on those points which they respectively deemed most important. In the minority, also, are probably some electors who assent to some,

HON. MR. CHRISTIE—A number of the representatives in the Federal Congress who voted for it were democrats, and without their concurrence and support it could not have been carried. Besides, that was only an amendment, not a revision of the Constitution. The Constitution of the United States was not the work of a party. The revision of the Constitution of the State of New York, in 1846, was not the work of a party I t is not desirable that any Constitution should be the work of a party ; in so important an undertaking all party spirit should be laid aside. (Hear, hear.) Why ? Because men of all parties are alike interested in the formation of a Constitution, and because in the construction of such an instrument , the collective wisdom of the leading men of all parties is needed. Besides, a Constitution so framed will be more likely, as my hon. friend from Wellington has so well said, to live in the hearts and affections of the people. (Hear, hear.) To show the good sense of our neighbors on this point, they do not give the revision of a Constitution—and the work of the Conference was a revision of our Constitution—to any party, but to men specially chosen for the purpose, irom all parties ; and I think the Governor General, and the Lieutenant-Governors of the Lower Provinces acted most wisely when they selected men of all shades of political opinion to compose this Conference and to prepare this Constitution, because all party views and feelings being laid aside, the whole object and motive of the members of the body was to devise a scheme which would best tend to promote the good of their common country. (Hear , hear.)

HON. MR. CHRISTIE—The hon. gentleman, I see, has not changed the ground which he took the other day, and which is precisely as I stated it. He thinks it would have been to the public advantage if this question had been taken up and discussed by a party. In this, in my judgment, he is entirely wrong; and I say he can find no instance of a constitution having been revised by a party.

The honorable gentleman very correctly stated the manner in which the Federal Constitution may be amended, but he is in error as to the mode in which state constitutions may be revised. One of the most important of the States revised its Constitution in 1846. I refer to the State of New York. The modus operandi on that occasion was as follows :—An act was passed in the State Legislature authorizing the electors at large to choose delegates to a convention, for the express purpose of revising the Constitution. The instrument passed by the convention was then submitted to the Legislature for approval ; but the Legislature had no power to alter it. It had either to be rejected or accepted as a whole. It was so accepted, none of the details being altered. My hon. friend will see that while the Conference was composed of leading representatives of the people in the various provinces, those conventions are composed of gentlemen elected by the people for that special purpose; and that the only difference between them is in the mode of selection. However, in both cases, all political parties are represented.

I hold that the substitution of appointment by the Crown for the elective principle, in this Chamber, is a great objection. I have always been an advocate of the elective principle; still I shrink from the responsibility of voting against the scheme because of that objection.

the same great principle is the basis of both—that life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness are the unalienable rights of man, and that to secure these rights, governments arc instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed. This is the secret of the strength of the British Constitution, and without a free and full recognition of it, no government can be strong or permanent. I am free to admit that the scheme before us has some defects, which, in my judgment, will mar its well-working ; but, at the same time, I am confident that, if it should become law, those defects can and will be remedied.

solutions were devised because they were better calculated in this shape to be palatable, if not to this Chamber, at least to other houses of the legislatures of British North America.

