<br>Theoretical Exposition: As we describe in the text, the shift in the burden of proof would have increased \(\epsilon_i\) and \(\alpha\). The first change would have increased the range of values of \(q\) for which the equilibrium in Case 1 could be sustained. Relative to Case 2, the immigration court caseload is lower in Case 1. The bond grant rate is also lower in Case 1 than Case 2 since there are no cases in which weak evidence is observed.

<br>Analytic Note: The excerpt from the National Association of Immigration Judges (NAIJ) shows immigration judges are asking for the same institutional changes that private, reputed organizations argued for previously: the need for an independent court following the separation of powers.

Source Excerpt: (p. 15) Every reputable organization that has studied the Immigration Court has reached the same conclusion. The American Bar Association has produced an in-depth and extensive report of the need for an independent Immigration Court. The Federal Bar Association has drafted proposed Article 1 legislation. The American Immigration Lawyers Association, the largest organization of immigration law attorneys who practice on a daily basis before the Court, has formally endorsed an independent Immigration Court. If nothing else, the drastic pendulum swings between the previous and current administration’s use and abuse of the Immigration Court has evidenced what our founding fathers knew at the inception of our country— the importance of separation of powers between the judicial role of the government from its law enforcement prerogatives. The judicial role of the Immigration Court is simply irreconcilable with the law enforcement mission and role of the DOJ. The only real and lasting solution is the establishment of an independent Immigration Court. Only then will we begin to move forward in solving the immigration crisis facing our nation.

Link to Data Source: * NAIJ Congressional Testimony “Written Testimony Before House Judiciary Committee, January 2020.” Posted Jan 29, 2020. https://data.qdr.syr.edu/file.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.5064/F60LYDGR/NAEJBX * See also: NAIJ - Written Testimony Before House Judiciary Committee, January 2020

<br>Methodological Description: All variables are averaged over the entire pre-intervention period up to but excluding the intervention period. Predictors selected to minimize MSPE in the pre-treatment period.

<br>Theoretical Exposition: This assumes that players (in this case the IJ) do not attempt to draw inferences about the type of ICE prosecutor before them when they find themselves at a history that should not be reached if the players adopt their equilibrium strategies. We will also assume the IJ to use information about how evidence emerges. There is one example in our model when this happens, specifically in the case “No Docket,” where no prosecutor brings a case to immigration court. This is admittedly an odd equilibrium. If an IJ in such an equilibrium was in fact asked to run a custody hearing, we are assuming that she would not draw an inference about the type of prosecutor before her but use her understanding about how evidence emerges. For example, we still allow the IJ to conclude that the respondent most not be dangerous if the IJ observes \(e_w\).

<br>Analytic Note: Excerpts from research interviews with private immigration attorneys clarify ICE attorneys' professional incentives for pursuing cases where the non-citizen respondent is neither dangerous nor a flight risk. Specifically, courtroom experience is a key factor when assigning immigration judgeships. Therefore, ICE attorneys may choose to detain non-dangerous individuals in order to acquire trail experience necessary for career advancement.

Source Excerpt: * RI 7: I did think when Brito came down that [ICE] would perhaps release people. Because pre-Brito they would arrest somebody, you know, for a driving without a license charge. And it's still my burden to show that that guy should be let out. Even though that's all he has on his record for 20 years or whatever. I don't think [ICE released people] to the extent it really should have; they still try to put on their case even when their cases are weak. * RI 51: One of the nice things about the Boston immigration court, though, is that a lot of the trial attorneys are former district attorneys. And so they're used to like conferencing the case. [ICE attorneys] don't just come straight from law school to government. They typically have experience in a forum where they're used to meeting to communicate with the other side. * RI 69: And it is easier to get into a judgeship if you were previously in law enforcement because you've already gone through the background checks. And more court experience is one heavy factor when weighing of the immigration judgeship. And for immigration judgeships, prosecutors are always going to have more court experience than the people representing the non-citizens.

Link to Data Source: * Research Interview 7: https://data.qdr.syr.edu/file.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.5064/F60LYDGR/PV33MN * Research Interview 51: https://data.qdr.syr.edu/file.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.5064/F60LYDGR/2OP5YN * Research Interview 69: https://data.qdr.syr.edu/file.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.5064/F60LYDGR/ZFK3WF

<br>Analytic Note: This excerpt from a research interview with a private immigration attorney suggests that IJs combine risk-aversion with unclear standards.

Source Excerpt: But once the burden was shifted to the government, I feel like the entire job was different. You know, because, well, you know, beforehand, we really had to go--it wasn't beyond a reasonable doubt--but it was, you know, we had to really convince the judge that does history that the detainee had was not going to cause any other problems. So I mean, let's be honest, the judge is always [asking], "What am I going to see in the newspaper the next day? What am I going to see on TV? Am I going to see that this person with a drunk driving arrest [from] 10 years ago going to be in five more [accidents and] kill somebody?" So our burden of proof before Brito was pretty significant. A lot of things in immigration a preponderance of the evidence. You were lucky depending on which judge you've got. Some judges don't like [operating under the influence] and some judges don't like assault and battery. It really just depends on the judge and whether or not you could meet a standard of more likely than not preponderance of the evidence. It was just all over the board beforehand, but it was very difficult. It was very difficult to prove that somebody was, like I said, was not a danger to the community or not a flight risk, especially if you couldn't access records fast enough.

Link to Data Source: * https://data.qdr.syr.edu/file.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.5064/F60LYDGR/LEXP17

<br>Analytic Note: In Brito v. Barr, the court ordered that for all immigration courts within its jurisdiction the burden of proof be assigned to the government; and, that the government must prove that the immigrant respondent is a flight risk by the preponderance of the evidence and dangerousness by clear and convincing evidence. The decision only applied to bond hearings in Massachusetts. We leverage the natural experiment created by the Brito decision to consider the causal effect of reallocating the burden of proof and establishing more familiar standards of proof on immigration court outcomes.

Source Excerpt: (p.22) The Court declares that aliens detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) are entitled to receive a bond hearing at which the Government must prove the alien is either dangerous by clear and convincing evidence or a risk of flight by a preponderance of the evidence and that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the alien’s future appearance and the safety of the community. At the bond hearing, the immigration judge must evaluate the alien’s ability to pay in setting bond above $1,500 and must consider alternative conditions of release, such as GPS monitoring, that reasonably assure the safety of the community and the alien’s future appearances.

Link to Data Source: * https://data.qdr.syr.edu/file.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.5064/F60LYDGR/CGJLVJ

<br>Analytic Note: This excerpt from a research interview with a private immigration attorney suggests that IJs know their decision are difficult to review under the legal regime in place.

Source Excerpt: It almost felt like for the judges who wanted to deny they just settled into this, "I'm going to recite these magic words," and "I'm going to say that there is clear and convincing evidence of dangerousness and that there is no reasonable alternative to detention that can protect the community or ensure the client safe." I have also tried to litigate this issue unsuccessfully. Once you have a judge who said all the magic words, even if the evidence doesn't meet clear and convincing standard, the district court will probably say, "No jurisdiction to review. You're asking me to reweigh the evidence and that is barred because there's a jurisdiction stripping statute within the detention statute. 8 US Code 1226, Section E, says there is no jurisdiction by a federal court to review a discretionary decision to detain. And so what you're complaining about is that evidence shouldn't have been weighted so heavily, that's a discretionary decision [that cannot be reviewed]."

Link to Data Source: * https://data.qdr.syr.edu/file.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.5064/F60LYDGR/ZFK3WF

<br>Analytic Note: The excerpt from the National Association of Immigration Judges (NAIJ) describes how bond hearings' quick tempo exacerbates inequities in the courtroom. To be precise, respondents are generally laypersons, non-English speakers who carry the burden of proof. Though they have the right to attorney, one is not provided for them. These disadvantaged, inexperienced defendants must prove their case against competent government lawyers.

Source Excerpt: (p. 5) DHS is always represented by an attorney, typically one who has handled hundreds, if not thousands, of cases and can more readily accommodate a shortened time frame for trial. The respondents are often unrepresented, non-English speaking, and forced to appear before a judge who is penalized for slowing down to provide more guidance. The respondents also carry the burden of proof to persuade the judge to allow them to remain in the United States under the law. Any lack of evidence caused by the speed at which the metrics force judges to process cases works against the respondent and can be fatal to his or her case.

Link to Data Source: * NAIJ Congressional Testimony “Written Testimony Before House Judiciary Committee, January 2020.” Posted Jan 29, 2020. https://data.qdr.syr.edu/file.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.5064/F60LYDGR/NAEJBX * See also: NAIJ - Written Testimony Before House Judiciary Committee, January 2020

<br>Analytic Note: This excerpt from a research interview with a private immigration attorney suggests that, under the Trump Administration, the DOJ used several tools that threatened fair treatment in immigration courts. These included, first, a performance management system that penalized IJs for spending more than the allotted time on a single case. Second, the government attacked the National Association of Immigration Judges, which was the entity pushing to end quotas and give immigration courts judicial independence (visit the NAIJ's Publications Archive for public statements and policy position papers). And finally, priorities guidance instructed ICE agents and attorneys who they were supposed to target and detain.

Source Excerpt: I observed several of the hearings right after Brito to see how they were going. And, you know, the ordering was different. So that's obviously a change. I guess I would say that, I don't know that I observed that the judges' behavior was necessarily different in terms of the outward manifestation of what they were thinking. You know, I guess I would also mention that there have been some external things that have been happening on judges, immigration judges in the not-so-distant past that also coincided with that period. You probably are aware that there were a series of efforts to undermine the independence of the immigration judges, including an effort by the Trump administration that I think was at least initially successful, to decertify their union protections. So that happened to and I want to say that was true, you can look it up, but I believe that was 2019-ish, probably. Decisions were happening in that. So there were issues with [the judges] independence. And again, I'm not saying I saw that reflected in the hearings, I observed. But, you know, I don't know what effect that has. I believe there were attempts to track more closely the progress of their cases through things like automated dashboards and things like that, that they're being forced to use. And then there have also some changes more recently, that might be somewhat relevant, at least to the population that's coming before the judges. The Trump administration had priorities guidance about who [ICE officials] were supposed to be targeting. And [Biden] got rid of that. [Trump] went with an all-of-the-above strategy for immigration arrests. When the Biden administration came in, they issued priorities guidance to narrow that back down again. So in theory, at least, whether or not that's happening, I'm sure, is a subject of much discussion. So the profile that people may be coming before the judges over time may have changed to some degree.

Link to Data Source: * https://data.qdr.syr.edu/file.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.5064/F60LYDGR/F1OOBA

<br>Analytic Note: Private immigration attorney who represented non-citizen respondents in immigration bond hearings believed the Brito decision—specifically shifting the burden of proof and identifying a clear standard of proof—would increase the rate IJs would grant their clients bonded release. The research participant thought that Brito led to more people being released, but the effect was not as large as expected.

Source Excerpt: All sorts of people were detained before. You could be like a mom of three and you could be detained no matter what, right. And now we definitely see fewer people detained, more serious crimes. It's tough to tell [Brito's effects] because a bunch of those are getting denied. They would have been denied anyway at any time. But I do think when Brito came out, more people were being released. Not as many, I mean, we thought this was gonna change our entire world. We thought it was going to be that everyone was going to get out and that that certainly didn't happen. But sure, more people got out.

Link to Data Source: * https://data.qdr.syr.edu/file.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.5064/F60LYDGR/PV33MN

<br>Analytic Note: The Supreme Court considers clear and convincing evidence is appropriate where the litigant with the benefit of the doubt has a “particularly important interest” at stake. Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 315-317 (1984) defines clear and convincing evidence.

Source Excerpt: (pp. 316-317) The standard reflects this Court's long-held view that a proposed diverter should bear most, though not all, of the risks of erroneous decision: "The harm that may result from disrupting established uses is typically certain and immediate, whereas the potential benefits from a proposed diversion may be speculative and remote." Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U. S., at 187; see also id., at 182, n. 9. In addition, the clear-and-convincing- evidence standard accommodates society's competing interests in increasing the stability of property rights and in putting resources to their most efficient uses: "[T]he rule of priority [will] not be strictly applied where it 'would work more hardship' on the junior user 'than it would bestow benefits' on the senior user ...[,though] the equities supporting the protection of existing economies will usually be compelling." Id., at 186-187 (quoting Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U. S. 589, 619 (1945)).

Link to Data Source: * https://data.qdr.syr.edu/file.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.5064/F60LYDGR/HGTRC3 * See also: https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/usrep/usrep467/usrep467310/usrep467310.pdf

<br>Methodological Description: These observational data nest as follows: states contain multiple HBCs, each HBC contains multiple IJs, each IJ makes multiple bond hearing decisions in a single period, and detainees may make several appearances in immigration court concerning their bonded release.

<br>Methodological Description: We took several steps to test these findings’ robustness. We shifted our unit of analysis from HBC to state and extended the time between observations from week to month. These adjustments did not change our general findings but did have the undesirable results of a smaller donor pool and fewer post-treatment observations. We also shortened the pre-treatment period to fewer than 38 weeks. This did not change our findings, but did make the synthetic control less precise. In another step, we added predictors to assess whether they changed our results. They did not. Our results persisted, but with less precision, regardless of which predictors we added to the synthetic control. The predictors used for robustness checks include a respondent’s gender, language, and nationality; each IJ’s gender and party of the president who appointed them; county-level vote share for the 2016 presidential candidates; and state-level measures for governorships and unemployment rates. We also utilized a synthetic difference-in-differences estimation procedure Arkhangelsky et al.’s (2021) that calculates an average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) as the pre- versus post- difference-in-difference between treated units and synthetic control units, where synthetic control units are chosen as an optimally weighted function of untreated units. The ATT was -1.89 (p = 0.92) and 0.05 (p = 0.17) for caseload and rate granted bond, respectively.

<br>Analytic Note: Formerly detained non-citizens, private immigration lawyers, and members of non-governmental organizations have reported squalid conditions, grossly insufficient medical standards, and abuse at the hands of government officials, all of which raise questions about violations of international and U.S. standards of human rights.

Source Excerpt: On Friday, Representative Nanette Barragán, Democrat of California and the chairwoman of the House homeland security subcommittee on border security, toured the shelter at the convention center in Long Beach and said the Biden administration was providing minors with much more humane conditions in the health department facilities than they had while in Border Patrol custody, where she said youths slept on mats on the ground and lacked medical care. “Let’s get the kids out of Border Patrol custody as quickly as possible,” Ms. Barragán said in an interview after touring the shelter, which housed 728 migrant children, with room for only 72 more. “In the H.H.S. custody, even in the emergency centers, they have medical staff, they have beds, they have television, they have activities.” Even so, she said she was “concerned” with data showing that the program was in need of more money in the coming months. “Make no mistake,” Ms. Barragán said, “there are things we need to work on.” Migrant surges in the spring are typical, but this year has brought record numbers. While previous administrations focused on expanding the number of facilities run by border agents, the Biden administration has pivoted by spending money on developing temporary shelters in convention centers, military sites and vacant arenas. “The administration is qualitatively looking at this response to this migration event in a different way,” said Cris Ramón, an immigration consultant based in Washington. During the 2020 presidential campaign, Mr. Biden promised that the United States would return to being a compassionate destination for migrants, a sharp contrast with the harsh policies put in place by President Donald J. Trump, who used an emergency public health rule to turn children away. Mr. Biden has committed to allowing these children to enter the country. And housing the migrant children is not the only challenge on the border for the Biden administration. The United States has also been increasingly allowing migrant families to enter the country because of new barriers to sheltering families in Mexico. As a result, the administration has struggled to find space for them and has turned to housing them in hotels before releasing them into the country.

Link to Data Source: * https://data.qdr.syr.edu/file.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.5064/F60LYDGR/OSDNFI * See also: https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/07/us/politics/migrant-children-shelters.html * Human rights groups maintain similar collections of similar articles available at: 1. https://www.aclu.org/news/by-issue/immigration-detention-conditions/ 2. https://www.splcenter.org/attention-on-detention

<br>Methodological Description: (i.e., that the treatment effect is 0 for all units) One of the advantages of conducting a randomized trial is that the researcher knows the precise procedure by which the units were allocated to treatment and control. Randomization inference considers what would have happened under all possible random assignments, not just the one that happened to be selected for the experiment at hand.

