2,291 Matching Annotations
  1. Nov 2022
  2. www.cambridge.org www.cambridge.org
    AnnoREP - Data for: Kosovo’s Independence Constitution: A Unilateral Commitment to an Internationalized Pouvoir Constituant
    58
    1. QDR 03 Nov 2022
      the 120-day transition period from Settlement’s “entry into force” moment

      <br> Excerpt: “Article 10 Constitutional Commission

      (…)

      10.4 (…) The Assembly of Kosovo shall formally approve the Constitution within 120 days of the entry into force of this Settlement with a two thirds majority of its current members, following appropriate consultations with Assembly members of Communities who are not in the majority in Kosovo. Upon formal approval, the Constitution shall be deemed adopted by the Assembly of Kosovo and shall enter into force on the first day immediately following the end of the transition period, as defined in Article 15.1 of this Settlement..”

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6CIKQNF/NATAKH

      Full Citation: United Nations Security Council. Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement. Dated March 26, 2007. Page 6.

    3. QDR 03 Nov 2022
      article 15

      <br> Excerpt: “Article 15 Transitional Arrangements and Final Provisions

      15.1 Upon the entry into force of this Settlement, there shall be a 120 day transition period:<br /> a) During the transition period, UNMIK shall continue to exercise its mandate in accordance with relevant UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions, in consultation with the International Civilian Representative (ICR). During the transition period, KFOR shall continue to exercise its mandate in accordance with relevant UNSC resolutions. The ICR shall have the authority to monitor implementation of the Settlement during the transition period and to make recommendations to UNMIK on actions to be taken to ensure compliance with the Settlement.<br /> b) The Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government and other applicable laws shall remain in effect until the end of the transition period to the extent not inconsistent with this Settlement.<br /> c) The Assembly of Kosovo shall formally approve a new Constitution before the end of this transition period, in accordance with the tens of this Settlement.<br /> d) If. by the end of the transition period, the new Constitution ha. not been formally approved, UNMIK shall amend the Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government, in accordance with the terms of this Settlement. The amended Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government shall remain in force until such time as the new Constitution is adopted by the Assembly. (…)”

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6CIKQNF/NATAKH

      Full Citation: United Nations Security Council. Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement. Dated March 26, 2007. Page 9.

    4. QDR 03 Nov 2022
      pressure.

      <br> Excerpt: “Article 3 Equality Before the Law

      1. The Republic of Kosovo is a multi-ethnic society consisting of Albanian and other Communities, governed democratically with full respect for the rule of law through its legislative, executive and judicial institutions.

      2. The exercise of public authority in the Republic of Kosovo shall be based upon the principles of equality of all individuals before the law and with full respect for internationally recognized fundamental human rights and freedoms, as well as protection of the rights of and participation by all Communities and their members.”

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6CIKQNF/ZHIRPP

      Full Citation: Constitution of Kosovo. 2008. Page 1.

    5. QDR 03 Nov 2022
      articles 1

      <br> Excerpt: “ANNEX II<br /> THE RIGHTS OF COMMUNITIES AND THEIR MEMBERS

      Article 1 Basic Provisions

      1.1 Inhabitants belonging to the same national or ethnic, linguistic, or religious group traditionally present on the territory of Kosovo (Communities) shall have specific rights as set forth in this Annex, in addition to the human rights and fundamental freedoms provided for in Article 2 of Annex I of this Settlement,

      1.2 Every member of h Community shall have the right freely to choose to be treated or not to be treated as such and no discrimination shall result from this choice or from the exercise of the rights which are connected to that choice.

      1.3 Members of Communities shall have the right to freely express. foster and develop their identity and community attributes.

      1.4 The exercise of these rights shall carry with it duties and responsibilities to act in accordance with Kosovo law, and shall not violate the rights of others.”

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6CIKQNF/NATAKH

      Full Citation: United Nations Security Council. Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement. Dated March 26, 2007. Page 18.

    6. QDR 03 Nov 2022
      (ii) Annex XII on the Legislative Agenda.

      <br> Excerpt: “ANNEX XII<br /> LEGISLATIVE AGENDA

      Article 1 Legislation to Be Formally Approved During the Transition Period

      The Assembly of Kosovo shall formally approve the necessary Iegislation to implement the terms of this Settlement during the 120day transition period, which shall be deemed adopted by the Assembly and shall become effective on the first day immediately following the transition period. Such legislation shall include, but not be limited to, the following laws or amendments thereto:

      1.1 Laws on General and Local Elections;<br /> 1.2 Law on Local Self-Government;<br /> 1.3 Law on Municipal Boundaries;<br /> 1.4 Law on the Establishment of Protective Zones;<br /> 1.5 Rules of procedures, or amendments thereto, as necessary to implement the terms of this Settlement immediately upon the end of the transition period, including, in particular, rules of procedures related to the protection and promotion of the rights of Communities and their members.”

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6CIKQNF/NATAKH

      Full Citation: United Nations Security Council. Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement. Dated March 26, 2007. Page 60.

    7. QDR 03 Nov 2022
      Constitution’s Preamble

      <br> Excerpt: “We, the people of Kosovo,

      Determined to build a future of Kosovo as a free, democratic and peace-loving country that will be a homeland to all of its citizens;

      Committed to the creation of a state of free citizens that will guarantee the rights of every citizen, civil freedoms and equality of all citizens before the law;

      Committed to the state of Kosovo as a state of economic wellbeing and social prosperity;

      Convinced that the state of Kosovo will contribute to the stability of the region and entire Europe by creating relations of good neighborliness and cooperation with all neighboring countries;

      Convinced that the state of Kosovo will be a dignified member of the family of peace-loving states in the world;

      With the intention of having the state of Kosovo fully participating in the processes of Euro-Atlantic integration;

      In a solemn manner, we approve the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo.”

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6CIKQNF/ZHIRPP

      Full Citation: Constitution of Kosovo. 2008. Page V.

    8. QDR 03 Nov 2022
      Constitution.

      <br> Excerpt: “ANNEX XII<br /> LEGISLATIVE AGENDA

      Article 2 Legislation to be Formally Approved During or Adopted After the Transition Period

      The Assembly of Kosovo may formally, approve other legislation during the transition period to implement the terms of this Settlement, which, if approved, shall be deemed adopted by the Assembly and shall become effective on the first day immediately following the transition period. Such legislation shall otherwise be adopted as a matter of priority immediately upon the conclusion of the transition period, and shall include, but not be limited to, the following laws or amendments thereto:<br /> 2.1 Laws related to the Rights of Communities and their Members;<br /> 2.2 Law on the Establishment of the Kosovo Security Council;<br /> 2.3 Legislation to establish a Civil Aviation Authority;<br /> 2.4 Amendments to the Assembly Rules of Procedure for the Establishment of an Assembly Security Oversight Committee;<br /> 2.5 Legislation on Local Finance;<br /> 2.6 Laws related to distribution of competencies and other issues in the following sectors;<br /> 2.6.1 Education;<br /> 2.6.2 Health Care;<br /> 2.7 Law on the Kosovo Security Force;<br /> 2.8 Law on Service in the Kosovo Security Force;<br /> 2.9 Law on Service in the Kosovo Police;<br /> 2.10 Law on the Establishment of a Domestic Kosovo Intelligence Agency;<br /> 2.11 Law on Kosovo Citizenship;<br /> 2.12 Law on National Symbols and Public Holidays;<br /> 2.13 Law on Restitution.”

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6CIKQNF/NATAKH

      Full Citation: United Nations Security Council. Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement. Dated March 26, 2007. Page 60.

    9. QDR 03 Nov 2022
      article 10 of the Settlement

      <br> Excerpt: “Article 10 – Constitutional Commission

      10.1 Immediately upon the entry into force of this Settlement, the President of Kosovo, in consultation with the Presidency of the Assembly of Kosovo, shall convene a Constitutional Commission to draft a Constitution, in consultation with the International Civilian Representative (ICR), in accordance with this Settlement.