had the right of making selections from all over the country. If that had been proposed, I think many honorable gentlemen would have found fault with it. (Hear, hear.) It was due to courtesy that the members of this House should not be overlooked, and not only that, but there were acquired rights which had to be respected. My honorable friend appears to dissent from this statement. Well, the last choice of the people are now in this House, and by the fact of their election they have acquired a right to a seat ; and I think those gentlemen who have been appointed for life have gained rights which should not be overlooked. (Hear, hear.) HON. MR. CURRIE—The honorable and gallant gentleman says we have an acquired right. I admit we have a right to sit here during the term for which we have been elected ; but what right have we to seat ourselves here for the remainder of our lives ? The people did not send us here to make this change in the composition of this House. (Hear, hear.) And what right even have the appointed members of this House to seats here during their lifetime? I have a despatch here, written by the late Duke of NEWCASTLE, who will be considered pretty good authority upon the point, to the Lieutenant-Governor of Prince Edward Island, on this very question. I need not read the words of the despatch, but the sense of it is, that legislative councillors have no right of property in their position, but simply a naked trust which the Legislature may at any time call upon them to surrender to other hands, if, in their opinion, the public interest shall require such transfer. HON. SIR E. P. TACHÉ—That is merely a matter of opinion. That may for a time have been the view of the Imperial authorities, but previous to 1856 they held and said directly the contrary. (Hear, hear.) They then said that they had granted certain privileges to certain gentlemen for life, and that they would not commit the injustice of withdrawing those privileges when the gentlemen had done nothing to forfeit them. (Hear, hear.) HON. MR. CURRIE—I am surprised at the honorable and gallant Premier questioning the ability of the distinguished gentleman who wrote the despatch to which I have just referred. Whatever may have been the opinion of the Colonial Office in 1856, this is a later opinion, for the despatch is dated the 4th of February, 1862, The honorable and gallant gentleman says they do not propose to take from any honorable gentleman the rights he now enjoys. I could understand this argument if they did not propose to take away the rights of any honorable member of this House ; but I cannot understand it when you propose to drive from this House faithful subjects who have served their country honestly in the Legislature, and I am afraid we have not yet had from the gallant Premier that explanation to which the House is entitled. (Hear, hear.) Why is it that the legislative councillors from Prince Edward Island are excepted ? In that province, as we know, the Legislative Council is elective, and it is an elected Chamber that is now in existence there, but the members of it are excepted from the provisions that apply to the legislative councils of the other provinces. Why is this ? I think there must be some reason, in the first place, for breaking the good rule that in no way shall the prerogative of the Crown be restricted ; and, in the second, for making an exception in regard to one that does not apply to the others. I think a reason may be found for this in the fact, that it was doubted whether the resolutions in a different shape would have passed through some of the chambers that compose the legislatures of the different provinces. (Hear, hear.) I would like to know what justice will be done if this change is carried out ? What, for instance, will be done with regard to two honorable members who come from the city of Hamilton ? One of them (the Hon. Mr. MILLS) is an appointed member ; the other (the Hon. Mr. BULL) was the almost unanimous choice of the people only a few months since. Under the working of the resolutions, one of these honorable gentlemen will forfeit his seat. HON. MR. ROSS—Why ? (Hear, hear.) HON. MR. CURRIE—If it does not follow that one of these honorable gentlemen will lose his seat, it must follow that some other portion of Upper Canada will be unrepresented in this House. (Hear, hear.) Let honorable gentlemen take either horn of the dilemma they please. It may be quite true that the gentlemen who have been sent here possess the confidence of their constituents, but it does not follow that they will be retained in their seats. It is plain that a great injustice will be done these honorable gentlemen, some of whom have served their country faithfully, without, in any way trenching upon the rights of the Crown or infringing on those of the people; and I think the conclusion this House and the country, as well as the other branch of the Legislature, will arrive at, is that those re-

I feel that there is something extraordinary in the fourteenth of these resolutions before the House, and I would like to hear the Government give a full explanation as to the manner in which that resolution was arrived at in the Conference. Bear in mind, honorable gentlemen, that the eleventh resolution declares that ” the members of the Legislative Council shall be appointed by the Crown under the great seal of the General Government, and shall hold office during life.” Thus the House will see that by this resolution the Crown has the right for all future time to select the legislative councillors in Upper Canada from any part of the country which the Crown sees fit; but in Lower Canada there is this difference that, according to the sixteenth resolution, ” each of the legislative councillors representing Lower Canada in the Legislative Council of the General Legislature, shall be appointed to represent one of the twenty-four electoral divisions mentioned in schedule A, of chapter 1st of the Consolidated Statutes of Canada, and such councillor shall reside or possess his qualification in the division he is appointed to represent.” Then the fourteenth resolution declares that ” the first selection of the members of the Legislative Council shall be made, except as regards Prince Edward Island, from the legislative councils of the various provinces, so far as a sufficient number be found qualified and willing to serve.” Now, honorable gentlemen, I have always understood— my reading of books on constitutional law has given me to understand—that the greatest of England’s statesmen who have spoken on the question of the Royal prerogative, have always broadly laid it down as a rule that the prerogative should never and could never be limited. How is it then that these thirty-three individuals, talented, able and gifted, as no doubt they were, who met in the room behind me and sat with closed doors, saw fit to hamper and cripple the operation of that good rule ? (Hear, hear.) Should the prerogative of the Crown in the selection of members of this House be limited ? It may be true that, residing in many of the divisions in Lower Canada represented in this House, there may be good men, competent men, well qualified men; but it is equally true that there may be just as good, able and talented men, outside of them as in it. Why, then, should the doors of this House be closed against these men ? Why is it, I would like to know, that the prerogative of the Crown is to be restricted so as to prevent the choice of these men ? HON. SIR E. P. TACHÉ—I can give explanations to the honorable gentleman. He must be aware that Lower Canada is in a different position from Upper Canada, and that there are two nationalities in it occupying certain portions of the country. Well, these divisions have been made so as to secure to both nationalities their respective rights, and these, in our opinion, are good reasons for the provision that has been made. HON. MR. CURRIE—I do not think my honorable and gallant friend sees the point of my remarks. I would ask why in the first selection the choice of the Crown is restricted to the members of this Chamber, when probably others out of it could be found whose presence here would be of more advantage to the public ? HON. SIR E. P. TACHÉ—I do not know what advantage would be derived if the Crown

That the legislative councillors representing Upper and Lower Canada in the Legislative Council of the General Legislature, shall be elected as at present, to represent the forty-eight electoral divisions mentioned in schedule A of chapter first of the Consolidated Statutes of Canada, and each such councillor shall reside or possess the qualification in the division he is elected to represent.