Source Excerpt: In order to simulate all possible random assignments, we need to stipulate the counterfactual outcomes – what we would have observed among control units had they been treated or among treated units had they not been treated. The sharp null hypothesis of no treatment effect for any unit is a skeptical worldview that allows us to stipulate all of the counterfactual outcomes. If there were no treatment effect for any unit, then all the control units’ outcomes would have been unchanged had they been placed in treatment. Similarly, the treatment units’ outcomes would have been unchanged had they been placed in the control group. Under the sharp null hypothesis, we therefore have a complete mapping from our data to the outcomes of all possible experiments. All we need to do is construct all possible random assignments and, for each one, calculate the test statistic (e.g., the difference in means between the assigned treatment group and the assigned control group). The collection of these test statistics over all possible random assignments creates a reference distribution under the null hypothesis. If we want to know how unusual our actual experimental test statistic is, we compare it to the reference distribution. For example, our experiment might obtain an estimate of 6.5, but 24% of all random assignments produce an estimate of 6.5 or more even in the absence of any treatment effect. In that case, our one-tailed p-value would be 0.24.

Link to Data Source: * https://egap.org/resource/10-things-to-know-about-randomization-inference/

<br>Theoretical Exposition: For this to be true, strong evidence must be sufficiently discriminating for the IJ, which requires that $$q< \frac{\pi \beta}{\alpha(1-\pi)}$$. Given that \(ICE_1\) knows that strong evidence will be observed at the hearing, \(ICE_1\) knows that the IJ will deny bond and the incentive to deny bond initially is transparent. In order for \(ICE_0\) to deny bond, it must be sufficiently likely that weak evidence will nevertheless appear strong at the hearing. This requires $$q \geq \frac{\epsilon_0}{v_0}$$. Thus, for this case, we require \(q\) to fall between the two thresholds in Figure 1: it must be neither too likely nor too unlikely that a weak case will appear strong. Placing the burden of proof on the prosecution would have reduced the range of \(q\) for which this equilibrium exists for two reasons. The change in the burden of production would have shifted the first threshold to the right by increasing \(\epsilon_0\). The change in the burden of persuasion would have shifted the second threshold to the left by increasing \(\alpha\) (or decreasing \(\beta\) or both).

<br>Analytic Note: The excerpt from the National Association of Immigration Judges (NAIJ) shows immigration judges are concerned with the weaponization of performance metrics in politically-motivated policy warfare.

Source Excerpt: (p. 7) Equally disturbing, because the performance metrics set the bar so high that all judges are incapable of meeting them, EOIR is empowered to dismiss judges who fail to follow their policy preferences under the pretext of inadequate performance. This is what happens when the structure of the Immigration Courts allow it to be used as a tool for immigration enforcement rather than as a fair and independent tribunal. They are a pretext. These meaningless and politically-motivated performance metrics are clearly designed to intimidate judges rather than to honestly evaluate their performance. It places each judge at odds with their oath of office to provide impartial justice because their continued employment hangs in the balance. Yet this is just another example of the pernicious effect of the structural defect of allowing the Immigration Court to remain in a law enforcement agency.

Link to Data Source: * NAIJ Congressional Testimony “Written Testimony Before House Judiciary Committee, January 2020.” Posted Jan 29, 2020. https://data.qdr.syr.edu/file.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.5064/F60LYDGR/NAEJBX * See also: NAIJ - Written Testimony Before House Judiciary Committee, January 2020

<br>Analytic Note: Excerpts from research interviews with private immigration attorneys illuminate how they provide important value to respondents, especially those held in custody, unfamiliar with U.S. laws, and/or non-English speaking. Competent lawyers can acknowledge and effectively rebut the government's claims; without them, the government would likely ride roughshod over a respondent's argument (RI #7, #52). Capable attorneys can review the government's case and prepare appropriate responses, including composing legal strategy, piecing together a compelling story on why and how the respondent is not dangerous, and collecting evidence supporting the respondent's counterarguments (RI #23).

Source Excerpt: * RI 7: Now, post Brito, the government presents the case and talks about how terrible my client is, and all these crimes they've committed, or whatever it is they want to say. And then my response rubuts that. I would say, "Nope. That's not true. Here's what happened." Or [I would say], "Yes, I acknowledge that. But look at all the wonderful ways he's changed since then." So, you're acknowledging their argument and rebutting it. * RI 23: In a practical sense, it means that we are actually getting paperwork from the government ahead of our bond hearings, which is just magical. \(\dots\) I think my stress levels going into a hearing changed a little bit because I knew what the government had and what they were likely to say. And I knew that if they thought someone was secretly a gang member, that would be at the top of their submission rather than after I've put together my 20-minute presentation. But, you know, if I think they have anything, then I can't tell my client, "Well, let's just hang back, see what the government comes up with." I need to have proof that my client is not dangerous. I had a client who was convicted of embezzlement. It was not great sounding. Okay. And he and another family member were co-defendants and the other family member had, to my mind, done a great deal more. More bad guy stuff than my client. And so I'm not going to let the government say, "Look, he's got a federal conviction." I have to think through what motivates my client has to stay here. I have to think through my argument that my guy has relief. How am I going to map out for the judge that that relief is not a pipe dream? [I have to explain,] "No, your honor. It's gonna be like this, he's gonna do A, he's gonna do B, he's going to do C. And you're gonna see that he's eligible for D." So I have to have that tight. The burden might be on the government, but if I can't say he's eligible for anything, I don't think any judge can ignore that. And the burden isn't really on the government to say what he's eligible for, especially when I have to do the fact-finding. * RI 52: I think that the burden-shifting made it much easier for detained immigrants to be able to get bond because instead of this ridiculous proving a negative of my client is not a flight risk. My client is not a danger to society, it was the government's job to actually demonstrate how they were a flight risk or a danger to the community.

Link to Data Source: * Research Interview #7: https://data.qdr.syr.edu/file.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.5064/F60LYDGR/PV33MN * Research Interview #23: https://data.qdr.syr.edu/file.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.5064/F60LYDGR/1K5HBD * Research Interview #52: https://data.qdr.syr.edu/file.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.5064/F60LYDGR/RD0IPI

<br>Analytic Note: Structurally, the Immigration Court is housed in the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), an agency within the United States Department of Justice. Under delegated authority from the Attorney General, Immigration Judges and the Board of Immigration Appeals interpret and adjudicate immigration cases according to United States immigration laws.

Source Excerpt: 8 C.F.R. §1001.1(l): The term immigration judge means an attorney whom the Attorney General appoints as an administrative judge within the Executive Office for Immigration Review, qualified to conduct specified classes of proceedings, including a hearing under section 240 of the Act. An immigration judge shall be subject to such supervision and shall perform such duties as the Attorney General shall prescribe, but shall not be employed by the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

Link to Data Source: * https://data.qdr.syr.edu/file.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.5064/F60LYDGR/TCQFPR * See also: https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-8/chapter-V/subchapter-A/part-1001/section-1001.1

<br>Analytic Note: The excerpt from the National Association of Immigration Judges (NAIJ) shows how the DOJ's policy and administrative decisions hamper the immigration judges' ability to discharge their duties and responsibilities under the law. DOJ's failure to provide in-person training and continuing legal education concerning legal developments in the field breeds ignorance and incompetence among IJs.

Source Excerpt: (p. 3) EOIR inappropriately minimizes the administrative time allotted for judges to keep current on legal developments, prepare for and review the reams of documentation frequently submitted in support of a given case, and render decisions in complex, vigorously litigated matters. In 2019, EOIR cancelled the annual in-person immigration judge training. Furthermore, EOIR terminated the ability of local judicial law clerks to provide courts with updated circuit and case law. Immigration judges are required to rely on centralized information provided by the Office of Policy which is often untimely, not court specific, and without the depth of analysis provided by law clerks who previously were responsible for the dissemination of this information.

Link to Data Source: * NAIJ Policy and Position Statement “Immigration Court in Crisis and in Need of Reform.” Posted Sep 19, 2019. https://data.qdr.syr.edu/file.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.5064/F60LYDGR/Z39KX6 * See also: NAIJ - Immigration Court in Crisis and in Need of Reform

<br>Theoretical Exposition: By construction, an IJ will always infer correctly that a respondent is peaceful if the IJ observes weak evidence. The question is what to infer when the evidence is strong. Since only \(ICE_1\) denies initial bond, strong evidence also perfectly reveals whether the respondent is dangerous. If the IJ will deny bond upon seeing strong evidence, it is possible that \(ICE_0\) might want to take advantage of the IJ’s beliefs and deny initial bond to an individual who is peaceful. To ensure that \(ICE_0\) has no incentive to do this, it must be that strong evidence is sufficiently discriminating or that $$q<\frac{\epsilon_0}{v_0}$$, the first threshold in Figure 1. Shifting the burden \(v_0\) of proof to the prosecution would have made this kind of equilibrium easier to sustain for increasingly coarse evidentiary signals (high values of \(q\)). This change would have plausibly increased the costs of litigation for ICE, shifting the first threshold to the right.

<br>Analytic Note: The excerpt from the National Association of Immigration Judges (NAIJ) illustrates that immigration judges recognize that longstanding institutions shape constraints and incentives that compel judges' behavior to conform to the political will of the Attorney General and, by extension, the White House.

Source Excerpt: (p. 1) The performance evaluation system has been turned into a mechanism to enforce the political will of the the-ncurrent administration on the immigration court and immigration judges. The current system places inappropriate focus on “organizational results,” which EOIR has equated with production quotas and time-based deadlines. The major flaw in the current evaluation and discipline structure for immigration judges stems from the fact that DOJ considers and treats immigration judges as merely attorney employees and not as judges. This violates the immigration court’s organic statute. By statute, we are attorneys appointed by the Attorney General to serve as judges. Since the language clearly reflects our judicial function once appointed, a traditional judicial model for performance evaluation and discipline is warranted. The current protocols employed by EOIR stand in stark contrast to how other courts nationwide evaluate judges.

Link to Data Source: * NAIJ Policy and Position Statement “Overview of EOIR Discipline and Performance Protocols. Posted Posted Mar 20, 2021. https://data.qdr.syr.edu/file.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.5064/F60LYDGR/J0U84D * See also: NAIJ - Overview of EOIR Discipline and Performance Protocols

<br>Analytic Note: The standard is met if the proposition is more likely to be true than not true. Stated differently, the standard is satisfied if there is a greater than fifty percent chance that the proposition is true.

Source Excerpt: (pp. 423-424) Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (U.S. Sup. Ct. 1979). The function of a standard of proof, as that concept is embodied in the Due Process Clause and in the realm of factfinding, is to “instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusion for a particular type of adjudication.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (170) (Harlan, J., concurring). Generally speaking, the evolution of this area of the law has produced across a continuum three standards or levels of proof for different types of cases. At one end of the spectrum is the typical civil case involving a monetary dispute between private parties. Since society has a minimal concern with the outcome of such private suits, the plaintiff's burden of proof is a mere preponderance of the evidence. The litigants thus share the risk of error in roughly equal fashion. In a criminal case, on the other hand, the interest of the defendant are of such magnitude that historically and without any explicit constitutional requirement they have been protected by standards of proof designed to exclude as nearly as possible the likelihood of erroneous judgment. In the administration of criminal justice, our society imposes almost the entire risk of error upon itself. This is accomplished by requiring under the Due Process Clause that the state prove the guilt of an accused beyond a reasonable doubt.

Link to Data Source: * https://data.qdr.syr.edu/file.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.5064/F60LYDGR/UYJWCA * See also: https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/usrep/usrep441/usrep441418/usrep441418.pdf

<br>Methodological Description: The synthetic is a weighted combination of control units from non-treated jurisdictions. Suppose that there is a sample of \(J+1\) jurisdictions indexed by \(j\), among which unit \(j=1\) is the jurisdiction of interest and jurisdictions \(j=2\) to \(j=J+1\) are potential comparisons. The treated unit, \(j=1\), is the jurisdiction exposed to the intervention. The remaining jurisdictions, \(j=2\) to \(j=J+1\) comprise the ``donor pool'' of potential comparison units unexposed to the intervention under study.

<br>Analytic Note: Private immigration attorney who represented non-citizen respondents in immigration bond hearings believed the Brito decision—specifically shifting the burden of proof and identifying a clear standard of proof—would increase the rate IJs would grant their clients bonded release. According to this research participant, the decision did not appear to have its full effect immediately, however.

Source Excerpt: Anticipating our discussion today, I went back through some of my old listserves to [remind myself what private immigration attorneys thought when Brito came out.] Everybody was in kind of shock from it all. And defense lawyers totally thought that it was going to be the silver bullet, like we thought, oh, great, we're going to be able to just go in, and then the government's going to have to prove [the case]. [Immediately following the decision}, the government and the judges, all acted like it didn't exist. And so ultimately, petitions were filed in federal court is my understanding. And then once the immigration court and the trial attorneys started to get reminded that they had to follow this new case, then they started being more favorable to issuing bond.

Link to Data Source: * https://data.qdr.syr.edu/file.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.5064/F60LYDGR/2OP5YN

<br>Theoretical Exposition: We will also assume that $$v_0>\epsilon_{0}$$, so that no prosecutor would fail to deny bond initially if she believed that that the IJ would also certainly deny bond. This assumption can be relaxed without doing any harm to the analysis. The consequence is that some of the equilibria we identify would require additional conditions to be identified in the results section. Substantively, it is also defensible. It means that \(ICE_1\), who knows that the detainee is dangerous, would not release him simply to avoid paying the costs of litigation. And once we have assumed that \(ICE_0\) is willing to go to court in order to keep a peaceful person in detention, we have already implicitly assumed that \(v_0\) must be relatively large.

<br>Analytic Note: An excerpt from this research interview with a private immigration attorney explains that IJs' decisions are always discretionary, no matter what standard they are required to follow.

Source Excerpt: To the judge's satisfaction feeds the immigration judge's sense that they operate nearly entirely on discretion. And they do. Basically, every application they see before them is discretionary. So the judge's personalities can play into it to a very high degree. Having a precise legal standard, I don't think, takes their personalities and their influences out of the equation. \(\dots\) I think they do speak to the standard. But I don't know if they're cognizant of the fact that there's a standard. They say what it is, and then they decide what they want.

Link to Data Source: * https://data.qdr.syr.edu/file.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.5064/F60LYDGR/1K5HBD

<br>Analytic Note: This excerpt from a research interview with a private immigration attorney suggests that IJs combine risk-aversion with unclear standards.

Source Excerpt: I just feel like often the government is just saying, "Seems dangerous to me. Look at this one police report." And if you have to prove dangerousness by clear and convincing evidence, I don't think there's any IJ who thinks [a police report] on its own is clear and convincing. Well, maybe there are, but not in Boston. So I do think [the Brito decision] mattered. [Brito] didn’t change the underlying fact that whose burden it is isn’t going to change the results. [If ] you have a long enough criminal record[, which] doesn’t technically bar you from bond, it makes the judge feel that you’re not safe. That's not going to change based on who has the burden.

Link to Data Source: * https://data.qdr.syr.edu/file.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.5064/F60LYDGR/C91RC1

<br>Analytic Note: A comprehensive legal review found two other federal courts enacted legal rules identical to Brito, but those changes occured two and seven months after our study period ends. Government documents confirm this and guide IJs to make bond hearings in the same manner in December 2020 as November 2017 (Office of the Chief Immigration Judge, 2017, 2020a,b).

Source Excerpt: 2017 Immigration Court Practice Manual

Chapter 9.3 - Bond Hearings

(a) In general. — In certain circumstances, an alien detained by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) can be released from custody upon the payment of bond. Initially, the bond is set by DHS. Upon the alien’s request, an Immigration Judge may conduct a “bond hearing,” in which the Immigration Judge has the authority to redetermine the amount of bond set by DHS.

$$\dots$$

(e) Bond hearings.—In a bond hearing, the Immigration Judge determines whether the alien is eligible for bond. If the alien is eligible for bond, the Immigration Judge considers whether the alien’s release would pose a danger to property or persons, whether the alien is likely to appear for further immigration proceedings, and whether the alien is a threat to national security. In general, bond hearings are less formal than hearings in removal proceedings.

$$\dots$$

(e)(vii) Decision. — The Immigration Judge’s decision is based on any information that is available to the Immigration Judge or that is presented by the parties. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(d).

Usually, the Immigration Judge’s decision is rendered orally. Because bond hearings are generally not recorded, the decision is not transcribed. If either party appeals, the Immigration Judge prepares a written decision based on notes from the hearing.

