prepare his own troops so that by the begining of the third yearof the war, when the French, Russian, German and Austro-Hungarianarmies had fought each other to a standstill and were running shortof men, Britain's reserves of military manpower would still be intac
Britain would thus be the most powerful power and most capable of setting terms
his evidence suggests that when Kitchener was raising the NewArmies he did not intend that they should be prematurely committedto a series of costly wearing-out battles on the western f
Kitchener wanted his armies used at the decisive point
He did not believe that the mere fact that Britainwas now allied to them meant that the war had extinguished theirpre-war rivalries and he was afraid that in the post-war world theywould reassert themselves
Kitchener recognized the pre-war rivalries and knew Britain would need an army to impose its terms on the French and Russians would sought their own aims
'our Army should reach its full strength at the beginning of the thirdyear of the War, just when France is getting into rather low waterand Germany is beginning to feel the pinc
Kitchener thus prepared his army right when all sides would be at their weakest
it was his duty so to prepareour land forces that by their steadily expanding numbers and constantlyincreasing efficiency they should enable us to play a part worthy ofEngland, and at the peace to impose terms in consonance with ourinterests.
Kitchener thus saw the New Armies as essential not only for shoring up and playing their part in the Entente but also for the imposition of their terms. If the war would be won on the ground, then Britain needed a land army
It therefore followed that it was worthwhile to raise large numbersof new troops because the war would not be over quickly
New Armies were thus formed on the basis of a long and brutal war which would be fought to the end
nd. 'Nofinancial pressure has ever yet stopped a war in progre
Kitchener believed that the war would need to be won on the ground not through purely financial means like the British government expected
. The Cabinet hoped that they could be usedas bargaining counters at the eventual peace confere
Britain's strategic vision was thus centered around the peripheral war not the Western Front
I9I4; theywished to defeat the Central Powers; and they wanted to ensure thatwhen the time came for the belligerents to make peace that Britainwas the strongest of them all and therefore was in a position to imposeher peace terms on both her enemies and her a
Asquith sought to preserve the coalition and beat the Central Powers while retaining enough strength to impose her terms at the peace conference
s he insisted that allied strategy, especially in the first two yearsof the war, had been fatally mistaken. Instead of exploiting the immensesuperiority in manpower which the Entente powers of Russia, France,the British Empire, Serbia, Italy, Roumania and Belgium possessedand instead of attacking the Central Powers where they were weakest,on the eastern and Balkan fronts, the British government heeded theadvice of Lord Kitchener and threw their weight into the war on thewestern front.
Llyod George pushed heavily for peripheral campaigns where Allied manpower, logistics, control of the seas, etc. could be used best to outflank the strong German defenses
The evacuation of Gallipoli made it apparent that there wouldbe no rapid end to the war and ministers felt they had no option otherthan to accept the recommendations of the Chantilly conference of6-8 December I9I5 that the British should concentrate their army inFrance to take part in a grand co-ordinated allied offensive in
Gallipoli signaled an end to peripheral campaign and a full focus on the West. However, political hopes for peripheral campains would remain
Attrition was what eventuated when these overly ambi-tious plans failed.
Attrition became a fall back when decisive battle failed
What it does add up to is attrition, in that the armies of allthe combatants were being worn down
Despite the inability of maintain mass assaults, the scale of battle in terms of time still led to severe casualties and the growing effect of war in terms of violence
On an average day on the Somme and at Verdun just a handfulof divisions were engaged in an attack, large battles being followed by a rapiddiminution in intensity.
The armies of the Western Front did not yet have the capability to engage a large number of divisions offensively for more than a short period at a time
Despite theircasualties, the initiative at the end of 1916 still lay with the Entente.
The German war machine had been significantly weakened by 1916 as the Allies despite heavy losses showed the power of their industrial machine
from a quiteunexpected source – the British.
The Somme had shown the power of the British and expedited the Germans need for victory.
The Somme saw the martyrdom of the volunteer armies raised in Britainbetween 1914 and 1916
The Somme and its continuous and brutal battles led to the near destruction of Britain's volunteer army
Notonly was Arras not in sight, but the German front trenches still were. Groundgained started to be measured in feet, and on some sections of the front eventhat proved too large a scale.
Haigs operation was thus a complete failure again due to artillery failures (though this was mostly weather based)
October he wrote to the War Committee and soughtpermission to continue the offensive. Here was a chance for the civilians toreassert their authority.
Haig asking permission thus allowed the politicians to make their reservations have an effect (whether they would do so)
They had totally lost the will to question their chiefmilitary adviser or their Commander-in-Chief in the West. The offensivewould continue. Haig could do what he liked.
The pressures of war and growing military control thus sidelined the politicians
most members of the Committee werethoroughly alarmed at the casualty total and perplexed that Romania couldbe overrun when they had been assured that at the very least the Sommeoffensive was pinning German troops to the Western Front
Politicians were not convinced of the offensives use
But as Haig paused in late September he made what could have been aserious mistake
Haig in a democratic regime relied on political support to maintain his advance and army itself
Below lay more Germandefences. But it was late in the campaigning season
The seasons thus worked against Haig though by now his army was exhausted
So, accompanied by a creeping barrage fired across the whole front, theFourth Army subdued the German defence and made reasonable ground (inGreat War terms) at modest cost.
