lastly, to the assumption of the armour of an alienating identity, which will mark with its rigid structure the subject's entire mental development.

In man, however, this relation to nature is altered by a certain dehiscence at the heart of the organism, a primordial Discord betrayed by the signs of uneasiness and motor uncoordination of the neo-natal months

I have myself shown in the social dialectic that structures human knowledge as paranoiac(3) why human knowledge has greater autonomy than animal knowledge in relation to the field of force4 of desire, but also why human knowledge is determine in that 'little reality' (ce peu de réalité,

Such facts are inscribed in an order of homeomorphic identification that would itself fall within the larger question of the meaning of beauty as both formative and erogenic.

This form would have to be called the Ideal-I.(1)

We have only to understand the mirror stage as an identification

the obstructions of his support and, fixing his attitude I a slightly leaning-forward position, in order to hold it in his gaze, brings back an instantaneous aspect of the image.

between this virtual complex and the reality it reduplicates --the child's own body, and the persons and things around him.

The child, at an age when he is for a time, however short, outdone by the chimpanzee in instrumental intelligence, can nevertheless already recognize as such his own image in a mirror.

In girls, the discovery of the penis gives rise to envy for it, which later changes into the wish for a man as the possessor of a penis.

penis and vagina were represented by the faecal stick and the rectum.

Since his faeces are his first gift, the child easily transfers his interest from that substance to the new one which he comes across as the most valuable gift in life.

transition from narcissistic self-love to object-love possible.

that nature has given babies to women as a substitute for the penis

In other women we find no evidence of this wish for a penis; it is replaced by the wish for a baby, the frustration of which in real life can lead to the outbreak of a neurosis

both baby and penis are called a “little one’

relation between “baby’ and “penis’.

baby and penis are ill-distinguished from one another

We realize, of course, that to express oneself in this way is incorrectly to apply to the sphere of the unconscious terms which belong properly {296} to other regions of mental life, and that we have been led stray by the advantages offered by an analogy.

I need not refrain from mentioning, where the context allows it, other instinctual transformations besides anal-erotic ones. Finally, it scarcely requires to be emphasized that the developmental events here described -just as the others found in psychoanalysis - have been inferred from the regressions into which they had been forced by neurotic processes

by the study of dreams. We learn from their interpretation that even in later years, if the Emperor and Empress appear in dreams, those exalted personages stand for the dreamer’s father and mother’s, So that the child’s overvaluation of his parents survives as well in the dreams of normal adults.

expression of a regret that those happy days have gone.

f anyone is inclined to turn away in horror from this depravity of the childish heart or feels tempted, indeed, to dispute the possibility of such things, he should observe that these works of fiction, which seem so full of hostility, are none of them really so badly intended, and that they still preserve, under a slight disguise, the child’s original affection for his parents.

his desire to bring his mother (who is the subject of the most intense sexual curiosity) into situations of secret infidelity and into secret love-affairs.’

the child’s imagination becomes engaged in the task of getting free from the parents of whom {223} he now has a low opinion and of replacing them by others,

for a boy is far more inclined to feel hostile impulses towards his father than towards his mother and has a far more intense desire to get free from him than from her.

The psychology of the neuroses teaches us that, among other factors, the most intense impulses of sexual rivalry contribute to this result

The liberation of an individual, as he grows up, from the authority of his parents is one of the most necessary though one of the most painful results brought about by the course of his development

imitation does not copy that which is prior, but produces and inverts the very terms of priority and derivativeness.

The origin requires its derivations in order to affirm itself as an origin, for origins only make sense to the extent that they are differentiated from that which they produce as derivatives

violence must be careful not to reinstall another in its place

How is it that I can both “be” one, and yet endeavor to be one at the same time?

But politically, we might argue, isn't it quite crucial to insist on lesbian and gay identities precisely because they are being threatened with erasure and obliteration from homophobic quarters?

Is it not possible to maintain and pursue heterosexual identifications and aims within homosexual practice, and homosexual identifications and aims within heterosexual practices?