Link to Data Source: * version November 2017: https://data.qdr.syr.edu/file.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.5064/F60LYDGR/OCDJKJ * version July 2020: https://data.qdr.syr.edu/file.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.5064/F60LYDGR/EIAM0V * version August 2020: https://data.qdr.syr.edu/file.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.5064/F60LYDGR/IBNRSY * version December 2020: https://data.qdr.syr.edu/file.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.5064/F60LYDGR/RXFTI7

<br>Analytic Note: In a legal dispute, one party is presumed to be correct and the other bears the burden of producing evidence persuasive enough to satisfy all the dispute’s legal elements. In criminal cases, the government carries the burden of proof while the defendant is presumed innocent.

Source Excerpt: (pp.423-424) Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (U.S. Sup. Ct. 1979). Since society has a minimal concern with the outcome of such private suits, the plaintiff's burden of proof is a mere preponderance of the evidence. The litigants thus share the risk of error in roughly equal fashion. In a criminal case, on the other hand, the interest of the defendant are of such magnitude that historically and without any explicit constitutional requirement they have been protected by standards of proof designed to exclude as nearly as possible the likelihood of erroneous judgment. In the administration of criminal justice, our society imposes almost the entire risk of error upon itself. This is accomplished by requiring under the Due Process Clause that the state prove the guilt of an accused beyond a reasonable doubt.

Link to Data Source: * https://data.qdr.syr.edu/file.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.5064/F60LYDGR/UYJWCA * See also: https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/usrep/usrep441/usrep441418/usrep441418.pdf

<br>Analytic Note: Private immigration attorney who represented non-citizen respondents in immigration bond hearings believed the Brito decision—specifically shifting the burden of proof and identifying a clear standard of proof—would increase the rate IJs would grant their clients bonded release. This research participant thought that Brito's class-action nature was especially relevant.

Source Excerpt: I was obviously really excited about it. I remember hearing about it the day before Thanksgiving in 2019. Obviously a huge win. I'd been involved in the litigation for a while, as I said. I was excited that finally, someone agreed, adopted arguments, and on a class wide basis. That is why it was so important. I had been more frustrated by the fact that litigating this issue, you had to do in this piecemeal fashion, because unless it was a class action, you had to file--you know, lose at a bond hearing, file a habeas corpus petition--and hope to get a decision on that before the issue became moot. And several of my cases had become moot before I could get a resolution. It seems like there is no power or impact from the prior district court decisions if the immigration judges don't have to follow them. And so that's why the class action piece of it was so important. I was optimistic because it had the reach that I had wanted for a long time, which is through a class as opposed to these individual petitions.

Link to Data Source: * https://data.qdr.syr.edu/file.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.5064/F60LYDGR/ZFK3WF

<br>Analytic Note: By contrast, the Biden administration’s directive (09/30/2021) narrowed immigration enforcement and prioritized those individuals that threaten national security, public safety, and border security (see RI #64, #69). Research participants (see RI #7, #10) noted COVID forced the Trump administration to soften how ICE prioritized detaining individuals and managing ongoing cases.

Source Excerpt: * RI 7: All sorts of people were detained before. You could be like a mom of three and you could be detained no matter what, right. \(\dots\) So when Brito first came down, [the government] had not [been bringing different types of cases forward, or allowing some of the individuals bonded release earlier knowing that it will be a harder case to prove in court.] It was very much, you know, almost business as usual. Same number of people being detained all of that. Now, there are way fewer bond hearings around here in Boston. So there are way fewer bond hearings, and fewer people detained, but I don't think it has to do with Brito, I think it has to do with like COVID. And there's a lot of action around here to try to not overcrowd the jails, because of COVID. So ICE can release people if they want just by themselves, and they don't have to put on a bond case they can just parole them or release them. And I think that to try to not overcrowd the jails. Some of that had happened. RI 10: I can't really speak to the rest of the country, unfortunately. I do know that it seemed like there was definitely a higher standard during COVID. I mean, a lot of people were just getting letters to call in; they weren't even asking them to show up to their appointments at ICE. The check-in appointments and stuff they were just being asked to call in. If they tried to show up they would get sent away. [Compared to before the COVID pandemic], I feel like ICE was trying to keep people away versus collecting them around here. But yeah, I can't speak to the rest of the country. * RI 10: I can't really speak to the rest of the country, unfortunately. I do know that it seemed like there was definitely a higher standard during COVID. I mean, a lot of people were just getting letters to call in; they weren't even asking them to show up to their appointments at ICE. The check-in appointments and stuff they were just being asked to call in. If they tried to show up they would get sent away. [Compared to before the COVID pandemic], I feel like ICE was trying to keep people away versus collecting them around here. But yeah, I can't speak to the rest of the country. * RI 64: The Trump administration had priorities guidance about who [ICE officials] were supposed to be targeting. And [Biden] got rid of that. [Trump] went with an all-of-the-above strategy for immigration arrests. When the Biden administration came in, they issued priorities guidance to narrow that back down again. So in theory, at least, whether or not that's happening, I'm sure, is a subject of much discussion. So the profile that people may be coming before the judges over time may have changed to some degree. * RI 69: Responding the the quetion, "I liked what you said about the 'burden to produce evidence' but also the 'burden to persuade,' given those added costs on the government side, have you noticed that the government is releasing people earlier in the process so that they can just focus on cases? Or do you think they're still bringing in the same types of cases now as they were before?" RI #69 response: "I don't think that [Brito] made a difference as to which cases [ICE] decided to detain and not to detain. I think the Biden enforcement priorities probably do make a difference about deciding to detain and not detain. But I think [the Brito] decision did not impact that."

Link to Data Source: * Biden Administration's directive: https://data.qdr.syr.edu/file.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.5064/F60LYDGR/WWXTYW * Research Interview 7: https://data.qdr.syr.edu/file.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.5064/F60LYDGR/PV33MN * Research Interview 10: https://data.qdr.syr.edu/file.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.5064/F60LYDGR/LEXP17 * Research Interview 64: https://data.qdr.syr.edu/file.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.5064/F60LYDGR/F1OOBA * Research Interview 69: https://data.qdr.syr.edu/file.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.5064/F60LYDGR/ZFK3WF

<br>Analytic Note: “The ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ standard historically has been reserved for criminal cases. This unique standard of proof, not prescribed or defined in the Constitution, is regarded as a critical part of the ‘moral force of the criminal law,’ In re Winship, 397 U.S., at 364, and we should hesitate to apply it too broadly or casually in noncriminal cases.” Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S., 428.

Source Excerpt: (pp.363-364) The reasonable-doubt standard plays a vital role in the American scheme of criminal procedure. It is a prime instrument for reducing the risk of convictions resting on factual error. The standard provides concrete substance for the presumption of innocence—that bedrock ‘axiomatic and elementary’ principle whose ‘enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law.’ Coffin v. United States, supra, at 453. As the dissenters in the New York Court of Appeals observed, and we agree, ‘a person accused of a crime...would be at a severe disadvantage, a disadvantage amounting to a lack of fundamental fairness, if he could be adjudged guilty and imprisoned for years on the strength of the same evidence as would suffice in a civil case." 24 N. Y. 2d, at 205, 247 N. E. 2d, at 259. The requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt has this vital role in our criminal procedure for cogent reasons. The accused during a criminal prosecution has at stake interests of immense importance, both because of the possibility that he may lose his liberty upon conviction and because of the certainty that he would be stigmatized by the conviction. Accordingly, a society that values the good name and freedom of every individual should not condemn a man for commission of a crime when there is reasonable doubt about his guilt. As we said in Speiser v. Randall, supra, at 525-526: ‘There is always in litigation a margin of error, representing error in factfinding, which both parties must take into account. Where one party has at stake an interest of transcending value—as a criminal defendant his liberty—this margin of error is reduced as to him by the process of placing on the other party the burden of . . . persuading the factfinder at the conclusion of the trial of his guilt be- yond a reasonable doubt. Due process commands that no man shall lose his liberty unless the Government has borne the burden of . . . convincing the factfinder of his guilt.’ To this end, the reasonable-doubt standard is indispensable, for it ‘impresses on the trier of fact the necessity of reaching a subjective state of certitude of the facts in issue.’ Dorsen & Rezneck, In Re Gault and the Future of Juvenile Law, 1 Family Law Quarterly, No. 4, pp. 1, 26 (1967). Moreover, use of the reasonable-doubt standard is indispensable to command the respect and confidence of the community in applications of the criminal law. It is critical that the moral force of the criminal law not be diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are being condemned. It is also important in our free society that every individual going about his ordinary affairs have confidence that his government cannot adjudge him guilty of a criminal offense without convincing a proper factfinder of his guilt with utmost certainty. Lest there remain any doubt about the constitutional stature of the reasonable-doubt standard, we explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.” U.S. Reports: In re Winship, 397 U.S. 363-364 (1970).

Link to Data Source: * https://data.qdr.syr.edu/file.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.5064/F60LYDGR/0B9UNP * See also: https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/usrep/usrep397/usrep397358/usrep397358.pdf

<br>Analytic Note: In December 2021, the First Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part the declaratory judgment and permanent injunction issued by the district court in this class action challenging the bond procedures used to detain noncitizen during the pendency of removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. 1226(a), the discretionary immigration detention provision, holding that the district court lacked jurisdiction to issue injunctive relief in favor of the class. In June 2022, the U.S. Government filed a petition to have Brito’s burden ruling reconsidered by the full (“en banc”) group of First Circuit judges.

Source Excerpt: (pp. 33-34) For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court's declaratory judgment to the extent it declared that if the government refuses to offer release subject to bond to a noncitizen detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §1226(a), it must either prove by clear and convincing evidence that the noncitizen is dangerous or prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the noncitizen poses a flight risk. We otherwise vacate the district court's declaratory judgment and permanent injunction and remand for entry of judgment in accordance with this opinion.

Link to Data Source: * https://data.qdr.syr.edu/file.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.5064/F60LYDGR/PNULCL * See also: https://cases.justia.com/federal/appellate-courts/ca1/20-1037/20-1037-2021-12-28.pdf?ts=1640728809

<br> This is an Annotation for Transparent Inquiry project, published by the Qualitative Data Repository. Please cite as:

Reyes, Norman Wray; Hamburger, Jacob. 2022. "Data for: The Constituent Process in Ecuador". Qualitative Data Repository. https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU. QDR Main Collection.

Additional documentation can be found on QDR.

Learn more about ATI here.

<br> This is an Annotation for Transparent Inquiry project, published by the Qualitative Data Repository. Please cite as:

Reyes, Norman Wray; Hamburger, Jacob. 2022. "Data for: The Constituent Process in Ecuador". Qualitative Data Repository. https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU. QDR Main Collection.

Additional documentation can be found on QDR.

Learn more about ATI here.

<br> Data Source: https://perma.cc/X2NJ-EMK6

Full Citation: Sentencia Interpretativa: 001-08-SI-CC. (Constitutional Court for the Period of Transition 2008). https://portal.corteconstitucional.gob.ec/BoletinJulio2020/0003-08-IC-sen_c.pdf .

<br> Source Excerpt: “Art. 2.- De las Atribuciones de la Asamblea Constituyente.- La Asamblea Constituyente ejerce sus facultades mediante la expedición de: mandatos constituyentes, leyes, acuerdos, resoluciones y las demás decisiones que adopte en uso de sus atribuciones”

Excerpt Translation: “Art. 2.- Powers of the Constituent Assembly.- The Constituent Assembly exercises its powers by issuing: constituent mandates, laws, agreements, resolutions, and other decisions that it adopts in use of its powers.”

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/ULOB0H

Full Citation: Ecuadorian Constituent Assembly. Constituent Mandate N° 1 [Constituent Mandate N° 1.] 2007. Page 1.

<br> Source Excerpt: “Las decisiones de la Asamblea Constituyente son jerárquicamente superiores a cualquier otra norma del orden jurídico y de obligatorio cumplimiento para todas las personas naturales, jurídicas y demás poderes públicos sin excepción alguna. Ninguna decisión de la Asamblea Constituyente será susceptible de control o impugnación por parte de alguno de los poderes constituidos”

Excerpt Translation: “The decisions of the Constituent Assembly are hierarchically superior to any other rule of the legal order and mandatory for all natural persons, legal entities, and other public powers without any exception. No decision of the Constituent Assembly shall be subject to control or challenge by any of the constituted powers.”

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/ULOB0H

Full Citation: Ecuadorian Constituent Assembly. Constituent Mandate N° 1 [Constituent Mandate N° 1.] 2007. Page 1.

<br> Source Excerpt: "¿Aprueba usted, que se convoque e instale una Asamblea Constituyente con plenos poderes de conformidad con el estatuto electoral que se adjunta, para que se transforme el marco institucional del Estado y elabore una nueva Constitución?".

Source Excerpt Translation: “¿Do you approve convening and establishing a Constituent Assembly with full powers in accordance to the attached Electoral Statute, for the transformation of the institutional framework of the State and the drafting of a new Constitution?”

Data Source: https://perma.cc/P2HW-4DJ5

Full Citation: Georgetown University Walsh School of Foreign Service Political Database of the Americas. República de Ecuador, Resultados Electorales, Resultados Consulta Popular [Republic of Ecuador, Electoral Results, Results Referendum.] 2007. https://pdba.georgetown.edu/Elecdata/Ecuador/consultapop_asconst2007.html .

<br> Source Excerpt: “De la Función Ejecutiva.- La Asamblea Constituyente ratifica al economista Rafael Correa Delgado, como Presidente Constitucional de la República del Ecuador y al Licenciado Lenín Moreno Garcés, como Vicepresidente Constitucional de la República del Ecuador.”

Source Excerpt translation: “The Executive Role.- The Constituent Assembly ratifies the economist Rafael Correa Delgado, as Constitutional President of the Republic of Ecuador and Lenín Moreno Garcés, as Constitutional Vice President of the Republic of Ecuador.”

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/ULOB0H

Full Citation: Ecuadorian Constituent Assembly. Constituent Mandate N° 1 [Constituent Mandate N° 1.] 2007. Page 2.

<br> Source Excerpt: “Art. 7.- De la Función Legislativa.- La Asamblea Constituyente asume las atribuciones y deberes de la Función Legislativa. En consecuencia, declara en receso a los diputados y diputadas principales y suplentes elegidos el 15 de Octubre del 2006. Este receso se inicia el día 29 de Noviembre del 2007, hasta cuando se realice la proclamación oficial de los resultados del referéndum aprobatorio.

Durante este receso los diputados no gozarán de inmunidad, fuero especial, ni sueldos, dietas o remuneración alguna, tampoco podrán autoconvocarse por ningún motivo. Este receso no será susceptible de interrupción, impugnación, acción de amparo constitucional u otra acción judicial.”

Source Excerpt Translation: “Art. 7.- The Legislative Role.- The Constituent Assembly assumes the powers and duties of the Legislative Function. Consequently, it declares in recess the main and alternate deputies elected on October 15, 2006. This recess begins on November 29, 2007, until the official proclamation of the results of the approval referendum.

During this recess, the deputies will not enjoy immunity, special jurisdiction, or salaries, allowances or any remuneration, nor will they be able to convene themselves for any reason. This recess will not be susceptible to interruption, challenge, constitutional protection action or other legal action.”

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/ULOB0H

Full Citation: Ecuadorian Constituent Assembly. Constituent Mandate N° 1 [Constituent Mandate N° 1.] 2007. Page 2.

<br> Source Excerpt: “Artículo 2. De los actos decisorios.- En el ejercicio de sus poderes, la Asamblea Constituyente aprobará:

1. El texto de la nueva Constitución que será sometido a referéndum;

2. Mandatos Constituyentes: Decisiones y normas que expida la Asamblea Constituyente para el ejercicio de sus plenos poderes. Estos mandatos tendrán efecto inmediato, sin perjuicio de su publicación en el órgano respectivo;

3. Leyes: Normas aprobadas por la Asamblea Constituyente en ejercicio de las facultades legislativas conferidas en el inciso primero del artículo 7 del Mandato Constituyente No. 1 adoptado el 29 de noviembre de 2007;

4. Resoluciones e Instructivos: Están destinados a regular el funcionamiento de la Asamblea en el marco de este Reglamento; y,

5. Acuerdos: Pronunciamientos de la Asamblea sobre asuntos políticos, administrativos, cívicos, solidarios, sociales, entre otros.”