The new artillery practices helped make advances more effective but could not overcome the lack of mobility and the impossibility of exploitation
ess sensibly, he decided not to fire a creepingbarrage, which by this time had become the standard form of infantryprotection in an attack, for fear of hitting the tanks
The tanks still untried were deprived of the level of support needed it still required
he weapon was untriedand to base a war-winning campaign on an untested weapon would haveinvolved the utmost peril.
The tank was an effective innovation but still not yet refined enough to truly win battles decisively without support
Britain had very deep pockets (4,000 million pounds were available to it inforeign investments in 1914) and the Germans could only watch as British warproduction reached new heights with American help.
Britain's wealth allowed it to match its continental effort with an economic one as the German army became heavily strapped for cash as the blockade squeezed
By 1916 Britain had assembled a mass army on a continental scale and it wasbacked by what was soon to become the largest munitions effort in the world.
Britain had truly created a mass army which matched the other European powers in scale, technology, and logistics
were under continuous bombardment from the British artillery. The Somme,despite the crude tactics used by Haig, reflected the arrival of Britain as amajor military power.
The Germans despite their defensive successes also took a considerable toll from artillery which proved the king of the battlefield despite a lack of decisive successes
ountered by similar attacks by smallnumbers of German troops. In this manner Falkenhayn, against the odds,managed to restore some kind of balance to the casualty lists.
The desires of both sides not to lose ground thus led to a balance casualty list
nched forward at great costbecause the tactics employed allowed the Germans to concentrate the max-imum amount of artillery against the small areas of the front under threat.
The abandonement of the wide front tactics toward small scale, narrow front attacks allowed for the concentration of German forces against them
There was never any doubt that despite these losses the battle would becontinued. The French were still under pressure at Verdun and the lengthypreparations made by Haig could hardly be broken off after twenty-fourhours.
The needs of the entire front thus forced a continuation of the bloodletting
inadequate and inaccurate artillery bombardment had missed much of theGerman defensive systems and most of the German batteries ranged on no-man’s-land
Inadequate artillery bombardment had left German defensive positions largely unscathed
However, the type of infantry tactics employed wassupremely irrelevant in the face of unsubdued German machine guns andartillery.
No tactical innovations could overcome the sheer firepower (untouched by British guns) which the Germans could call upon
Rawlinson could have suggested that such an operation on the WesternFront in 1916 was quite chimerical.
Cavalry by now had gone by the wayside
He planned to capture all three German lines. Howelse could the four divisions of cavalry he had massed just behind the frontbreak through and gallop towards the coast, thus rolling up the Germandefences in the northern sector of the Western Front?
Thus Haig's expectations of a battle of movement overrode the needs of the positional battle.
And it was not just in numbers that the artillery would prove to beinsufficient. There were serious inadequacies in quality, type and manner ofdelivery.
The artillery which the British relied on was defective from the start
o attack on a wide front (in this case eleven kilo-metres) it was necessary to accumulate massive amounts of ammunition andguns to demolish the extensive German trench lines and fortified villages facedby the British.
The idea of a wide front allowed for greater control of the battlefield but also stretched British resources to the max
But as the killing at Verdun proceeded, it became clear that the Allies’ frontof attack would be narrower than at first thought
The withdrawal of French forces sucked out much of the needed forces and scale which was necessary for the assault
Yet it is not easy to find another promisingarea for an offensive
The terrain limitations and strong defensives on other fronts made the Somme the best of the worst as promised French support made the prospect of an attack here more promising
adicaldeparture from Britain’s previous wars.
Britain had always sent smaller professional expeditionary forces to Europe never large conscripted armies
Meanwhile back on the Western Front, where the war would be won orlost, the British army was slowly building to a size where a considerableoffensive could be launched.
Britain had finally created a general army
the decision was taken to proceed with the northernoperation. This proved to be a mistake. In short order the Germans stoppedthe offensive in its tracks.
Russian forces did not learn from Brusilov and facing the much stronger Germans were doomed to repeat another failed offensive
onrad’soffensive was running out of steam because, as was often the case in the GreatWar, his troops had outrun their artillery support.
As always with attacks on the Western Front
If this did not amount to ‘bleeding white’, it at least meant progress hadbeen made by Falkenhayn towards that goal. The problem was that he hadbled his own army white as well.
Falkenhayn had bleed both the armies white
alkenhayn had in any case seemed to growtired of his own conception. Losses for both sides approached 250,000.
The battle had drained the German army and had led to once again a period of stalemate
The fighting at Verdun had by this point lost all sensible purpose. It shouldhave been obvious to the Germans that the price to be paid to gain theadditional seven kilometres of ground that they needed to take the city wastoo high.
The fighting had devolved into more attritional butchery as Falkenhayen pushed for his decisive victory which had slipped away from him
to whicharmy was being bled white.