The principle of the double majority, as a remedy for our difficulties, has proved to be a failure ; representation by population, which would have satisfied Upper Canada, has been persistently denied by Lower Canada ; and, therefore, I see no resource but to fall back upon the project of the Confederation of the provinces.

HON. MR. ROSS—That was a legislative union, while in this the representation will be based on population. HON. MR. SEYMOUR—That does not affect the case. After the Irish union was effected, what was the representation of Ireland in the House of Commons? It was 100 members in a total number of 656 ; and in the House of Lords 28 Peers, in a House of 450 members. And although it was considered by England an absolute necessity that the union should be brought about, she did not give a preponderance, and scarcely a fair share, of the representation to the sister kingdom. HON. MR. ROSS—That is because in the English Parliament they do not recognize the principle of representation by population. HON. MR. SEYMOUR—My hon. friends will say that this proposed change is neither American nor English. SEVERAL HON. MEMBERS—It is Canadian. (Hear, hear.)

Well, that is a matter of very little importance. (Laughter.) Now, honorable gentlemen, I have shown that this scheme has no precedent, even on the other side of the line. Among all the wild republican theories of our neighbors, they have never proposed to change the Constitution in this manner—never changed it, at all events, without the consent of the people, obtained in some form or other. Reference has been made, I think, by my honorable friend in front (Hon. Mr. Ross) to the union of England and Ireland. Well, every honorable member knows the means employed to bring about that union.

Whenever a majority of the House of Representatives shall deem it necessary to alter or amend this Constitution, they may propose such alterations and amendments, which proposed amendments shall be continued to the next General Assembly, and be published with the laws which may have been passed at the same session, and if two-thirds of each house, at the next ses-

sion of said Assembly, shall approve the amendments proposed, by yeas and nays, said amendments shall, by the Secretary, be transmitted to the town, clerk in each town in this State, whose duty it shall be to present the same to the inhabitants thereof, for their consideration, at a town meeting legally warned and held for that purpose ; and if it shall appear in a manner provided by law, that a majority of the electors present at such meetings shall have approved such amendments, the same shall be valid, to all intents and purposes, as a part of this Constitution. That is the way one of the oldest states guards the rights and liberties of its people. Then here is another extract from the Constitution of the State of Mississippi, one of the new states, showing how the people there are protected against hasty innovation :— Whenever two-thirds of the General Assembly shall deem it necessary to amend or change this Constitution, they shall recommend to the electors, at the next election for members of the General Assembly, to vote for or against a convention; and if it shall appear that a majority of the citizens of the state, voting for representatives, have voted for a convention, the General Assembly shall, at their next session, call a convention, to consist of as many members as there may be in the General Assembly, to be chosen by the qualified electors in the manner, and at the times and places of choosing members of the General Assembly ; which convention shall meet within three months after the said election, for the purpose of revising, amending, or changing the Constitution.

Then there is another point in connection with the Lower Provinces, which I will here notice. The franchise is lower there—it is almost universal. Persons entered upon the assessment roll for a small amount of personal property may vote for members of the Confederate Parliament. Here members are elected by persons assessed for real property to a certain amount. This is another matter which should have been attended to. It is not right that members should be sent to the General Parliament on these terms.

alluded the other day to the conservative feature of the Senate in the United States, in allowing the same representation to small states as to the larger states. But this does not at all affect the general arrangement, because the large majority are large states. But while my honorable friend approves of this portion, he should have expressed an opinion on the whole system. In the United States, no change of Constitution can be effected without the consent of two-thirds of both branches of the Legislature, and that must afterwards be sanctioned by three fourths of the state governments. This is a conservative feature also.

We have had the Constitution of 1841 altered more than once—twice at least—since the union. If we find that some parts of the machinery do not work—if, after the establishment of the Confederation, we find some little error has been made—-we will then, no doubt, have power and authority also to alter it.

They appreciate the considerations which have influenced the Conference in determining the mode in which this body, so important to the constitution of the Legislature, should be composed. But it appears to them to require further consideration, whether, if the members be appointed for life, and their number be fixed, there will be any sufficient means of restoring harmony between the Legislative Council and the popular Assembly, if it shall ever unfortunately happen that a decided difference of opinion shall arise between them.