It is possible to argue that whereas no transparent or full revelation is afforded by “lesbian” and “gay,” there remains a political imperative to use these necessary errors or category mistakes,

Is the “subject” who is “out” free of its subjection and finally in the clear? Or could it be that the subjection that subjectivates the gay or lesbian subject in some ways continues to oppress, or oppresses most insidiously, once “outness” is claimed? What or who is it that is “out,” made manifest and fully disclosed, when and if I reveal myself as lesbian? What is it that is now known, anything? What remains permanently concealed by the very linguistic act that offers up the promise of a transparent revelation of sexuality?

Can sexuality even remain sexuality once it submits to a criterion of transparency and disclosure, or does it perhaps cease to be sexuality precisely when the semblance of full explicitness is achieved?

identity categories tend to be instruments of regulatory regimes, whether as the normalizing categories of oppressive structures or as the rallying points for a liberatory contestation of that very oppression.

In its own precarious position at/as the border, homosexuality seems capable of both subtending the dominance of the hetero and structurally subverting it.

But the figure inside/outside, which encapsulates the structure of language, repression, and subjectivity, also designates the structure of exclusion, oppression, and repudiation.

It has everything to do with the structures of alienation, splitting, and identification which together produce a self and an other, a subject and an object, an unconscious and a conscious, an interiority and an exteriority.

suggesting that new (and old) sexual possibilities are no longer thinkable in terms of a simple inside/outside dialectic

is someone who uses "the means at hand," that is, the instruments he finds at his disposition around him, those which are already there, which had not been especially conceived with an eye to the operation for which they are to be used and to which one tries by trial and error to adapt them, not hesitating to change them whenever it appears necessary, or to try several of them at once, even if their form and their origin are heterogenous -- and so forth.

The Savage Mind

that language bears within itself the necessity of its own critique. This critique may be undertaken along two tracks, in two "manners." Once the limit of nature/culture opposition makes itself felt, one might want to question systematically and rigorously the history of these concepts.

Levi-Strauss will always remain faithful to this double intention

Levi-Strauss will always remain faithful to this double intention

That belongs to culture, on the other hand, which depends on a system of norms regulating society and is therefore capable of varying from one social structure to another.

That belongs to culture, on the other hand, which depends on a system of norms regulating society and is therefore capable of varying from one social structure to another.

That belongs to culture, on the other hand, which depends on a system of norms regulating society and is therefore capable of varying from one social structure to another.

That belongs to culture, on the other hand, which depends on a system of norms regulating society and is therefore capable of varying from one social structure to another.

That belongs to culture, on the other hand, which depends on a system of norms regulating society and is therefore capable of varying from one social structure to another.

But if nobody can escape this necessity, and if no one is therefore responsible for giving in to it, however little, this does not mean that all the ways of giving in to it are of an equal pertinence.

This moment is not first and foremost a moment of philosophical or scientific discourse, it is also a moment which is political, economic, technical, and so forth

when everything became a system where the central signified, the original or transcendental signified, is never absolutely present outside a system of differences.

an infinite number of sign-substitutions came into play.

a freeplay which is constituted upon a fundamental immobility and a reassuring certitude, which is itself beyond the reach of the freeplay.

The center is at the center of the totality, and yet, since the center does not belong to the totality (is not part of the totality), the totality has its center elsewhere

At the center, the permutation or the transformation of elements (which may of course be structures enclosed within a structure) is forbidden.

unorganized structure-but above all to make sure that the organizing principle of the structure would limit what we might call the freeplay of the structure.

Nevertheless, up until the event which I wish to mark out and define, structure-or rather the structurality of structure-although it has always been involved, has always been neutralized or reduced, and this by a process of giving it a center or referring it to a point of presence, a fixed origin

The truth is quite the contrary: the author is not an indefinite source of significations that fill a work; the author does not precede the works; he is a certain functional principle by which, in our culture, one limits, excludes, and chooses; in short, by which one impedes the free circulation, the free manipulation, the free composition, decomposition, and recomposition of fiction.

Freud is not just the author of The Interpretation of Dreams or Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious; Marx is not just the author of the Communist Manifesto or Das Kapital: they both have established an endless possibility of discourse.

