3 Matching Annotations
  1. Apr 2023
    1. Clearly this type of reasoning has an argumentation scheme. One premisedefines or describes a goal. The other premise describes a means of achieving thegoal. The conclusion directs the agent towards action to carry out the means.6But this type of reasoning is so common and distinctive, having manyvariants and subspecies of argumentation, that it is misleading to call it anargumentation scheme. Better to call it a type of reasoning that can be used inargumentation in different types of dialogue (as in Walton, What Reas., 1990).
      • Agential Network
      • Case and Inferential Qualifications
      • Conclusions and Goal Relations
      • Normative Framework
    2. A person who puts forward an argumentation anticipates criticism, and bychoosing a particular type of argumentation, using the one argumentationscheme rather than the other, he implies that he thinks he knows which routewill lead to the justification of his standpoint. At any rate, whether he reallythinks this or not, if he is to be taken seriously by the other party, he may beheld to be committed to deal with the critical questions which pertain to ajustification via the argumentation scheme that is inherent in his argumentation.In relying on a certain argumentation scheme, the arguer invokes a particular testing method in a dialectical procedure, in which certain criticalreactions are relevant, and others not. Each argumentation scheme calls, as itwere, for its own set of critical reactions. In conjunction with each other,these reactions constitute a well-rounded test for checking the soundness of anargumentation of the type concerned. (p. 98)This way of describing argumentation schemes suggests that they are normativelybinding, in the following sense. If the hearer accepts the premises of the speaker'sargument, and the argument is an instance of a genuine and appropriate argumentation scheme (for the type of dialogue they are engaged in), then the hearer mustor should (in some binding way) accept the conclusion. This does not appear to be"validity" in the same sense in which the word is familiarly used in deductive (orperhaps even inductive) logic. But it does appear to express a normative or broadlylogical sense of validity, bindingness, conditional acceptability, or whatever youwant to call it
      • Initial Speaker has goal in mind thus presents reasoning that invites particular types of attention
      • This includes Supportive and Critical attention
      • The reasoning is normative in that it conformism to the shared communicative standards. Not definitive logical ones.
    3. Arguments like the one in Case 1 . 1 lie on a razor's edge: They are somewhatweak and unreliable, and apt to fail occasionally, but they are not so bad or inherently erroneous that they should be called "fallacious" in all instances. On theother hand, they can tum out to be fallacious, in some cases. And, in particular,they run the risk of committing the secundum quid fallacy as quite a general sort offailure they are prone to. If this is right, a new approach to fallacies is called foran approach that takes more care in assessing the particulars of a given case.In arguments like the one in Case 1 . 1 , the premise, if true in a given case,does give a reason for accepting the conclusion. But it is not a conclusive reason,and it is subject to default relative to what is known (or becomes known) of thefurther circumstances of the case. The problem then is to find the underlying structure of inference in such a case that enables one to identify and test the correctness(or incorrectness) of the argument as an instance of an argumentation scheme
      • Case = Argumentative Stage in the Sequence of Goal Statements
      • All Cases generate infernal qualifications.
      • Inferential Qualifications give rise to conclusions
      • Qualification to Conclusion = Argument
      • Arguments Relate to Goal.