thirty

It is a product of the striving for power

encounters

developmeht, largely under capitalistic auspices, has created an urgentneed for stable, strict, intensive, and calculable administration.

Its development is, to take the most strikingcase, at the root of the modern \Vestern state

action

norms

quarters

norms

law

commands

it

established

zation

Legal

fields

purest

complaint

do not owe thisobedience to him as an individual, but to the impersonal order. Hence, itfollows that there is an obligation to obedience only within the sphereof the rationally delimited jurisdiction which, in term!> of the order, hasbeen given to him

form

Charismatic grounds-resting on devotion to the exceptionalsanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person, and ofthe normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by him (charisffi3ticauthority

Traditional grounds-resting on an established belief in the sanc-tity of immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of those exercisingauthority under them (traditional authority); or finally

Rational grounds~resting on a belief in the legality of enacted'rules and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to issuecommands (legal authority

sight

authority

Experience shows that in no instance does domination vOluntarilylimit itself to the appeal to material or affectual or ideal motives as a basisfor its continuance. In addition every such system attempts to establishand to cultivate the belief in its legitimacy

tis its character as a compulsory association, particularly the fact that onebeomes a member of the church by birth, which distinguishes thechurch from a "sect.

compulsory hierocratic organizationwill be called a "church" insofar as its administrative staff claims amonopoly of the legitimate use of hierocratic coercion

order

staff

order

A "Power" (M~ht) is the probability that one actor within a socialrelationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resist-ance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests.B. "Domination" (Herrschaft)" is the probability that a commandwith a given specific content will be obeyed by a given group of persons."Discipline" is the probability that by virtue of habituation a commandwill receive prompt and automatic obedience in stereotyped forms, onthe part of II given group of persons

characteristics

So far as anorganization is solely oriented to the first type, it will be called an ad·rninistr~tive organization; so far as it is oriented to the second type, 3regulative organization

extent

rules

staff

organization

disadvantages

appropriation

Appropriated advantages will be called "rights

inalienable

conditions

it

Thus a process ofselection or a conflict between them means only that one type of action _has in the course of time been displaced by another, whether it ,is actionby the same persons or by others.

remainS

he conceptual separa-tion of peaceful [from violent] conRict is justified by the quality of themeans normal to it and the peculiar SOCiological consequences of its oc-currence (see ch. II and later)

order

competition

physical

traditional

question

violation

granted

provided it is regulatedhy some order and applied hy a staff.

penalty

staff

violation

disapproval

either

ubjective belief in thevalidity. of an order which constitutes the valid order itself.

It is true, of course,that there is no causal relationship between the normative validity ofan order in the legal sense and any empirical process.

On the contrary, there is a gradual transition betweenthe two extremes', and also it is possible, as it has heen pointed out,for contradictory systems of order to exist at the same time. In thatcase each is "valid" precisely to the extent that there is a probabilitythat action will in fact be oriented to it

hefact that the order is recognized as valid in his society is madeevident by the fact that he cannot violate it openly without punish-ment. But apart from this limiting case, it is very common forviolation of an order to be confined to more or less numerous partialdeviations from it, or for the attempt to be made, with varying degreesof good faith, to justify the deviation as legitimate

extreme case, not at all

The transitionsbetween orientation to an order from motives of tradition or of ex-pediency to the case where a belief in its legitimacy is involved areempirically gradual.

attitude

degree

which he fulfills partly because disobediencewould be disadvantageous to him but also because its violation wouldhe abhorrent to his sense of duty (of course, in varying degrees).

interests

with

this way there arise similarities, uni-formities, and continuities in their attitudes and actions which are oftenfar more stable than they would be if action were oriented to a systemof nonns and duties which were considered binding on the members ofa group

conventional

custom

here

insofar as the probability of its existence within agroup is based on nothing but actual practice

practice is based upon long standing

oriented toward identical expectations

same

The meaning of a social relationship may be agreed upon bymutual consent.