Source Excerpt Translation: “Article 2. Decision-making acts.- In the exercise of its powers, the Constituent Assembly will approve:

1. The text of the new Constitution that will be submitted to a referendum;

2. Constituent Mandates: Decisions and regulations issued by the Constituent Assembly for the exercise of its full powers. These mandates will have immediate effect, without prejudice to its publication in the respective body;

3. Laws: Norms approved by the Constituent Assembly in exercise of the Legislative powers conferred in the first paragraph of Article 7 of the Mandate Constituent No. 1 adopted on November 29, 2007;

4. Resolutions and Instructions: They are intended to regulate the operation of the Assembly within the framework of these Regulations; and,

5. Agreements: Pronouncements of the Assembly on political matters, administrative matters, civic matters, solidarity maters, social matters, etc.”

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/WQMADD

Full Citation: Ecuadorian Constituent Assembly. Reglamento de Funcionamiento de la Asemblea Constituyente [Constituent Assembly Internal Rules of Procedure.] 2007. Page 2.

<br> Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/ULOB0H

Full Citation: Ecuadorian Constituent Assembly. Constituent Mandate N° 1 [Constituent Mandate N° 1.] 2007.

<br> Source Excerpt: “Los jueces y tribunales que tramiten cualquier acción contraria a las decisiones de la Asamblea Constituyente serán destituidos de su cargo y sometidos al enjuiciamiento correspondiente. De igual manera, serán sancionados los funcionarios públicos que incurran o promuevan, por acción u omisión, el desacato o desconocimiento de las disposiciones de la Asamblea Constituyente”

Source Excerpt Translation: “The judges and courts that process any action contrary to the decisions of the Constituent Assembly will be removed from their position and subjected to the corresponding prosecution. In the same way, public officials who incur or promote, by action or omission, contempt or ignorance of the provisions of the Constituent Assembly, will be sanctioned.”

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/ULOB0H

Full Citation: Ecuadorian Constituent Assembly. Constituent Mandate N° 1 [Constituent Mandate N° 1.] 2007. Page 1.

<br> Data Source: https://perma.cc/7PNX-J72F

Full Citation: National Assembly of Ecuador. Codigo Organico de Organization Territorial, COOTAD [Code of Autonomies and Decentralization (COOTAD)]. Registered October 19 2010. https://www.defensa.gob.ec/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2016/01/dic15_CODIGO-ORGANICO-DE-ORGANIZACION-TERRITORIAL-COOTAD.pdf .

<br> Source Excerpt: “Artículo 4. De los órganos.- Son órganos de la Asamblea Constituyente: 1. El Pleno; 2. La Comisión Directiva; 3. Las Mesas Constituyentes; 4. Las Comisiones Auxiliares; y, 5. Los demás órganos que establezca el Pleno o la Comisión Directiva.”

Source Excerpt Translation: “Article 4. Bodies.- The bodies of the Constituent Assembly are: 1. The Plenary; 2. The Board of Directors; 3. Working groups; 4. The Auxiliary Commissions; and, 5. The other bodies established by the Plenary or the Board of Directors.”

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/WQMADD

Full Citation: Ecuadorian Constituent Assembly. Reglamento de Funcionamiento de la Asemblea Constituyente [Constituent Assembly Internal Rules of Procedure.] 2007. Page 3.

<br> Source Excerpt: “Art. 1.- Del Poder Constituyente.- La Asamblea Constituyente, por mandato popular del 15 de abril de 2007, asume y ejerce el poder constituyente con plenos poderes.”

Source Excerpt Translation: “Art. 1.- Constituent Power.- The Constituent Assembly, by popular mandate of April 15, 2007, assumes and exercises constituent power with full powers.”

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/ULOB0H

Full Citation: Ecuadorian Constituent Assembly. Constituent Mandate N° 1 [Constituent Mandate N° 1.] 2007. Page 1.

<br> Source Excerpt: “Artículo 3. De la supremacía de los actos decisorios de la Asamblea Constituyente.- Ninguna decisión de la Asamblea Constituyente será susceptible de control o impugnación por parte de alguno de los poderes constituidos. La Asamblea Constituyente respetará, profundizando en su contenido social y progresivo, los derechos fundamentales de los ciudadanos y ciudadanas. Toda autoridad pública está obligada a su cumplimiento, bajo prevenciones de apremio y destitución.”

Source Excerpt Translation: “Article 3. On the supremacy of the decision-making acts of the Constituent Assembly.- No decision of the Constituent Assembly will be susceptible to control or challenge by any of the powers constituted. The Constituent Assembly will respect, deepening its social and progressive content, the fundamental rights of citizens. Every public authority is obliged to comply, under penalty of constraint and dismissal.”

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/WQMADD

Full Citation: Ecuadorian Constituent Assembly. Reglamento de Funcionamiento de la Asemblea Constituyente [Constituent Assembly Internal Rules of Procedure.] 2007. Page 3.

<br> Source Excerpt: “Que, la Asamblea Constituyente es la legítima representante de la voluntad soberana del pueblo, por lo tanto, en su nombre y representación, aprueba y expide el siguiente: Mandata Constituyente No. 1”

Source Excerpt Translation: “That the Constituent Assembly is the legitimate representative of the sovereign will of the people, therefore, in its name and representation, it approves and issues the following: Constituent Mandate No. 1”

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/ULOB0H

Full Citation: Ecuadorian Constituent Assembly. Constituent Mandate N° 1 [Constituent Mandate N° 1.] 2007. Page 1.

<br> Source Excerpt: “Artículo 6. De la Comisión Directiva.- Está integrada por el presidente o presidenta de la Asamblea, dos vicepresidentes o vicepresidentas y dos vocales”

Source Excerpt Translation: “Article 6. Board of Directors.- It is made up of the president of the Assembly, two vice-presidents or vice-presidents and two members.”

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/WQMADD

Full Citation: Ecuadorian Constituent Assembly. Reglamento de Funcionamiento de la Asemblea Constituyente [Constituent Assembly Internal Rules of Procedure.] 2007. Page 4.

<br> Source Excerpt: “Article 68

The stable and monogamous union between two persons without any other marriage ties who have a common-law home, for the lapse of time and under the conditions and circumstances provided for by law, shall enjoy the same rights and obligations of those families bound by formal marriage ties.

Adoption shall only be permitted for different-gender couples.”

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/I9ME03

Full Citation: Constitution of Ecuador. Article 68. 2008. Page 34.

<br> Source Excerpt: “Article 12

The human right to water is essential and cannot be waived. Water constitutes a national strategic asset for use by the public and it is unalienable, not subject to a statute of limitations, immune from seizure and essential for life.”

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/I9ME03

Full Citation: Constitution of Ecuador. Article 12. 2008. Page 13.

<br> Source Excerpt: “Artículo 5. Del Pleno.- El Pleno es el máximo órgano de decisión de la Asamblea Constituyente. Está integrado por ciento treinta (130) asambleístas.

El quórum para la instalación y funcionamiento del Pleno, lo constituye la mitad más uno de los miembros de la Asamblea Constituyente.”

Source Excerpt Translation: “Article 5. Plenary.- The Plenary is the highest decision-making body of the Constituent Assembly. It is made up of one hundred thirty (130) assembly members.

The quorum for the installation and operation of the Plenary is constituted by half plus one of the members of the Constituent Assembly.”

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/WQMADD

Full Citation: Ecuadorian Constituent Assembly. Reglamento de Funcionamiento de la Asemblea Constituyente [Constituent Assembly Internal Rules of Procedure.] 2007. Page 3.

<br> Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/WQMADD

Full Citation: Ecuadorian Constituent Assembly. Reglamento de Funcionamiento de la Asemblea Constituyente [Constituent Assembly Internal Rules of Procedure.] 2007.

<br> Source Excerpt: “Artículo 11. De las Mesas Constituyentes – (…). Cada asambleísta obligatoriamente deberá integrarse a una Mesa Constituyente.”

Source Excerpt Translation: “Article 11. Working groups - (…). Each assembly member must compulsorily join a working group.”

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/WQMADD

Full Citation: Ecuadorian Constituent Assembly. Reglamento de Funcionamiento de la Asemblea Constituyente [Constituent Assembly Internal Rules of Procedure.] 2007. Page 8.

<br> Source Excerpt: “Article 171

The authorities of the indigenous communities, peoples, and nations shall perform jurisdictional duties, on the basis of their ancestral traditions and their own system of law, within their own territories, with a guarantee for the participation of, and decision-making by, women. The authorities shall apply their own standards and procedures for the settlement of internal disputes, as long as they are not contrary to the Constitution and human rights enshrined in international instruments.

The State shall guarantee that the decisions of indigenous jurisdiction are observed by public institutions and authorities. These decisions shall be subject to monitoring of their constitutionality. The law shall establish the mechanisms for coordination and cooperation between indigenous jurisdiction and regular jurisdiction.”

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/I9ME03

Full Citation: Constitution of Ecuador. Article 171. 2008. Page 70.

<br> Source Excerpt: "Article 407

Activities for the extraction of nonrenewable natural resources are forbidden in protected areas and in areas declared intangible assets, including forestry production Exceptionally, these resources can be tapped at the substantiated request of the President of the Republic and after a declaration of national interest issued by the National Assembly, which can, if it deems it advisable, convene a referendum.”

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/I9ME03

Full Citation: Constitution of Ecuador. Article 407. 2008. Page 138.

<br> Source Excerpt: “Artículo 48. De la iniciativa.- La Asamblea Constituyente tramitará los proyectos de ley provenientes de la propia Asamblea, que cuenten con el respaldo de por lo menos el cinco por ciento (5%) de asambleístas; del Presidente de la República, o los que se hubieren presentado por iniciativa ciudadana respaldada por lo menos con el cero punto uno por ciento (0,1%) del padrón electoral nacional.”

Source Excerpt Translation: “Article 48. On the initiative.- The Constituent Assembly will process the bills from the Assembly, which had the support of at least five percent (5%) of assembly members; of the President of the Republic, or those that have been presented by citizen initiative and supported by at least zero point one percent (0.1%) of the electoral national roll.”

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/WQMADD

Full Citation: Ecuadorian Constituent Assembly. Reglamento de Funcionamiento de la Asemblea Constituyente [Constituent Assembly Internal Rules of Procedure.] 2007. Page 22.

<br> Source Excerpt: “Article 141

The President of the Republic performs the duties of the Executive Branch of Government and is the Head of State and Government and is in charge of public administration.

The Executive Branch is comprised of the Office of the President and the Office of the Vice-President of the Republic, the Ministries of State and the other organizations and institutions needed to fulfill, in the framework of their competence, the attributions of Leadership, planning, implementation and evaluation of national public policies and plans that are created to implement them.”

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/I9ME03

Full Citation: Constitution of Ecuador. Article 141. 2008. Page 60.

<br> Source Excerpt: “Artículo 47. De la Comisión Especial de Redacción.- Para la redacción del texto final de la Constitución, aprobado por el Pleno, la presidencia conformará una Comisión Especial de Redacción.

Esta comisión deberá revisar omisiones notorias y contradicciones de sintaxis y efectuará correcciones gramaticales, ortográficas, entre otras.

Este texto, puesto a consideración del Pleno con cinco (5) días de anticipación, será aprobado, sin previo debate, con los votos de la mayoría absoluta de los asambleístas.”

Source Excerpt Translation: “Article 47. The Special Drafting Commission.- For drafting of the final text of the Constitution, approved by the Plenary, the presidency will form a Special Drafting Commission.

This commission shall review notorious omissions and contradictions in syntax and will make grammar and spelling corrections, among others.

This text, submitted to the Plenary for consideration five (5) days in advance, will be approved, without prior debate, with the votes of the absolute majority of the assembly members.”

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/WQMADD

Full Citation: Ecuadorian Constituent Assembly. Reglamento de Funcionamiento de la Asemblea Constituyente [Constituent Assembly Internal Rules of Procedure]. 2007. Page 22.

<br> Source Excerpt: “Article 332

The State shall guarantee respect for the reproductive rights of all workers, including the elimination of labor risks affecting reproductive health, access to employment and job security, without limitations due to pregnancy or number of children, maternity and breast-feeding rights, and the right to paternity leave.

The dismissal of a working woman because of pregnancy and maternity, along with discrimination in connection with reproductive roles, is forbidden.”

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/I9ME03

Full Citation: Constitution of Ecuador. Article 332. 2008. Page 117.

<br> Source Excerpt: “Articulo 13. De las funciones de las Mesas Constituyentes.- Las Mesas Constituyentes tomarán sus decisiones por mayoría absoluta de sus integrantes, …”

Source Excerpt Translation: “Article 13. Working groups roles.- The working groups will make their decisions by an absolute majority of their members, …”

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/WQMADD

Full Citation: Ecuadorian Constituent Assembly. Reglamento de Funcionamiento de la Asemblea Constituyente [Constituent Assembly Internal Rules of Procedure.] 2007. Page 9.

<br> Source Excerpt: “Artículo 15. De las Comisiones Auxiliares..- De existir temas que requieran tratamiento especializado, a propuesta del Pleno de la Asamblea o de su presidente o presidenta, la Comisión Directiva podrá conformar comisiones auxiliares con algunos asambleístas.”

Source Excerpt Translation: “Article 15. Auxiliary Commissions.- If there are issues that require specialized treatment, at the proposal of the Plenary of the Assembly or its president, the Executive Commission may form auxiliary commissions with some assembly members.”

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/WQMADD

Full Citation: Ecuadorian Constituent Assembly. Reglamento de Funcionamiento de la Asemblea Constituyente [Constituent Assembly Internal Rules of Procedure.] 2007. Page 10.

<br> Source Excerpt: “Article 261

The central State shall have exclusive jurisdiction over:

1. National defense, domestic security and public law and order.

2. International relations

3. The registration of persons, naturalization of foreigners and immigration control

4. National planning.

5. Economic, tax, customs, and tariff policies; fiscal and monetary policies, foreign trade and debt.

6. Policies on education, health, social security and housing. To plan, build and maintain the physical infrastructure and the facilities for education and health.

7. Protected natural areas and natural resources.

8. Management of natural disasters.

9. Measures to be taken as a result of international treaties.

10. The radio spectrum and the general system of communications and telecommunications; seaports and airports.

11. Energy resources; minerals, oil and gas, and water resources, biodiversity and forest resources.

12. The control and administration of national state enterprises.”

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/I9ME03

Full Citation: Constitution of Ecuador. Article 261. 2008. Page 94.

<br> Source Excerpt: “Article 283

The economic system is socially oriented and mutually supportive; it recognizes the human being as a subject and an end; it tends towards a dynamic, balanced relationship among society, State and the market, in harmony with nature; and its objective is to ensure the production and reproduction of the material and immaterial conditions that can bring about the good way of living.

The economic system shall be comprised of public, private, mixed-economy, grassroots solidarity forms of economic organization, and others as established by the Constitution. The grassroots solidarity economy shall be regulated pursuant to the law and shall include cooperative, associative and community sectors.”

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/I9ME03

Full Citation: Constitution of Ecuador. Article 283. 2008. Page 104.

<br> Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/V8ZLPV

Full Citation: The National Assembly of Ecuador. Ley Para La Equidad Tributaria. [Tax Equity Law]. Introduced December 29th, 2007.

<br> Source Excerpt: “Article 35

Elderly persons, girls, children and adolescents, pregnant women, persons with disabilities, persons in prison and those who suffer from disastrous or highly complex diseases shall receive priority and specialized care in the public and private sectors. The same priority care shall be received by persons in situations of risk, victims of domestic and sexual violence, child mistreatment, natural or manmade disasters. The State shall provide special protection to persons who are doubly vulnerable.”

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/I9ME03

Full Citation: Constitution of Ecuador. Article 35. 2008. Page 18.

<br> Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/MCRESE

Full Citation: Ecuador Ministry of National Planning and Development. Plan National De Desarrollo [National Development Plan]. 2007.

<br> Source Excerpt: “Article 67

Family in its various forms is recognized. The State shall protect it as the fundamental core of society and shall guarantee conditions that integrally favor the achievement of its goals. They shall be comprised of legal or common-law ties and shall be based on the equality of rights and the opportunities of their members.

Marriage is the union of man and woman and shall be based on the free consent of the persons entering into this bond and on the equality of rights, obligations and legal capacity.”

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/I9ME03

Full citation: Constitution of Ecuador. Article 67. 2008. Page 33.

<br> Source Excerpt: “Article 6: (…).