The savageness of the fighting meant that the attritional battle Falkenhayen sought was affecting his own soldiers as well as the French.
or these reasons the fire support received bythe German troops suffered a savage diminution and as a result the first phaseof the Verdun operation fizzled out.
The attack fizzled out as the artillery support slackened
the German command found it impossible tomove them forward over this ground.
The immobility of early WW1 artillery meant sustaining attacks were nearly impossible
No doubt the introductionof flamethrowers was one reason that the French defence gradually wilted
New technologies helped contribute to victories before adaptation
alkenhayn was not swayed. Hereckoned, not without reason, that to sufficiently devastate the French defend-ers his artillery fire must be as concentrated as possible.
Thus the limitations of an attritional battle ultimately strengthened the defenders position
He conceded that the defences needed reinforcement and offeredtwo additional infantry divisions. There was to be no reinforcement in guns,either for the forts or the field artillery.
Joffre did not truly give Verdun the reserves it needed
many of the garrisons of the forts werealso removed.
Verdun was thus in 1916 not a particularly heavily manned and supplied sector of the front
gaps inthe enemy line would be achieved by the same means put forward byFalkenhayn – that is, huge amounts of artillery and shells would be used toeliminate the dominance of defensive trench positions.
Again artillery would be entrusted to win the day
They were not designed tobe attritional battles. Great masses of cavalry would sweep through gaps madein the enemy defences and roll up the German positions
Showed the continued faith in a war of movement by Entente commanders
hat he proposed was to assemble the largest amount of artillery yetseen in war, about 1,200 guns of which 500 were heavy calibre, and inrelatively short but devastating bombardments destroy the French defendersuntil the ground could be occupied with modest infantry resources
Falkenhayen sought to use his vast artillery resources to win the victory rather than a massed infantry assault
His new idea was toattack at a point that was bound to be defended and then use his superiority inartillery to batter the defenders into submission
Falkenhayen did not want a battle of movement but a battle of attrition
The longer the war, they reasoned, the less chance Germany would have ofwinning it.
German leaders became increasingly fearful of the growing military strength of the Allies
The year 1915 was the one in which totalisation of the war was substantiallyset in motion. But it was still some way from reaching its full destructivepotential.
1915 set in motion the totalization of the war, 1916 saw its full effect
In acontext of extreme ‘negative mobilisation’,28 1915 confirms that the totality ofthe enemy population – and sometimes a part of one’s own people – was nowthe enemy, and not only the nation’s armed and fighting fraction
Not only did the military become the enemy but the enemies civilians as well
theseacts of war, of a new kind, signalled a depth of hostility to the ‘Other’ in whichno part of the ‘enemy’ population within would be spared
A new depth of hostility towards the 'other'
None of the nations at war had a fiscal system capable of meeting the costsof the war; all had recourse to credit – in France, this applied from thebeginning of 1915, in the form of Treasury Bonds and long-term war loans.
All nations had to resort to credits in order to keep the war going as their fiscal systems proved inadequate to the scale of the war
The year 1915 was thus identified as a first point of take-off for production,24even though it continued to be hampered by multiple pinch-points character-istic of an accelerated crisis of growth
1915 saw the first steps toward total war economies as economies organized and centralized to meet the demands of the war
showed the extent to which from 1915onwards the blockade helped to extend and intensify the violence of the war.1
Blockade helped extend the violence of war
operated in the occupied territories and the rationing system imposed ontheir civilian populations: total exploitation (ameliorated to some extent bythe Commission of Relief for Belgium) was established.
Blockade justified the exploitation and deprivation of occupied territories
question of control of the seas was of centralimportance during the course of 1915.
Blockade became a powerful weapon in forcing victory
transmitted extreme hostility to theenemy.
Extreme violence led to an escalation of hate toward enemies
it was these which signalled the intention to eradicate the Armeniancommunity.
Mass deportations thus took the form of ethnic cleansing and complete massacres
Against the setback to their externalmilitary projects, the Young Turks’ leadership to some extent turned to thedestruction of the designated internal enemy.
Scapegoating of internal enemy due to military failures
vicissitudes of the war alsocontributed to setting a cumulative genocidal spiral in motion.
Growing threats and the growing scale of the war led to fear of internal enemies and thus legitimized escalating violence against them
setting of a pan-Turkishethnicity designated the Armenians as potential enemies of the ‘Turkish race’destined to regenerate the Empire
The need to purge internal enemies was legitimized by nationalistic and purification politics
econd year of thewar played a central role in the process of totalisation and ‘brutalisation’ ofthe war.
Second year of the war greatly contributed to the war totalization and brutalization
1915 was also characterised by an unprecedented radical-isation of violence towards populations seen as too unreliable to be left alivein their towns and villages.
The totalization of war led to the perceived need to eliminate untrustworthy populations leading to unprecedented violence
erman and Austro-Hungarian occupations ofthe second year of the war, however severe, constituted a stage designed tore-establish order
Occupation led to a settling of order as the war settled into stalemate
iolence was part of this process,less in relation to the German occupation in Belgium and the north and east ofFrance than to the Austro-Hungarian presence in Serbia and above all theBulgarians in Macedonia;
Violence continued as the need to support the war motivated occupying soldiers to treat their civilians with extreme brutality
he primary concern was the material exploitation of resources; thelocal occupied population was itself an important local resource, to be put toactive use as part of the invaders’ war effort.