The meaningful content which remains relatively constant in asocial relationship is capable of formulation in terms of maxims whichthe parties concerned expect to be adhered to by their partners on theaverage and approximately

"correct" or a metaphysically "true" meaning.

Hence, the definition does not specify whetherthe relation of the actors is co-operative or the opposite

t would be very unusual to find concrete cases of action, espe-cially of social action, which were oriented only in one or another ofthese ways. Furthennore. this classification of the modes of orientationof action is in no sense meant to exhaust the possibilities of the field,but. only to fonnulate in conceptually pure fonn certain sociologicallyimportant types to which actual action is more or less closely approxi-mated or, in much the more common case, which constitute it; de"ments.

him

clearly self-conscious fonnulation, of the ultimatevalues governing the action and the consistently planned orientation ofits detailed course to these values

senses

rationality

habituation

states

lue for its own sake of some ethical, aesthetic, religiou

these expectations are used as "conditions" or"means" for the attainment of the actor's own rationally pursued andcalculated ends

But conceptually it is essential todistinguish them, even though merely reactive imitation may well havea degree of sociological importance at least equal to that of the typewhich can be called social action in the strict sense.

both the orientation tothe behavior of others and the meaning which can be imputed by theactor himself, are by no means always capable of clear determination andare often altogether unconscious and seldom fully self-conscious.

both

meaningfully

found to employ some apparently useful procedurewhich he learn\.:d from someone else does not, however, constitute, in thepresent sense, social action. Action such as this is not oriented to theaction of the other person, but the actor has, through observing theother, become acquainted with certain objective facts; and it is these towhich his action is oriented

n such cases as that of the influence of the demagogue,there may be a wide variation in the extent to which his mass clientele isaffected by a meaningful reaction to the fact of its large numbers; andwhatever this relation may be, it is open to varying interpretations

Others become more difficult under these conditions. Hence it ispossible that a particular event or mode of human behavior can give riseto the most diverse kinds of feeling-gaiety, anger, enthusiasm, despair,and passions of all sorts-in a crowd situation which would not occur atall or not nearly so readily if the individual were alone.

action conditioned by crowd

or example, a mere collision of twocyclists may be compared to a natural event.

The economic activity of an individualis social only if it takes account of the behavior of someone else. Thusvery generally it becomes social insofar as the actor assumes that otherswill respect his actual control over economic gocxls.

occasion

which includes both failure to act and passiveacquiescence, may, be oriented to the past, present, or expected futurebehavior of others

But the difficulty need not prevent the sociologist from systematizing hisconcepts by the classification of possible types of subjective meaning.That is, he may reason as if action actually proceeded on the basis ofclearly self-conscious meaning. The resulting deviation from the concretefacts must continually be kept in mind whenever it, is a question of thislevel of concreteness, and must be carefully studied with reference bothto degree and kind

The theoreticaloconcepts of sociology are ideal types not only from theobjective point of view, but also in their application to subjective proc-esses. In the great majority of cases actual action goes on in a state of in-articulate half.consciousness or actual unconsciousness of its subjectivemeaning. The actor is more likely to "be aware" of it in a vague sense thanhe is to "know" what he is doing or he explicitly self-conscious about it.In most cases his action is governed by impulse or habit.

First, in analysing the extent to which in theconcrete case, or on the average for a class of cases, the action was inpart economically detennined along with the other factors. Secondly, hythrowing the discrepancy between the actual course of events and theideal type into relief, the analysis of the non-eeonomic motives actuallyinvolved is facilitated.

r sociology the motives which detennine it are qualitatively heterogene-ous.