We are asked to sacrifice the election of the Legislative Council ; but is the system proposed a better one ? I do not think so, for to my mind the mode in which it is proposed to constitute that House appears to be unsound in every way. Not only are the people to be deprived of an important right, but the prerogative of the Crown is to be infringed by limiting the number of members to be appointed. It is painful to take a backward step of this kind, and to abandon a reform, the fruit of the persevering struggles of so many eminent men ; and I believe that if we consent to this change, the consequences of the act will soon be seen.

The Federal Government will have the right of imposing taxes on the provinces without the concurrence of the local governments. Under article five of the 29th resolution, the Federal Government may raise moneys by all modes or systems of taxation, and I look upon this power as most excessive. Thus, in case it should happen, as I said a moment ago, that the Lower Canada Government refused to undertake the payment of the debt contracted for the redemption of the Seigniorial Tenure, the Federal Government would have two methods of compelling it to do so. First, by retaining the amount out of the eighty cents per head indemnity to be accorded to the Local Government, and secondly, by imposing a local and direct tax. The Lieutenant Governor of the Local Government will be appointed by the Federal Government, and will be guided by its instructions. We are not told whether the Local Government will be responsible to the Local Legislature; whether there will be only one or two branches of the Legislature, nor how the Legislative Council will be composed, if there is to be one ; we are refused any information whatsoever on these points, which are nevertheless of some importance.

What shall I say on the subject of marriage—the basis of all our institutions ? Is it not dangerous to have it at the mercy of the Federal Government ? We shall soon be told probably that it is but a sounding affair, and before long, mayors will take the place of the curés, and will celebrate the marriages of their constituents. Our laws which regulate our marriages at present are very important to us, and are based on the Roman law. These are the only laws suitable to Canadians, and the wise provisions characterizing them were the fruit of the experience of several ages. We should not incur the risk of any change in them by a legislature, the majority of whose members do not hold our opinions on this subject.

Had it not been for the nomination of these members, and the adhesion given by some others, it would have been impossible to reform the Legislative Council. But what results may be anticipated from the proposed constitution of the Federal Legislative Council ? By limiting the number of the members of this House, the prerogative of the Crown is, in fact, restricted, and a system is adopted, exactly the reverse of that which exists in England. And in the event of serious difficulties arising between the House of Commons and the Upper House, what would happen ? The same thing would happen which has already occurred before, but with this difference, that the Crown would not have the power of infusing new elements, and legislation would thus be at a stand-still. The only course to be pursued under those circumstances will be to ask the Imperial Government to amend the constitution of the Council, as the people will be powerless from our having deprived them of the right of electing councillors. For my part, I am convinced that this new system will not be productive of beneficial results. I do not propose to repeat here all the arguments which have been already urged against the projected changes; but I must say, as holding my authority from the people, that the question of Confederation has never been adverted to during the two elections which I have passed through, and that, therefore, I do not think that my constituents expressed their opinion on this question when they elected me, or that they conferred upon me the right of changing the constitution of the Legislative Council, without consulting them in the matter.

The LAFONTAINE-BALDWIN Administration, seeing that there was no possibility of obtaining reforms on account of the obstacles raised by the Legislative Council as then constituted, had recourse to the appointment of new liberal councillors ; and by the adhesion of the older ones, they succeeded in carrying their measures.

questions in respect of which we are in complete ignorance, and in relation to which the Government will say nothing whatever. And, with respect to the constitution of the local governments, are we, in case the Upper Canada majority choose to impose their ideas upon us, are we, I say, to submit to them ?

When we make a Constitution, we must in the first place settle the political and religious questions which divide the populations for whom the Constitution is devised ; because it is a well known fact, that it is religious differences which have caused the greatest troubles and the greatest difficulties which have agitated the people in days gone by.

The hon. member pretends that if the elective principle continues to be applied to the Legislative Council, the result will very soon be that all those adventurers who seek to live in political life and by political life, will drive from our midst all men of merit, and will then control the affairs of the country. For my part, I by no means stand in dread of such a result, for I know that there is too much good sense among the people to make it possible that they will ever consent to serve as a stepping-stone to political adventurers in pursuit of the advancement of their own personal prospects and fortune in public life. I am well aware that some political adventurers do occasionally succeed in imposing upon the people by means of fine promises and a hypocritical exterior ; but the political life of such individuals has never been of long duration, and the results of the election of legislative councillors by the people remain to prove the complete absence of foundation for the fears expressed by the honorable member. I think, moreover, that the results which have hitherto obtained from the application of the elective principle to this House, and from the election of the members who now sit in it, are satisfactory and do no dishonor to this honorable House. At any rate I never yet heard such a thing asserted. The hon. member maintains that it is not necessary that the Legislative Council should be elective, because that body is intended, or has for its mission, to act as a counterpoise between the Executive and the Lower House. But that state of affairs exists at the present day

