There is an aporia also concerning the question whether the affections of the soul are all also common to that which has the soul or whether there is something peculiar to the soul itself. This is something that must be grasped, but it is not easy.

And it seems that most things soul neither do nor suffer without the body, such as be angry, make bold, desire, perceive in general, but thinking seems to be most like a peculiar character. If, however, this also is some sort of representation, or something not without a representation, then even that could not be without the body.

Now, if any of the operations or affections of the soul is peculiar, then it would be possible for it to separate. And if nothing is peculiar to it, it would not have been separable, but as something that is straight has many properties that belong to it insofar as it is , straight, such as touching a sphere in a point, yet

And it seems that all the affections of the soul are with body: spirit, gentleness, fear, pity, boldness, also joy, and loving and hating; for simultaneously wth these body is affected in some way.

This is indicated (i) by the fact that sometimes [the soul] is not irritated or intimidated by the occurrence of strong and clear affections, and (ii) sometimes it is moved by slight and feeble ones, when the body is excited and disposed in such a way as when it is growing angry. This latter point is even clearer: for these things come to be in the affections of the fearer when nothing fearful takes place.

If this is the case, then it is clear that affections are reasons enmattered. So such definitions as ‘growing angry is a certain motion of such-and-such a body or part or power produced by so-and-so for the sake of so-and-so’, and therefore it is already the remit of the student of nature to study the soul, either all, or the soul of this kind.