- Jan 2018
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sakai.stlawu.edu sakai.stlawu.edu
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I rely on Oppenheim and Putnam for a detailed exposition of the hypothesis that we may hope to find such a unified physicalistic body of scientific theory and for a presentation of evidence that the hypothesis is credible.
I have a couple questions concerning this last passage. First, it seems that we have to have one of two options. The first is to accept this view, with substantial credited backing, or, choose to believe that our natural sciences are greatly flawed and we have failed to account for this other stuff. Now, my question is, is there any evidence throughout history that this "other stuff" as ever existed? Or if there has ever been any evidence that suggests otherwise?
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We can be content rather merely to identify the experience as that state which is typically caused in thus-and-such ways and typically causes thus-and-such effects, saying nothing about its causes and effects in a (small) residue of exceptional cases.
As a large overarching theme, this makes sense, however, to me, it would be a mistake not to thoroughly investigate some of these exceptional cases he mentions. While these cases might not be explicable, there is undoubtedly some underlying factor at play.
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So it is pointless to exhibit various discrepancies between what is true of experiences as such and what is true of neural states as such. We can explain those discrepancies without denying psycho- physical identity and without admitting that it is somehow identity of a defective sort.
This seems to be a significant clarification and claim. By making it very clear that a specific experience does not dictate a specific neural state and vise versa, he protects his argument from all objections that point out the individual difference between all humans activation patterns and neural circuits.
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sakai.stlawu.edu sakai.stlawu.edu
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e. But I say that experiences are not to be identified with ghost stuff but with brain stuff.
important
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All it claims is that in so far as a sensation statement is a report of something, that something is in fact a brain process.
Important- clear and concise
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All except for one place: in consciousnes
One of the overarching goals of neuroscience
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will one day be explicable in mechanistic terms
Similar to the idea of "disenchantment" in the Ethics of Authenticity.
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