      10.2 The Constitutional Commission shall be composed of twenty-one (2 1) Kosovan members, who shall possess the relevant professional qualifications and expertise necessary for this purpose, and who shall reflect the diversity of Kosovo society having due regard for internationally recognized principles of gender equality, as reflected in the human rights instruments referred to in Article 2 of Annex I of this Settlement. Fifteen (1 5) members shall be appointed by the Resident of Kosovo, in consultation with the Presidency of the Assembly of the Kosovo. Three (3) members shall be appointed by the Assembly members holding seats reserved for the Kosovo Serb Community, and three (3) members appointed by the Assembly members holding seats reserved for other Communities that are not in the majority in Kosovo.

      10.3 The Commission shall establish meaningful mechanisms to inform members of the public about its work. The ICR shall appoint representatives to assist the work of the Commission, including in developing its rules of procedure and evaluating available international models for constitution drafting.

      10.4 The Assembly may not formally approve the Constitution until such time as the ICR has certified it as in accordance with the terms of this Settlement. The Assembly of Kosovo shall formally approve the Constitution within 120 days of the entry into force of this Settlement with a two thirds majority of its current members, following appropriate consultations with Assembly members of Communities who are not in the majority in Kosovo. Upon formal approval, the Constitution shall be deemed adopted by the Assembly of Kosovo and shall enter into force on the first day immediately following the end of the transition period, as defined in Article 15.1 of this Settlement.“

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6CIKQNF/NATAKH

      Full Citation: United Nations Security Council. Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement. Dated March 26, 2007. Page 7.

    10. QDR 03 Nov 2022
      article 2 on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms

      <br> Excerpt: “ANNEX I<br /> CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

      Article 2 Provisions on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms

      2.1 The Constitution shall provide that the rights and freedoms set forth in the following international instruments and agreements shall be directly applicable in Kosovo and have priority over all other law; no amendments to the Constitution shall diminish these rights:

      Universal Declaration of Human Rights; European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and its Protocols: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its Protocols; Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; Convention on the Elimination of dl Forms of Discrimination Against Women; Convention on the Rights of the Child; Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. (…)”

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6CIKQNF/NATAKH

      Full Citation: United Nations Security Council. Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement. Dated March 26, 2007. Page 10.

    12. QDR 03 Nov 2022
      article 4

      <br> Excerpt: “Article 4 Form of Government and Separation of Power

      1. Kosovo is a democratic Republic based on the principle of separation of powers and the checks and balances among them as provided in this Constitution.
      2. The Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo exercises the legislative power.
      3. The President of the Republic of Kosovo represents the unity of the people. The President of the Republic of Kosovo is the legitimate representative of the country, internally and externally, and is the guarantor of the democratic functioning of the institutions of the Republic of Kosovo, as provided in this Constitution.
      4. The Government of the Republic of Kosovo is responsible for implementation of laws and state policies and is subject to parliamentarian control.
      5. The judicial power is unique and independent and is exercised by courts.
      6. The Constitutional Court is an independent organ in protecting the constitutionality and is the final interpreter of the Constitution.
      7. The Republic of Kosovo has institutions for the protection of the constitutional order and territorial integrity, public order and safety, which operate under the constitutional authority of the democratic institutions of the Republic of Kosovo.”

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6CIKQNF/ZHIRPP

      Full Citation: Constitution of Kosovo. 2008. Page 1.

    13. QDR 03 Nov 2022
      3

      <br> Excerpt: “ANNEX II<br /> THE RIGHTS OF COMMUNITIES AND THEIR MEMBERS

      Article 3 Rights of Communities and their Members

      3.1 Members of communities shall have the right, individually or in Community, to:<br /> a. Express, maintain and develop their culture and preserve the essential elements of their identity, namely their religion, language, traditions and culture:<br /> b. Receive public education in one of the official languages of Kosovo of their choice at all levels;<br /> c. Receive pre-school, primary and secondary public education in their own language to the extent prescribed by law, with the thresholds for establishing specific classes or schools for this purpose being lower than normally stipulated for educational institutions;<br /> d. Establish and manage their own private educational and training establishments for which public financial assistance may be granted, in accordance with the law and international standards;<br /> e. Use their language and alphabet freely in private Adin public;<br /> f, Use of their language and alphabet in their relations with the municipal authorities or local offices of central authorities in areas where they represent a sufficient share of the population iqaccordance with the law. The costs incud by the use of an interpreter or a translator shall be borne by the competent authorities;<br /> g. Use and display Community symbols, in accordance with the law and international standards;<br /> (…).”

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6CIKQNF/NATAKH

      Full Citation: United Nations Security Council. Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement. Dated March 26, 2007. Page 19.

    14. QDR 03 Nov 2022
      Court.

      <br> Excerpt: “ANNEX I<br /> CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

      Article 6 The Constitutional Court and Justice System

      With regard to the Constitutional Court of Kosovo, the Constitution shall inter alia provide that:

      6.1 The Constitutional Court shall be composed of nine judges, which shall be distinguished jurists of the highest moral character.

      6.1.1 Six (6) judges shall be appointed by the President on the proposal of the Assembly. Of the six judges appointed for the first term of office following the entry into force of the Constitution, two (2) judges shall serve for a non-renewable term of three years, two (2) judges shall serve for a non-renewable term of six years, and two (2) judges shall serve for a non-renewable term of nine years. Thereafter, each judge appointed to the Constitutional Court shall be appointed for a nonrenewable term of nine years. The judges whose terms of office are to expire at the end of the initial periods of three or six years shall be chosen by lot by the President of Kosovo immediately after their appointment.

      6.1.2 With respect to four (4) of the six judicial positions, the decision to propose a person as a judge of the Constitutional Court shall require a two-thirds majority within the Assembly; with respect to the other two positions, the consent of the majority of the members of the Assembly including the consent of the majority of the members of the Assembly holding seats reserved or guaranteed for representatives of Communities that are not in the majority in Kosovo, shall be required.

      6,1.3 Three international judges shall be appointed by the President of the European Court of Human Rights, upon consultation with the International Civilian Representative. (…)”.

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6CIKQNF/NATAKH

      Full Citation: United Nations Security Council. Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement. Dated March 26, 2007. Page 15.

    16. QDR 03 Nov 2022
      “establish meaningful mechanisms to inform members of the public about its work.”

      <br> Excerpt: “Article 10 Constitutional Commission

      (…)

      10.3 The Commission shall establish meaningful mechanisms to inform members of the public about its work. The ICR shall appoint representatives to assist the work of the Commission, including in developing its rules of procedure and evaluating available international models for constitution drafting.”

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6CIKQNF/NATAKH

      Full Citation: United Nations Security Council. Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement. Dated March 26, 2007. Page 6.

    17. QDR 03 Nov 2022
      period

      <br> Excerpt: “Article 1 General Principles

      (…)

      1.11 The international community shall supervise, monitor and have all necessary powers to ensure effective and efficient implementation of this Settlement, as set forth in Annexes IX, X and XI. Kosovo shall also issue an invitation to the international community to assist Kosovo in successfully fulfilling its obligations to this end.

      ANNEX IX<br /> INTERNATIONAL CIVILIAN REPRESENTATIVE

      Article 2 Mandate and Powers of the International Civilian Representative

      2.1 Regarding the general supervision of the implementation of this Settlement, the ICR shall:<br /> a. Be the final authority in Kosovo regarding interpretation of the civilian aspects of this Settlement:”

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6CIKQNF/NATAKH

      Full Citation: United Nations Security Council. Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement. Dated March 26, 2007. Page 2/52.

    18. QDR 03 Nov 2022
      “the Assembly may not formally approve the Constitution until such time as the ICR has certified it.”

      <br> Excerpt: “Article 10 Constitutional Commission

      (…)

      10.4 The Assembly may not formally approve the Constitution until such time as the ICR ha, certified it as in accordance with the terms of this Settlement.”

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6CIKQNF/NATAKH

      Full Citation: United Nations Security Council. Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement. Dated March 26, 2007. Page 6.

