eber, the son of Protestant "insiders," attained similar goals byactively involving and immersing himself in the issues and policies of his day.Much like the "innerworldly ascetics" of early Calvinism about whom he wrotewith such awe and admiration, Weber gained intellectual autonomy by plung-ing into the struggles of the social and political world rather than by "other-worldly" withdrawal from its turmoils.

had to be an inductive science of the concrete economic behavior of par-ticular men in particular social contexts. This accounts for their institutionalemphasis and their insistence on the importance of the noneconomic matrixof economic life.

economics.

Rickert

matter

In the humanistic disciplines, the Geisteswissenschajten,knowledge is not external but internal. Men are intelligible to us in theiruniqueness and individuahty.

Always and everywhere, Weber followed only the call of his own demon,refusing to be bridled by political expediency.

democracy

He was a man in the tradition of Luther's "Here I stand, I can dono other," even though at times it would almost appear to his contemporariesthat he had more in common with Don Quixote.

The Protestant Ethic

who had previously been courted by a close friend ofWeber's from whom he had snatched her away.

exual fulfillment came to Weber only in his late forties, shortly beforeWorld War I, in an extramarital affair.

His frantic workpace was perhaps a means for diverting his increasingly antagonistic feelingstoward a father on whom he was still wholly dependent.

It is most prob-ably in the Strasbourg period that Weber acquired his lifelong sense of awefor the Protestant virtues, even though he was unable to share the Christian be-lief on which they were based. He never lost respect for men who not onlybelieved as Channing did but who actually lived his moral philosophy.

These distractions did not keep Weber from his studies.

scars

Both parents descended from a line ofProtestants, who had been refugees from Catholic persecution in the past buthad later become successful entrepreneurs.

Max Weber-'' was continually beset by psychic torment.

All contemporaryor near-contemporary sociology shows the impact of his genius

He argued that society must be considered as adelicate balance of multiple opposing forces, so that a war, a revolution, oreven an heroic leader might succeed in throwing the total balance in favor ofa particular outcome.

In his writings on the sociologyof music Weber contrasted the concise notations and the well-tempered scaleof modern music—the rigorous standardization and coordination that governsa modern symphony orchestra—with the spontaneity and inventiveness of themusical systems of Asia or of nonliterate tribes

He attempted to show howprophets with their charismatic appeals had undermined priestly powersbased on tradition; how with the emergence of "book religion" the final sys-tematization and rationalization of the religious sphere had set in, which foundits culmination in the Protestant Ethic

rather than being a consequence of capitalism as such.

Eden

Thus modern rationalized and bureaucratized sys-tems of law have become incapable of dealing with individual particularities,to which earlier types of justice were well suited.

Weberagreed that quite often, especially in the modern capitalist world, economicpower is the predominant form. But he objects that "the emergence of eco-nomic power may be the consequence of power existing on other grounds.

which are held together by notions of proper life-styles and by thesocial esteem and honor accorded to them by others.

Classification of men into such groups is based on their consumption pat-terns rather than on their place in the market or in the process of production.

and a positive ethical sanction is provided for acquisitive activities aimed atmaximizing the self-interests of the actor.

authority

religious

In all these instances, Weber also provides illustra-tions pointing to changing motivations of historical actors, yet on balance,structure seems more important than motivation.

framework

B

probability

a variety of causal chains

his recognition of the extreme difficulties in making entirely ex-haustive causal imputations.

Weber argued, for example, that human action was truly unpredict-able only in the case of the insane,

We shall then be in a position to determine empiricallywhether the concrete conduct of Protestants in, say, seventeenth-century Eng-land did in fact approximate the type and in what specific aspects it failedto do so

An ideal type never corresponds to concretereality but always moves at least one step away from it. It is constructed outof certain elements of reality and forms a logically

Thenotion of the ideal type was meant to provide escape from this dilemma

or does it partake of the contempla-tion of sages and philosophers about the meaning of the universe.

Weber was fundamentally at odds with those who argued for a moralitybased on science.

Hence, the relativity ofvalue orientations leading to different cognitive choices has nothing to do withquestions of scientific validity

A sociology of humangroups has the inestimable advantage of having access to the subjective aspectsof action, to the realm of meaning and motivation.

