In contrast to the previous studies, for the switch dilemma,consequentialist agents were rated to be no less moral (Z0.73,p.47,d0.10) or trustworthy (Z1.87,p.06,d0.26)than deontological agents.
To me, this seems to weigh against their main claim. In the one case in which a majority favored the consequentialist choice, the consequentialists are not disfavored! They are really playing this down. Am I missing something?
The switch case differs from the footbridge case in two criticalways
But it is still in the domain of HARMING people (more versus fewer).
nd recent theoretical work has demon-strated that “cooperating without looking”—that is, without consid-ering the costs and benefits of cooperation—is a subgame perfectequilibrium (Hoffman, Yoeli, & Nowak, 2015). Therefore, expressingcharacteristically deontological judgments could constitute a behaviorthat enhances individual fitness in a cooperation market because thesejudgments are seen as reliable indicators of a specific valued behav-ior—cooperation
Is this relevant to the idea that '(advocating) Effective giving is a bad signal'?
Does utilitarian decision-making in 'good space' contradict this?
I'm not convinced. An 'excuse not to do something' is not the same as a 'choice to be effective'.
Across 5 studies, we show that people who make characteristically deontological judgments arepreferred as social partners, perceived as more moral and trustworthy, and are trusted more in economicgames.
But this does NOT hold in the switching case/switching study