    19. QDR 03 Nov 2022
      violation.

      <br> Excerpt: “ANNEX IXINTERNATIONAL CIVILIAN REPRESENTATIVE

      Article 2 Mandate and Powers of the International Civilian Representative

      2.1 Regarding the general supervision of the implementation of this Settlement, the ICR shall:

      a. Be the final authority in Kosovo regarding interpretation of the civilian aspects of this Settlement:<br /> b. Ensure effective implementation of this Settlement through the execution of specific tasks accorded to the ICR in other parts of this Settlement;<br /> c. Take corrective measures to remedy, as necessary, any actions taken by the Kosovo authorities that the ICR deems to be a breach of this Settlement, or seriously undermine the rule of law, or to be otherwise inconsistent with the terms or spirit of this Settlement; such corrective measures may include, but are not limited to, annulment of laws or decisions adopted by Kosovo authorities;<br /> d. In cases of serious or repeated failures to comply with the letter or spirit of this Settlement, and/or in instances of serious obstruction in the work of the ICR and/or ESDP Mission, the ICR shall have the authority to sanction or remove from office any public official or take other measures, as necessary, to ensure full respect for this Settlement and its implementation;<br /> e. Monitor, through his/her own office or through the establishment of appropriate reporting mechanisms from other international actors or organizations as may be present in Kosovo, the implementation of all civilian aspects of this Settlement.”

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6CIKQNF/NATAKH

      Full Citation: United Nations Security Council. Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement. Dated March 26, 2007. Page 52.

    20. QDR 03 Nov 2022
      aspects.

      <br> Excerpt: “ANNEX X<br /> EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY (ESDP) MISSION

      Article 1 Mandate and Powers

      The ESDP Mission shall, under the direction of the European Union Special Representative, exercise the power as outlined in Article 2.3 of Annex IX of this Settlement.

      The ESDP Mission and its personnel will be accorded the privileges and immunities as specified in Article 4.6 of Annex IX of this Settlement.”

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6CIKQNF/NATAKH

      Full Citation: United Nations Security Council. Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement. Dated March 26, 2007. Page 57.

    21. QDR 03 Nov 2022
      “immediately upon the entry into force of this Settlement”

      <br> Excerpt: “Article 10 Constitutional Commission

      10.1 Immediately upon the entry into force of this Settlement, the President of Kosovo, in consultation with the Presidency of the Assembly of Kosovo, shall convene a Constitutional Commission to draft a Constitution, in consultation with the International Civilian Representative (ICR), in accordance with this Settlement. (…).”

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6CIKQNF/NATAKH

      Full Citation: United Nations Security Council. Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement. Dated March 26, 2007. Page 6.

    25. QDR 03 Nov 2022
      independence.

      <br> Excerpt: “ANNEX I<br /> CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

      Article 1 Basic Provisions

      The Constitution of Kosovo shall:<br /> 1.1 Be consistent in all its provisions with this Settlement. and be interpreted in accordance with this Settlement: in the event of a conflict between the provisions of the Constitution and the provisions of this Settlement, the latter shall prevail.<br /> 1.2 Incorporate the provisions set forth in Article 1, General Principles, of this Settlement.<br /> 1.3 Affirm that Kosovo is a multi-ethnic society based upon the equality of all citizens and the highest level of internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as the promotion and protection of the rights and contributions of all its Communities and their members.<br /> 1.4 Affirm that Kosovo has no official religion and that it shall be neutral on questions of religious beliefs.<br /> 1.5 Affirm the responsibility of the Kosovo authorities to promote and facilitate the safe and dignified return of refugees and internally displaced persons from Kosovo. and to assist them in recovering their property and possessions.<br /> 1.6 Provide for the right of all citizens of the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia habitually residing in Kosovo on 1 January 1998 and their direct descendants to Kosovo citizenship regardless of their current residence and of any other citizenship they may hold.”

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6CIKQNF/NATAKH

      Full Citation: United Nations Security Council. Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement. Dated March 26, 2007. Page 10.

    26. QDR 03 Nov 2022
      resolution

      <br> Excerpt: “The National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia concludes that the Proposal of UN Secretary-General's Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari breaches the fundamental principles of international law since it does not take into consideration the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Serbia in relation to Kosovo-Metohija. In this Proposal, Kosovo-Metohija is beyond any doubt and against international law given the attributes of a sovereign state, thus illegally laying the foundations for the creation of an independent state on the territory of Serbia.”

      Data Source: https://perma.cc/2WUB-KKCR

      Full Citation: National Assembly of Serbia. Serbia: "Draft Resolution following UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari's "Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement" and continuation of negotiations on the future status of Kosovo-Metohija. Published February 13, 2007. https://perma.cc/2WUB-KKCR .

    27. QDR 03 Nov 2022
      it.

      <br> Excerpt: “ANNEX IXINTERNATIONAL CIVILIAN REPRESENTATIVE

      Article 4 Structure/staffing of the International Civilian Representative

      4.1 The ICR shall be appointed by an International Steering Group following consultations within the EU. The ISG shall seek UN Security Council endorsement of this appointment. The ISG shall have the following membership: France, Germany, Italy, Russia, United Kingdom, United States, European Union, European Commission, NATO.”

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6CIKQNF/NATAKH

      Full Citation: United Nations Security Council. Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement. Dated March 26, 2007. Page 54.

    28. QDR 03 Nov 2022
      force.

      <br> Excerpt: “12.7 The ISG shall conduct its first review of the mandate of the ICR, on the basis of the state of implementation of this Settlement, no later than two years after the entry into force of this Settlement.”

      (…)<br /> Annex IX<br /> INTERNATIONAL CIVILLAN REPRESENTATIVE<br /> (…)<br /> Article 5 Reduction and Termination of the Mandate of the International Civilian Representative

      5.1 Based upon the recommendations of the ICR, the International Steering Group shall establish benchmarks for a periodical review of the mandate of the ICR, and shall conduct a full review of the powers of the ICR no later than two years after the entry into force of this Settlement, with a view to gradually reducing the scope of the powers of the ICR and the frequency of intervention.

      5.2 The mandate of the ICR shall be terminated when the International Steering Group determines that Kosovo has implemented the terms of this Settlement.

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6CIKQNF/NATAKH

      Full Citation: United Nations Security Council. Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement. Dated March 26, 2007. Page 8/55.

    29. QDR 03 Nov 2022
      community.

      <br> Data Source 1: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6CIKQNF/NATAKH

      Full Citation: United Nations Security Council. Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement. Dated March 26, 2007.

      Data Source 2: https://perma.cc/B982-W2PZ

      Full Citation: Special Envoy of the United Nations Secretary-General. Report of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Kosovo's Future Status. Dated October 24, 2005. https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Kosovo%20S2007%20168.pdf .

    30. QDR 03 Nov 2022
      Report of the Special Envoy

      <br> Excerpt: “Mr. Eide has concluded that, while standards implementation in Kosovo has been uneven, the time has come to move to the next phase of the political process. Based on the assessment provided in the report and further consultations I have undertaken, in particular with my Special Representative, Mr. Søren Jessen-Petersen, I accept Mr. Eide’s conclusion. I therefore intend to initiate preparations for the possible appointment, in the light of the outcome of the forthcoming Council deliberations, of a special envoy to lead the future status process.”

      Data Source: https://perma.cc/UN6A-ZPSR

      Full Citation: Special Envoy of the United Nations Secretary-General. A Comprehensive Review of the Situation in Kosovo. Dated June 13, 2005. http://pbosnia.kentlaw.edu/kai-eide-report-N0554069.pdf . Page 1.

    32. QDR 03 Nov 2022
      Helsinki Final Act

      <br> Excerpt: “The participating States…Declare their determination to respect and put into practice, each of them in its relations with all other participating States, irrespective of their political, economic or social systems as well as of their size, geographical location or level of economic development, the following principles, which all are of primary significance, guiding their mutual relations"

      Data Source: https://perma.cc/SN92-P5WJ

      Full Citation: "Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe Final Act". Signed August 1, 1975.https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/5/c/39501.pdf . Page 4.

    34. QDR 03 Nov 2022
      “Guiding Principles”

      <br> Excerpt: “The Contact Group reaffirms the importance which it attaches to constructive and sustained dialogue at all levels between Belgrade and Pristina and between the different communities in Kosovo. It asks the authorities in Belgrade to actively encourage the Serbs of Kosovo to take their place in Kosovo’s institutions. The Security Council will remain actively seized of the matter. The final decision on the status of Kosovo should be endorsed by the Security Council. The Contact Group therefore informs all the involved parties that the outcome of the status process should be based on the principles set out below:”

      Data Source: https://perma.cc/6NBD-ZQR6

      Full Citation: The Contact Group. Huiding Principles of the Contact Group for a Settlement of the Status of Kosovo. Dated November 10, 2005. https://www.esiweb.org/pdf/kosovo_Contact%20Group%20-%20Ten%20Guiding%20principles%20for%20Ahtisaari.pdf . Page 1.