Hence there is no in-surmountable chasm between the procedures of the natural and the socialscientist, but they differ in their cognitive intentions and explanatory projects

"There is no absolutely'objective' scientific analysis of culture or ... of 'social phenomena' inde-pendent of special and 'one-sided' viewpoints according to which—expresslyor tacitly, consciously or unconsciously—they are selected, analyzed and organ-ized for expository purposes."

Both the natural and the social sciences mustabstract from the manifold aspects of reality; they always involve selection.

And against both theseapproaches Weber emphasized the value-bound problem choices of the in-vestigator and the value-neutral methods of social research

Against the historicists Weber argued that the method of science,whether its subject matter be things or men, always proceeds by abstractionand generalization. Against the positivists, he took the stand that man, in con-trast to things, could be understood not only in external manifestations, that is,in behavior, but also in the underlying motivations.

Hence it is the task of sociology to reduce these concepts to "under-standable" action, that is without exception, to the actions of participatingindividual men.

nature

'Which social factors havebrought about the rationahzation of Western civilization?

The paradigm of a sociology which is both historical and systematic.

action.

Weber argued, falls outside the purviewof sociology

e in a great while a textbook comes a

atcontemptuousgesture,hesummeduphisfeelingsaboutthemanandtheissue:"Well,afterall,hewasjustl

IntroductionSomeyears

Such an aim draws him beyond himself; impersonaland disinterested, it is above all individual personalities; like everyideal, it can be conceived of only as superior to and dominatingreality.

something

Since human personality is the only thing that appeals unanimouslyto all hearts, since its enhancement is the only aim that can becollectively pursued, it inevitably acquires exceptional value in theeyes of all. It thus rises far above all human aims, assuming areligious nature

individual differences multiply

In the first, the indi-vidual is forbidden to destroy himself on his own authority; but theState may permit him to do so. The act is immoral only when it iswholly private and without collaboration through the organs of collect-ive life. Under specific circumstances, society yields slightly andabsolves what it condemns on principle. In the second period, con-demnation is absolute and universal. The power to dispose of a humanlife, except when death is the punishment for a crime, 28 is withheld notmerely from the person concerned but from society itself. It is hence-forth a right denied to collective as well as to private disposition.

This is an error. Society is injuredbecause the sentiment is offended on which its most respected moralmaxims today rest, a sentiment almost the only bond between itsmembers, and which would be weakened if this offense could becommitted with impunity

How couldwe have such a right if society, the existence greater than ourselves,does not have it?

Because we have animmortal soul in us, a spark of divinity, we must now be sacred toourselves. We belong completely to no temporal being because we arekin to God

The publicconscience, while reproving it as a general rule, reserved the right toauthorize it in certain cases

cult of humanpersonality

This is not true of suicide, which,beyond 10 or 15 years, is common to all ages

, buta general, vague aptitude

psychologists

health

fate

way

inclination

result

were insane.

apprehended

effect

Thus it would depend essentially on individual causes

ccordingly, the difference observed betweenthem under other circumstances is not one of race

Austria

Let us see whether the German retains thissad primacy outside Germany, in the midst of the life of other peoplesand acclimatized to different civilizations

suicide

nationality

“race” no longer corresponds to anything def-inite.

social phenomena

ving factors of historical developmen

A society does not depend for its number of suicides onhaving more or fewer neuropaths or alcoholics

alcoholism

suicide-rate

Such an ambiguous power 30 could not therefore accountfor so definite a social fact as the suicide-rate

Disgust with life andinert melancholy will readily germinate amongst an ancient and dis-oriented society, with all the fatal consequences which they imply;contrariwise, in a youthful society an ardent idealism, a generous pros-elytism and active devotion are more likely to develop

insanity

But even by combining them no regular parallel-ism is found between the extent of mental alienation and that of sui-cide.

; for idiots are much more numerous in thecountry than in the city, while suicides are much rarer in the country

But thisis because, first, he has combined the insane proper and idiots underthe common name of alienated

religion

moment

centers

proportion

person

generality

freely

purpose

average

immediately

impulse

character

destruction

groups

insanity

task

but as interdependent functions;thus one cannot suffer lesion without the others being affected

invades

Clinical experience has never been able to observe adiseased mental impulse in a state of pure isolation;

Thus, ambition, from beingnormal, becomes morbid and a monomania of grandeur when itassumes such proportions that all other cerebral functions seem para-lyzed by it

suicidal insanity

persons

environment

In this regard, both pursue the same goal; scientific thought is only a moreperfected form of religious thought. Hence it seems natural that religionshould lose ground as science becomes better at performing its task.