The hon. member also stated that he did not want to make a backward step in relation to the election of the members of the Legislative Council. In reply to that, I would state that the elective principle, as applied to the Legislative Council, becomes unnecessary in view of the numerical strength of Lower Canada in the Federal Parliament, for the House of Commons is the body that will make and unmake ministers. Why have the elective principle for the Legislative Council, since we shall have it for the House of Commons, since we shall have a responsible Government and a Federal Government, composed of members elected by the people ? The hon. member has stated that he desired to advance with the intellect of the people, and not to take a backward step. These are great words—the intellect of the people ! progress ! But for my part, I do not hesitate to assert, that the people will gladly sacrifice the election of the members of the Legislative Council, in view of the control of all the matters I mentioned before. The hon. member has said that the elective principle would have been the safe-guard of Lower Canada. I can understand this to be the case in a House which is able to make and unmake administrations, but in a House which is indissoluble, I cannot discover its importance. The safety of Lower Canada depends, not on the elective principle, but on the responsibility of the members of the Executive to the House of Commons. I may be permitted to say one word on the subject of the elective right, as it is the grand panacea for all the ills incident to humanity. We must not shut our eyes against evidence. Have we, since the union of several counties to form electoral divisions, seen persons of independent fortune and character, who do not seek to make a gainful pursuit of politics, offer themselves for election to the Legislative Council ? I acknowledge that the elections to seats in the Legislative Council which have taken place so far have had excellent results : the members sent hither by their constituencies have added new lustre to the body ; but has it not now become almost impossible to get an independent man to stand ? The contested elections in the large divisions have disgusted many who would do honor to the country, but who will not risk their fortune in an election ; and if we see such a result already, what is it likely to be hereafter ? We shall see political intriguers making their own of the electoral divisions as a living—living by politics and for politics only. We shall see what has been seen in other countries—people embracing political life as a shield against their creditors, sheltering themselves under its segis against the law. Such men will fill this House, to the exclusion of honor and honesty. I say again, those who now compose this House are honorable men, who are a credit to their country — in time, their seats will be filled by political intriguers.

but I can tell him that the Protestant minority of Lower Canada have nothing to fear from the Catholic majority of that province : their religion is guaranteed by treaty, and their schools and the rights which may be connected with them, are to be settled by legislation to take place hereafter, and when that legislation is laid before the Houses, those members who so greatly tremble now for the rights of the Protestant minority will have an opportunity of protecting that minority ; they may then urge their reasons, and insist that the Protestants shall not be placed in a position of the slightest danger. But even granting that the Protestants were wronged by the Local Legislature of Lower Canada, could they not avail themselves of the protection of the Federal Legislature ? And would not the Federal Government exercise strict surveillance over the action of the local legislatures in these matters ? Why should it be sought to give existence to imaginary fears in Lower Canada ?

Legislative Council of the Federal Parliament, the appointed members to remain for life, and the elective members for eight years from the date of their election, unless removed by death or other cause ; their successors to be elected by the same divisions and electors as have elected them.

This is the resolution which he proposes in amendment: Upper Canada to be represented in the Legislative Council by twenty-four elective members, and Lower Canada by twenty-four elective members, and the Maritime Provinces by twenty-four members, corresponding with the twenty-four elective members in each section of Canada, of which Nova Scotia shall have ten, New Brunswick ten, and Prince Edward Island shall have four, and the present members of the Legislative Council of Canada, as well life members as elective members, shall be members of the first

The first point to which I directed my attention was to ascertain what guarantees Lower Canada would find in Confederation for its laws, its religion and its autonomy. I find the guarantee of all these things in that article of the scheme which gives to Lower Canada the local government of its affairs, and the control of all matters relating to its institutions, to its laws, to its religion, its manufactures and its autonomy. Are you not all prepared, hon. gentlemen, and you especially members from Lower Canada, to make some few sacrifices in order to have the control of all those things to which I have just referred, and which are all to be within the jurisdiction of the local governments.

The Prime Minister stated that the object of Confederation was to strengthen the monarchical principle in this country. I do not see that it is necessary to confer upon the Crown greater privileges than it already possesses in England itself. In England the members of the House of Lords are not appointed by the Crown ; succession in the peerage goes down hereditary from father to son ; but here it is proposed that the members of the Legislative Council, which body corresponds to the House of Lords, should be selected by the Crown. Why should this be ? Why go beyond what is done in England itself? Is it that the Crown complains that it has not sufficient power here ?