    35. QDR 03 Nov 2022
      country,

      <br> Data Source 1: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6CIKQNF/NWZEBP

      Full Citation: United Nations Security Council. Resolution 1272 (1999). Adopted October 25, 1999.

      Data Source 2: https://perma.cc/XQ7H-K5B5

      Full Citation: United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor. On the Election of a Constituent Assembly to Prepare a Constitution for an Independent and Democratic East Timor. Published March 16, 2001. https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/past/etimor/untaetR/reg20012.pdf .

    36. QDR 03 Nov 2022
      formally invited an international civilian presence to supervise the Settlement’s implementation and its unilaterally-declared status as independent

      <br> Excerpt: “5. We welcome the international community's continued support of our democratic development through international presences established in Kosovo on the basis of UN Security Council resolution 1244 (1999). We invite and welcome an international civilian presence to supervise our implementation of the Ahtisaari Plan, and a European Union-led rule of law mission. We also invite and welcome the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to retain the leadership role of the international military presence in Kosovo and to implement responsibilities assigned to it under UN Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) and the Ahtisaari Plan, until such time as Kosovo institutions are capable of assuming these responsibilities. We shall cooperate fully with these presences to ensure Kosovo's future peace, prosperity and stability.”

      Data Source: https://perma.cc/9CQY-C9BF

      Full Citation: Kosovo Declaration of Independence. Feb 17, 2008. https://www.refworld.org/docid/47d685632.html .

    40. QDR 03 Nov 2022
      parties.

      <br> Excerpt: “Upon our appointment as Troika representatives, we vowed to “leave no stone unturned” in the search for a mutually acceptable outcome. In pursuit of this goal, we explained to the parties the principles that would guide our work. First, we reaffirmed that Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) and the November 2005 guiding principles of the Contact Group would continue to be our operating framework. Second, we noted that while the Ahtisaari Settlement was still on the table, we would be prepared to endorse any agreement the parties might be able to reach. Both sides were repeatedly reminded of their responsibility for success or failure of the process.”

      Data Source: https://perma.cc/JY8H-VXMR

      Full Citation: European Union/United States/Russian Federation Troika on Kosovo. Report of the European/ Union/United States/ Russian Federation Troika on Kosovo. Dated December 4, 2007. https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/09FC5B573AF25D48852573B1005A49D1-Full_Report.pdf . Page 2.

    45. QDR 03 Nov 2022
      Kosovo Statute

      <br> Analytic note: “This document does not exist online. It is also very difficult to find a printed copy. Now, the legal basis for this Statute, is provided for in Article 110, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the 1990 Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, which maintains that: “The Statute is the highest legal act of the autonomous province laying down, on the basis of the Constitution, the responsibility of the autonomous province, elections, organisation and operation of its bodies and other issues of interest to the autonomous province. The Statute of the Autonomous Province shall be adopted by its Assembly, subject to prior approval of the National Assembly.” In addition, article 13 of the Constitutional Act Implementing the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia (Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, No. 1/1990), maintains that “The Assembly of the Republic of Serbia shall adopt a provisional statutory decision of the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija and call direct and secret elections to the Assembly of the Province according to the provisions of the Constitution and the provisional statutory decision. The newly elected Assembly of the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija shall adopt the Statute of the Province.”

      Data Source 1: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6CIKQNF/ZOK9NM

      Full Citation: Constitution of The Republic of Serbia 1990.

      Data Source 2: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6CIKQNF/FPWHWF

      Full Citation: Republic of Slovenia. Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-government of Kosovo (Request for an Advisory Opinion)." Submitted July 17, 2009.

    49. QDR 03 Nov 2022
      It committed to incorporating the “relevant” principles of the Settlement

      <br> Excerpt: “1. We, the democratically-elected leaders of our people, hereby declare Kosovo to be an independent and sovereign state. This declaration reflects the will of our people and it is in full accordance with the recommendations of UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari and his Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement.”

      Data Source: https://perma.cc/9CQY-C9BF

      Full Citation: Kosovo Declaration of Independence. Feb 17, 2008. https://www.refworld.org/docid/47d685632.html .

    52. QDR 03 Nov 2022
      steps.

      <br> Excerpt: “We, a Troika of representatives from the European Union, the United States and the Russian Federation, have spent the last four months conducting negotiations between Belgrade and Pristina on the future status of Kosovo. Our objective was to facilitate an agreement between the parties. (…)The Troika was able to facilitate high-level, intense and substantive discussions between Belgrade and Pristina. Nonetheless, the parties were unable to reach an agreement on the final status of Kosovo. Neither party was willing to cede its position on the fundamental question of sovereignty over Kosovo. This is regrettable, as a negotiated settlement is in the best interests of both parties.”

      Data Source: https://perma.cc/JY8H-VXMR

      Full Citation: European Union/United States/Russian Federation Troika on Kosovo. Report of the European/ Union/United States/ Russian Federation Troika on Kosovo. Dated December 4, 2007. https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/09FC5B573AF25D48852573B1005A49D1-Full_Report.pdf . Page 2.

    57. QDR 03 Nov 2022
      Resolutions

      <br> Data Source 1: https://perma.cc/77VZ-MSEJ

      Full Citation: United Nations Security Council. Resolution 1271. (1999). Adopted October 22, 1999. http://unscr.com/files/1999/01271.pdf .

      Data Source 2: https://perma.cc/VMC2-C38B

      Full Citation: United Nations Security Council. Resolution 1511 (2003). Adopted October 16, 2003.

      Data Source 3: https://perma.cc/X69A-D9XQ

      Full Citation: United Nations Security Council. Resolution 1546 (2004). Adopted June 8, 2004. http://unscr.com/files/2004/01546.pdf .

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    AnnoREP - Data for: Making and remaking Kenya's constitution
    49
    2. QDR 03 Nov 2022
      BBI’s proposed amendment

      <br> Source Excerpt: “22. Article 130 (1) of the Constitution is amended by inserting the words ‘the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Ministers’ immediately after the words ‘the Deputy President.’”

      Data Source: https://perma.cc/JW9L-9GRS

      Full Citation: Parliament of Kenya. The Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) Bill, 2020. 2020. http://kenyalaw.org/kenyalawblog/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Constitution-of-Kenya-Amendment-Bill-25-11-2020.pdf . Page 8.

    4. QDR 03 Nov 2022
      Accord in 2008

      <br> Source Excerpt: “An Act of Parliament to give effect to the Agreement on the Principles of Partnership of the Coalition Government, to foster national accord and reconciliation, to provide for the formation of a coalition Government and the establishment of the offices of Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Ministers and Ministers of the Government of Kenya, their functions and various matters connected with and incidental to the foregoing.”

      Data Source: https://perma.cc/U288-Q9XB

      Full Citation: Parliament of Kenya. National Accord and Reconciliation Act No. 4 of 2008. 2008. http://kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/pdfdownloads/Acts/NationalAccordandReconciliationAct_No4of2008.pdf . Page 5.

    7. QDR 03 Nov 2022
      to be leader of government business in the Assembly and to supervise the “execution of the functions of ministries and government departments”.

      <br> Source Excerpt: "151A. Office of the Prime Minister (1) There shall be a Prime Minister appointed by the President in accordance with Article 151B.(2) The Prime Minister shall— (a) be the leader of government business in the National Assembly; (b) oversee the legislative agenda in the National Assembly on behalf of government; (c) supervise the execution of the functions of ministries and government departments; (d) chair cabinet committee meetings as assigned by the President; (e) assign any of the functions of the Office to the Deputy Prime Ministers; and (f) perform any other duty assigned by the President or conferred by legislation.”

      Data Source: https://perma.cc/JW9L-9GRS

      Full Citation: Parliament of Kenya. The Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) Bill, 2020. 2020. http://kenyalaw.org/kenyalawblog/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Constitution-of-Kenya-Amendment-Bill-25-11-2020.pdf . Page 9.

    13. QDR 03 Nov 2022
      the Committee of Experts (CoE)

      <br> Source Excerpt: “8. (1) There is established a committee to be known as the Committee of Experts… 16. In the performance of its functions under this Act, the Committee of Experts shall not be subject to the control of any person or authority.”