But when reference is made to "typical" cases, the tenn shouldalways be UDderstood, unless. ochawise stated, as meaning ideo! types,which may in turiibe: rational or imltional as the case may he (thusin economic theory &hey are always rational), hut in any case are alwaysconstrocted with 19iew to adequacy on the level of meaning

But sociological investigation attempts to include inits scope wrious irrational phenomena, such as prophetic, mystic, andaffectual modes of action, formulated in terms of theoretical conceptswhich are adequate on the level of meaning. In all cases, rational Or.irrational, sociological analysis both abstracts from reality and at thesame time helps us to understand it, in that it shows With what degree ofapproximation a concrete historical phenomenon can be subsumed underone or more of these concepts

We have taken for granted that sociology seeks to formulate typeconcepts and generalized uniformities of empirical process

Similarly the rational deliberation of an actor as towhether the remlts of a given proposed course of action will or will notpromot~ certain spednc interests, and the corresponding decision, donot become one bit more understandable by taking "psychological" con-siderations into account. But it is precisely on the basis of such rationalassumptions that most of the hws .of SOCiology, including those of eco-nomics, arc built up.

Whatmotives determine and lead the individual members and participants inthis socialistic communi+y to behave in such a way that the communitycame into being in the first place and that it continues to exist? Any'form of functional analysis which proceeds from the whole to the partscan accomplish only a preliminary preparation for this investigation-a preparation, the utility and indispensability of which, if properly car-ried out, is naturaJIy beyond question

We can accomplish something which is never attain-able in the natural sciences, namely the subjective understanding of theaction of the component individuals. The natural sciences on the otherhand cannot do this, being limited to the formulation of causal uni-formities in objects and events and the explanation of individual factsby applying them. We do not "understand" the behavior of cells, but canonly observe the relevant functional relationships and generalize on thebasis of these observations.

For purposes of sociological analysis two things can be said. Firstthis functional frame of reference is convenient for purposes of practicalillustration and for provisional orientation. In these respects. it is notonly useful but indispensable. But at the same time if its cognitive valueis overestimated and its concepts illegitimately "reified,"H it can be highly,dangerous. Secondly, in certain circumstanCes this is the only availableway of determining just what processes of social action it is important tounderstand in order to explain a given phenomenon

But in the above important connexion, at least, this would naturally beimpOSSible

mIr a certain kind of development ofactual or possible social actions of individual persons.

action

It is further possible toattempt, with their help, to obtain a causal explanation of individual phe-nomena, that is, to subsume them under unifonnities. But the subjectiveunderstanding of action takes the same account of this type of fact anduniformity as of any others not capable of subjective interpretation.

the behavior of one or more individual humanbeings

Such phenomena,however important, are simply treated by a different method from theothers; they become conditions, stimuli, furthering or hindering circum-stances of action

For this there must be somedegree of determinable frequency of approximation to an average or apure type.

The striking rationalplausibility of the hypothesis must here necessan1y be relied on as a sup-port. In very many cases of historical interpretation which seem highlyplausible, however, there is not even a possibility of the order of verifica-rion which was feasible in this case. Where this is true the interpretationmust necessarily remain a hypothesis.

ften, unfortunately, there is available only the uncertain procedureof the "imaginary experiment" which consists in thinking away certainelements of a chain of motivation and working out the course of actionwhich would then probably ensue, thus arriving at a causal judgment.

Third, the actors in any given situation are oftensu~ject to opposing and conflicting impulses, all of which we are able tounderstand. In a large number of cases we know from experience it isnot_possible to arrive at even an approximate estimate of the relativestrength of conflicting motives and very often we cannot be certain ofour interpretation. Only the actual outcome of the conflict gives a solidbasis of judgment

Secondly, processes of action which seem to an observer to be thesame or similar may fit into exceedingly various complexes of motive inthe case of the actual actor

In the first place the "conscioLs motives" may well,even to the actor himself, conceal the various "motives" and "repressions"which constitute the real driving force of his action. Thus in such caseseven subjectively honest self-analysis has only a relative value.

Every interpretation attempts to attain clarity and certainty, but nomatter how clear an interpretation as 'such appears to be from the pointof view of meaning, it cannot on this account claim to be the causallyvalid. interpretation

(a) as in the his-torical approach, the actually intended meaning for Concrete individualactior.; or (b) as in cases of sociological mass phenomena, the average of,or an approximation to, the actually intended meaning; or (c) the mean-ing appropriate to a scientifically formulated pure type (an ideal type)of a common phenomenon.