Take, for instance, the question of the fisheries. Article 17, of the 29th resolution, gives to the Federal Parliament the power of legislating on the ” sea coast and inland fisheries.” Under the 8th article of the 43rd resolution, the local legislatures will also have the right of legislating on the ” sea coast and inland fisheries.” Thus the local legislatures and the Federal Legislature will have the right to legislate on the same subjects. And if the laws they make are in opposition the one to the other, what will be the result ?

Thus it was said that under Confederation we should obtain coal from Nova Scotia without having any duty to pay. This reasoning might appear to carry a certain amount of force with it, but I must say that it is in fact captious, for we find at the present day that we can indeed get this coal, but by paying the export duty exactly like foreign countries. Would there, then, be no real free trade between the different parts of the same Confederation ? Would the position of the provinces, in this respect, remain as it is to-day ? The proof of what I state here is found in Hon. Mr. GALT’S speech to his constituents :— In Nova Scotia a considerable revenue was derived from a royalty en coal mines, and its representatives at the Conference stated that if the General Government imposed an export duty on coal it would annihilate one of their most important resources, and, therefore, Nova Scotia has been allowed to regulate herself the export duty on coal, precisely as New Brunswick enjoys that right as regards its timber. This duty which Nova Scotia may impose on the export of its coal, whatsoever it may be styled, is then in reality an export duty, and the result, as regards ourselves, is to leave us still in the same position if we must pay the duty in order to get the coal of that province. The argument based on the fact that we could obtain coal from Nova Scotia without paying an import duty, is thus destroyed, since the duty will still exist. I have already stated that the plan submitted for our approval is exceedingly complex, and that it is not easy to foresee the difficulties that will arise between the local governments and the Federal Government.

when speaking of the school question, I would not vote for a Constitution which would not confer on the Catholics of Upper Canada the same advantages as are possessed by the Protestants of Lower Canada, and I consider that this is a matter that should be settled before taking a vote on the resolutions, for when Confederation is once voted it may easily happen that we shall not be able to obtain what is promised us now.

The 29th section of the scheme submitted to us says : ” The Federal Parliament shall have the power of making laws for the peace, the well-being, and the good government of the Confederate provinces, and in particular in respect of the following matters.” The powers of the Federal Government will be in reality unlimited. The fact of the enumeration of these thirty-seven heads does not in the least restrain the power of the Federal Government from legislating on everything. The exceptions are few. I would ask the Honorable Premier, for instance, whether the Federal Government has not the power to enact that marriage is a civil contract ? He cannot deny it, and I do not believe that that clause will in any way suit Lower Canada. In a matter of divorce, I consider that the power of legislating upon it ought to be vested in the Federal Government ; but as to the passing of a marriage act, we have the authority of the past to convince us that Lower Canada will never be satisfied with what is proposed in the plan of Confederation. On a former occasion, when a member of the Parliament of Canada moved to enact that marriage should be made a civil contract, all the members for Lower Canada voted against the motion, and the whole country was opposed to it. I shall also inquire whether the Federal Government will not have the right to enact that religious corporations shall no longer exist in the country, or that they shall not be allowed to hold real property, except what is absolutely necessary for their lodging accommodation. According to the resolutions which have been submitted to us, the Federal Government would certainly have this right. It has been said that article 15 of the 43rd resolution replies to this objection, but I can see nothing in that article which restricts the right of the Federal Government to legislate on this matter. The 43rd resolution defines the powers of the local governments, and article 15 of that resolution declares that they may make laws respecting ” property and civil rights, excepting those portions thereof assigned to the General Parliament.” That article reserves to the local legislatures nothing relative to religious corporations, and the Federal Government would have full power to decree that those corporations shall not hold immovable property. The supreme power is that which has the right to legislate upon, and regulate the existence of, the corporations in question, and they can only possess civil rights so long as the Government permits them to exist. The same might be said of most of the institutions to which Lower Canada is attached. I am therefore right in saying that, so far as those things which Lower Canada most holds to are concerned, Confederation is in fact a Legislative union, because upon the Federal Government is conferred the right of legislating upon those subjects which Lower Canada holds most dear.

I think that if, with the retaining these electoral divisions the elective principle was also retained, the French population of Lower Canada would also find in it their protection. For then each division would be free to choose for its representative in the Federal Legislative Council a man attached to the institutions of Lower Canada, while, in giving the nomination of the legislative councillors to the Federal power, the latter would be at liberty to choose whomsoever it thought proper, and, unfortunately — a circumstance which I do not anticipate, but which may occur — the General Government, when formed, might be surrounded by coteries inimical to Lower Canada interests, and be led by them to choose members for the Legislative Council hostile to the views of Lower Canada. I consider, therefore, an elective Legislative Council in the Confederation as essential to the interests of Lower Canada.