Civilians became part of the exploitation of their own home countries often via coercion
extension of institutionalised concentration – with the prolongedinternment, on both sides, of non-national individuals present on national soilat the time of the outbreak of war – was fundamentally part of the same logic.
Internment of civilians behind the line contributed to institutionalized war against civlians
without truestrategic objective, they signalled that enemy populations in their entiretywere henceforward considered enemies and were therefore now a legitimatetarget.
The growing reach of the war signaled that civilians were no longer safe
atrocities continued to feature in powerfulreplays of memory:
Atrocities became a powerful motivator for the continuation of the war
1915, for example, the ‘war cultures’became enduringly crystallised around a body of mobilising themes, wordsand images which confirmed the meaning initially attributed to the war itself –both in justifying its continuation and the new sacrifices that this implied
1915 solidified the war culture through justification of its continuation
All these practices stimulated movements of mass exodus: the effects ofthe refugee phenomenon, a central feature of the outbreak of war, continuedto be felt throughout 1915, upsetting the fragile equilibrium of the homefronts.
Mass refugee movements due to the violence of the front
he events of 1914 had established mass attacks on unarmed civilians as theorder of the day.
The need for a quick victory overrode any appeals to civilization and the protection of civilians
Thus by the end of 1915, not only had movement continued to be the orderof the day everywhere except on the Western Front, but even there, the end of1915 showed that there was still hope of a breakthrough followed by a return tomanoeuvre
1915 did not represent the death kneel of the war of movement. Many commanders still believed in the cult of the offensive which made them unprepared for the sheer bloodletting of 1916
o set off for the Adriatic at the cost of a murderous wintermarch through the Albanian mountains, while the Allied troops had no choicebut to withdraw to the Greek frontier.
Salonika thus became a new front as the Serbian front collapsed
yet the ‘great advance’ of the Germans was the chiefmilitary victory in 1915: Russia lost Galicia, Poland, Lithuania and Courlandin their ‘Great Retreat’, representing a withdrawal of 250 kilometres betweenJanuary and September, provoking the decision of the Tsar to take over themilitary High Command in person.
The Austro/German offensives had taken advantage of the war of movement and their offensives had devastated the Russians leading to the Great Retreat
than its equivalent in the West.
The positional warfare of the Western Front was not able to be applied universally across the Eastern Front making a war of movement still possible
By the end of the summer all thetroops present on the peninsula were immobilised in a dense network oftrenches, similar to those on the Western Front but concentrated into a muchsmaller area.
Western Front tactics on a smaller scale
the troops were pinned down on the beaches and dominated byOttoman defensive positions.
Here the defensive also triumphed as positional warfare was imposed once again.
Designed to take control of the Dardanelles Straitsand Constantinople while simultaneously creating solid and direct liaisonwith Russia, the plan for the operation was an interesting attempt to getround the strategic blockade in the West, supported by the British navy.
Peripheral operations became a key part not only of strengthening strategic positions but of getting around the static warfare of the Western Front
This superiority of defence over attack was repeated all the more easilyelsewhere because the experience of static warfare was broadly valid on otherfronts.
The lessons of the Western Front were soon applied across the war though not Universally.
Then the escalation began.
Innovations in tactics prompted an escalation as each side tried to outdo the other
The introduction of gas and flamethrowers in the same year marked aninflection in violence of a different order, inflicting death or wounds withoutbreaking the anatomical barrier of the skin, and thus without spilling blood
Introduction of new technologies to break the stalemate merely increased the violence of the war
Theenemy drew even closer as weapons for hand-to-hand fighting became morewidespread:
The expansion of technologies combined with the growing proximity of fighting combined to increase the brutality of fighting
long-term installation of the war of position, a defining feature of thesecond year of the war, also contributed to the institutionalisation of a fullrange of practices which radicalised the inherent violence of the battlefield.
The institution of a war of position increased the violence of the war
wo offensives continued until mid October, however, in a pattern character-istic of a war which was slow to learn from an initial setback.
Commanders dragged out offensives even if they were unsuccessful
hen, between 9 May and 18 June, the combined French and Britishforces launched a massive attack in Artois: in some places this achievedpenetration of up to four kilometres in depth along a front of around fifteenkilometres, but without achieving a decisive breakthrough – in static warfare,this breach was too narrow for lasting exploitation
Even large penetrations would eventually be ground down as reserves and rear lines ground down an offensive and the offensive had no real counter to maintain their momentum once separated from their artillery. The mobility of firepower was still not yet at a stage to allow a return to a war of movement
ven wherethe enemy front line was pierced, no one could hope to exploit the initialsuccess
The principle of defence in depth meant that even successful breakthroughs could not be exploited as rear lines and reserves quickly moved as the offensives momentum grund down
support trenches were strengthened and supplementary lines of defence werelaid out well to the rear
The growing sophistication of the trench lines as the war progressed
prevailingsomewhat simple techniques of attack, the temptation was strong to launchtroops into an assault without adequate artillery preparation.