Ecuadorian nationality is a political and legal bond between individuals and the State, without detriment to their belonging to any of the other indigenous nations that coexist in plurinational Ecuador.”

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/I9ME03

Full Citation: Constitution of Ecuador. Article 6. 2008. Page 10.

<br> Source Excerpt: “Article 130

The National Assembly shall be able to remove the President of the Republic from office in the following cases:

1. For having taken up duties that do not come under his/her competence, after a favorable ruling by the Constitutional Court.

2. For severe political crisis or internal unrest.

Within seventy-two (72) hours, after concluding the procedure provided for by law, the National Assembly shall issue a ruling, with a statement of its reasons, on the basis evidence for his/her defense submitted by the President of the Republic.

To proceed with the removal from office, the favorable vote of two thirds of the members of the National Assembly shall be required. If the motion to remove the President from office is adopted, the Vice-President shall take over the Office of the President of the Republic.

This power can only be exercised once during the legislative period, during the first three years of office…”

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/I9ME03

Full Citation: Constitution of Ecuador. Article 130. 2008. Page 56.

<br> Source Excerpt: "Article 275

The development structure is the organized, sustainable and dynamic group of economic, political, socio-cultural and environmental systems which underpin the achievement of the good way of living (sumak kawsay).

The State shall plan the development of the country to assure the exercise of rights, the achievement of the objectives of the development structure and the principles enshrined in the Constitution. Planning shall aspire to social and territorial equity, promote cooperation, and be participatory, decentralized, deconcentrated and transparent.”

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/I9ME03

Full Citation: Constitution of Ecuador. Article 275. 2008. Page 100.

<br> Source Excerpt: “Article 148:

The President of the Republic will be able to dissolve the National Assembly when, in his/her opinion, it has taken up duties that do not pertain to it under the Constitution, upon prior favorable ruling by the Constitutional Court; or if it repeatedly without justification obstructs implementation of the National Development Plan or because a severe political crisis and domestic unrest.

This power can be exercised only once the first three years of his/her term of office.

Within seven days at the most after the publication of the decree of dissolution, the National Electoral Council shall convene, for the same date, legislative and presidential elections for the rest of the respective terms of office.

Up until the installation of the National Assembly, the President of the Republic shall be able, upon a prior favorable ruling issued by the Constitution Court, issue decree-laws for urgent economic matters, which may be adopted or repealed by the legislative body.”

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/I9ME03

Full Citation: Constitution of Ecuador. Article 148. 2008. Page 63.

<br> Source Excerpt: “Article 181

In addition to those powers established by law, the Judiciary Council shall also be empowered to:

1. Define and implement policies for the improvement and modernization of the judicial system.

2. Be informed of and approve the draft of the Judiciary’s budget, with the exception of the autonomous bodies.

3. To direct the selection process for judges and other public officers of the Judiciary, as well as their evaluation, promotion and sanctioning. All processes shall be public and decisions shall be reasoned.

4. To administer the judicial career and professionalization, and organize and manage schools for judicial training.

5. To monitor the transparency and efficiency of the Judiciary.

The Judiciary Council’s decisions shall require a simple majority approval.”

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/I9ME03

Full Citation: Constitution of Ecuador. Article 181. 2008. Page 72.

<br> Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/KIKSDX

Full Citation: National Assembly of Ecuador. Ley Orgánico Del Servicio Publico [Law of the public Service]. Registered October 6 2010.

<br> Source Excerpt: “Article 363

The State shall be responsible for:

1. Drafting public policies that guarantee the promotion, prevention, healing, rehabilitation and provision of integral health care and the fostering of healthy practices in the family, at work, and in the community.

2. Universalizing healthcare, permanently improving quality, and enlarging coverage.

3. Building up state healthcare services, incorporating human talent, and providing physical infrastructure and equipment to public health institutions.

4. Guaranteeing ancestral and alternative health practices by recognizing, respecting and promoting the use of their knowledge, medicines and instruments.

5. Providing specialized care to groups requiring priority attention as provided for in the Constitution.

6. Ensuring sexual and reproductive health actions and services and guaranteeing the integral healthcare and the life of women, especially during pregnancy, childbirth and postpartum.

7. Guaranteeing the availability and access to quality, safe and effective medicines, regulating their marketing, and promoting the national production and use of generic drugs that meet the epidemiological needs of the population. With respect to access to medicine, public health interests shall prevail over economic and commercial interests.

8. Promoting the integral development of health staff.”

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/I9ME03

Full Citation: Constitution of Ecuador. Article 363. 2008. Page 126.

<br> Source Excerpt: “Article 321

The State recognizes and guarantees the right to property in all of its forms, whether public, private, community, State, associative, cooperative or mixed- economy, and that it must fulfill its social and environmental role”.

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/I9ME03

Full Citation: Constitution of Ecuador. Article 321. 2008. Page 114.

<br> Source Excerpt: “Article 204

The people are the mandator and prime auditor of public power, in the exercise of their right to participation.

The Transparency and Social Control Branch of Government shall promote and foster monitoring of public entities and bodies and of natural persons or legal entities of the private sector who provide services or carry out activities for the general welfare, so they shall conduct them with responsibility, transparency and equity, it shall foster and encourage public participation; it shall protect the exercise and fulfillment of rights; and it shall prevent and combat corruption.

The Transparency and Social Control Branch shall be comprised of the Council for Public Participation and Social Control, the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman, the Office of the Comptroller General, and the Superintendencies. These entities shall have a legal status and administrative, financial, budgetary and organizational autonomy.”

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/I9ME03

Full Citation: Constitution of Ecuador. Article 204. 2008. Page 79.

<br> Source Excerpt: “Article 42

All arbitrary displacement is forbidden. Persons who have been displaced shall have the right to receive protection and emergency humanitarian aid from the authorities, ensuring access to food, shelter, housing, and medical and health services.

Children, adolescents, pregnant women, mothers with underage daughters and sons, elderly persons and persons with disabilities shall receive preferential and specialized humanitarian assistance.”

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/I9ME03

Full Citation: Constitution of Ecuador. 2008. Article 42. Page 20.

<br> Source Excerpt: “Article 182

The National Court of Justice shall be comprised of twenty-one (21) judges, who shall be organized in specialized courts and shall be designated for a nine-year term of office. They cannot be reelected and a third of them shall be renewed every three years. They shall leave their office in accordance with the law.

The judges of the National Court of Justice shall elect, from among its members, the Chief Justice, who shall be representing the Judicial Branch and shall have a three-year term of office. In each court, a Chief Justice shall be elected for a one-year term.

There shall be alternate judges who shall be part of the Judicial Branch and who shall be selected on the basis of the same processes and shall have the same responsibilities and be subject to the same system of incompatibilities as those of the standing judges. The National Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction over the country's entire territory and its seat shall be in Quito.”

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/I9ME03

Full Citation: Constitution of Ecuador. Article 182. 2008. Page 73.

<br> Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/ZHZMLV

Full Citation: National Assembly of Ecuador. Ley Orgánica de Ordenamiento Territorial Uso Y Gestion de Suelo [Organic Code of Territorial Organization]. Registered July 5 2016.

<br> Source Excerpt: “Article 145

The President of the Republic shall cease to perform his/her duties and shall leave office in the following cases:

1. Expiry of the presidential term of office.

2. Voluntary resignation from office accepted by the National Assembly.

3. Removal from office, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.

4. Permanent physical or mental disability preventing him/her from performing his/her duties, as certified in accordance with law by a committee of specialized physicians and so declared by the National Assembly with the votes of two thirds of its members.

5. Giving up the post, as confirmed by the Constitutional Court and declared by the National Assembly with the votes of two thirds of its members.

6. Impeachment and recall, in accordance with the procedures provided for by the Constitution.”

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/I9ME03

Full Citation: Constitution of Ecuador. Article 145. 2008. Page 61.

<br> Source Excerpt: “Article 209

To perform its duties as designated, the Council for Public Participation and Social Control shall organize citizen selection commissions, which shall be in charge of conducting, in those cases that pertain to them, the public competitive and merit-based examination with the submittal of candidacies, citizen oversight and the right to challenge by the citizenry.

The citizen selection commissions shall be comprised of one delegate for each State branch of government and an identical number of representatives for social organizations and the citizenry, chosen by the public drawing of lots from among those submitting their candidacies and meeting the requirements provided for by the Council and the law. The candidates shall be subject to public scrutiny and citizen challenge. The commissions shall be directed by one of the representatives of the citizenry, who shall have the tie-breaking vote, and its sessions shall be open to the public.”

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/I9ME03

Full Citation: Constitution of Ecuador. Article 209. 2008. Page 81.

<br> Source Excerpt: “Article 43

The State shall guarantee the rights of pregnant and breast-feeding women to:

1. Not be discriminated for their pregnancy in education, social, and labor sectors.

2. Free maternal healthcare services.

3. Priority protection and care of their integral health and life during pregnancy, childbirth and postpartum.

4. The facilities needed for their recovery after pregnancy and during breast-feeding.”

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/I9ME03

Full Citation: Constitution of Ecuador. Article 43. 2008. Page 21.

<br> Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/P4BY2E

Full Citation: "International Labor Organization Convention 169: Indigenous And Tribal People's Convention." Adopted on June 27 1989.

<br> Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/JLITVS

Full Citation: Constitution of Ecuador. 1998.

<br> Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/H3XKUH

Full Citation: National Assembly of Ecuador. Ley Orgánica de Educación Intercultural [Law of Intercultural Education]. Passed March 31 2011.

<br> Source Excerpt: “Article 205

The representatives of the entities that are part of the Transparency and Social Control Branch shall perform their duties for a period of five years, shall benefit from immunity from prosecution in the National Court and shall be subject to impeachment by the National Assembly. In the event this impeachment occurs, with the ensuing removal from office, a new process to designate the representative shall take place. In no case can the Legislative Branch designate the respective replacement.

Its supreme authorities must be Ecuadorian nationals who are in possession of their political rights and shall be selected by means of a competitive and merit-based examination with the submittal of candidacies, subject to citizen oversight and challenge.”

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/I9ME03

Full Citation: Constitution of Ecuador. Article 205. 2008. Page 79.

<br> Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/75MQIN

Full Citation: National Assembly of the Republic of Ecuador. Ley Orgánica de Recurosos Hídricos, Usos Y Aprovechamiento del Agua [Law on Water Resources and Uses]. Introduced August 6 2014.

<br> Source Excerpt: “Article 11

The exercise of rights shall be governed by the following principles:

(…)

1. The contents of rights shall be developed progressively by means of standards, case law, and public policies.

The State shall generate and guarantee the conditions needed for their full recognition and exercise.

Any deed or omission of a regressive nature that diminishes, undermines or annuls without justification the exercise of rights shall be deemed unconstitutional.”

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/I9ME03

Full Citation: Constitution of Ecuador. Article 11. 2008. Page 12.

<br> Source Excerpt: “Article 6

All female and male Ecuadorians are citizens and shall enjoy the rights set forth in the Constitution.

Ecuadorian nationality is a political and legal bond between individuals and the State, without detriment to their belonging to any of the other indigenous nations that coexist in plurinational Ecuador.

Ecuadorian nationality is obtained by birth or naturalization and shall not be forfeited because of marriage or its dissolution or by acquiring another nationality.”

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/I9ME03

Full Citation: Constitution of Ecuador. Article 6. 2008. Page 10.

<br> Source Excerpt: “Article 441

The amendment of one or various articles of the Constitution that does not alter the fundamental structure or the nature and constituent elements of the State, does not set constraints on rights and guarantees, and does not change the procedure for amending the Constitution shall be carried out as follows:

1. By means of a referendum requested by the President of the Republic or by the citizenry with the backing of at least eight percent (8%) of the persons registered in the voter registration list.

2. At the initiative of a number accounting for no less than one third of the members of the National Assembly.

The bill of amendment shall be processed in two discussions; the second discussion shall be held, without delay, no later than thirty (30) days after a year has elapsed since the start of the first debate. The amendment shall only be adopted if it is supported by two thirds of the members of the National Assembly.”

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/I9ME03

Full Citation: Constitution of Ecuador. Article 441. 2008. Page 148.

<br> Source Excerpt: “Artículo 39. Inclusión de informes en el orden del día.- Una vez analizados, debatidos y resueltos el o los articulados constitucionales, las Mesas Constituyentes elevarán los respectivos informes a conocimiento de la Presidencia, la cual ordenará su distribución por Secretaría.

Después de cuarenta y ocho (48) horas de la distribución de tales informes, el presidente o presidenta, podrá incluirlos en el orden del día, dentro de los cinco (5) días hábiles siguientes.”

Source Excerpt Translation: “ Article 39. Inclusion of reports in the agenda.- Once the constitutional article(s) are analyzed, debated, and resolved, the Tables of Constituents will submit the respective reports to the knowledge of the Presidency, which will order its distribution by the Secretariat.

After forty-eight (48) hours from the distribution of such reports, the President may include them in the agenda, within five (5) business days.”

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/WQMADD

Full Citation: Ecuadorian Constituent Assembly. Reglamento de Funcionamiento de la Asemblea Constituyente [Constituent Assembly Internal Rules of Procedure]. 2007. Page 20.

<br> Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/HOYUVF

Full Citation: "International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights.". Opened for signature December 16 1966.

<br> Source Excerpt: “Article 318

Water is part of the country's strategic heritage for public use; it is the unalienable property of the State and is not subject to a statute of limitations. It is a vital element for nature and human existence. Any form of water privatization is forbidden.

The management of water shall be exclusively public or community-based. The public service of sanitation and the supply of drinking and irrigation water shall be provided only by legal entities of the State or communities.

The State shall bolster the management and operating of community initiatives with regard to the management of water and provision of public services, by encouraging alliances between public and community bodies for the provision of services.

The State, through the sole authority for water, shall be directly responsible for planning and managing water resources for human consumption, irrigation to guarantee food sovereignty, ecological wealth and productive activities, in this order of priority. State authorization will be required for the use of water for productive purposes by the public, private and grassroots solidarity sectors, pursuant to the law.”

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/I9ME03

Full Citation: Constitution of Ecuador. Article 318. 2008. Page 113.

<br> Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/WMM0TQ

Full Citation: IACHR. Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. March 5 2013.

<br> Source Excerpt: “Article 235

The Office of the State Prosecutor is a public, technical, and legal body, with administrative, budgetary, and financial autonomy, directed and represented by the State Prosecutor, who is appointed for a four-year term.”

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/I9ME03

Full Citation: Constitution of Ecuador. Article 235. 2008. Page 89.

<br> Source Excerpt: “Article 17: Legislative Branch of Government

The terms of office of the standing and alternate congresspersons who were elected on October 15, 2006 are hereby terminated.

Five days after announcing the results of the Ratification Referendum, the Constituent Assembly shall meet to set up the Legislative and Auditing Committee, making efforts to uphold the political proportionality that prevailed in the plenary of the Constituent Assembly.

This Legislative and Auditing Committee shall perform the duties of the National Assembly as provided for in the Constitution, until the Assembly persons are elected and sworn into office, as provided for in the present Transition System.”

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/I9ME03

Full Citation: Constitution of Ecuador. Article 17. 2008. Page 14.

<br> Source Excerpt: “Article 129

The National Assembly shall be able to proceed with the impeachment of the President or Vice-President of the Republic at the request of at least one third of its members, in the following cases:

1. For crimes against the security of the State.

2. For crimes of extortion, bribery, embezzlement or illicit enrichment.

3. For crimes of genocide, torture, forced disappearance of persons, kidnapping or homicide on political or moral grounds.

To file impeachment proceedings, a ruling of admissibility by the Constitutional Court shall be required, but prior criminal proceedings shall not be required.

Within seventy-two hours, once the procedures provided for by law have concluded, the National Assembly shall issue a ruling, with a statement of its reasons, on the basis of evidence for his/her defense submitted by the President of the Republic.

To proceed with censure and removal from office, a favorable vote of two thirds of the members of the National Assembly shall be required. If the censure leads to grounds for suspicion of criminal liability, a decision shall be taken to refer the matter for investigation by the competent judge.”

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/I9ME03

Full Citation: Constitution of Ecuador. Article 129. 2008. Page 56.

<br> Source Excerpt: “De los derechos colectivos

Sección primera

De los pueblos indígenas y negros oafroecuatorianos

Art. 83.- Los pueblos indígenas, quese autodefinen como nacionalidades deraíces ancestrales, y los pueblos negros oafroecuatorianos, forman parte del Estadoecuatoriano, único e indivisible.”