No, my constituents never gave me this right, nor was any elected member entrusted with it, and whoever assume to vote away the liberties of the people in this manner, betray their mandate. If it was desired that the people should surrender this right they should have been informed of such desire in good time, so that they might have considered the question ; but without warning them, or consulting them, this most highly-prized principle was bartered away to the Lower Provinces for a Confederation which could not last.

I do not wish, however, to see the local governments crushed under a great central power, and I am sure the people cannot wish, and do not wish, to give up the principle of election in respect of this House. They had fought too long for the privilege to do that

I was not sent here to assist in doing any such thing, and am not aware that there has been any evidence of a desire in the country for a return to the old mode of appointment by the Crown. I am not aware of one complaint, or of any dissatisfaction whatever with the present constitution of the Legislative Council, and I therefore regard it as not a little strange that a few gentlemen, without mission or warrant, should have devised such a change, and should be trying to press it upon the Legislature and the country.

be more disposed to stretch its prerogatives and to trench upon the domain of the local governments than to narrow down and retain its authority. The scheme then, in my opinion, is defective in that it inverts this order and gives to the General Government too much power and to the local governments too little. As it is now, if the scheme goes into operation, tlie local governments will be in danger of being crushed (écrasés) by the General Government. The tendency of the whole scheme seems to be one of political retrogression instead of advancement.

My opinion is, that as much power as possible should have been entrusted to the local governments, and as little as is consistent with the functions it will have to discharge to the Central Government, and my reason for entertaining this opinion is, that the Supreme Government, with its power of purse and its control of the armies, will always

HON. MR. MCCREA—Does the honorable member from Grandville not remember the increase of members in the representation of the other House, in 1853, and the amendment of the constitution of this House in 1856, the very question I am now debating ? Surely these measures were amendments of that act, and who knows but under the new Constitutional Act—the favorite measure of my honorable friend—the election of members of this House, may not again be resorted to, if the nominative principle shall not be found to work well ? But let us examine for a moment what the amendment of my honorable friend from Wellington is intended to effect. It will be seen by referring to the amendment itself, that the honorable gentleman proposes that the members of this House from Canada and from the Maritime Provinces shall have a different origin or, as it were, a different parentage, elected by the people with us, and appointed by the Crown from the eastern provinces. I take it that it is very desirable that in whatever way the members of this House may be chosen, there should be uniformity in the system. By the honorable gentleman’s plan we shall have one-third of the members from below representing the Crown, and two-thirds from above, representing the people ; a curious sort of incongruity which I think should by all means be avoided. I may be answered that our present House is constituted in that very way ; but honorable gentlemen must remember that the life member» are not the sole representatives of any particular section of the province, but are chosen indiscriminately from all parts of the province. This is not likely to lead to a sectional collision like the scheme of my honorable friend, and be sides that, the appointment of life members in this House is not to be continued after the seats of the present members shall have become vacant from any cause whatever. I think the scheme of my honorable friend the most objectionable of all.

they honored me with this seat. I admit that the proposed system is not the same as the old one, because it limits the numbers, and to this limitation I have the most serious objections ; but I am not going to hazard the success of the union scheme, as I sincerely believe I would, by voting for the amendment, but I shall take it as it is, with the hope and belief that in the new Parliament, when the union is consummated, the constitution of this House may be set right.

They hold that the elective principle applied to this branch of Parliament gives too much power to the people, while I, on the other hand, argue that they have not by it as quick and as sharp a remedy against a stubborn Council as they had under the system of nomination. The great beauty of the old system was the promptness with which at the critical moment it could be brought to bear, and the history of its operations, both in this country and in England, clearly shows its superiority. My honorable friend from the division of King has cited the case of the greatest commoner of England, the celebrated WILLIAM PITT, having appointed so many members to the House of Lords within the first few months of his ministerial career. Did not PITT at that time command the confidence of the people of England? Does not my honorable friend know, if he has read the history of those times, that this great statesman steadily refused to accept office until he saw that public opinion was ripe for his schemes ? And was not PITT, at the commencement of his parliamentary career, the great advocate of parliamentary reform ? It is true that subsequent causes, over which he had no control, led him to pursue a very different course. What if at the times of tlie achievements by the people of those two great victories of civil and religious liberty in England, I mean Catholic emancipation and the passage of the Reform Bill, the Crown, through its ministers responsible to the House of Commons and the English nation, had not had power to coerce the Lords into consent, but had been obliged to wait for two years for the doubtful issue of a certain number of elections. Such have been my opinions with regard to the comparative merits of the nominative and elective principles as applied to this House, and I have not hesitated to express them among my constituents, both before and since

resolutions of the 3rd September, 1841, at Kingston, established the true British principle of responsible government, and I maintain that since that time the people never demanded that this House should be made elective.

