10 Matching Annotations
- Jan 2022
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For example, suppose your API returns a 401 Unauthorized status code with an error description like The access token is expired. In this case, it gives information about the token itself to a potential attacker. The same happens when your API responds with a 403 Forbidden status code and reports the missing scope or privilege.
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Now, assume your client attempts to access a resource that it MUST NOT access at all, for example, because it belongs to another user. What status code should your API return? Should it return a 403 or a 401 status code?You may be tempted to return a 403 status code anyway. But, actually, you can't suggest any missing permission because that client has no way to access that resource. So, the 403 status code gives no actual helpful information. You may think that returning a 401 status code makes sense in this case. After all, the resource belongs to another user, so the request should come from a different user.However, since that resource shouldn't be reached by the current client, the best option is to hide it.
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stackoverflow.com stackoverflow.com
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Special case: Can be used instead of 404 to avoid revealing presence or non-presence of resource
eh? instead of 404? I would actually say that:
- 404 is as good or better at avoiding revealing presence or non-presence of resource; probably better because 401 implies that we found the resource but that they needed to be signed in in order to access
- normally one would use a 404 instead of a 401/403 (usually instead of a 403) to avoid revealing presence or non-presence of resource.
I think they know which is the correct, as evidenced by how they said about 404 below: "User/agent known but server will not reveal anything about the resource, does as if it does not exist." — I think this must have just been a typo.
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- Dec 2020
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github.com github.com
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The only solution that I can see is to ensure that each user gets their own set of stores for each server-rendered page. We can achieve this with the context API, and expose the stores like so: <script> import { stores } from '@sapper/app'; const { page, preloading, session } = stores(); </script> Calling stores() outside component initialisation would be an error.
Good solution.
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One way to do that is to export them from @sapper/app directly, and rely on the fact that we can reset them immediately before server rendering to ensure that session data isn't accidentally leaked between two users accessing the same server.
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This would be cumbersome, and would encourage developers to populate stores from inside components, which makes accidental data leakage significantly more likely.
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Just realised this doesn't actually work. If store is just something exported by the app, there's no way to prevent leakage. Instead, it needs to be tied to rendering, which means we need to use the context API. Sapper needs to provide a top level component that sets the store as context for the rest of the app. You would therefore only be able to access it during initialisation, which means you couldn't do it inside a setTimeout and get someone else's session by accident:
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github.com github.com
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This is an opportunity to fix a bug: if you're on a page that redirects to a login page if there's no user object, or otherwise preloads data specific to that user, then logging out won't automatically update the page — you could easily end up with a page like HOME ABOUT LOG IN ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Secret, user-specific data that shouldn't be visible alongside a 'log in' button:
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- Apr 2020
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security.googleblog.com security.googleblog.com
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At the same time, we need to ensure that no information about other unsafe usernames or passwords leaks in the process, and that brute force guessing is not an option. Password Checkup addresses all of these requirements by using multiple rounds of hashing, k-anonymity, and private set intersection with blinding.
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gavinmiller.io gavinmiller.io
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You see entropy is information leaking. When it comes to passwords (and secure systems in general) you want to leak as little information as possible. Otherwise an attacker has information they can use to their advantage.
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