In short, the former gods are growing old or dying, and others have notbeen born.

Its pity forthe downcast seems to us too platonic. We would like one that is more vig-orous but do not yet see clearly what it should be or how it might be realizedin fact.

uitenaturally, the corresponding mythological personages are of the same charac-ter; their sphere of influence is not definite; they hover above the individualtribes and above the land. These are the great international gods

Except by reachingoutside himself, how could the individual add to the energies he possesses

have shown that precisely this is often true of ritual activityand mythological thought.

It rests on conditions that can be uncovered through observa-tion. It is a natural product of social life.

In short, upon the real world where pro-fane life is lived, he superimposes another that, in a sense, exists only in histhought, but one to which he ascribes a higher kind of dignity than he as-cribes to the real world of profane life.

since what defines the sacred is that thesacred is added to the real.

his persistent idealization is a fundamental fea-ture of religions.

n the end, the point is not to exerta kind of physical constraint upon blind and, more than that, imaginaryforces but to reach, fortify, and discipline consciousnesses.

religion

hus it is action that dominates religious life, for the very rea-son that society is its source.

have shown what moralforces it develops and how it awakens that feeling of support, safety, and pro-tective guidance which binds the man of faith to his cult.

properties

Thecultisnotmerelyasystemof signsbywhichthefaithisoutwardlyexpressed;itisthesumtotalofmeansbywhichthat faithiscreated andrecreatedperiodically

he is a man who is stronger.

Indeed, they sense that thetrue function of religion is not to make us think, enrich our knowledge, or addrepresentations of a different sort and source to those we owe to science. Itstrue function is to make us act and to help us live.

hether there is room alongside scientific knowledge for another form ofthought held to be specifically religious.

single idea cannot express one reality here and a dif-ferent one there unless this duality is merely apparent.

the truths thus obtained would be applicable to allliving things, including the most advanced, even if this case was the simplestprotoplasmic being imaginable.

But it is noless true that when a law has been proved by a single well-made experiment,this proof is universally valid.

ollective consciousness is the highest form of psychic life, forit is a consciousness of consciousnesses. Being outside and above individualand local contingencies, collective consciousness sees things only in theirpermanent and fundamental aspect,* which it crystallizes in ideas that can becommunicated.

single causal relation

time

other

Thesewould be sufficient for man as well if his movements had to satisfy individualneeds alone. In order to recognize that one thing resembles others withwhich we are already acquainted, we need not arrange them in genera andspecies.

way

For the same reason, the rhythm of collective life governs and con-tains the various rhythms of all the elementary lives of which it is the result;consequently, the time that expresses it governs and contains all the individ-ual times. It is time as a whole.

The concept of totality is but the concept ofsociety in abstract form.

Since the universe exists only insofar as it is thought of and since it isthought of in its totality only by society, it takes its place within society; itbecomes an element of society’s inner life, and thus is itself the total genusoutside which nothing exists.

But that state of personal expectancy can-not be assimilated to the conception of a universal order of succession thatimposes itself on all minds and all events.

But all these relationships are personal to the indi-vidual who is involved with them, and hence the notion he can gain fromthem can in no case stretch beyond his narrow horizon.

e category of genus was at firstindistinct from the concept of human group; the category of time has therhythm of social life as its basis; the space society occupies provided the rawmaterial for the category of space; collective force was the prototype for theconcept of effective force, an essential element in the category of causality

definition

t is also to subsume the variable under thepermanent and the individual under the social.

But that faith is not essentially different from reli-gious faith. The value we attribute to science depends, in the last analysis,upon the idea we collectively have of its nature and role in life, which is tosay that it expresses a state of opinion.

The method I follow in the study of religiousphenomena is based on exactly this principle.

Concepts

t is in the form of collective thoughtthat impersonal thought revealed itself to humanity for the first time, and bywhat other route that revelation could have come about is hard to se

his is why we have somuch difficulty understanding one another, and why, indeed often, we lie toone another unintentionally. This happens because we all use the same wordswithout giving them the same meaning

society

crystallized

the concept must be defined by other traits.