Lack of innovative offensive tactics compounded the defensive superiority
Several elements contributed to this – barbed wire, which prevented anysimple crossing of no-man’s-land; infantry rifle fire, above all machine-gunfire, setting up a virtually impassable wall of bullets; and barrages of artilleryshells, which shattered assault troops as soon as they left their trenc
The use of barbed wire in conjunction with defensive firepower made it a tall order for any offensive unit to take on attacking a trench line
Further,there was no question of abandoning any particular stretch of front line that wastoo exposed, or of shortening the lines in the interests of easier defence: theposition remained where battle had established it.
The ideas of defence in depth had not yet applied. Both sides were committed to meeting in battle
extreme difficulty for the High Command to fully understand thisnew factor,
Learning curve needed to adjust to the new conditions of war meant that the tactics were not yet in place to overcome the defensive superiority
he superiority of the defence over assault
Superiority of the defense created the conditions for the Western front stalemate
1915 confirmed and even reinforced the strategic deadlockwhich was apparent from the autumn of 1914.
1915 confirmed that this war would be one of stalemate
Ludendorff finally realised that the war could not be won but he still heldhopes that a peace with favourable conditions was possible as German troopswere standing in France and Belgium and controlled most of EasternEurope.
Ludendorf's failure led to a catastrophic loss of confidence and a sense of delusion amongst the German military
he Allies attacked with superior manpower, artillery fire and tanks, and amuch higher morale. The failure of the spring offensive and the success of theAllied attacks were disastrous for the morale of German soldiers, and theeffect on the morale of the High Command was even more disastrous
Allies used their logistical and manpower advantage to its greatest extent, allowing them to take on a wide ranging series of offensives, the Germans simply did not have the manpower or morale to oppose
artillery and aerialsuperiority was overwhelming and the assault troops were well equipped withLewis guns and mortars. Every battalion was accompanied by six tanks. Theresult of the attack was an impressive victory.
Combined arms warfare helped overcome the German fortifications
he Allied attacks did not go furtherthan their artillery could reach
Allied forces would consolidate their forces before an attack to make sure they were best prepared to take on the German positions
offensives were launched in rapid succession to prevent the OHL fromdirecting reinforcements to critical points
Allowed the allies to stretch German forces and prevent German forces from reesetablishing proper defenses
Foch devised a plan consisting of a series of attacks aimed at reachingimportant railway hubs and improving the lines of communication.
The Allies would not overshot their objectives in order to prevent a continual and slowly weakening offensive
Theirsuperiority in terms of firepower was re-established in the summer of 1918.Rupprecht realised much earlier than Ludendorff that morale among theGerman soldiers was droppin
Allied firepower and German lack of morale would prove crucial
utthey anticipated that counter-attacks and offensives with narrow objectivescould be effective and break the morale of the German army.
Idea of General Warfare. Multiple simultaneous attacks which would allow the Allies with their superior logistics to slowly wear down the German army
Germans held positions which still had tobe fortified. The soldiers were much more vulnerable to Allied attacks than inthe fortified positions they had held before the spring offensive.
The attacks merely created a longer line for Germany to defend and without already prepared fortifications
he German army hadretaken old battlefields or territory which had been destroyed by its troopsduring the tactical retreat to the Hindenburg Line
The ground taken by the Germans was destroyed and worthless
All in all, the German offensives had made considerable territorial gains,but none of the strategic objectives had been achieved. The BEF and theFrench army had neither been separated, nor had the British troops beenpushed back to the Channel ports, nor had Paris been taken
Germany had seized ground but without strategic gains, such ground was worthless
aunched a successful counter-attack – also using tanks – against theGerman Fifth and Seventh Armies on 18 July, which forced the Germans toretreat to Soissons on the River Aisn
French had learned a way to turn back German attacks through timely intelligence, defensive depth, and well placed counterattacks
Once again logistical, especially transportation problems prevented theGerman army from exploiting the strategic opportunities. The attack divisionswere exhausted and supplies, artillery and fresh troops could not be broughtforward quickly enough
The lack of motorised transport made supply of these massive offensives impossible to sustain
Casualties were high, as here – wherethe BEF could not afford to lose much ground – the defences were deep andheavily fortified. Ludendorff stopped the offensive on 29 April.
British fortification and timely reserves eventually meant the offensive ran out of gas
The German troopswere exhausted and too far from the railway heads. The lines were over-stretched, there was insufficient motorised transportation and horses, andneither fresh troops nor supplies could be brought forward quickly enough
Germany simply did not have enough resources to win a victory of such scale especially due to Ludendorff's flip flopping and lack of strategic vision
he front waspushed back forty miles in some areas, but neither had the BEF and the Frencharmy permanently been separated nor had Amiens with its important railwayhub been taken.3
The lack of a strategic goal left German forces with a large territorial gain but with little intrinsic or strategic value to the land. It merely created a salient which would be difficult to defend
he opposition of Haig and Pétain against aunified High Command was finally overcome.