Modern literary criticism, even when – as is now customary – it is not concerned with questions of authentication, still defines the author in much the same way: the author provides the basis for explaining not only the presence of certain events in a work, but also their transformations, distortions, and diverse modifications (through his biography, the determination of his individual perspective, the analysis of his social position, and the revelation of his basic design).

Since literary anonymity is not tolerable, we can accept it only in the guise of an enigma. As a result, the author function today plays an important role in our view of literary works.

Once a system of ownership for texts came into being, once strict rules concerning author's rights, author-publisher relations, rights of reproduction, and related matters were enacted - at the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century - the possibility of transgression attached to the act of writing took on, more and more, the form of an imperative peculiar to literature.

An anonymous text posted on a wall probably has an editor – but not an author.

But if we proved that Shakespeare did not write those sonnets which pass for his, that would constitute a significant change and affect the manner in which the author's name functions. If we proved that Shakespeare wrote Bacon's Organon by showing that the same author wrote both the works of Bacon and those of Shakespeare, that would be a third type of change that would entirely modify the functioning of the author's name. The author's name is not, therefore, just a proper name like the rest

God and man have died a common death

the critical and the religious approaches.

. The deleted passages and the notes at the bottom of the page? Yes. What if, within a workbook filled with aphorisms, one finds a reference, the notation of a meeting or of an address, or a laundry list

Even when an individual has been accepted as an author, we must still ask whether everything that he wrote, said, or left behind is part of his work.

None of this is recent; criticism and philosophy took note of the disappearance – or death

The work, which once had the duty of providing immortality, now possesses the right to kill, to be its author's murderer,

o perpetuate the immortality of the hero: if he was willing to die young, it was so that his life, consecrated and magnified by death, might pass into immortality; the narrative then redeemed this accepted death. In another way, the motivation, as well as the theme and the pretext of Arabian narratives – such as The Thousand and One Nights – was also the eluding of death: one spoke, telling stories into the early morning, in order to forestall death, to postpone the day of reckoning that would silence the narrator. Scheherazade's narrative is an effort, renewed

In writing, the point is not to manifest or exalt the act of writing, nor is it to pin a subject within language; it is, rather, a question of creating a space into which the writing subject constantly disappears.

I want to deal solely with the relationship between text and author

Traditions are no longer passed down the generations. Instead, they are learned from celebrity chefs, the modern day oracles.

Each year, the magazines also presented one or more alternative Christmas day

In the early 2000’s, this picture of Christmas started to change. The focus was now on preparation, as women were shown serving the food. The magazines also started to give women ‘how to’ instructions.

For this project, the most relevant social change over the last 20 years in both countries is that most women in both countries are now in full time or part time work.

semioticians have developed a language to describe what symbolism is and how it works – concepts such as signification, denotation, connotation and myth.

Each December edition had a dedicated Christmas food section which contained editorial (such as shopping lists and recipes) and supporting imagery.

Our analysis clearly showed that ‘perfect’ means not just how the food was cooked but how it was displayed;

domestic goddesses

In the internal part, evolutionary linguistics has been neglected in favour of synchronic linguistics and I have dealt only with a few general principles of linguistics.

Idea of different tenses, which seems quite natural to us, is quite alien to certain languages. As in the Semitic system (Hebrew) there is no distinction, as between present, future and past; that is to say these ideas of tense are not predetermined, but exist only as values in one language or another.

Psychologically, what are our ideas, apart from our language ? They probably do not exist. Or in a form that may be described as amorphous. We should probably be unable according to philosophers and linguists to distinguish two ideas clearly without the help of a language (internal language naturally).

f you take on the other hand a simple lexical fact, any word such as, I suppose, mouton - mutton, it doesn't have the same value as sheep in English. For if you speak of the animal on the hoof and not on the table, you say sheep. It is the presence in the language of a second term that limits the value attributable to sheep. mutton / sheep / mouton (Restrictive example.)