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/JLITVS

Full Citation: Constitution of Ecuador. Article 83. 1998. Page 22.

<br> Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/7Y8EGG

Full Citation: National Assembly of Ecuador. Codigo Orgánico de la Produccion, Comercio e Inversiones, COPCI [Code of Production, COPCI]. Registered December 29 2010.

<br> Source Excerpt: “Article 207

The Council for Public Participation and Social Control shall promote and encourage the exercise of the rights involving public participation, shall promote and setup social control mechanisms in matters of general welfare, and shall designate the authorities that pertain to it in accordance with the Constitution and the law. The Council's structure shall be deconcentrated and shall be in line with the performance of its duties.

The Council shall be comprised of seven standing council persons and seven alternates. The standing members shall elect from among themselves the Chair, who shall be the Council's legal representative for a term that shall extend to the middle of his/her term of office.

The selection of council persons shall be done from among candidates proposed by social organizations and the citizenry. The selection process shall be organized by the National Electoral Council, which will conduct the competitive and merit-based public examination process, with submittal of candidacies, subject to citizen oversight and challenge in accordance with the law.”

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/I9ME03

Full Citation: Constitution of Ecuador. Article 207. 2008. Page 80.

<br> Source Excerpt: “CHAPTER 3: Decentralized autonomous governments and special systems

Article 251

Each autonomous region shall elect by ballot its regional council and its regional governor, who shall chair said council and cast the tie-breaking vote. Regional council persons shall be elected in proportion to the urban and rural population for a four-year term of office, and a deputy governor shall be elected from among said councilors. Each regional government shall establish in its bylaws the public participation mechanisms provided for by the Constitution.”

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/I9ME03

Full Citation: Constitution of Ecuador. Article 251. 2008. Page 92.

<br> Source Excerpt: “Article 191

The Office of the Attorney for the Defense of the People is an autonomous body of the Judicial Branch, aimed at guaranteeing full and equal access to justice by persons who, because of their situation of defenselessness or economic, social, or cultural status, cannot hire legal defense services for the protection of their rights.

The Office of the Attorney for the Defense of the People shall provide technical, timely, efficient, effective and free-of-charge legal services to support and legally advise the rights of persons in all matters and institutions.

The Office of the Attorney for the Defense of the People is indivisible and shall function as a decentralized entity with administrative, economic, and financial autonomy, it shall be represented by the Attorney for the Defense of the People and shall benefit from human and material resources and labor conditions that are equivalent to those of the Attorney-General's Office.”

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/I9ME03

Full Citation: Constitution of Ecuador. Article 191. 2008. Page 75.

<br> Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/AQ49Y2

Full Citation: National Assembly of the Republic of Ecuador. Ley Orgánica de comunicación [Communications Law]. Introduced June 25 2013.

<br> Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/4PBPFB

Full Citation: National Assembly of Ecuador. Ley Orgánica de Education Superior [Law of Higher Education]. Registered October 12 2010.

<br> Source Excerpt: “Article 242

The State is territorially organized into regions, provinces, cantons and rural parishes. Special systems may be established for reasons of environmental conservation, or ethnic-cultural or population factors.

Autonomous metropolitan districts, the province of Galapagos, and indigenous and pluricultural territorial districts shall constitute special systems.”

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/I9ME03

Full Citation: Constitution of Ecuador. Article 242. 2008. Page 90.

<br> Source Excerpt: “Article 183

To be judge of the National Court of Justice, in addition to the requirements of propriety provided for by law, the following is required:

1. Be an Ecuadorian national and in possession of political rights.

2. Hold a university degree in law legally recognized in the country.

3. Having practiced with notable rectitude the profession of attorney, judge or university instructor in law, for a period of at least ten years.

The judges of the National Court of Justice shall be elected by the Judiciary Council in conformity with a procedure entailing a competitive merit-based examination, subject to challenge and social monitoring. Parity between men and women shall be fostered.”

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/I9ME03

Full Citation: Constitution of Ecuador. Article 183. 2008. Page 73.

<br> Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/7WRXEE

Full Citation: Guayaquil Court No. 457-201. (Court of Criminal Guarantees 2011).

<br> Source Excerpt: “Article 1

Ecuador is a constitutional State of rights and justice, a social, democratic, sovereign, independent, unitary, intercultural, multinational and secular State. It is organized as a republic and is governed using a decentralized approach.

Separation of church and state Sovereignty lies with the people, whose will is the basis of all authority, and it is exercised through public bodies using direct participatory forms of government as provided for by the Constitution.

Nonrenewable natural resources of the State's territory belong to its inalienable and absolute assets, which are not subject to a statute of limitations.”

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/I9ME03

Full Citation: Constitution of Ecuador. Article 1. 2008. Page 8.

<br> Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/I9ME03

Full Citation: Constitution of Ecuador. 2008.

<br> Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/I9ME03

Full Citation: Constitution of Ecuador. 2008.

<br> Source Excerpt: “Article 1

Ecuador is a constitutional State of rights and justice, a social, democratic, sovereign, independent, unitary, intercultural, multinational and secular State. It is organized as a republic and is governed using a decentralized approach.

Separation of church and state Sovereignty lies with the people, whose will is the basis of all authority, and it is exercised through public bodies using direct participatory forms of government as provided for by the Constitution.

Nonrenewable natural resources of the State's territory belong to its inalienable and absolute assets, which are not subject to a statute of limitations.”

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/I9ME03

Full Citation: Constitution of Ecuador. Article 1. 2008. Page 8.

<br> Source Excerpt: “Article 183

To be judge of the National Court of Justice, in addition to the requirements of propriety provided for by law, the following is required:

1. Be an Ecuadorian national and in possession of political rights.

2. Hold a university degree in law legally recognized in the country.

3. Having practiced with notable rectitude the profession of attorney, judge or university instructor in law, for a period of at least ten years.

The judges of the National Court of Justice shall be elected by the Judiciary Council in conformity with a procedure entailing a competitive merit-based examination, subject to challenge and social monitoring. Parity between men and women shall be fostered.”

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/I9ME03

Full Citation: Constitution of Ecuador. Article 183. 2008. Page 73.

<br> Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/7WRXEE

Full Citation: Guayaquil Court No. 457-201. (Court of Criminal Guarantees 2011).

<br> Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/AQ49Y2

Full Citation: National Assembly of the Republic of Ecuador. Ley Orgánica de comunicación [Communications Law]. Introduced June 25 2013.

<br> Source Excerpt: “Article 242

The State is territorially organized into regions, provinces, cantons and rural parishes. Special systems may be established for reasons of environmental conservation, or ethnic-cultural or population factors.

Autonomous metropolitan districts, the province of Galapagos, and indigenous and pluricultural territorial districts shall constitute special systems.”

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/I9ME03

Full Citation: Constitution of Ecuador. Article 242. 2008. Page 90.

<br> Source Excerpt: “Article 191

The Office of the Attorney for the Defense of the People is an autonomous body of the Judicial Branch, aimed at guaranteeing full and equal access to justice by persons who, because of their situation of defenselessness or economic, social, or cultural status, cannot hire legal defense services for the protection of their rights.

The Office of the Attorney for the Defense of the People shall provide technical, timely, efficient, effective and free-of-charge legal services to support and legally advise the rights of persons in all matters and institutions.

The Office of the Attorney for the Defense of the People is indivisible and shall function as a decentralized entity with administrative, economic, and financial autonomy, it shall be represented by the Attorney for the Defense of the People and shall benefit from human and material resources and labor conditions that are equivalent to those of the Attorney-General's Office.”

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/I9ME03

Full Citation: Constitution of Ecuador. Article 191. 2008. Page 75.

<br> Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/4PBPFB

Full Citation: National Assembly of Ecuador. Ley Orgánica de Education Superior [Law of Higher Education]. Registered October 12 2010.

<br> Source Excerpt: “De los derechos colectivos

Sección primera

De los pueblos indígenas y negros oafroecuatorianos

Art. 83.- Los pueblos indígenas, quese autodefinen como nacionalidades deraíces ancestrales, y los pueblos negros oafroecuatorianos, forman parte del Estadoecuatoriano, único e indivisible.”

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/JLITVS

Full Citation: Constitution of Ecuador. Article 83. 1998. Page 22.

<br> Source Excerpt: “CHAPTER 3: Decentralized autonomous governments and special systems

Article 251

Each autonomous region shall elect by ballot its regional council and its regional governor, who shall chair said council and cast the tie-breaking vote. Regional council persons shall be elected in proportion to the urban and rural population for a four-year term of office, and a deputy governor shall be elected from among said councilors. Each regional government shall establish in its bylaws the public participation mechanisms provided for by the Constitution.”

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/I9ME03

Full Citation: Constitution of Ecuador. Article 251. 2008. Page 92.

<br> Source Excerpt: “Article 207

The Council for Public Participation and Social Control shall promote and encourage the exercise of the rights involving public participation, shall promote and setup social control mechanisms in matters of general welfare, and shall designate the authorities that pertain to it in accordance with the Constitution and the law. The Council's structure shall be deconcentrated and shall be in line with the performance of its duties.

The Council shall be comprised of seven standing council persons and seven alternates. The standing members shall elect from among themselves the Chair, who shall be the Council's legal representative for a term that shall extend to the middle of his/her term of office.

The selection of council persons shall be done from among candidates proposed by social organizations and the citizenry. The selection process shall be organized by the National Electoral Council, which will conduct the competitive and merit-based public examination process, with submittal of candidacies, subject to citizen oversight and challenge in accordance with the law.”

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/I9ME03

Full Citation: Constitution of Ecuador. Article 207. 2008. Page 80.

<br> Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/HOYUVF

Full Citation: "International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights.". Opened for signature December 16 1966.

<br> Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/7Y8EGG

Full Citation: National Assembly of Ecuador. Codigo Orgánico de la Produccion, Comercio e Inversiones, COPCI [Code of Production, COPCI]. Registered December 29 2010.

<br> Source Excerpt: “Article 235

The Office of the State Prosecutor is a public, technical, and legal body, with administrative, budgetary, and financial autonomy, directed and represented by the State Prosecutor, who is appointed for a four-year term.”

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/I9ME03

Full Citation: Constitution of Ecuador. Article 235. 2008. Page 89.

<br> Source Excerpt: “Article 129

The National Assembly shall be able to proceed with the impeachment of the President or Vice-President of the Republic at the request of at least one third of its members, in the following cases:

1. For crimes against the security of the State.

2. For crimes of extortion, bribery, embezzlement or illicit enrichment.

3. For crimes of genocide, torture, forced disappearance of persons, kidnapping or homicide on political or moral grounds.

To file impeachment proceedings, a ruling of admissibility by the Constitutional Court shall be required, but prior criminal proceedings shall not be required.

Within seventy-two hours, once the procedures provided for by law have concluded, the National Assembly shall issue a ruling, with a statement of its reasons, on the basis of evidence for his/her defense submitted by the President of the Republic.

To proceed with censure and removal from office, a favorable vote of two thirds of the members of the National Assembly shall be required. If the censure leads to grounds for suspicion of criminal liability, a decision shall be taken to refer the matter for investigation by the competent judge.”

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/I9ME03

Full Citation: Constitution of Ecuador. Article 129. 2008. Page 56.

<br> Source Excerpt: “Article 17: Legislative Branch of Government

The terms of office of the standing and alternate congresspersons who were elected on October 15, 2006 are hereby terminated.

Five days after announcing the results of the Ratification Referendum, the Constituent Assembly shall meet to set up the Legislative and Auditing Committee, making efforts to uphold the political proportionality that prevailed in the plenary of the Constituent Assembly.

This Legislative and Auditing Committee shall perform the duties of the National Assembly as provided for in the Constitution, until the Assembly persons are elected and sworn into office, as provided for in the present Transition System.”

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/I9ME03

Full Citation: Constitution of Ecuador. Article 17. 2008. Page 14.

<br> Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/WMM0TQ

Full Citation: IACHR. Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. March 5 2013.

<br> Source Excerpt: “Article 318

Water is part of the country's strategic heritage for public use; it is the unalienable property of the State and is not subject to a statute of limitations. It is a vital element for nature and human existence. Any form of water privatization is forbidden.

The management of water shall be exclusively public or community-based. The public service of sanitation and the supply of drinking and irrigation water shall be provided only by legal entities of the State or communities.

The State shall bolster the management and operating of community initiatives with regard to the management of water and provision of public services, by encouraging alliances between public and community bodies for the provision of services.

The State, through the sole authority for water, shall be directly responsible for planning and managing water resources for human consumption, irrigation to guarantee food sovereignty, ecological wealth and productive activities, in this order of priority. State authorization will be required for the use of water for productive purposes by the public, private and grassroots solidarity sectors, pursuant to the law.”

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/I9ME03

Full Citation: Constitution of Ecuador. Article 318. 2008. Page 113.

<br> Source Excerpt: “Artículo 39. Inclusión de informes en el orden del día.- Una vez analizados, debatidos y resueltos el o los articulados constitucionales, las Mesas Constituyentes elevarán los respectivos informes a conocimiento de la Presidencia, la cual ordenará su distribución por Secretaría.

Después de cuarenta y ocho (48) horas de la distribución de tales informes, el presidente o presidenta, podrá incluirlos en el orden del día, dentro de los cinco (5) días hábiles siguientes.”

Source Excerpt Translation: “ Article 39. Inclusion of reports in the agenda.- Once the constitutional article(s) are analyzed, debated, and resolved, the Tables of Constituents will submit the respective reports to the knowledge of the Presidency, which will order its distribution by the Secretariat.

After forty-eight (48) hours from the distribution of such reports, the President may include them in the agenda, within five (5) business days.”

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/WQMADD

Full Citation: Ecuadorian Constituent Assembly. Reglamento de Funcionamiento de la Asemblea Constituyente [Constituent Assembly Internal Rules of Procedure]. 2007. Page 20.

<br> Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/75MQIN

Full Citation: National Assembly of the Republic of Ecuador. Ley Orgánica de Recurosos Hídricos, Usos Y Aprovechamiento del Agua [Law on Water Resources and Uses]. Introduced August 6 2014.

<br> Source Excerpt: “Article 441

The amendment of one or various articles of the Constitution that does not alter the fundamental structure or the nature and constituent elements of the State, does not set constraints on rights and guarantees, and does not change the procedure for amending the Constitution shall be carried out as follows:

1. By means of a referendum requested by the President of the Republic or by the citizenry with the backing of at least eight percent (8%) of the persons registered in the voter registration list.

2. At the initiative of a number accounting for no less than one third of the members of the National Assembly.

The bill of amendment shall be processed in two discussions; the second discussion shall be held, without delay, no later than thirty (30) days after a year has elapsed since the start of the first debate. The amendment shall only be adopted if it is supported by two thirds of the members of the National Assembly.”

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/I9ME03

Full Citation: Constitution of Ecuador. Article 441. 2008. Page 148.

<br> Source Excerpt: “Article 11

The exercise of rights shall be governed by the following principles:

(…)

1. The contents of rights shall be developed progressively by means of standards, case law, and public policies.

The State shall generate and guarantee the conditions needed for their full recognition and exercise.

Any deed or omission of a regressive nature that diminishes, undermines or annuls without justification the exercise of rights shall be deemed unconstitutional.”

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/I9ME03

Full Citation: Constitution of Ecuador. Article 11. 2008. Page 12.

<br> Source Excerpt: “Article 6

All female and male Ecuadorians are citizens and shall enjoy the rights set forth in the Constitution.

Ecuadorian nationality is a political and legal bond between individuals and the State, without detriment to their belonging to any of the other indigenous nations that coexist in plurinational Ecuador.

Ecuadorian nationality is obtained by birth or naturalization and shall not be forfeited because of marriage or its dissolution or by acquiring another nationality.”

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/I9ME03

Full Citation: Constitution of Ecuador. Article 6. 2008. Page 10.

<br> Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/JLITVS

Full Citation: Constitution of Ecuador. 1998.

<br> Source Excerpt: “Article 205

The representatives of the entities that are part of the Transparency and Social Control Branch shall perform their duties for a period of five years, shall benefit from immunity from prosecution in the National Court and shall be subject to impeachment by the National Assembly. In the event this impeachment occurs, with the ensuing removal from office, a new process to designate the representative shall take place. In no case can the Legislative Branch designate the respective replacement.

Its supreme authorities must be Ecuadorian nationals who are in possession of their political rights and shall be selected by means of a competitive and merit-based examination with the submittal of candidacies, subject to citizen oversight and challenge.”