In this regard, our ownconcepts and those of science differ only in degree

ne can affirm nothing that science denies, deny nothing that science af-firms, and establish nothing that does not directly or indirectly rest on prin-ciples taken from science.

the formulas tobe pronounced and the movements to be executed would lose efficacy if theywere not exactly the same as those that had already proved successful

role

in innumerable religions.

life

death

he is uninterested in whether gods exist

through

Spiritual beings” must be understood to mean con-scious subjects that have capacities superior to those of ordinary men, whichtherefore rightly includes the souls of the dead, genies, and demons as well asdeities, properly so-called.

lower races,

advanced

forth

Religious conceptions aim above all to express andexplain not what is exceptional and abnormal but what is constant and reg-ular.

To have the idea of the supernatural, then, it is notenough for us to witness unexpected events; these events must be conceivedof as impossible besides—that is, impossible to reconcile with an order thatrightly or wrongly seems to be a necessary part of the order of things. It isthe positive sciences that have gradually constructed this notion of a neces-sary order. It follows that the contrary notion cannot have predated those sci-ences

t is in this form, Jevons claims,that the idea of the supernatural was born at the beginning of history; and itis in this way and at this moment that religion acquired its characteristic ob-ject.

but they were not regarded as glimpses intoa mysterious world where reason could not penetrate.

o long as what is immovable and inflexible about the or-der of things was unknown, and so long as it was seen as the work ofcontingent wills, it was of course thought natural that these wills or otherscould modify the order of things arbitrarily.

Itpresupposes an idea that is its negation, and that is in no way primitive. To beable to call certain facts supernatural,

he forces he brings into play by these various means do not seem tohim particularly mysterious.

What is certain, in any case, is that this idea appears very late in the his-tory of religions.

Faith effortlesslyreconciled itself with science and philosophy; and thinkers like Pascal, whofelt strongly that there is something profoundly obscure in things, were so lit-tle in harmony with their epochs that it was their fate to be misunderstoodby their contemporaries.

Besides, we have seen that the preference for studying religion among themost civilized peoples is far from being the best method.”

Religion can be defined onlyin terms of features that are found wherever religion is found.

If taking this step is to yield the results it should, we must begin by free-ing our minds of all preconceived ideas.

I willtake advantage of all the opportunities that present themselves to capture atbirth at least some of those ideas that, while religious in origin, were boundnevertheless to remain at the basis of human mentality.

they appear as ingenious instruments of thought, which humangroups have painstakingly forged over centuries, and in which they haveamassed the best of their intellectual capital.2

of time, space, genus, cause, and personality are constructedfrom social elements should not lead us to conclude that they are stripped ofall objective value. Quite the contrary, their social origin leads one indeed tosuppose that they are not without foundation in the nature of things.

greatercomplexity

ewouldthusreturntonominalismandempiricismbyanotherroute

Outsideus,it isopinionthatjudgesus;morethanthat,becausesocietyisrepresentedinsideusaswell,itresiststheserevolutionary impulses fromwithin.Wefeelthatwe cannotabandonourselvestothem withoutourthought’s ceasingtobe trulyhuman.

heydoindeedexpressthemostgeneralrelationshipsthatexistbe-tweenthings;having broaderscopethanallourideas,theygovernalltheparticularsofour intellectuallife.If,ateverymoment, mendidnotagreeonthesefundamentalideas,iftheydidnothaveahomogeneousconceptionoftime, space, cause,number,andsoon.Allconsensusamongminds,andthusallcommonlife,wouldbecomeimpossible.

Aspartofsociety,theindividualnaturallytranscendshimself,bothwhenhethinksandwhenheacts.

hat beingthecase,weunderstandhowreasonhasgainedthepowertogobeyondtherangeofempirical cognition.Itowesthispowernottosomemysteriousvirtuebutsimplytothefact that,asthewell-knownfor-mulahasit,manisdouble.Inhimaretwobeings:anindividual beingthathasitsbasisinthebodyandwhosesphereofactionisstrictlylimitedbythisfact,andasocialbeingthatrepresentswithinusthehighestrealityinthein-tellectualandmoral*realmthatisknowablethroughobservation:

Therepresentationsthatexpresssocietythereforehaveanal-togetherdifferentcontentfromthepurely individual representations,andonecanbecertaininadvancethat theformeraddsomethingtothelatter.