If you take animus in relation to anima and animal, it is a different order of relations. There is an associative family: animus anima animal

Some botanists and naturalists devote their entire careers to one approach or the other.

that even academies cannot change by decree the course taken by the institution we call the language,

institutions such as legal institutions, or for instance a set ,of rituals, or a ceremony established once and for all, have many characteristics which make them like languages,

By distinguishing between the language and the faculty of language, we distinguish 1) what is social from what is individual, 2) what is essential from what is more or less accidental

how language lives, carries on and changes over time. More generally, it is evident that language plays such a considerable role in human societies,

the utility of linguistics, or its claim to be included among those studies relevant to what is called 'general culture'.

comparing different Indo-European languages with one another,

anguages could be compared with one another; that a bond or relationship existed between languages often separated geographically by great distances;

Philology introduced a new principle: the method of critical examination of texts.

All traditional grammar is normative grammar, that is, dominated by a preoccupation with laying down rules, and distinguishing between a certain allegedly 'correct' language and another, allegedly 'incorrect'; which straight away precludes any broader view of the language phenomenon as a whole.

The first of these phases is that of grammar, invented by the Greeks and carried on unchanged by the French.

The task of feminist critics is to find a new language, a new way of reading that can integrate our intelligence and our experience, our reason and our suffering, our skepticism and our vision.

The experience of women can easily disappear, become mute, invalid, and invisible, lost in the diagrams of the structuralist or the class conflict of the Marxists.

Both Marxism and structuralism see themselves as privileged critical discourse, and preempt the claim to superior places in the hierarchy of critical approaches. A key word in each system is “science”; both claim to be sciences of literature, and repudiate the personal, fallible, interpretative reading. Marxist aesthetics offers a “science of the text,” in which the author becomes not the creator but the producer of a text whose components are historically and economically determined. Structuralism presents linguistically based models of textual permutations and combinations, offering a “science of literary meaning,” a grammar of genre. The assimilation of these positivist and evangelical literary criticisms by Anglo-American scholarship in the 1960s and 1970s is not, I would argue, a spontaneous or accidental cultural phenomenon. In the Cold War atmosphere of the late 1950s, when European structuralism began

women began to organize their own publishing houses

Lise goes in search of her killer, lures him to a park, gives him the knife. But in Lise’s careful selection of her death-dress, her patient pursuit of her assassin,

According to Dame Rebecca West, unhappiness is still the keynote of contemporary fiction by English women

Gynocritics begins at the point when we free ourselves from the linear absolutes of male literary history, stop trying to fit women between the lines of the male tradition, and focus instead on the newly visible world of female culture.

The second type of feminist criticism is concerned with woman as writer - with woman as the producer of textual meaning, with the history, themes, genres, and structures of literature by women. Its subjects include the psychodynamics of female creativity; linguistics and the problem of a female language; the trajectory of the individual or collective female literary career; literary history; and, of course, studies of particular writers and works. No term exists in English for such a specialized discourse, and so I have adapted the French

The first type is concerned with woman as reader - with woman as the consumer of male produced literature, and with the way in which the hypothesis of a female reader changes our apprehension of a given text, awakening us to the significance of its sexual codes. I shall call this kind of analysis the feminist critique, and like other kinds of critique it is a historically grounded inquiry which probes the ideological assumptions of literary phenomena. Its subjects include the images and stereotypes of women in literature, the omissions of and misconceptions about women in criticism,

described only male perceptions, experiences; and options, and have falsified the social and personal contexts in which literature is produced and consumed

yet these “cases” cannot continue to be settled, one by one, out of court.

terminology is best understood as a form of intimidation, intended to force

Robert Boyers, in the Winter 1977 issue of Partisan Review, that it will be obsessed with destroying great male artists. In “A Case Against Feminist Criticism”, Boyers used a single work, Joan Mellen’s Women and Their Sexuality in the New Film (1973), as an example of feminist deficiency in “intellectual honesty” and “rigor”. He defines feminist criticism as the “insistence on asking the same questions of every work and demanding ideologically satisfactory answers to those questions as a means of evaluating it,” and concludes his diatribe thus:   Though I do not think anyone has made a credible case for feminist criticism as a viable alternative to any other made, no one can seriously object ‘to feminists continuing to try. We ought to demand that such efforts be minimally distinguished by intellectual candor and some degree of precision. This I have failed to discover in most feminist criticism. [3]

like Freire the discussion is over because it is 'scientifically proven' that their theory of revolution is

Ideology is conceived as a pure illusion, a pure dream, i.e. as nothingness. All its reality is external to it. Ideology is thus thought as an imaginary construction whose status is exactly like the theoretical status of the dream among writers before Freud.