Crisis finally forced the appointment of a generalissimo
aw the chance to drive a wedge between the BEF and the Frencharmy and inflict the deadly blow on the Allies he had hoped for.
In doing so he fundamentally redefined his strategic goal
stiff resistance of the British Third Army, but Ludendorff alsoseemed to believe that the BEF had been beaten and that it was now time toturn against the French army to prevent reinforcements being sent to theBritish.
Ludendorff ambition and confidence ultimately betrayed him as he overstretched his strategic goal
Operation Michael had succeeded on one section of the front where astrategic victory was beyond the possibilities of the German army.Ludendorff, however, had the Eighteenth Army push on, not, as planned, ina north-westerly direction but south and south-west
Ludendorff decided to take advantage of a local success which compromised his strategic vision
As the Britishhad just taken over part of the front from the French army, the principles ofdeep defence had not yet been fully applied
British 5th was undermanned and not properly dug in
EF held on to the strategically crucial Vimy Ridge andprevented the German troops from reaching their objectives. Progress wasmade but casualties on the German side were high
The BEF was able to extract a heavy toll on the Germans weakening their advance as it progressed
Ludendorff referred to his experience on the Eastern Front: attack, find theweak spots, use the momentum and push forward. This gave the offensive ahigh degree of flexibility but the inherent flaw of this plan was that the attackcould splinter into a number of advances without achieving a decisivevictory.
Ludendorff did not have a strategic objective in mind beside destroying the British army making him far more likely to pivot away from his original plan
Here the German troops would have to cross the old Somme battlefield.This was also very difficult terrain but not as muddy as ‘Flanders fields’
Somme battlefields were possible to traverse but the extensive destruction made it difficult to exploit gains
the morale of the British soldiers after the costly offensives of1917 would be low, and decided to attack the BEF first.
Ludendorff saw the defeat of the British as the key to defeating the Allied alliance
The German High Command hadexperienced the resilience of French soldiers and shrank back from taking onthe French army at Verdun, the logical point for an offensive
Resilience of the French helped dissuade an attack on their lines
developed a new method ofdirecting fire without ranging shots. The artillery aimed its fire at the enemy’sbatteries, Headquarters and lines of communication.
Firing on these targets would sow confusion throughout an enemies battleline and essential basis for the stormtrooper tactics
brief period of artillery preparation before attacks usinghurricane bombardment with the aim of preventing the Allies from learning earlyon where the major blow would fall.
Short and intense bombardments meant to take advantage of maximum firepower and surprise
The German army used combined-arms and infiltration tactics, which hadbeen successfully applied by General Oskar von Hutier in the Battle of Riga andwhich were later tested at Caporetto and during the counter-attack at Cambrai.
Stormtrooper tactics
etter fightingefficiency
Germans had learned an effective style of war based on the Battle of Riga known as stormtrooper tactics
The troops lived off the country and tried to extract more resources(especially food) from Ukraine. This led to local uprisings which were crushedby German and Austrian troops, generating even more disaffection.
German exctraction policy led to greater dissatisfaction in their occupied territories
he defeat of the Russian Empire wasthe precondition for the independence of half a dozen nations.
The disintegration of the empire system started with Russia
negotiations should begin without conditions and be based on the principleof no annexations or reparations. The offer of peace also included the right ofself-determination of nations which – as later became clear – opened up thepossibility for manipulation.
Soviet idea of revolutionary diplomacy
y 1918 Czechs and Slovaks were also hoping for an independent state. Thevague promise of more autonomy if the Central Powers won the war wasundercut by the very real possibility of independence in the event of an Alliedvictory.
Allied promises thus undercut Central Powers vague appeals to the stateless
Wilson did not demand the dissolution of both empires but proposedautonomy for their nationalities.
His idea of self determination was quite limiting
right of self-determination of all nations.
Key to Versailles treaty
He took a gamble, placing all his hopes on thesuccess of the spring offensive
This gamble proved disastrous
German ambitions and thevolatile situation in the former Russian Empire prevented the full weight ofGerman military power from being directed to the Western Front.
Germany did not take full advantage of the release of resources from the Eastern Front.
Ludendorff shared the imperialist dreams of some of the military, political andeconomic elite, and wanted to fully exploit the collapse of the Russian Empireand the power vacuum it created by expanding borders, promoting colonisa-tion and securing German dominance in Eastern Europe for the foreseeablefuture.
Ludendorff's ambition eventually doomed the German army
There are two important teachings pertaining to governance in10Confucianism: respect for and maintenance of the (hierarchical) social order, and ethical rule
Basis of Confucian Governance
The East Asian International Society itself can trace its intellectual origins back to China. As theregional hegemon, China set the rules of diplomatic conduct with foreign polities, and also assumednormative supremacy within the order.
China set the parameters of diplomatic conduct and assumed supremacy
The constitutive6norms of the East Asian International Society were hegemonic constructs that originated from China,and were premised on Confucianism and the assumption of Chinese supremacy
East Asian International Society predicated on Chinese culture and supremacy
This hypothetical argument highlights the openness of China’srelations with foreign powers created by its frontier expansion, and pointsto the possibility of more fluid geopolitical alliances, each of which had ef-fects on military balances, technological reform, and the political economyof trade.