      Data Source: https://perma.cc/J2AR-QN9U

      Full Citation: Parliament of Kenya. Constitution of Kenya Review Act Chapter 3A. 2009. http://kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/pdfdownloads/Acts/ConstitutionofKenyaReviewCap3A.pdf . Page 8.

    14. QDR 03 Nov 2022
      Prime Minister is to be the leader of the largest party or largest coalition in the National Assembly

      <br> Source Excerpt: “151B. Appointment of the Prime Minister (1) Within seven days of the President being sworn in after a general election, or following an occurrence of a vacancy in the office of the Prime Minister, the President shall nominate a Prime Minister in accordance with this Article. (2) A person is eligible to be nominated as the Prime Minister if the person is an elected member of the National Assembly who is the leader in the National Assembly of the largest party or coalition of parties.”

      Data Source: https://perma.cc/JW9L-9GRS

      Full Citation: Parliament of Kenya. The Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) Bill, 2020. 2020. http://kenyalaw.org/kenyalawblog/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Constitution-of-Kenya-Amendment-Bill-25-11-2020.pdf . Page 9.

    15. QDR 03 Nov 2022
      brought the two forces (now called services) together under a single Inspector General

      <br> Source Excerpt: “224 (1) There is established the Kenya Internal Security Service consisting of-(a) the Kenya Police Service; and(b) the Administration Police Service.226 (1) There is established the office of the Inspector General of the Kenya Internal Security Service who shall be appointed by the President with the approval of the National Assembly."

      Data Source: https://perma.cc/ZR8K-G67C

      Full Citation: Parliamentary Select Committee. Revised Harmonized Draft: Constitution of Kenya. 2010. https://constitutionnet.org/sites/default/files/draft_from_the_parliamentary_select_committee_to_the_coe.pdf . Page 122.

    17. QDR 03 Nov 2022
      Wako Draft made the Prime Minister accountable to the President

      <br> Source Excerpt: “Appointment and functions of Prime Minister163.(1) There shall be a Prime Minister of the Republic, who shall be appointed by the President in accordance with the provisions of this Part. (2) The Prime Minister shall be accountable to the President and shall, under thegeneral direction of the President – (a) be the Leader of Government business in Parliament;(b) perform or cause to be performed such other duties as the President may direct; and (c) perform such other functions as are conferred by this Constitution and any other functions as the President may assign.”

      Data Source: https://perma.cc/KEX3-DSGR

      Full Citation: Parliament of Kenya.Proposed New Constitution. 2005. http://academia-ke.org/library/download/kenya-wako-draft-constitution-2005/?wpdmdl=7755&refresh=6117cb486d8df1628949320 . Page 92.

    20. QDR 03 Nov 2022
      appointed by the President from among the members of the cabinet.

      <br> Source Excerpt: “151D. The Deputy Prime Ministers (1) There shall be two Deputy Prime Ministers appointed by the President from among the Cabinet Ministers. (2) A Deputy Prime Minister shall, in addition to their functions as a Cabinet Minister, (a) deputise for the Prime Minister in the execution of the Prime Minister’s functions; and (b) perform any other function the Prime Minister may assign.”

      Data Source: https://perma.cc/JW9L-9GRS

      Full Citation: Parliament of Kenya. The Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) Bill, 2020. 2020. http://kenyalaw.org/kenyalawblog/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Constitution-of-Kenya-Amendment-Bill-25-11-2020.pdf . Page 11.

    21. QDR 03 Nov 2022
      three principal draft constitutions

      <br> Data Source 1: https://perma.cc/NQ5D-R5DV

      Full Citation: Constitution of Kenya Review Commission. Draft Constitution of Kenya [Bomas Draft]. 2004. https://s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/s3.sourceafrica.net/documents/118273/Kenya-4-Draft-Constitution-Bomas-Draft-2004.pdf .

      Data Source 2: https://perma.cc/KEX3-DSGR

      Full Citation: Parliament of Kenya. Proposed New Constitution. 2005. http://academia-ke.org/library/download/kenya-wako-draft-constitution-2005/?wpdmdl=7755&refresh=6117cb486d8df1628949320 .

    22. QDR 03 Nov 2022
      Committee of Experts on Constitutional Review 2010a

      <br> Data Source: https://perma.cc/Z85J-VZC8

      Full Citation: Committee of Experts on Constitutional Review. The Report of the Committee of Experts on Constitutional Review Issued on the Submission of the Reviewed harmonized Draft Constitution to the Parliamentary Selected Committee on Constitutional Review, 8th January, 2010. 2010. https://katibaculturalrights.files.wordpress.com/2016/04/final_report_on_the_reviewd_draft1.pdf .

    23. QDR 03 Nov 2022
      mandated to start the review process by identifying the ‘contentious issues’

      <br> Source Excerpt: “3. The object and purpose of this Act is to- … (c) provide a mechanism for consensus-building on contentious issues in the review process … 23. The Committee of Experts Shall- … (b) identify the issues which are contentious or not agreed upon in the existing draft constitutions;”

      Data Source: https://perma.cc/J2AR-QN9U

      Full Citation: Parliament of Kenya. Constitution of Kenya Review Act Chapter 3A. 2009. http://kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/pdfdownloads/Acts/ConstitutionofKenyaReviewCap3A.pdf . Page 6.

    24. QDR 03 Nov 2022
      Review Act 2008, section 29

      <br> Source Excerpt: “29. In the performance of its functions under this Act, the Committee of Experts shall draw upon the views and materials collected or prepared by the various organs of review under the expired Act, including but not limited to-(a) the summary of the views of Kenyans collected and collated by the Commission; (b) the various draft constitutions prepared by the Commission and the Constitutional Conference; (c) the Proposed New Constitution, 2005; (d) documents reflecting political agreement on critical constitutional questions, such as the document commonly known as the Naivasha Accord; (e) analytical and academic studies commissioned or undertaken by the Commission or the Constitutional Conference.”

      Data Source: https://perma.cc/TX8E-SDVY

      Full Citation: Parliament of Kenya. Constitution of Kenya Review Act (Act 9 of 2008). 2008. https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2013/11/08/The_Constitution_of_Kenya_Review_Act_2008.pdf . Page 22.

    25. QDR 03 Nov 2022
      The BBI proposal concerning the Leader of the Official Opposition

      <br> Source Excerpt: “16. The Constitution is amended by inserting the following new Article immediately after Article 107— 107A. Leader of Official Opposition (1) There shall be a Leader of Official Opposition in the National Assembly. (2) The Leader of Official Opposition shall be the person— (a) who received the second greatest number of votes in a presidential election; and (b) whose political party or coalition of parties has at least twenty-five percent of all the members of the National Assembly.”

      Data Source: https://perma.cc/JW9L-9GRS

      Full Citation: Parliament of Kenya. The Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) Bill, 2020. 2020. http://kenyalaw.org/kenyalawblog/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Constitution-of-Kenya-Amendment-Bill-25-11-2020.pdf . Page 6.

    26. QDR 03 Nov 2022
      slate of proposed constitutional amendments

      <br> Data Source 1: https://perma.cc/JW9L-9GRS

      Full Citation: Parliament of Kenya. The Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) Bill, 2020. 2020. http://parliament.go.ke/sites/default/files/2020-10/CONSTITUTION%20OF%20KENYA%20AMENDMENT%20Bill%2C%202020.pdf .

      Data Source 2: https://perma.cc/XE2V-3B22

      Full Citation: Parliament of Kenya. The Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) Bill, 2020. 2020. http://kenyalaw.org/kenyalawblog/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Constitution-of-Kenya-Amendment-Bill-25-11-2020.pdf .

    27. QDR 03 Nov 2022
      Constitution of Kenya Review Act (Act 9 of 2008)

      <br> Source Excerpt: “AN ACT of Parliament to facilitate the completion of the review of the Constitution of Kenya, and for connected purposes.”

      Data Source: https://perma.cc/J2AR-QN9Uhttps://perma.cc/TX8E-SDVY

      Full Citation: Parliament of Kenya. Constitution of Kenya Review Act (Act 9 of 2008). 2008. https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2013/11/08/The_Constitution_of_Kenya_Review_Act_2008.pdf . Page 4.