Here, ideology is the system of the ideas and representations which dominate the mind of a man or a social group

Repressive State Apparatus functions ‘by violence’, whereas the Ideological State Apparatuses function ‘by ideology’.

In order to advance the theory of the State it is indispensable to take into account not only the distinction between state power and state apparatus, but also another reality which is clearly on the side of the (repressive) state apparatus, but must not be confused with it. I shall call this reality by its concept: the Ideological State Apparatuses.

Presented in this form, the Marxist-Leninist ‘theory’ of the State has its finger on the essential point, and not for one moment can there be any question of rejecting the fact that this really is the essential point. The State Apparatus, which defines the State as a force of repressive execution and intervention ‘in the interests of the ruling classes’ in the class struggle conducted by the bourgeoisie and its allies against the proletariat, is quite certainly the State, and quite certainly defines its basic ‘function’.

The State is a ‘machine’ of repression, which enables the ruling classes (in the nineteenth century the bourgeois class and the ‘class’ of big landowners) to ensure their domination over the working class, thus enabling the former to subject the latter to the process of surplus-value extortion (i.e. to capitalist exploitation).

It is easy to see that this representation of the structure of every society as an edifice containing a base (infrastructure) on which are erected the two ‘floors’ of the superstructure, is a metaphor, to be quite precise, a spatial metaphor: the metaphor of a topography (topique).[5] Like every metaphor, this metaphor suggests something, makes some thing visible. What? Precisely this: that the upper floors could not ‘stay up’ (in the air) alone, if they did not rest precisely on their base.

, I shall say that the reproduction of labour power requires not only a reproduction of its skills, but also, at the same time, a reproduction of its submission to the rules of the established order, i.e. a reproduction of submission to the ruling ideology for the workers, and a reproduction of the ability to manipulate the ruling ideology correctly for the agents of exploitation and repression, so that they, too, will provide for the domination of the ruling class ‘in words’.

by the capitalist education system, and by other instances and institutions.

I should also like to point out that this minimum is doubly historical in that it is not defined by the historical needs of the working class ‘recognized’ by the capitalist class, but by the historical needs imposed by the proletarian class struggle (a double class struggle: against the lengthening of the working day and against the reduction of wages).

It is ensured by giving labour power the material means with which to reproduce itself: by wages. Wages feature in the accounting of each enterprise, but as ‘wage capital’,[3] not at all as a condition of the material reproduction of labour power.

A moment’s reflection is enough to be convinced of this: Mr X, a capitalist who produces woollen yarn in his spinning-mill, has to ‘reproduce’ his raw material, his machines, etc. But he does not produce them for his own production – other capitalists do: an Australian sheep farmer, Mr Y, a heavy engineer producing machine-tools, Mr Z, etc., etc. And Mr Y and Mr Z, in order to produce those products which are the condition of the reproduction of Mr X’s conditions of production, also have to reproduce the conditions of their own production, and so on to infinity – the whole in proportions such that, on the national and even the world market, the demand for means of production (for reproduction) can be satisfied by the supply.

What happens at the level of the firm is an effect, which only gives an idea of the necessity of reproduction, but absolutely fails to allow its conditions and mechanisms to be thought.

It follows that, in order to exist, every social formation must reproduce the conditions of its production at the same time as it produces, and in order to be able to produce. It must therefore reproduce: 1. the productive forces, 2. the existing relations of production.

point of view of reproduction.

every child knows that a social formation which did not reproduce the conditions of production at the same time as it produced would not last a year.[2] The ultimate condition of production is therefore the reproduction of the conditions of production.