Thus we understand in tenus of motive the meaning anactor attaches to the proposition twice two e<juals four, when he statesit or writes it down, in that we understand what makes him do this atprecisely this mOInent and in these circumstance

actions

This would be the case if, and in-sofar as, we had statistically conclusive proof of their influence on socio-logically relevant behavior.

It may be that the Hooding of theDollart [at the mouth of the Ems river near the Dutch-Gennan border}in 1277 had historical significance as a stimulus to the beginning ofcertain migrations of considerable importance. Human mortality, indeedthe organic life cycle from the helplessness of infancy to that of old age,is naturally of the very greatest sociolOgical importance through thevariQus ways in which human action has been oriented to these facts.To still a~oth~r category of facts devoid of meaning_ belong certainpsychic or psychophysical phenomena such as fatigue, habituation,memory, etc.; also certain typical states of euphoria under some condi-tions of ascetic mortification; finally, typical variations in the reactions ofindividuals according to reaction-time, precision, and other modes. Butin the last analysiS the same principle applies to these as to otherphenomena which are devoid of meaning. Both the actor and the soci-ologist must accept them as data to be taken int~ account

modes

Thatis to say they are devoid of meaning if they cannot be related to actionin the role of means or ends but constitute only the stim~lus, the favor-ing or hindering citcUmstances.

danger

By comparison with this it is possible to understandthe ways in which actual action is influenced by irrational factors of allsorts, such as affects and errors, in that they account for the deviationfrom the line of conduct which would be expected on the hypotheSisthat the action were pure! y rational

hese difficulties confront, for instance, people not susceptibleto unusual acts of religious and charitable zeal, or persons who abhorextreme rationalist fanaticism (such as the fanatic advocacy of the"rights of man

self-analysis

Understandable and non-understandable components of a processare o~·ten intermingled and hound up together

investigation

consequences

Here also he made no attempts to withdraw,in the manner of Simmel, but rather immersed himself deeply in publicmatters, striving at the same time to maximize his objective understanding.

eber did notwithdraw, as Simmel had done, but rather attempted to clarify his emotionsand sort out his commitments by viewing his relationships with detached con-cern.*^ Such a strategy, however, took a serious toll of his psychic energies;it finally led to his breakdown when repressed antagonisms burst out in thatfinal confrontation between father and son shortly before the father's death

eber, the son of Protestant "insiders," attained similar goals byactively involving and immersing himself in the issues and policies of his day.Much like the "innerworldly ascetics" of early Calvinism about whom he wrotewith such awe and admiration, Weber gained intellectual autonomy by plung-ing into the struggles of the social and political world rather than by "other-worldly" withdrawal from its turmoils.

had to be an inductive science of the concrete economic behavior of par-ticular men in particular social contexts. This accounts for their institutionalemphasis and their insistence on the importance of the noneconomic matrixof economic life.

economics.

Rickert

matter

In the humanistic disciplines, the Geisteswissenschajten,knowledge is not external but internal. Men are intelligible to us in theiruniqueness and individuahty.

Always and everywhere, Weber followed only the call of his own demon,refusing to be bridled by political expediency.

democracy

He was a man in the tradition of Luther's "Here I stand, I can dono other," even though at times it would almost appear to his contemporariesthat he had more in common with Don Quixote.

The Protestant Ethic

who had previously been courted by a close friend ofWeber's from whom he had snatched her away.

exual fulfillment came to Weber only in his late forties, shortly beforeWorld War I, in an extramarital affair.

His frantic workpace was perhaps a means for diverting his increasingly antagonistic feelingstoward a father on whom he was still wholly dependent.

It is most prob-ably in the Strasbourg period that Weber acquired his lifelong sense of awefor the Protestant virtues, even though he was unable to share the Christian be-lief on which they were based. He never lost respect for men who not onlybelieved as Channing did but who actually lived his moral philosophy.