The amendment brings up the question of members being appointed for life by the Crown, or elected for a term of years by the people. I am among those of the reform party who think that making the members of this House elective was a step in the wrong direction; and though I am free to admit that but for the elective principle having been applied to this House, I should never have had the honor of a seat within its walls, yet I am prepared to re-affirm that opinion on the floor of this House by my voting, as I shall do, against this amendment of my honorable friend from Wellington, and to sanction a return to the nomination of members for life by the Crown, under the advice of Ministers responsible to the people through the Legislative Assembly. I deny that the extension of the elective principle to this House was ever sought for, or petitioned for by the people at the time of its consummation. It is quite true, honorable gentlemen, that before the union of Upper and Lower Canada, and during the palmy days of the Family Compact and the irresponsibility of the Government, when the Assembly had no control over the Executive, except by stopping the supplies, the Legislative Council was chosen for the mere purpose of opposing the public will, and they did it most effectually.

Some honorable gentlemen have urged that the people should not elect their representatives to the Upper House, because it involves a very great expense on the part of the elected, and because they cannot judge who is worthy of their confidence so well as the Government of the day. Now, I argue that if the people are unfit to choose members of this House, they are unfit to choose members of the other House too. If three counties united are not able to make a good selection, how can one-third part of that constituency make a good one ? And with regard to the corrupt influences that may be brought to bear, will it be for a moment said that a large constituency of three counties can be as easily corrupted as a constituency composed of only one county ? I think not. I think a more independent vote is brought to bear on the election of a member of the Upper House than of the Lower. Yet the members of the Lower House want to assume the power of dictating who shall compose the Legislative Council.

than their transitory impulses. But this advantage -would be wholly lost if the whole body were chosen or could be removed under the influence of such an impulse. The first of these dangers is obviated (or intended to be so) by providing that half only of the Council shall be elected at one time. The second, by giving to each Councillor a fixed tenure of office, independent of any popular or governmental influence. Thus, it will be seen, lie would place the Council out of the reach of Government, while they should be under the influence of the settled convictions of the people and not their mere transitory impulse. He would have them elected by a conservative body of electors. The next clause of the instructions runs thus :— In Prince Edward Island, I would enforce a tolerably high property qualification in the case of the electors, but of the candidate I would only require that he should be a British subject, resident in the colony, and thirty years of age.

Nor do I think it any way objectionable, but the contrary, that the Council (as in Canada, Victoria, South Australia and Tasmania) be incapable of being dissolved by the Governor. An Upper Chamber is valuable as an element of stability, and the principal value of an elective Upper Chamber I conceive to be this,—that while in virtue of its elective character, it may claim equally with the Assembly to speak the voice of the community, it may yet be so composed as to reflect their settled wishes and principles rather

HON. MR. REESOR—Well, there it is. The honorable gentleman acknowledges his determination to reward his political supporters. Is this the way to obtain an independent branch of the Legislature, one that will operate as a wholesome check on hasty legislation? Those who receive favors from a political party are not likely to turn their backs upon that party. I think we are not likely, under any circumstances, to have a more independent House under the proposed system than we now have, or one which will better advance the interests of the country. If you wish to raise the elective franchise, for elections to the Upper House—if you would confine their election to voters on real estate of $400 assessed value, and tenants holding a lease-hold of $100 annual value, and thus place these elections out of the reach of a mere money influence that may sometimes operate upon the masses—if you think this body is not sufficiently conservative—let them be elected by a more conservative portion of the community— that portion which has the greatest stake in the community—but do not strike out the elective principle altogether.

HON. MR. CAMPBELL—Does the honorable gentleman suppose that the members of this House will owe their nomination to the political services they can render in this House ? HON. MR. REESOR—Not solely, but rather to their political services at elections and otherwise, before their nomination. The honorable gentleman will remember a certain little domestic arrangement he made on the other side of the House, while in opposition, in which he had many warm friends. Does he expect to forget those ?

their views were sometimes warped by circumstances. Looking across the ocean, my honorable friend will remember that during the Administration of WILLIAM PITT, who wielded almost the sole control of Parliament in England for seventeen years, he appointed, during this period, 140 members to the House of Lords, subservient to his own wishes and intent on carrying out his views. I will just read to this House a short extract relating to him, written by a man capable of judging. In MAY’S Constitutional History we read :— When Mr. PITT had been eight years in power he had created between sixty and seventy Peers, the greater part of whom owed their elevation to the parliamentary support they had themselves given to the Ministry, or to their influence in returning members to the House of Commons.