- Mar 2020
nd recent theoretical work has demon-strated that “cooperating without looking”—that is, without consid-ering the costs and benefits of cooperation—is a subgame perfectequilibrium (Hoffman, Yoeli, & Nowak, 2015). Therefore, expressingcharacteristically deontological judgments could constitute a behaviorthat enhances individual fitness in a cooperation market because thesejudgments are seen as reliable indicators of a specific valued behav-ior—cooperation
Is this relevant to the idea that '(advocating) Effective giving is a bad signal'?
Does utilitarian decision-making in 'good space' contradict this?
I'm not convinced. An 'excuse not to do something' is not the same as a 'choice to be effective'.
Across 5 studies, we show that people who make characteristically deontological judgments arepreferred as social partners, perceived as more moral and trustworthy, and are trusted more in economicgames.
But this does NOT hold in the switching case/switching study