On 2017 Feb 14, Lydia Maniatis commented:

In this article, Felin et al (2016) mix up two different issues, which, like oil and water, intermingle but don’t mix. Put another way, the authors alternate between the two poles of a false dichotomy. On the one side is a truism, on the other an epistemological fallacy.

The latter involves the view expressed by Koenderink (2014) in an editorial called “The All-Seeing-Eye?” Here, he essentially makes the old argument that because all knowledge, and all perception, is indirect, inferential and selective, it makes no sense to posit a unique, real world. As I have pointed out in Maniatis (2015), the anti-realist position of Koenderink (2014) as well as Rogers (2014) and Hoffman (2009) and Purves et al (2014) (all of whom are cited in this respect by Felin et al (2016)) are paradoxical and inconsistently asserted. Rogers (2014), for example, describes the concept of “illusion” as invalid, while at the same time saying that “illusions” are useful). Inconsistency is inevitable if we want to make references to an objective world on the one hand (e.g. in making scientific statements), and at the same time claim that there is no unique, objective world.

It is clear from the text that Felin et al (2016) are not, in fact, adopting an anti-realist view. It has simply been inappropriately mixed into a critique of poor practices in the social sciences. These practices involve setting up situations in which participants make incorrect inferences, and treating this as an example of bias or irrationality. As the authors correctly discuss, this is pointless and inappropriate; the relevant question is how do organisms manage, most of the time, to make correct or useful inferences on the basis of information that is always inadequate and partial? What implicit assumptions allow them to fill in the gaps?

These are basic, fundamental points, but do not license a leap to irrationality; Arguing that it is not useful to treat a visual illusion, for example, as simply a mistake is not a reason to reject the distinction between veridical and non-veridical solutions, and this applies also to cognitive inferences about the world.

As the authors themselves note, their points are not new - despite the existence of researchers who have ignored or failed to understand them. So they seem to be giving themselves a little too much credit when they describe their views as “provocative” and a prescription for a “radically different, organism-specific understanding of nature, perception, and rationality.”

On 2017 Feb 14, Lydia Maniatis commented:

In this article, Felin et al (2016) mix up two different issues, which, like oil and water, intermingle but don’t mix. Put another way, the authors alternate between the two poles of a false dichotomy. On the one side is a truism, on the other an epistemological fallacy.

The latter involves the view expressed by Koenderink (2014) in an editorial called “The All-Seeing-Eye?” Here, he essentially makes the old argument that because all knowledge, and all perception, is indirect, inferential and selective, it makes no sense to posit a unique, real world. As I have pointed out in Maniatis (2015), the anti-realist position of Koenderink (2014) as well as Rogers (2014) and Hoffman (2009) and Purves et al (2014) (all of whom are cited in this respect by Felin et al (2016)) are paradoxical and inconsistently asserted. Rogers (2014), for example, describes the concept of “illusion” as invalid, while at the same time saying that “illusions” are useful). Inconsistency is inevitable if we want to make references to an objective world on the one hand (e.g. in making scientific statements), and at the same time claim that there is no unique, objective world.

It is clear from the text that Felin et al (2016) are not, in fact, adopting an anti-realist view. It has simply been inappropriately mixed into a critique of poor practices in the social sciences. These practices involve setting up situations in which participants make incorrect inferences, and treating this as an example of bias or irrationality. As the authors correctly discuss, this is pointless and inappropriate; the relevant question is how do organisms manage, most of the time, to make correct or useful inferences on the basis of information that is always inadequate and partial? What implicit assumptions allow them to fill in the gaps?

These are basic, fundamental points, but do not license a leap to irrationality; Arguing that it is not useful to treat a visual illusion, for example, as simply a mistake is not a reason to reject the distinction between veridical and non-veridical solutions, and this applies also to cognitive inferences about the world.

As the authors themselves note, their points are not new - despite the existence of researchers who have ignored or failed to understand them. So they seem to be giving themselves a little too much credit when they describe their views as “provocative” and a prescription for a “radically different, organism-specific understanding of nature, perception, and rationality.”