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/I9ME03

Full Citation: Constitution of Ecuador. Article 205. 2008. Page 79.

<br> Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/P4BY2E

Full Citation: "International Labor Organization Convention 169: Indigenous And Tribal People's Convention." Adopted on June 27 1989.

<br> Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/H3XKUH

Full Citation: National Assembly of Ecuador. Ley Orgánica de Educación Intercultural [Law of Intercultural Education]. Passed March 31 2011.

<br> Source Excerpt: “Article 43

The State shall guarantee the rights of pregnant and breast-feeding women to:

1. Not be discriminated for their pregnancy in education, social, and labor sectors.

2. Free maternal healthcare services.

3. Priority protection and care of their integral health and life during pregnancy, childbirth and postpartum.

4. The facilities needed for their recovery after pregnancy and during breast-feeding.”

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/I9ME03

Full Citation: Constitution of Ecuador. Article 43. 2008. Page 21.

<br> Source Excerpt: “Article 209

To perform its duties as designated, the Council for Public Participation and Social Control shall organize citizen selection commissions, which shall be in charge of conducting, in those cases that pertain to them, the public competitive and merit-based examination with the submittal of candidacies, citizen oversight and the right to challenge by the citizenry.

The citizen selection commissions shall be comprised of one delegate for each State branch of government and an identical number of representatives for social organizations and the citizenry, chosen by the public drawing of lots from among those submitting their candidacies and meeting the requirements provided for by the Council and the law. The candidates shall be subject to public scrutiny and citizen challenge. The commissions shall be directed by one of the representatives of the citizenry, who shall have the tie-breaking vote, and its sessions shall be open to the public.”

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/I9ME03

Full Citation: Constitution of Ecuador. Article 209. 2008. Page 81.

<br> Source Excerpt: “Article 145

The President of the Republic shall cease to perform his/her duties and shall leave office in the following cases:

1. Expiry of the presidential term of office.

2. Voluntary resignation from office accepted by the National Assembly.

3. Removal from office, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.

4. Permanent physical or mental disability preventing him/her from performing his/her duties, as certified in accordance with law by a committee of specialized physicians and so declared by the National Assembly with the votes of two thirds of its members.

5. Giving up the post, as confirmed by the Constitutional Court and declared by the National Assembly with the votes of two thirds of its members.

6. Impeachment and recall, in accordance with the procedures provided for by the Constitution.”

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/I9ME03

Full Citation: Constitution of Ecuador. Article 145. 2008. Page 61.

<br> Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/ZHZMLV

Full Citation: National Assembly of Ecuador. Ley Orgánica de Ordenamiento Territorial Uso Y Gestion de Suelo [Organic Code of Territorial Organization]. Registered July 5 2016.

<br> Source Excerpt: “Article 182

The National Court of Justice shall be comprised of twenty-one (21) judges, who shall be organized in specialized courts and shall be designated for a nine-year term of office. They cannot be reelected and a third of them shall be renewed every three years. They shall leave their office in accordance with the law.

The judges of the National Court of Justice shall elect, from among its members, the Chief Justice, who shall be representing the Judicial Branch and shall have a three-year term of office. In each court, a Chief Justice shall be elected for a one-year term.

There shall be alternate judges who shall be part of the Judicial Branch and who shall be selected on the basis of the same processes and shall have the same responsibilities and be subject to the same system of incompatibilities as those of the standing judges. The National Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction over the country's entire territory and its seat shall be in Quito.”

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/I9ME03

Full Citation: Constitution of Ecuador. Article 182. 2008. Page 73.

<br> Source Excerpt: “Article 42

All arbitrary displacement is forbidden. Persons who have been displaced shall have the right to receive protection and emergency humanitarian aid from the authorities, ensuring access to food, shelter, housing, and medical and health services.

Children, adolescents, pregnant women, mothers with underage daughters and sons, elderly persons and persons with disabilities shall receive preferential and specialized humanitarian assistance.”

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/I9ME03

Full Citation: Constitution of Ecuador. 2008. Article 42. Page 20.

<br> Source Excerpt: “Article 204

The people are the mandator and prime auditor of public power, in the exercise of their right to participation.

The Transparency and Social Control Branch of Government shall promote and foster monitoring of public entities and bodies and of natural persons or legal entities of the private sector who provide services or carry out activities for the general welfare, so they shall conduct them with responsibility, transparency and equity, it shall foster and encourage public participation; it shall protect the exercise and fulfillment of rights; and it shall prevent and combat corruption.

The Transparency and Social Control Branch shall be comprised of the Council for Public Participation and Social Control, the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman, the Office of the Comptroller General, and the Superintendencies. These entities shall have a legal status and administrative, financial, budgetary and organizational autonomy.”

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/I9ME03

Full Citation: Constitution of Ecuador. Article 204. 2008. Page 79.

<br> Source Excerpt: “Article 321

The State recognizes and guarantees the right to property in all of its forms, whether public, private, community, State, associative, cooperative or mixed- economy, and that it must fulfill its social and environmental role”.

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/I9ME03

Full Citation: Constitution of Ecuador. Article 321. 2008. Page 114.

<br> Source Excerpt: “Article 363

The State shall be responsible for:

1. Drafting public policies that guarantee the promotion, prevention, healing, rehabilitation and provision of integral health care and the fostering of healthy practices in the family, at work, and in the community.

2. Universalizing healthcare, permanently improving quality, and enlarging coverage.

3. Building up state healthcare services, incorporating human talent, and providing physical infrastructure and equipment to public health institutions.

4. Guaranteeing ancestral and alternative health practices by recognizing, respecting and promoting the use of their knowledge, medicines and instruments.

5. Providing specialized care to groups requiring priority attention as provided for in the Constitution.

6. Ensuring sexual and reproductive health actions and services and guaranteeing the integral healthcare and the life of women, especially during pregnancy, childbirth and postpartum.

7. Guaranteeing the availability and access to quality, safe and effective medicines, regulating their marketing, and promoting the national production and use of generic drugs that meet the epidemiological needs of the population. With respect to access to medicine, public health interests shall prevail over economic and commercial interests.

8. Promoting the integral development of health staff.”

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/I9ME03

Full Citation: Constitution of Ecuador. Article 363. 2008. Page 126.

<br> Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/KIKSDX

Full Citation: National Assembly of Ecuador. Ley Orgánico Del Servicio Publico [Law of the public Service]. Registered October 6 2010.

<br> Source Excerpt: “Article 181

In addition to those powers established by law, the Judiciary Council shall also be empowered to:

1. Define and implement policies for the improvement and modernization of the judicial system.

2. Be informed of and approve the draft of the Judiciary’s budget, with the exception of the autonomous bodies.

3. To direct the selection process for judges and other public officers of the Judiciary, as well as their evaluation, promotion and sanctioning. All processes shall be public and decisions shall be reasoned.

4. To administer the judicial career and professionalization, and organize and manage schools for judicial training.

5. To monitor the transparency and efficiency of the Judiciary.

The Judiciary Council’s decisions shall require a simple majority approval.”

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/I9ME03

Full Citation: Constitution of Ecuador. Article 181. 2008. Page 72.

<br> Source Excerpt: “Article 148:

The President of the Republic will be able to dissolve the National Assembly when, in his/her opinion, it has taken up duties that do not pertain to it under the Constitution, upon prior favorable ruling by the Constitutional Court; or if it repeatedly without justification obstructs implementation of the National Development Plan or because a severe political crisis and domestic unrest.

This power can be exercised only once the first three years of his/her term of office.

Within seven days at the most after the publication of the decree of dissolution, the National Electoral Council shall convene, for the same date, legislative and presidential elections for the rest of the respective terms of office.

Up until the installation of the National Assembly, the President of the Republic shall be able, upon a prior favorable ruling issued by the Constitution Court, issue decree-laws for urgent economic matters, which may be adopted or repealed by the legislative body.”

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/I9ME03

Full Citation: Constitution of Ecuador. Article 148. 2008. Page 63.

<br> Source Excerpt: "Article 275

The development structure is the organized, sustainable and dynamic group of economic, political, socio-cultural and environmental systems which underpin the achievement of the good way of living (sumak kawsay).

The State shall plan the development of the country to assure the exercise of rights, the achievement of the objectives of the development structure and the principles enshrined in the Constitution. Planning shall aspire to social and territorial equity, promote cooperation, and be participatory, decentralized, deconcentrated and transparent.”

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/I9ME03

Full Citation: Constitution of Ecuador. Article 275. 2008. Page 100.

<br> Source Excerpt: “Article 130

The National Assembly shall be able to remove the President of the Republic from office in the following cases:

1. For having taken up duties that do not come under his/her competence, after a favorable ruling by the Constitutional Court.

2. For severe political crisis or internal unrest.

Within seventy-two (72) hours, after concluding the procedure provided for by law, the National Assembly shall issue a ruling, with a statement of its reasons, on the basis evidence for his/her defense submitted by the President of the Republic.

To proceed with the removal from office, the favorable vote of two thirds of the members of the National Assembly shall be required. If the motion to remove the President from office is adopted, the Vice-President shall take over the Office of the President of the Republic.

This power can only be exercised once during the legislative period, during the first three years of office…”

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/I9ME03

Full Citation: Constitution of Ecuador. Article 130. 2008. Page 56.

<br> Source Excerpt: “Article 6: (…).

Ecuadorian nationality is a political and legal bond between individuals and the State, without detriment to their belonging to any of the other indigenous nations that coexist in plurinational Ecuador.”

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/I9ME03

Full Citation: Constitution of Ecuador. Article 6. 2008. Page 10.

<br> Source Excerpt: “Article 67

Family in its various forms is recognized. The State shall protect it as the fundamental core of society and shall guarantee conditions that integrally favor the achievement of its goals. They shall be comprised of legal or common-law ties and shall be based on the equality of rights and the opportunities of their members.

Marriage is the union of man and woman and shall be based on the free consent of the persons entering into this bond and on the equality of rights, obligations and legal capacity.”

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/I9ME03

Full citation: Constitution of Ecuador. Article 67. 2008. Page 33.

<br> Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/MCRESE

Full Citation: Ecuador Ministry of National Planning and Development. Plan National De Desarrollo [National Development Plan]. 2007.

<br> Source Excerpt: “Article 35

Elderly persons, girls, children and adolescents, pregnant women, persons with disabilities, persons in prison and those who suffer from disastrous or highly complex diseases shall receive priority and specialized care in the public and private sectors. The same priority care shall be received by persons in situations of risk, victims of domestic and sexual violence, child mistreatment, natural or manmade disasters. The State shall provide special protection to persons who are doubly vulnerable.”

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/I9ME03

Full Citation: Constitution of Ecuador. Article 35. 2008. Page 18.

<br> Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/V8ZLPV

Full Citation: The National Assembly of Ecuador. Ley Para La Equidad Tributaria. [Tax Equity Law]. Introduced December 29th, 2007.

<br> Source Excerpt: “Article 283

The economic system is socially oriented and mutually supportive; it recognizes the human being as a subject and an end; it tends towards a dynamic, balanced relationship among society, State and the market, in harmony with nature; and its objective is to ensure the production and reproduction of the material and immaterial conditions that can bring about the good way of living.

The economic system shall be comprised of public, private, mixed-economy, grassroots solidarity forms of economic organization, and others as established by the Constitution. The grassroots solidarity economy shall be regulated pursuant to the law and shall include cooperative, associative and community sectors.”

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/I9ME03

Full Citation: Constitution of Ecuador. Article 283. 2008. Page 104.

<br> Source Excerpt: “Article 261

The central State shall have exclusive jurisdiction over:

1. National defense, domestic security and public law and order.

2. International relations

3. The registration of persons, naturalization of foreigners and immigration control

4. National planning.

5. Economic, tax, customs, and tariff policies; fiscal and monetary policies, foreign trade and debt.

6. Policies on education, health, social security and housing. To plan, build and maintain the physical infrastructure and the facilities for education and health.

7. Protected natural areas and natural resources.

8. Management of natural disasters.

9. Measures to be taken as a result of international treaties.

10. The radio spectrum and the general system of communications and telecommunications; seaports and airports.

11. Energy resources; minerals, oil and gas, and water resources, biodiversity and forest resources.

12. The control and administration of national state enterprises.”

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/I9ME03

Full Citation: Constitution of Ecuador. Article 261. 2008. Page 94.

<br> Source Excerpt: “Artículo 15. De las Comisiones Auxiliares..- De existir temas que requieran tratamiento especializado, a propuesta del Pleno de la Asamblea o de su presidente o presidenta, la Comisión Directiva podrá conformar comisiones auxiliares con algunos asambleístas.”

Source Excerpt Translation: “Article 15. Auxiliary Commissions.- If there are issues that require specialized treatment, at the proposal of the Plenary of the Assembly or its president, the Executive Commission may form auxiliary commissions with some assembly members.”

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/WQMADD

Full Citation: Ecuadorian Constituent Assembly. Reglamento de Funcionamiento de la Asemblea Constituyente [Constituent Assembly Internal Rules of Procedure.] 2007. Page 10.

<br> Source Excerpt: “Articulo 13. De las funciones de las Mesas Constituyentes.- Las Mesas Constituyentes tomarán sus decisiones por mayoría absoluta de sus integrantes, …”

Source Excerpt Translation: “Article 13. Working groups roles.- The working groups will make their decisions by an absolute majority of their members, …”

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/WQMADD

Full Citation: Ecuadorian Constituent Assembly. Reglamento de Funcionamiento de la Asemblea Constituyente [Constituent Assembly Internal Rules of Procedure.] 2007. Page 9.

<br> Source Excerpt: “Article 332

The State shall guarantee respect for the reproductive rights of all workers, including the elimination of labor risks affecting reproductive health, access to employment and job security, without limitations due to pregnancy or number of children, maternity and breast-feeding rights, and the right to paternity leave.

The dismissal of a working woman because of pregnancy and maternity, along with discrimination in connection with reproductive roles, is forbidden.”

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/I9ME03

Full Citation: Constitution of Ecuador. Article 332. 2008. Page 117.

<br> Source Excerpt: “Artículo 47. De la Comisión Especial de Redacción.- Para la redacción del texto final de la Constitución, aprobado por el Pleno, la presidencia conformará una Comisión Especial de Redacción.

Esta comisión deberá revisar omisiones notorias y contradicciones de sintaxis y efectuará correcciones gramaticales, ortográficas, entre otras.

Este texto, puesto a consideración del Pleno con cinco (5) días de anticipación, será aprobado, sin previo debate, con los votos de la mayoría absoluta de los asambleístas.”

Source Excerpt Translation: “Article 47. The Special Drafting Commission.- For drafting of the final text of the Constitution, approved by the Plenary, the presidency will form a Special Drafting Commission.

This commission shall review notorious omissions and contradictions in syntax and will make grammar and spelling corrections, among others.

This text, submitted to the Plenary for consideration five (5) days in advance, will be approved, without prior debate, with the votes of the absolute majority of the assembly members.”

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/WQMADD

Full Citation: Ecuadorian Constituent Assembly. Reglamento de Funcionamiento de la Asemblea Constituyente [Constituent Assembly Internal Rules of Procedure]. 2007. Page 22.

<br> Source Excerpt: “Article 141

The President of the Republic performs the duties of the Executive Branch of Government and is the Head of State and Government and is in charge of public administration.

The Executive Branch is comprised of the Office of the President and the Office of the Vice-President of the Republic, the Ministries of State and the other organizations and institutions needed to fulfill, in the framework of their competence, the attributions of Leadership, planning, implementation and evaluation of national public policies and plans that are created to implement them.”

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/I9ME03

Full Citation: Constitution of Ecuador. Article 141. 2008. Page 60.

<br> Source Excerpt: “Artículo 48. De la iniciativa.- La Asamblea Constituyente tramitará los proyectos de ley provenientes de la propia Asamblea, que cuenten con el respaldo de por lo menos el cinco por ciento (5%) de asambleístas; del Presidente de la República, o los que se hubieren presentado por iniciativa ciudadana respaldada por lo menos con el cero punto uno por ciento (0,1%) del padrón electoral nacional.”

Source Excerpt Translation: “Article 48. On the initiative.- The Constituent Assembly will process the bills from the Assembly, which had the support of at least five percent (5%) of assembly members; of the President of the Republic, or those that have been presented by citizen initiative and supported by at least zero point one percent (0.1%) of the electoral national roll.”

