Ultimately, the opinion of the court states that a state cannot "foster its own view of the flag by prohibiting expressive conduct relating to it". So,this part of the Texas law is not permissible.

within the textbook, the opinion of the court states that the government cannot prohibit the expression of an idea just because society finds it offensive or disagreeable. There is also not an exception to this law when it comes to the national flag.

according to the textbook, there is evidence of both of these elements. Johnson portrayed an expressive element toward his feelings about Regans reelection when he burned the flag, and due to the demonstration taking place, it was easy to tell that the audience could understand his message from the expression.

the freedom of expression is a part of the first amendment's rights, not the second amendment.

according to the textbook, Justice Kennedy was the only concurring opinion.

The act that Johnson performed was not within the realm of painted an upside down American flag on himself, but rather he doused an American flag kerosene and set it on fire.

according to the textbook, the protestor in question that violated the American flag was named Gregory Lee Johnson.

according to the textbook, the demonstrators marched through the city to protest the Regan administration policies while the National Convention was taking place.

I'm not sure if this constitutes an error, but I am pretty sure a case citation is supposed to look like: Texas v. Johnson 491 U.S. 397 (1989).

Again, Rehnquist's opinion states that the guidelines of the program are channeling funds to all families, regardless of their religious beliefs, and although lower-income students were preferred, wealthy students struggling in school were not eliminated either.

Rehnquist's opinion states that the program is believed to be one of private choice and is neutral toward all aspects of religion.

Within Rehnquist's opinion, he states that because the government is just providing assistance to a broad class of individuals who then choose where to allocate that money, there is no violation of the establishment clause.

Breyer was also dissenting with Justice Ginsburg.

Justice O'Connor, according to the textbook, was one of the two concurring opinions.

The issue at hand revolves around if the voucher program offends the establishment clause of the first amendment.

According to the textbook, 97% of students that received the vouchers to attend a private school used them.

According to the textbook, 80% of the private schools that opted into the program were religious.

Simmon-Harris claimed that the voucher program violated the establishment clause, not the free exercise clause of the first amedment.

Although a minor detail, the guidelines of the Pilot Project Scholarship Program stated that parents had were to choose among the five options for their children; the children were not to make the decision themselves.

The school district in question is the Cleveland school district, not the Baltimore school district.

This is not a legal citation. A legal citation states where to find the case within a certain source/database, and a textbook does not count. This should actually say, "536 U.S. 639 (2002)".

The case actually occurred in 2002.

What constitutes a case of confidence? Is Marshall saying here that the national and state governments need to just have confidence in one another that there will be no abuse of power from either end? When does the Court decide a case is to be considered a case of confidence?

This section confuses me. Is Marshall saying here that not only can the government create a national bank, but they can delegate powers to this bank for it to exercise? Or is it saying that the State of Maryland, where the bank will be established, is to delegate powers to this national bank?

If Marshall is saying what I think he is saying here, could technically any "power-move" the national government makes be considered an implied power, if not prohibited by the Constitution? Would it just depend on how the justices perceive it, at the time of the conflict?

Justice Roberts is not a justice that took part in this court case. Although, i'm sure he would have loved to have been!

According to the textbook, Justice Jackson had a concurring opinion on this court case.

According to the specifications on case briefs, this section is also supposed to state which justice wrote the majority or plurality opinion. Clearly, this piece of information is missing.

Again, the court ruled in favor of Youngstown Sheet and Tube. There is ultimately no way that the president has congressional power to instate this act, according to the court, and Truman was essentially out of line in how he chose to fix this situation.

The court did not rule against Youngstown Sheet and Tube. Although this court was very diversified in how they interpreted executive power, the ultimate judgement was that the president does not have such authority.

The issue at hand is not whether congress can take over an industry to prevent a strike or not. The court is trying to decide if it is within the president's executive power to prevent an industrial strike, and if Truman's action was unconstitutional.

Technically, according to the textbook, Truman did not claim that it was his inherent powers that justified his action. The textbook states that Truman claimed "the authority that was vested to him as president and commander in chief" was enough to authorize his executive order.

The U.S. was not involved in the Vietnam War at this point in time. Rather, we were involved in a war in Korea. The textbook corrects this issue, as well as the time frame in which this event occurred in.

Technically, the union never actually got the chance to strike. According to the brief in the textbook, Truman issued his executive order hours before the strike was supposed to start on April 9.