Two questions, then, emerge from Marx's formulations in the Grundrisse. The first concerns the relation between 'base' and 'superstructure'; the second concerns our own relation in the present with past art. To take the second question first: how can it be that we moderns still fmd aesthetic appeal in the cultural products of past, vastly different societies? In a sense, the answer Marx gives is no different from the answer to the question: How is it that we moderns still respond to the exploits of, say, Spartacus? We respond to Spartacus or Greek sculpture because our own history links us to those ancient societies; we find in them an undeveloped phase of the forces which condition us

historically relative structure of perception which underpins the power of a particular social class.

then, is for Marxism part of the 'superstructure' of society. It is (with qualifications we shall make later) part of a society's ideology — an element in that complex structure of social perception which ensures that the situation in which one social class has power over the others is either seen by most members of the society as 'natural', or not seen at all.

The social relations between men, in other words, are bound up with the way they produce their material life.

In the social production of their life, men enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will, relations of production which correspond to a definite stage of development of their material productive forces.

It also examines literary texts for their 'sociological' relevance, raiding literary works to abstract from them themes of interest to the social historian.

'sociology of literature'.

Marxist criticism is part of a larger body of theoretical analysis which aims to understand ideologies — the ideas, values and feelings by which men experience their societies at various times. And certain of those ideas, values and feelings are available to us only in literature.

Marxist criticism comfortably wedged between Freudian and mythological approaches to literature,

Marxist criticism analyses literature in terms of the historical conditions which produce it;

He had to draw on his past experiences with the verbal symbols. He had to select from the various alternative referents that occurred to him. To do this, he had to find some context within which these referents could be related. He sometimes found it necessary to reinterpret earlier parts of the text in the light of later parts. Actually, he had not fully read the first line until he had read the last, and interrelated them. There was a kind of shuttling back and forth as one or another synthesizing element--a context, a persona, a level of meaning--suggested itself to him.

rereading of the text for the purpose of paying attention to rhythm; the lines had evidently first been read as simply conversation, or an interchange between two speakers, and hence with no effort to sense a rhythmic pattern or a structure.

The reading of a text is an event occurring at a particular time in a particular environment at a particular moment in the life history of the reader.

, developed further by Hadley Cantril. For example, in one of the Ames-Cantril experiments the viewer "sees" a room as rectangular although it is actually trapezoidal or otherwise distorted. The observer is confronted with a definitely structured stimulus, but he selects, organizes, and interprets the cues according to his past experience of a room. The observer hits walls which he interprets as being elsewhere; he flails about with a stick at walls that are not there. Sometimes a disturbing period of readjustment is required. Such experiments demonstrate how much perception depends on the selection and organization of cues according to past experience and expectations. The perception may be revised, but it will be through an extension of the transactional process to which both perceiver and the environment contribute.11

The poem, then, must be thought of as an event in time.

Moreover, we see that the reader was not only paying attention to what the words pointed to in the external world, to their referents; he was also paying attention to the images, feelings, attitudes, associations, and ideas that the words and their referents evoked in him

a number of the readers never freed themselves from the problem of finding such a practical explanation for a play's success being dependent on the sun.

During the last rehearsal before the play has its tryout in Philadelphia or New Haven,

One writes, "Upon reading . . . the first time, I couldn't make any sense out of it."

A group of men and women, graduate students in English, were handed a text. They were told that they were to remain anonymous, and that they should start writing as soon as possible after beginning to read. They were not asked to introspect about what they were doing, but simply to jot down whatever came to them.

Having drunk a pint of beer at luncheon‑beer is a sedative to the brain, and my afternoons are the least intellectual portion of my life‑I would go out for a walk of two or three hours. As I went along, thinking of nothing in particular, only looking at things around me and following the progress of the seasons, there would flow into my mind, with sudden and unaccountable emotion, sometimes a line or two of verse, sometimes a whole stanza at once.

Professor Curt Ducasse, an ingenious theorist of expression, is the conscious objectification of feelings, in which an intrinsic part is the critical moment. The artist corrects the objectification when it is not adequate. But this may mean that the earlier attempt was not successful in objectifying the self, or "it may also mean that it was a successful objectification of a self which, when it confronted us clearly, we disowned and repudiated in favor of another."6 What is the standard by which we disown or accept the self?

poetry is the lava of the imagination