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/WQMADD

Full Citation: Ecuadorian Constituent Assembly. Reglamento de Funcionamiento de la Asemblea Constituyente [Constituent Assembly Internal Rules of Procedure.] 2007. Page 22.

<br> Source Excerpt: "Article 407

Activities for the extraction of nonrenewable natural resources are forbidden in protected areas and in areas declared intangible assets, including forestry production Exceptionally, these resources can be tapped at the substantiated request of the President of the Republic and after a declaration of national interest issued by the National Assembly, which can, if it deems it advisable, convene a referendum.”

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/I9ME03

Full Citation: Constitution of Ecuador. Article 407. 2008. Page 138.

<br> Source Excerpt: “Article 171

The authorities of the indigenous communities, peoples, and nations shall perform jurisdictional duties, on the basis of their ancestral traditions and their own system of law, within their own territories, with a guarantee for the participation of, and decision-making by, women. The authorities shall apply their own standards and procedures for the settlement of internal disputes, as long as they are not contrary to the Constitution and human rights enshrined in international instruments.

The State shall guarantee that the decisions of indigenous jurisdiction are observed by public institutions and authorities. These decisions shall be subject to monitoring of their constitutionality. The law shall establish the mechanisms for coordination and cooperation between indigenous jurisdiction and regular jurisdiction.”

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/I9ME03

Full Citation: Constitution of Ecuador. Article 171. 2008. Page 70.

<br> Source Excerpt: “Artículo 11. De las Mesas Constituyentes – (…). Cada asambleísta obligatoriamente deberá integrarse a una Mesa Constituyente.”

Source Excerpt Translation: “Article 11. Working groups - (…). Each assembly member must compulsorily join a working group.”

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WZUAYU/WQMADD

Full Citation: Ecuadorian Constituent Assembly. Reglamento de Funcionamiento de la Asemblea Constituyente [Constituent Assembly Internal Rules of Procedure.] 2007. Page 8.

<br> This is an Annotation for Transparent Inquiry project, published by the Qualitative Data Repository. Please cite as:

Dev, Jeetendra. 2022. "Data for: Nepal's Constitutional Development and the Challenges of Constitution Making". Qualitative Data Repository. https://doi.org/10.5064/F6LTXGPB. QDR Main Collection.

Additional documentation can be found on QDR.

Learn more about ATI here.

<br> This is an Annotation for Transparent Inquiry project, published by the Qualitative Data Repository. Please cite as:

Dev, Jeetendra. 2022. "Data for: Nepal's Constitutional Development and the Challenges of Constitution Making". Qualitative Data Repository. https://doi.org/10.5064/F6LTXGPB. QDR Main Collection.

Additional documentation can be found on QDR.

Learn more about ATI here.

<br> This is an Annotation for Transparent Inquiry project, published by the Qualitative Data Repository. Please cite as:

M’Barek, Mabrouka. 2022. "Data for: Makers of Our Own History: Upholding the Revolution and Unsettling Coloniality in the Drafting of Tunisia’s 2014 Constitution". Qualitative Data Repository. https://doi.org/10.5064/F6TUWMUT. QDR Main Collection. V1.

Additional documentation can be found on QDR.

Learn more about ATI here.

<br> This is an Annotation for Transparent Inquiry project, published by the Qualitative Data Repository. Please cite as:

M’Barek, Mabrouka. 2022. "Data for: Makers of Our Own History: Upholding the Revolution and Unsettling Coloniality in the Drafting of Tunisia’s 2014 Constitution". Qualitative Data Repository. https://doi.org/10.5064/F6TUWMUT. QDR Main Collection. V1.

Additional documentation can be found on QDR.

Learn more about ATI here.

<br> This is an Annotation for Transparent Inquiry project, published by the Qualitative Data Repository. Please cite as:

Ebrahim, Hassen. 2022. "Data for: Decisions Deadlocks and Deadlines in Making South Africa's Constitution". Qualitative Data Repository. https://doi.org/10.5064/F6MDFAZM. QDR Main Collection.

Additional documentation can be found on QDR.

Learn more about ATI here.

<br> This is an Annotation for Transparent Inquiry project, published by the Qualitative Data Repository. Please cite as:

Ebrahim, Hassen. 2022. "Data for: Decisions Deadlocks and Deadlines in Making South Africa's Constitution". Qualitative Data Repository. https://doi.org/10.5064/F6MDFAZM. QDR Main Collection.

Additional documentation can be found on QDR.

Learn more about ATI here.

<br> This is an Annotation for Transparent Inquiry project, published by the Qualitative Data Repository. Please cite as:

Caka, Gresa. 2022. "Data for: Kosovo’s Independence Constitution: A Unilateral Commitment to an Internationalized Pouvoir Constituant". Qualitative Data Repository. https://doi.org/10.5064/F6CIKQNF. QDR Main Collection.

Additional documentation can be found on QDR.

Learn more about ATI here.

<br> This is an Annotation for Transparent Inquiry project, published by the Qualitative Data Repository. Please cite as:

Caka, Gresa. 2022. "Data for: Kosovo’s Independence Constitution: A Unilateral Commitment to an Internationalized Pouvoir Constituant". Qualitative Data Repository. https://doi.org/10.5064/F6CIKQNF. QDR Main Collection.

Additional documentation can be found on QDR.

Learn more about ATI here.

<br> This is an Annotation for Transparent Inquiry project, published by the Qualitative Data Repository. Please cite as:

Murray, Christina. 2022. "Data for: Making and remaking Kenya's constitution". Qualitative Data Repository. https://doi.org/10.5064/F6E1GIFI. QDR Main Collection.

Additional documentation can be found on QDR.

Learn more about ATI here.

<br> This is an Annotation for Transparent Inquiry project, published by the Qualitative Data Repository. Please cite as:

Murray, Christina. 2022. "Data for: Making and remaking Kenya's constitution". Qualitative Data Repository. https://doi.org/10.5064/F6E1GIFI. QDR Main Collection.

Additional documentation can be found on QDR.

Learn more about ATI here.

<br> Source Excerpt: “The Transitional Government of the Republic of Burundi and the National Council for the Defence of Democracy-Forces for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD-FDD), hereinafter referred to as 'the Parties'…

Recalling the principles and objectives of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi and the Transitional Constitution of the Republic of Burundi,

Recalling our commitment to respect and implement in good faith the agreements and protocols concluded for the purposes of ending the war and rebuilding Burundi,

Reaffirming our unshakeable determination to put an end to the root causes of the continuing situation of violence, bloodshed, insecurity, political instability, and exclusion, which has heaped distress and suffering on the Burundian people and is seriously compromising the prospects for economic development and the establishment of equality and social justice in our country…”

Data Source: https://perma.cc/9JG3-XPPF

Full Citation: "Global Ceasefire Agreement between the Transitional Government of Burundi and the National Council for the Defence of the Democracy-Forces for the Defence of Democracy." Conclusion date: November 16, 2003. https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/BI_031116_GlobalCeasefireAgreement.pdf . Page 4.

<br> Source Excerpt: “Article 164: The National Assembly is composed of at least one hundred deputies at the rate of 60% Hutu and 40% Tutsi, with a minimum of 30% of women, elected by direct universal suffrage for a mandate of five years and three deputies from the Twa co-opted ethnicity conforming to the electoral code. Where the results of the vote do not reflect the above percentages, a co-optation mechanism provided under the electoral code will proceed to address the imbalance. The number of candidates to elect by district is fixed by electoral law proportionally to the population.”

Data Source: https://perma.cc/BHF6-P4Q2

Full Citation: Constitution of Burundi. 2005. https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Burundi_2005.pdf . Page 30.

<br> Source Excerpt: “Article 175: The National Assembly may not have a valid deliberation unless at least two thirds of the deputies are present. The laws are voted by the majority of two-thirds of the deputies presented or represented. The organic laws are voted by the majority of two-thirds of the deputies present or represented, except this majority cannot be inferior to the absolute majority of the members composing the National Assembly. The majority of two-thirds of deputies present or represented is also required for voting on resolutions, decisions, and important recommendations.”

Data Source: https://perma.cc/BHF6-P4Q2

Full Citation: Constitution of Burundi. 2005. https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Burundi_2005.pdf . Page 32.

<br> Data Source: https://perma.cc/9JG3-XPPF

Full Citation: "Global Ceasefire Agreement between the Transitional Government of Burundi and the National Council for the Defence of the Democracy-Forces for the Defence of Democracy." Conclusion date: November 16, 2003. https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/BI_031116_GlobalCeasefireAgreement.pdf .

<br> Source Excerpt: [The signatories of this agreement] “Expressing our deep appreciation for the persistent efforts of the Facilitators, the late Mwalimu Julius Kambarage Nyerere and Mr. Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela…Determined to put aside our differences in all their manifestations in order to promote the factors that are common to us and which unite us, and to work together for the realization of the higher interests of the people of Burundi…Reaffirming our commitment to shape a political order and a system of government inspired by the realities of our country and founded on the values of justice, democracy, good governance, pluralism, respect for the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual, unity, solidarity, mutual understanding, tolerance and cooperation among the different ethnic groups within our society…”

Data Source: https://perma.cc/V4AY-2AJH

Full Citation: "Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi." Conclusion date: August 28, 2000. https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/BI_000828_Arusha%20Peace%20and%20Reconciliation%20Agreement%20for%20Burundi.pdf . Page 3.

<br> Data Source:  https://perma.cc/V4AY-2AJH

Full Citation: "Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi." Conclusion date: August 28, 2000. https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/BI_000828_Arusha%20Peace%20and%20Reconciliation%20Agreement%20for%20Burundi.pdf .

<br> Source Excerpt: “Article 96: The President of the Republic is elected by universal direct suffrage for a term of five years renewable one time.”

Data Source: https://perma.cc/BHF6-P4Q2

Full Citation: Constitution of Burundi. 2005. https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Burundi_2005.pdf . Page 17.

<br> Data Source: https://perma.cc/RU8U-GSJC

Full Citation: Parliament of Burundi. Burundi Electoral Code of 2009. 2009. https://cdn.accf-francophonie.org/2019/03/burundi-code-electoral-2009.pdf .

<br> Source Excerpt: “Article 302: Exceptionally, the first President of the Republic of the post-transition period is elected by the elected National Assembly and the elected Senate meeting in Congress, with a majority of two-thirds of the members. If this majority is not obtained on the first two ballots, it immediately proceeds to other ballots until a Candidate obtains the suffrage equal to the two-thirds of the members of the Parliament. In the case of vacancy of the first President of the Republic of the post-transition period, his successor is elected according to the same modalities specified in the Preceding paragraph.

The President elected for the first post-transition period may not dissolve the Parliament.”

Data Source: https://perma.cc/BHF6-P4Q2

Full Citation: Constitution of Burundi. 2005. https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Burundi_2005.pdf . Page 56.

<br> This is an Annotation for Transparent Inquiry project, published by the Qualitative Data Repository. Please cite as:

Kiganahe, Didace; Ngenge, Yuhniwo. 2022. "Data for: Burundi: The Search for Constitutional Peace". Qualitative Data Repository. https://doi.org/10.5064/F6AZRVZI. QDR Main Collection.

Additional documentation can be found on QDR.

Learn more about ATI here.

<br> This is an Annotation for Transparent Inquiry project, published by the Qualitative Data Repository. Please cite as:

Kiganahe, Didace; Ngenge, Yuhniwo. 2022. "Data for: Burundi: The Search for Constitutional Peace". Qualitative Data Repository. https://doi.org/10.5064/F6AZRVZI. QDR Main Collection.

Additional documentation can be found on QDR.

Learn more about ATI here.

<br> Source Excerpt: “Article 302: Exceptionally, the first President of the Republic of the post-transition period is elected by the elected National Assembly and the elected Senate meeting in Congress, with a majority of two-thirds of the members. If this majority is not obtained on the first two ballots, it immediately proceeds to other ballots until a Candidate obtains the suffrage equal to the two-thirds of the members of the Parliament. In the case of vacancy of the first President of the Republic of the post-transition period, his successor is elected according to the same modalities specified in the Preceding paragraph.

The President elected for the first post-transition period may not dissolve the Parliament.”

Data Source: https://perma.cc/BHF6-P4Q2

Full Citation: Constitution of Burundi. 2005. https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Burundi_2005.pdf . Page 56.

<br> Source Excerpt: “Article 96: The President of the Republic is elected by universal direct suffrage for a term of five years renewable one time.”

Data Source: https://perma.cc/BHF6-P4Q2

Full Citation: Constitution of Burundi. 2005. https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Burundi_2005.pdf . Page 17.

<br> Data Source:  https://perma.cc/V4AY-2AJH

Full Citation: "Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi." Conclusion date: August 28, 2000. https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/BI_000828_Arusha%20Peace%20and%20Reconciliation%20Agreement%20for%20Burundi.pdf .

<br> Data Source: https://perma.cc/RU8U-GSJC

Full Citation: Parliament of Burundi. Burundi Electoral Code of 2009. 2009. https://cdn.accf-francophonie.org/2019/03/burundi-code-electoral-2009.pdf .

<br> Data Source: https://perma.cc/9JG3-XPPF

Full Citation: "Global Ceasefire Agreement between the Transitional Government of Burundi and the National Council for the Defence of the Democracy-Forces for the Defence of Democracy." Conclusion date: November 16, 2003. https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/BI_031116_GlobalCeasefireAgreement.pdf .

<br> Source Excerpt: “Article 175: The National Assembly may not have a valid deliberation unless at least two thirds of the deputies are present. The laws are voted by the majority of two-thirds of the deputies presented or represented. The organic laws are voted by the majority of two-thirds of the deputies present or represented, except this majority cannot be inferior to the absolute majority of the members composing the National Assembly. The majority of two-thirds of deputies present or represented is also required for voting on resolutions, decisions, and important recommendations.”

Data Source: https://perma.cc/BHF6-P4Q2

Full Citation: Constitution of Burundi. 2005. https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Burundi_2005.pdf . Page 32.

<br> Source Excerpt: “The Transitional Government of the Republic of Burundi and the National Council for the Defence of Democracy-Forces for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD-FDD), hereinafter referred to as 'the Parties'…

Recalling the principles and objectives of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi and the Transitional Constitution of the Republic of Burundi,

Recalling our commitment to respect and implement in good faith the agreements and protocols concluded for the purposes of ending the war and rebuilding Burundi,

Reaffirming our unshakeable determination to put an end to the root causes of the continuing situation of violence, bloodshed, insecurity, political instability, and exclusion, which has heaped distress and suffering on the Burundian people and is seriously compromising the prospects for economic development and the establishment of equality and social justice in our country…”

Data Source: https://perma.cc/9JG3-XPPF

Full Citation: "Global Ceasefire Agreement between the Transitional Government of Burundi and the National Council for the Defence of the Democracy-Forces for the Defence of Democracy." Conclusion date: November 16, 2003. https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/BI_031116_GlobalCeasefireAgreement.pdf . Page 4.

<br> Source Excerpt: [The signatories of this agreement] “Expressing our deep appreciation for the persistent efforts of the Facilitators, the late Mwalimu Julius Kambarage Nyerere and Mr. Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela…Determined to put aside our differences in all their manifestations in order to promote the factors that are common to us and which unite us, and to work together for the realization of the higher interests of the people of Burundi…Reaffirming our commitment to shape a political order and a system of government inspired by the realities of our country and founded on the values of justice, democracy, good governance, pluralism, respect for the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual, unity, solidarity, mutual understanding, tolerance and cooperation among the different ethnic groups within our society…”

Data Source: https://perma.cc/V4AY-2AJH

Full Citation: "Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi." Conclusion date: August 28, 2000. https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/BI_000828_Arusha%20Peace%20and%20Reconciliation%20Agreement%20for%20Burundi.pdf . Page 3.

<br> Source Excerpt: “Article 164: The National Assembly is composed of at least one hundred deputies at the rate of 60% Hutu and 40% Tutsi, with a minimum of 30% of women, elected by direct universal suffrage for a mandate of five years and three deputies from the Twa co-opted ethnicity conforming to the electoral code. Where the results of the vote do not reflect the above percentages, a co-optation mechanism provided under the electoral code will proceed to address the imbalance. The number of candidates to elect by district is fixed by electoral law proportionally to the population.”

Data Source: https://perma.cc/BHF6-P4Q2

Full Citation: Constitution of Burundi. 2005. https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Burundi_2005.pdf . Page 30.