These distractions did not keep Weber from his studies.

scars

Both parents descended from a line ofProtestants, who had been refugees from Catholic persecution in the past buthad later become successful entrepreneurs.

Max Weber-'' was continually beset by psychic torment.

All contemporaryor near-contemporary sociology shows the impact of his genius

He argued that society must be considered as adelicate balance of multiple opposing forces, so that a war, a revolution, oreven an heroic leader might succeed in throwing the total balance in favor ofa particular outcome.

In his writings on the sociologyof music Weber contrasted the concise notations and the well-tempered scaleof modern music—the rigorous standardization and coordination that governsa modern symphony orchestra—with the spontaneity and inventiveness of themusical systems of Asia or of nonliterate tribes

He attempted to show howprophets with their charismatic appeals had undermined priestly powersbased on tradition; how with the emergence of "book religion" the final sys-tematization and rationalization of the religious sphere had set in, which foundits culmination in the Protestant Ethic

rather than being a consequence of capitalism as such.

Eden

Thus modern rationalized and bureaucratized sys-tems of law have become incapable of dealing with individual particularities,to which earlier types of justice were well suited.

Weberagreed that quite often, especially in the modern capitalist world, economicpower is the predominant form. But he objects that "the emergence of eco-nomic power may be the consequence of power existing on other grounds.

which are held together by notions of proper life-styles and by thesocial esteem and honor accorded to them by others.

Classification of men into such groups is based on their consumption pat-terns rather than on their place in the market or in the process of production.

and a positive ethical sanction is provided for acquisitive activities aimed atmaximizing the self-interests of the actor.

authority

religious

In all these instances, Weber also provides illustra-tions pointing to changing motivations of historical actors, yet on balance,structure seems more important than motivation.

framework

B

probability

a variety of causal chains

his recognition of the extreme difficulties in making entirely ex-haustive causal imputations.

Weber argued, for example, that human action was truly unpredict-able only in the case of the insane,

We shall then be in a position to determine empiricallywhether the concrete conduct of Protestants in, say, seventeenth-century Eng-land did in fact approximate the type and in what specific aspects it failedto do so

An ideal type never corresponds to concretereality but always moves at least one step away from it. It is constructed outof certain elements of reality and forms a logically

Thenotion of the ideal type was meant to provide escape from this dilemma

or does it partake of the contempla-tion of sages and philosophers about the meaning of the universe.

Weber was fundamentally at odds with those who argued for a moralitybased on science.

Hence, the relativity ofvalue orientations leading to different cognitive choices has nothing to do withquestions of scientific validity

A sociology of humangroups has the inestimable advantage of having access to the subjective aspectsof action, to the realm of meaning and motivation.

Hence there is no in-surmountable chasm between the procedures of the natural and the socialscientist, but they differ in their cognitive intentions and explanatory projects

"There is no absolutely'objective' scientific analysis of culture or ... of 'social phenomena' inde-pendent of special and 'one-sided' viewpoints according to which—expresslyor tacitly, consciously or unconsciously—they are selected, analyzed and organ-ized for expository purposes."

Both the natural and the social sciences mustabstract from the manifold aspects of reality; they always involve selection.

And against both theseapproaches Weber emphasized the value-bound problem choices of the in-vestigator and the value-neutral methods of social research

Against the historicists Weber argued that the method of science,whether its subject matter be things or men, always proceeds by abstractionand generalization. Against the positivists, he took the stand that man, in con-trast to things, could be understood not only in external manifestations, that is,in behavior, but also in the underlying motivations.

Hence it is the task of sociology to reduce these concepts to "under-standable" action, that is without exception, to the actions of participatingindividual men.

nature

'Which social factors havebrought about the rationahzation of Western civilization?

The paradigm of a sociology which is both historical and systematic.

action.

Weber argued, falls outside the purviewof sociology