    28. QDR 03 Nov 2022
      first, that ‘life begins at conception’ and, second, that ‘abortion is not permitted unless in the opinion of a registered medical practitioner the life of the mother is in danger’

      <br> Source Excerpt: “25 (1) Every person has the right to life.(2) The life of a person begins at conception. (3) A person shall not be deprived of life intentionally except as may be authorised by this Constitution or any other written law. (4) Abortion is not permitted unless in the opinion of a registered medical practitioner, the life of the mother is in danger.”

      Data Source: https://perma.cc/ZR8K-G67C

      Full Citation: Parliamentary Select Committee. Revised Harmonized Draft: Constitution of Kenya. 2010. https://constitutionnet.org/sites/default/files/draft_from_the_parliamentary_select_committee_to_the_coe.pdf . Page 22.

    29. QDR 03 Nov 2022
      as the Bomas Draft proposed

      <br> Source Excerpt: “Structure of the National Executive 151. The executive authority of the Republic at the national level of government is vested in the President, the Deputy President, the Prime Minister, and Ministers, all of whom, in the performance of their respective functions, shall work in harmony for the good of Kenya and the progress of the people of Kenya.”

      Data Source: https://perma.cc/NQ5D-R5DV

      Full Citation: Constitution of Kenya Review Commission. Draft Constitution of Kenya [Bomas Draft]. 2004. https://s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/s3.sourceafrica.net/documents/118273/Kenya-4-Draft-Constitution-Bomas-Draft-2004.pdf . Page 79.

    30. QDR 03 Nov 2022
      Constitution of Kenya Review Commission 2005, 28.2.1

      <br> Source Excerpt: “We, the Commissioners of Constitution of Kenya Review Commission are pleased to publish this final report on the work we were mandated to do. We listened very carefully to the views of Kenyans throughout the country. We have been touched by their stories and found much wisdom in their recommendations. We analysed social, political. economic and constitutional developments in Kenya over the last four decades, and tried to imagine the future in which the new Constitution will operate. As mandated by the Constitution of Kenya Review Commission Act, we went around the country, between December 2001 and July 2002, to collect and collate the views of Kenyans of all walks of life concerning the issues they wanted addressed in the new Constitution. Although the information we assembled is vast, this report, and other publications of the Commission, is intended to make this information conveniently available to the public.”

      Data Source: https://perma.cc/D4QW-44VQ

      Full Citation: The Constitution of Kenya Review Commission. The Final Report of The Constitution of Kenya Review Commission. 2005. http://kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/CommissionReports/The-Final-Report-of-the-Constitution-of-Kenya-Review-Commission-2005.pdf . Page XV.

    33. QDR 03 Nov 2022
      Report of the Committee of Eminent Persons 2006

      <br> Source Excerpt: “On 24th February 2006, His Excellency the President appointed a Committee of Eminent Persons to undertake an evaluation of the Constitution of Kenya review process and to make recommendations on how to conclude the process… The Committee has compiled this report after listening to the views of Kenyans from all walks of life. This report is also informed by the findings of several studies and a national survey that the Committee commissioned in order to ensure that the views of Kenyans all over the country were captured.”

      Data Source: https://perma.cc/6KPN-8E7Z

      Full Citation: Committee of Eminent Persons. Report of the Committee of Eminent Persons on the Constitution Review Process. 2006. http://kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/CommissionReports/Report-of-the-Committee-of-Eminent-Persons-on-the-Constitution-Review-Process.pdf . Page V.

    35. QDR 03 Nov 2022
      Steering Committee on the Implementation of the Building Bridges to a United Kenya 2020

      <br> Source Excerpt: “Your Excellency [President of the Republic of Kenya], You appointed this Steering Committee by Gazette Notice No. 264, published on 10th January, 2020. It was our privilege, as per the mandate, to conduct validation of the Task force Report on Building Bridges to a United Kenya through consultations with citizens, civil society, the faith- based organizations, cultural leaders, the private sector and experts; and propose administrative, policy, statutory or constitutional changes that are necessary for the implementation of the recommendations contained in the Task force Report…”

      Data Source: https://perma.cc/5ZTA-MBH6

      Full Citation: Steering Committee on the Implementation of the Building Bridges. Report of the Steering Committee on the Implementation of the Building Bridges to a United Kenya Taskforce Report. 2020. https://s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/s3.sourceafrica.net/documents/120777/Report-of-the-Steering-Committee-on-the.pdf . Page 1.

    36. QDR 03 Nov 2022
      Agenda Item Four

      <br> Data Source: https://perma.cc/3XMX-ZP2R

      Full Citation: Kenyan National Dialogue and Reconciliation. Kenyan National Dialogue and Reconciliation Through the Mediation of H.E. Kofi A. Annan and the Panel of Eminent African Personalities on the Resolution of the Political Crises Annotated Agenda and Timetable. 2008. https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/KE_080101_Annotated%20Agenda%20for%20the%20Kenya%20Dialogue%20and%20Reconciliation.pdf .

    41. QDR 03 Nov 2022
      introduced presidential term limits

      <br> Source Excerpt: Article 5(9)(1): "The President shall hold office for a term of five years beginning from the date on which he is sworn in as President."

      Data Source: https://perma.cc/AFW2-5AXH

      Full Citation: Parliament of Kenya. The Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) Act, 1992. No. 6 of 1992. 1992. http://www.kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/pdfdownloads/Constitution/HistoryoftheConstitutionofKenya/Acts/1992/ActNo.6of1992.pdf . Page 150.

    46. QDR 03 Nov 2022
      1998 Constitution of Kenya Review Act

      <br> Source Excerpt: “An ACT of Parliament to facilitate the comprehensive review of the Constitution of the people of Kenya and its eventual alteration by Parliament; to provide for the establishment, powers and functions of the Commission, District Constitutional Forums and the National Constitutional Consultative Forum, and for connected purposes.”

      Data Source: https://perma.cc/3MA5-FR8X

      Full Citation: Parliament of Kenya. The Constitution of Kenya Review Act 1997. No. 13 of 1997. 1997. https://constitutionnet.org/sites/default/files/KEL97-005.pdf . Page 539.

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  4. Nov 2021
  5. www.cambridge.org www.cambridge.org
    Making Sense of Human Rights Diplomacy: Evidence from a US Campaign to Free Political Prisoners
    58
    1. QDR 01 Nov 2021
      stave off meaningfulhuman rights reform

      <br>

      Analytic Note: An op-ed published in The Washington Post by one of the women featured in #Freethe20, Khadija Ismayilova, expresses the concern that dictators could use minor concessions in one issue area to avoid major reforms.

      Source Excerpt: “[Azerbaijani President] Aliyev is shamelessly trying to use political prisoners as bargaining chips to advance his foreign policy agenda” (Ismayilova 2016).

      Full Citation: Ismayilova, Khadija. "Don't Let Azerbaijan Use Political Prisoners as Props." The Washington Post, March 31, 2016.

    2. QDR 01 Nov 2021
      leadership transition

      <br>

      Analytic Note: One interviewee explained that the difference in outcomes of the two Vietnamese women featured in #Freethe20 could be explained by a combination of the loss of leverage from US negotiation of the TPP and changing leadership in the Vietnamese government.

      Source Excerpt:

      "Q: What about Bui Thi Minh Hang? How do you explain the different outcomes? Ta Phong Tan was released right after the launch but Bui Thi Minh Hanh served her full sentence.

      A: She was part of a large network that was cracked down on once the Politburo leadership in the presidency changed. In some ways, there was this sort of opening up and engagement [in Vietnam], and then a new group of the Politburo came in [in early 2016], and there was another faction. You don't have a multiparty system [in Vietnam], but you do have different factions, so it's almost like you have distinct parties."

      Full Citation: Interview 10, January 24, 2019.

    3. QDR 01 Nov 2021
      leverage the ongoing TPP negotiations.

      <br>

      Analytic Note: In contrast to the direct, explicit sources of leverage in the Azerbaijan cases, the leverage in the Vietnam cases was broader and more indirect via the negotiation of TPP.

      Source Excerpt: "When you have something like TPP being negotiated, everyone in the Vietnamese government knows that it has to be voted on, then it's like a horse-trading of a sort."

      Full Citation: Interview 10, January 24, 2019.