Openness of Chinas relations to foreign powers could have been maintained had China been forced to continue its expansionism
Merchant elitescould benefit from cooperation with state officials in the development ofthe new regions.
Frontier expansion helped prevent commercial escape from the state
inally, frontier expansion offeredan outlet for peasant farmers, relieving pressure on the land in the core re-gions while granting them greater freedom from state burdens.
Relief of the land was essential in a burgeoning population
ising regional powers rivaled theclaims of the central state apparatus
Commercialization allowed regional powers to challenge the state by diversfying the means of economic growth
Bayly’s argument points to the corrosive impact of commercialization onsocial solidarity. The cash nexus challenged bonds based on military loy-alty, religious devotion, or kinship, replacing them with considerations ofprivate interest.
Commercialization replaced imperial loyalty with private interest. This fundamentally challenged the imperial state as the military service state collapsed and was replaced by commercial interest
state then had to gain the loyalty of its military and of-ficial servitors not through appeals to unity but through contractual rela-tionships
The need to then commercially negotiate with the military and government left the state weak and extremely vulnerable in times of crisis
his should be seen not as the “decline” of Ottomancivilization but as a reorientation of political power toward regions in re-sponse to new commercial sources of wealth.
The new commercialization of wealth meant that local empires lost their mandate of power, as local powers increased in stature
commercialization challenged the presupposi-tions on which the empires based their right to rule, which were fundamen-tally the maintenance of social order and the upholding of moral norms.
Commercialization fundamentally eroded empires right to rule
hese empires failed “becausewealthy and prideful men found less and less reason to support the myth ofempire to the disadvantage of their own real local interests.”
Local players decided to put commercial interests ahead of Empire
Flexible, negotiated local admin-istration, a feature of imperial rule everywhere, revealed itself more openlyon the frontier than elsewhere.
Flexible and local administration helped create the Qing state
was a negoti-ated state in its interior, somewhat like the Ottoman empire, but its peoplehad much stronger local social institutions and a greater ability to resist thestate when they chose.
China was a negotiated state but its people were more able to resist the state
If coopera-tion benefited both sides, local government could be carried out smoothlyby flexible interpretation of regulations.18 But when the state was weak orabusive, or local elites held the balance of power, conflict flared up.
Cooperation was possible but state weakness allowed local association to attempt to break out of the regulations imposed against it
Hence a great deal of authority was dele-gated to local associations to carry out tasks that served the state.
Qing helped turn these associations into state tools
he Ottomans created a centralized state by very different meansfrom western European states like France because they negotiated withtheir rivals instead of trying to suppress them.
Negotiation rather than repression
Westerners, of course, equally divided among themselves but willingto follow British leadership, included “most-favored nation” clauses inthe unequal treaties precisely to prevent this well-known Chinese strategy
Westerners thus learned to get around this Qing tactic
s-sence of Qing frontier policy was to keep the Mongols divided by con-stant diplomacy, drawing in allies against other, more dangerous rivals.
Qing divide and conquer against the Mongols
In each case, Mongol leaders gained official rank, salaries, gifts,and guarantees of subsistence in return for surrendering the right to moveor freely designate their successors.
Mongols thus used tribute to induce loyalty
The Qing rulers, however, realized that negotiation, with coercion heldin reserve, could work just as well on distant frontiers as in domestic con-texts.
Qing rulers effectively used negotiation to pacify the Mongols
Even in the relatively peaceful mid-Ming, local control depended precari-ously on compromises between civil officials and those who controlled mil-itary force.
Dependence on compromise with strongmen weakened imperial control
hese so-called banditshad powerful patrons, reaching as far as the eunuchs in the imperial courtitself.
These men of force exercised influence throughout China outside imperial control
Furthermore, although there wassubstantial private trade across both frontiers, the unregulated smugglingthat developed along the south coast, with its many small harbors and fastships, was far harder to control than the narrow choice of routes across thedeser
The Qing were unable to control the Canton trade due to greater commercial interests and lack of presence
he much larger torrent of silver and credit flowing intothe south drew Canton merchants into close dependence on their Britishcounterparts
The larger torrent of trade in Canton lead to dependence on British traders
All the foreigners astutely took ad-vantage of local flexibility to push their own commercial interests as far aspossible, but if they pushed too far, the Qing shut down the trade to bringthem in line
Qing flexed regulations but also brought the hammer down
he frontier served as an experimental zone for adapting prece-dents to local circumstances.
Frontier became a key reference point for dealing with the Westerners
esignatedHan merchant groups obtained monopoly licenses to trade with foreigners;regulations strictly controlled access to ports, times of stay, and goods to betraded.
Northwestern trade was remarkably similar to Southern practices
he kind of military and diplomatic experience gained on the northwesternfrontier generated inappropriate responses for the new challenges on differ-ent terrain.
Qing officials so schooled in the Northwest did not adapt to changing geographical circumstances
Yet the flexibility of the empire, its ability to react to ex-ternal shocks and take advantage of new opportunities, seems to have de-clined, so that while Japan could react rapidly to the appearance of Westernsteamships in its harbor in 1854, Chinese officials could not mount a uni-fied response to the Opium War of 1839–1842.