This sentence states that the conflict began in the sugar industry, but the rest of the paragraph recalls this conflict happening among the steel industry. The case brief written in the textbook also states that this issue occurred within the steel industry.

I am confused on how the legislature fits into the court's original jurisdiction. Did the legislature have to approve each of the cases that the supreme court took? Why only for original jurisdiction and not appellate jurisdiction as well? Does this still apply today?

When mentioning Mr. Marbury's commission, they state that he is given a five year term. Were judicial appointments not lifetime appointments within the early years of the court system? Was the term five years for each appointee?

When this is referring to a man considering himself "injured", does that mean that a remedy can only be given to cases in which someone was injured? Or is this a form of metaphorical speech?

Just from this line of questioning from Justice Ginsberg, I can tell she is one of the two dissenting opinions. In this question she is imposing on Cortman, she is bringing up a stare decisis line of thinking, in which she brings up the Emerson case of 1947 where the justices had decided that the Framers did not want tax money being used to build or maintain churches. Additionally, Justice Ginsberg challenges Cortman by bringing in the hypothetical situation of which a church is selective in its members. She is rebutting his point that explains how if there is no establishment clause issue, can the states force people to choose between religion and receiving public benefit.

I think that the second dissenting opinion in this case is Justice Sotomayer. For starters, in this question stated at about 3:15, she is questioning Cortman on how the playground is considered secular and not religious. She states that, after looking into the churches bylaws and advertisements, she believes the church conducts play on the playground in a religious manner. This connects back to Justice Ginsburg's claim of how the Everson case was decided that tax money cannot be used to build or maintain churches unless secular activity is proven. Additionally, at around 15:38, Justice Sotomayor is basically stating that this case has nothing to do with the free-exercise clause because the church will not close or stop practice without the new playground. She continues to argue and question Cortman for a few minutes, shooting down every rebuttal he makes, eventually getting into a matter of respecting the history of an amendment.

This mention of Locke has been used numerous times throughout this conversation, and I have yet to understand where the meaning of this is being drawn from. Are they referring to something John Locke wrote? Is this the name of something or someone I may have missed?

Justice Stephen Breyer is in the majority. Around 34:33, Justice Breyer is creating a scenario and a question for Layton, based off of his response to Justice Alito about how fire and police services are a public service because the treasury does not write a direct check. Justice Breyer chimed in by asking Layton to answer if the Constitution would allow for a state to provide protection to everyone except churches, which is what he was basically applying to how the Missouri government is willing to help all other organizations except churches. Additionally, at 35:50, Justice Breyer states that the Constitution does not permit those types of exclusion laws based on the free exercise of religion. He then takes this and makes the connection that if the Constitution does not allow for the state treasury's to pay for the health of children except ones that belong to a church, how are they able to deny money to an establishment that is trying to increase the safety of the playground for the children at the church.

I believe that Justice Alito is in the majority. First, at about 19:09, Justice Alito rebuttals Justice Sotomayor's line of questioning, which was revolving around the idea that the first amendment has a respectable history that should be honored enough to not bring it in to this specific argument. Justice Alito asks Cortman if he thinks this is even a proper way to analyze this issue, thus giving Cortman the break he needed from Justice Sotomayor's interrogation to continue with his argument involving the first amendment. At about 31:08, Justice Alito interrogates Layton, the defendant and spokesperson for the Missouri government, about how different federal programs that would help different places of worship by creating additions or improvements. This came after Layton stated how the state wanted to stay separate from any religious affairs. He also questions the nature of how the Missouri government will provide assistance to religious-affiliated schools, but not churches. He demands that Layton provide definitions, examples, answer case-scenarios, and draw the fine line between the two.

This question by Justice Alito made me realize that each state may have its own definition of "church". If this is to be one of the deciding factors of this particular case, and a case of the same material opens up in a different state, would the Supreme Court use Trinity Lutheran v. Comer to decide in a similar manner? Or would they have to judge with no stare decisis because of the different terms within the different state constitutions?

My first question is a bit more overarching of the argument that is happening so far. Is this argument, that the division of religious versus secular property on the church grounds, a violation of the first amendment? More specifically, if every individual has the freedom of religion, why does it matter that this church playground must be secular? Are they telling Cortman that they can judge what happens on the churches own private property? Why does this affect whether the church can join a fundraiser or not?