    4. QDR 01 Nov 2021
      competing interests

      <br>

      Analytic Note: The fact that human rights concerns were preempted by security and economic interests in Azerbaijan at this time was also well-known outside the government. For example, in a January 2016 article in The Washington Post, Samuel Ramani writes: “In short, America’s reluctance to take action against the Aliyev regime can be explained by Azerbaijan’s cooperation with U.S. strategic objectives. Bringing in energy, combating ISIS and other Islamist terrorism and thwarting Russian aggression are urgent concerns for U.S. policymakers. Human rights aren’t.”

      Full Citation: Ramani, Samuel. 2016. Three Reasons the U.S. Won't Break with Azerbaijan Over Its Violations of Human Rights and Democratic Freedoms. The Washington Post, January 20.

    5. QDR 01 Nov 2021
      skeptics of diplomacy around political prisoners p

      <br>

      Analytic Note: It is important to note that our interviewees offered conflicting opinions in their long-run assessments of the US governments' focus on political prisoners. For example, some interviewees viewed political prisoner releases as token concessions (Interview 6) while others saw them as complementary to structural change (Interview 9) or important irrespective of the broader context (Interview 10).

      Source Excerpts:

      "There are elements within any administration that want to pat themselves on the back for promoting human rights and are okay with that boiling down to only diplomacy around political prisoners. For there to be real forward progress, [the release of political prisoners] has to be coupled with something related to systemic issues" (Interview 6).

      "The attention that was drawn to these individuals drew more attention to the structural problems... This [campaign] provided a window into... the ratcheting up of the repression in China, for example" (Interview 9).

      "I visited a prisoner of conscience we were able to get out, and he was flat out being tortured. There's nothing you can tell me that will make me think that if I see someone like that, and I'm able to land him in a life that he's free of that, that I shouldn't try. I don't know, I think that's a human question" (Interview 10).

      Full Citations:

      Interview 6, September 17, 2018.

      Interview 9, January 17, 2019.

      Interview 10, January 24, 2019.

    6. QDR 01 Nov 2021
      existing database of UA

      <br>

      Analytic Note: Importantly, this distribution is not reflective of all political prisoners but rather of the information on individual cases featured by Amnesty International. For example, while human rights groups suspect North Korea has among the most political prisoners, Amnesty International typically does not have enough information on these prisoners to profile their cases. In addition, scholars have previously noted that Amnesty International engages in “information politics” by “reporting more heavily on human rights abuses in some countries than others” (Ron et al. 2005, p. 575) to maximize the impact of their advocacy work.

      Full Citation: Ron, James, Howard Ramos, and Kathleen Rodgers. 2005. “Transnational Information Politics: NGO Human Rights Reporting, 1986-2000.” International Studies Quarterly 49: 557-587.

    7. QDR 01 Nov 2021
      likely unable to mobilizeforeign publics

      <br>

      Analytic Note: In particular, government officials expressed regret about not translating press releases into local languages in the target countries.

      Source Excerpt:

      “Q: On the operational side, for these 20 cases, what did the media strategy look like? Who did you think was going to cover these things? What was the balance of international versus national media in the countries that were targeted? How much take-up did you think you got?

      A: If we had tried #Freethe20 later and secured more buy-in from the regions, we might have been able to activate in a more comprehensive way on the media part. We definitely did, for example, DOA Ukraine … What we didn’t do, though, was in-language media (in Ukrainian or in Russian). We didn’t have those assets available at the time.”

      Full Citation: Interview 5, August 21, 2018.

    8. QDR 01 Nov 2021
      concrete “carrots and sticks”

      <br>

      Analytic Note: One U.S. official who had worked on dozens of political prisoner cases noted that specific sanctions or changes in financial and military assistance were powerful tools for releasing political prisoners:

      Source Excerpt: “In the last two years, we’ve put Visa removals for any officials in Country X responsible for the detention of Person X. That’s been quite successful …. We almost always look at these countries and see if there’s some aid we can pull … Sometimes we say that we can do more aid if we address these human rights abuses."

      Full Citation: Interview 3, August 15, 2018.

    9. QDR 01 Nov 2021
      minimum of two months.

      <br>

      Analytic Note: Many women who appeared in the Urgent Actions were detained for a few days before release. Since these women could not have plausibly been featured in the #Freethe20 campaign, we selected a threshold of two months of imprisonment or detention.

    10. QDR 01 Nov 2021
      struggled to balance economic and security interests

      <br>

      Analytic Note: Our interviews highlighted conflicting interests over the bilateral relationship with Azerbaijan between officials in the State Department pursuing concerns about human rights abuses and political prisoners, officials in the Energy Department who were pursuing progress on the Southern Gas Corridor, and officials in the Department of Defense who were prioritizing security cooperation on counter-terrorism. Therefore, officials working on political prisoner issues were unable to highlight these issues in Azerbaijan at a more senior level of government.

      Source Excerpt: “This is a real example of deadlock. Policy stopped at the Assistant Secretary level. We never had a Deputies committee meeting on Azerbaijan. We … asked for them all the time, but we [weren’t able] to get a senior level meeting.”

      Full Citation: Interview 6, September 17, 2018.

    11. QDR 01 Nov 2021
      (Table 3).

      <br>

      Analytic Note: In non-technical terms, this table compares the release outcomes of women featured in #Freethe20 to other female political prisoners featured by Amnesty International from the same 12 countries during the same time period. Substantively, the table shows that women featured in the #Freethe20 campaign were more likely to be released within the three years following the start of the campaign in September 2015 relative to a comparable set of women. The different models show that this finding holds even when we take into account location and other characteristics about the individual case from Urgent Action reports.

    12. QDR 01 Nov 2021
      political prisoners—

      <br>

      Analytic Note: According to the official guidelines outlined by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), a political prisoner is an individual that meets one of five criteria:

      "(1) The detention violates basic guarantees in the European Convention on Human Rights, particularly freedom of thought, conscience, and religion; freedom of expression and information; and freedom of assembly and association. (2) The detention is imposed for purely political reasons. (3) The length or conditions of detention are out of proportion to the offense. (4) He or she is detained in a discriminatory manner as compared to other persons. (5) The detention is the result of judicial proceedings that are clearly unfair and connected with the political motives of authorities."

      Full Citation: Parliamentary Assembly Council of Europe. “Resolution 1900.” Text adopted by the Assembly on 3 October 2012.

    13. QDR 01 Nov 2021
      major focus

      <br>

      Analytic Note: While there are no reliable estimates of the population of political prisoners worldwide, many of the world’s most repressive countries unjustly detain hundreds or thousands of individuals for their political beliefs. For example, human rights groups estimate over 9,000 political prisoners are held in China, 60,000 in Egypt, and well over 80,000 in North Korea (Lai 2018, Hammer 2017, BBC News 2018).

      Full Citations:

      Lai, Pong. 2018. Who Are China's Political Prisoners? A Human Rights Assessment. Hong Kong Free Press, June 10.

      Hammer, Joshua. How Egypt's Activists Became 'Generation Jail.' 2017. The New York Times Magazine, March 14.

      North Korea: How Many Political Prisoners Are Detained in Prison? 2018. BBC News, May 10.

    14. QDR 01 Nov 2021
      Figure 1. Scholarly attention to forms of international action around human rights

      <br>

      Analytic Note: The Google Books NGram Viewer is a text analysis tool that shows the relative frequency that terms appear in the Google Books corpus by year of publication. The corpus used in this analysis is of scanned books printed in the English language available on Google Books.

      Full Citation: Jean-Baptiste Michel, Yuan Kui Shen, Aviva Presser Aiden, Adrian Veres, Matthew K. Gray, William Brockman, The Google Books Team, Joseph P. Pickett, Dale Hoiberg, Dan Clancy, Peter Norvig, Jon Orwant, Steven Pinker, Martin A. Nowak, and Erez Lieberman Aiden. 2011. Quantitative Analysis of Culture Using Millions of Digitized Books. Science 331(6014): 176-182.

    15. QDR 01 Nov 2021
      broader, symbolic functions

      <br>

      Analytic Note: The idea that the release of a political prisoner has a much broader impact was a theme that we repeatedly heard in interviews from both human rights advocates and government officials. We pushed our interviewees on this point by presenting a skeptic’s view of releasing political prisoners as “low-hanging fruit.”

