- Sep 2021
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mmcr.education mmcr.education
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And -- and still get the public money.
I think she might be the second dissenting justice as she goes against David Cortman strongly here. She says they are able to deny members thus they are private thus they don't get immediate right to public money
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this Court said in no uncertain terms what the Framers didn't want was tax money imposed to pay for building or maintaining churches or church property. And doesn't that fit this case?
I think her opinion is leaning more towards the side of not finding the state's funding a violation. The argument is that the framers wanted to exclude religious institutions from public funding and this school fits the criteria for exclusion
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We seem to be confusing money with religious practice.
Her language suggest that there is a misunderstanding of what is actually being argued and that the side in favor of no funding is arguing something moot because there is no religious violation at all. The Establishment clause is not tying in in her opinion
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Elena Kagan
I think this is a great point brought up by justice Kagan. It ties back to one of my questions I left earlier. She seems to think that there may be a risk of favoritism and a violation of that establishment clause that Cortman keeps talking about but going the other way. And again Cortman doesn't do a good job answering that question, in fact in this example he sidesteps it all together and simply says the system is set up to not discriminate and be "religion blind" Although that sounds great, the problem is discriminatory people wont be "religion blind" which is something she seems to realize.
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We seem to be confusing money with religious practice. I don't think the two are tied.
I believe justice sotomayor is one of the dissenting judges based on these comments. I think she makes a very good point and I don't think Cortman does a good job defending his point here. He tries to argue that it creates a conflict with the establishment clause but it seems to me that following the establishment clause would suggest they not fund the school.
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- Feb 2014
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www.ucs.louisiana.edu www.ucs.louisiana.edu
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Dissent 1: Rehnquist (joined by White): A. "Liberty" not found in the Bill of Rights is not absolutely protected because RULE: the correct test for social and economic regulation is whether the law has "rational relation to a valid state objective." B. The majority ignores that rule. The trimester scheme is "judicial legislation" and historical legal prohibitions show abortion is "not so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked fundamental" because the drafters of the 14th Amendment did not intend to limit the states' ability to regulate abortion. Dissent 2: White: A. There is "Nothing in the language or history of the Constitution to support the Court’s judgment," so the majority’s decision must be a "raw exercise of judicial power" that is "improvident and extravagant." B. The decision whether to allow abortions or not should be left to the people of the states and their legislatures—in other words, the political process.
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lawschool.about.com lawschool.about.com
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Concurring/Dissenting Opinion: You don’t need to spend too much time on this part other than the pinpoint the concurring or dissenting judge’s main point of contention with the majority opinion and rationale. Concurring and dissenting opinions hold lots of law professor Socratic Method fodder, and you can be ready by including this part in your case brief.
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euro.ecom.cmu.edu euro.ecom.cmu.edu
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Concurri ng and/or Diss enting Opinio ns. Concurring and dissenting opinions (a.k.a. “concu rrence s” and “dissents”) are opinions by judges w ho did not se e entire ly e ye -to-ey e with the other judges of the court, and wish to express a slightly or even dramatically diff erent view of the case. In g en er al , a co nc ur ri ng op in io n i s a n o pi ni on by a judge who would have reached the same result as the majority, but f or a different reason. Dissenting opinions are opinions by judges who disagree with the majority’s result entirely. I n most cases, dissenting opinions try to persuade the reader that the majority ’s decision was simply incorre ct.
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