Qing did not react as quickly to the threat as did other Asian nations
Chinese rulers, in theirown eyes, had finished their project by 1760
The goals of centralization, homogenization, and simplification
n each case the in-novations arose from the demand of the frontier regions for security andthe needs of the military commanders for adequate supplies.
Demand of frontier expansion necessitated innovation
innovations that built an increasingly centralized and coordinated bureau-cracy which used mercantile and agrarian resources actively for economicdevelopment to serve its security needs
During this expansionist period, the Qing built an innovative and extensive bureacracy which effcetively used resources
the Qing em-pire also engaged in a competitive state-building process as it pushed itsborders outward
Competitive state building due to expansionism
competitive European state systemestablished in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries generated the processof state building, military mobilization, and commercial growth that fueledimperial expansion.
Competition and its pressures motivated states to innovate and not to allow weakness or corruption
hese endemic weaknesses of the granary system wouldundermine the entire effectiveness of famine relief, allowing severe out-breaks of peasant revolt.
The corruption and neglect of agricultural projects thus made Qing agriculture extremely unstable
The end of this expansion in the mid-eighteenth century, and the end ofthe frontier wars, meant that both the incentives for innovation and themeans of control slackened
The lack of expansionist pressures led to a lessening desire for innovation and control
Many of its projects were de-signed to ensure the security of poor regions so that severe attacks of fam-ine would not touch off revolts, and so that military forces could obtainsubsistence from local markets
Need for public projects based on border security and military movement
ncentive to reform itself declined,and the will to control abuses slackened.
The pressures of expansion created a strong state, the lack of these pressures led to a loosening of imperial power
end to military challenges on the frontier let much dy-namism ebb out of the bureaucracy.
Dynamism was leeched out of the empire due to the end of expansion. The need to reform to meet expansionist challenges was slowly degraded
Despite extensive controls, the enormous paper flow of the bureaucracy byits very nature obstructed clear lines of communication and control, leavingthe way open for abuse.
The corruption of the bureaucracy due to its extensive mobilization led to a slow wastage of imperial resources
This frontier expansion project stimulated official mobilization of theempire’s economic resources.
The empire's expansion effectively mobilized resources from the empire
A language of civilization defined the identity of these peo-ples and the treatment they received.
Civilization could be given and taken away based on submission or rebellion
Balancing coercive, monetary, and cultural appeals was thekey to preserving the state and maintaining social order.
Balance between monetary, cultural, and coercive
When preaching harmony failed or harvests collapsed in a drought,officials had to summon up whatever police forces they had to prevent ban-ditry or revolt.
Thus coercive force was necessary in the maintenance of the empire
the Manchu rulers organized theirsociety to make war. The Manchu people were created in 1616 as part ofthe state formation in Manchuria dedicated to unifying through force thetribes of the Northeast. D
Manchu warfare was essential in the creation of the Qing state
hus the "Western conquest" proved abortive. Instead of being takenover by the new invaders, the Chinese world order finally disintegrated.
The West did not conquer China, China merely destroyed itself
The power structure, the establishment,by any definition came to include a large Western element.
Power structure came to include the west
The Ch'ing officials control them througha personal relationship, which is the essence of control in the Chinesebureaucracy.
Essence of control via personal relationship. Western forces subsumed into the Chinese state
"If you can't lick 'em, join 'em," had its Peking counterpart: barbarianstoo strong to defeat can be pacified by concessions, letting them participatein Chinese life
Treaty system was a way to pacify the West and subsume them into the Chinese system
on-Chinese Manchus had conqueredthe Ming state and taken on Chinese ways. In ruling they used Chinesecultural forms and Manchu, Mongol, and Chinese personnel. To thisstructure additional non-Chinese could now be added.
Manchus had taken on the culture of the Chinese while ruling jointly between Manchus and Han. This structure would later be added the west
Westerners could and did par-ticipate in the Ch'ing power structure but were quite incapable of takingon Chinese culture as previous barbarian invaders had done.
Westerners participated in the system but deliberately aschewed its cultural boundaries. But the joint participation in the system did give the Westerners an incentive in keeping the Qing Empire alive.
culture,on the other hand, included the ideology of imperial Confucianism, theunderlying classical philosophy of social order, and the ritual observancesand ceremonial forms which all together legitimized and sanctioned theruling authority.
Culture helped legitimize the authority of the empire via ritual, philosophy, and social order
power structurewas based on military capacity, force held in reserve, and included theadministrative capacity of emperor, magistrates, censors, and officialdomgenerally to maintain control of the functions of governmen
Power structure based on military force and administrative capacity.
gain the imperialedict makes the point that if a British officer is to be given the command hemust, like Ward, become enrolled as a Chinese subject and accept Ch'ingcontrol.
Assimilation of foreign mercenaries into the ranks of the Middle Kingdom
This was part of a general effortto extend the interval between tribute missions, perhaps a symptom of theweakening of the institution
Weakening of the institution due to the slowing of tribute missions