      Source Excerpt:

      “Q: Let me offer a skeptic’s view of political prisoner diplomacy: Getting political prisoners released is low-hanging fruit and we end up giving up things to regimes without addressing the underlying issues and the regimes can then simply arrest other people or arrest the same people later.

      A: I don’t disagree with that comment, but I think the human impact of getting these people out is significant … I think there is merit to the people being able to tell their stories. Not all of them do, but a lot of them do. A lot of them continue their activism, even if they’re outside the country… It’s hard to measure the precise impact they have but the narrative that they provide, both inside and outside the country, is powerful.”

      Full Citation: Interview 7, September 17, 2018.

    16. QDR 01 Nov 2021
      case selection process,

      <br>

      Analytic Note: A variety of factors determined the #Freethe20 short list. In the opinion of officials working on the campaign, there were not substantial differences between women that made the short list and women that made the long list. However, there were some clear instances in which internal pushback against the inclusion of specific target countries in the campaign resulted in those individuals not making the short list.

      Source Excerpt:

      “Q: How were the specific cases selected?

      A: We were looking for a lot of things … We were looking for diversity in terms of regional balance and background. We didn’t want all human rights lawyers who were protesting. We also wanted to hit some countries that weren’t consistently being showcased in terms of their crackdown on political prisoners. We were looking at some of these countries that had negative human rights records but weren’t always in the spotlight for it … We also couldn’t leave off certain countries, like Syria and Iran, who were some of the worst [offenders] that we continued to highlight … Another point we looked at was what their story was. We wanted to make people care about cases and make them feel compelled to support the campaign and raise their voices … But there are definitely people we initially had on our list and there was pushback and we ended up not being able to use that… But there were some examples in which we also pushed back really strongly. An example was Sanaa Seif [from Egypt] because getting to be able to highlight her case was important.”

      Full Citation: Interview 1, August 6, 2018.

    17. QDR 01 Nov 2021
      usually only one made the short list.

      <br>

      Analytic Note: For example, women from Eritrea, Egypt, Uzbekistan, Syria, Russia, and Ethiopia were featured on both lists. In many of these cases, however, only 1 or 2 women were included in the final campaign. For example, two women from Egypt (Sanaa Seif and Yara Sallam) and three from Syria (Rasha Chorbaji, Razan Zeitouneh, and Safaa Lala) were in the list of 40, but only Sanaa Seif and Rasha Chorbaji were featured in #Freethe20.

    18. QDR 01 Nov 2021
      conflicting interests that emerge in the inter-agency process

      <br>

      Analytic Note: In US foreign policy, this dynamic is apparent with many states with whom the US has close security cooperation. For example, security cooperation between the United States and many Gulf States leads the US to prioritize security interests over human rights abuses in these countries. As a report by the Congressional Research Service notes, “Human rights observers assert that U.S. official criticism of the UAE’s measures against dissent has been muted because of the close U.S.-UAE strategic alliance.”

      Full Citation: Katzman, Kenneth. 2018. The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy. Congressional Research Service Report RS21852.

    19. QDR 01 Nov 2021
      greater concern

      <br>

      Analytic Note: In our interviews, for example, policymakers noted that some ambassadors from countries featured in #Freethe20 expressed frustration to senior US officials about the public nature of the human rights campaign.

      Source Excerpt: "One ambassador [to the U.S.] was not happy at all [about the campaign] ... He said this is the kind of thing that you should be raising with us privately."

      Full Citation: Interview 1, August 6, 2018.

    20. QDR 01 Nov 2021
      Making Sense of Human Rights Diplomacy: Evidence from a US Campaign to Free Political Prisoners

      <br> This is an Annotation for Transparent Inquiry project, published by the Qualitative Data Repository. Please cite as:

      Myrick, Rachel; Weinstein, Jeremy. 2021. "Making Sense of Human Rights Diplomacy: Evidence from a US Campaign to Free Political Prisoners". Qualitative Data Repository. https://doi.org/10.5064/F6OYTNPQ. QDR Main Collection.

      Additional documentation can be found on QDR.

      Learn more about ATI here.

    21. QDR 01 Nov 2021
      largely transactional.

      <br>

      Source Excerpt:

      “Q: Once the U.S. government agreed on focusing on these prisoners, what was the strategy?

      A: …Formally, we adopted a transactional approach in which we would make certain concessions to Azerbaijan and they would make certain concessions to us.”

      Full Citation: Interview 6, September 17, 2018.

    22. QDR 01 Nov 2021
      alternatives are exhausted

      <br>

      Analytic Note: In many cases, the use of public pressure is a direct result of failed efforts to secure progress through private engagement. Our interviews with government officials conducting human rights diplomacy frequently revealed this pattern.

      Source Excerpt: "We start private. We'd say `We'd like to solve this [human rights issue] privately. We're happy to do this that way. If there's no movement on this, we'll go public."

      Full Citation: Interview 3, August 15, 2018.

    23. QDR 01 Nov 2021
      visible forms of coercive HRD

      <br>

      Analytic Note: In general, many of the public, coercive actions around human rights are taken by Congress. For example, Congress has repeatedly issued sanctions on the Iranian regime in part due to human rights violations.

      Full Citation: Katzman, Kenneth. 2020. Iran Sanctions. Congressional Research Service Report RS20871.

    24. QDR 01 Nov 2021
      balancing human rights concerns with a set of competing security interests

      <br>

      Analytic Note: For example, we cannot rule out the concern that political prisoners in Bahrain may not have been included in the short list due to the strategic importance of Bahrain in US military presence in the Gulf Region.

      Full Citation: U.S. Security Cooperation with Bahrain. 2018. Bureau of Political-Military Affairs Fact Sheet, U.S. Department of State.

    25. QDR 01 Nov 2021
      Figure 2 displays

      <br>

      Analytic Note: In non-technical terms, this plot shows the probability that women from the #Freethe20 “short list” (dark gray) or “long list” (light gray) were still in prison (y-axis) based on the number of months that passed since the start of the campaign in September 2015 (x-axis). A statistical test shows that the two different curves are significantly different. Substantively, this shows that women featured in the #Freethe20 campaign were released from prison at a faster rate relative to women who were not featured in the campaign.

    26. QDR 01 Nov 2021
      hypocrisy of the Chinese government

      <br>

      Analytic Note: At the time, despite hosting a celebration of women’s rights, an estimated 23 percent of over 9,000 political prisoners in China were women.

      Full Citation: Lai, Pong. 2018. Who Are China's Political Prisoners? A Human Rights Assessment. Hong Kong Free Press, June 10.

    27. QDR 01 Nov 2021
      Table 4 uses

      <br>

      Analytic Note: In non-technical terms, this table compares the release rate of women featured in #Freethe20 to other female political prisoners featured by Amnesty International from the same 12 countries during the same time period. Substantively, the table shows that women featured in the #Freethe20 campaign spent a short time in prison relative to a comparable set of women. The different models show that this finding holds even when we take into account location and other characteristics about the individual case from Urgent Action reports.

    28. QDR 01 Nov 2021
      Figure 4 plots

      <br>

      Analytic Note: In non-technical terms, this figure shows how news coverage and Internet searches about each of the women featured in #Freethe20 changed over time. Substantively, the plots show a small but statistically significant increase in media coverage and Internet searches for women featured in #Freethe20 during the month of the campaign’s launch. However, this attention did not seem to persist much beyond the launch in September 2015. This finding holds when we take into account each women’s country of origin and the timing of their arrests and releases. In an online supplement, we model the data in many different ways and find similar results.

    29. QDR 01 Nov 2021
      public pressure generated by the campaign

      <br>

      Analytic Note: This seemed particularly to be the case in Azerbaijan, where the two political prisoners cases were not originally prioritized by the U.S. government. Here, public pressure from civil society was likely an important factor in shaping the U.S. government’s decision to engage in human rights diplomacy around these women.

      Source Excerpt:

      “Q: So to the extent to which public attention was effective, how was it effective?

      A: When I say there was a large amount of public attention, I have to step back and say that’s purely in the eyes of the beholder. No one has ever heard of these people if you’re not a full time policy person. I would like to think that the answer to those questions was that there was some amount of pressure that is put on both the [U.S. government] and the [target] state.”

      Full Citation: Interview 6, September 17, 2018.

    30. QDR 01 Nov 2021
      public pressure generated by the campaign

      <br>

      Analytic Note: This seemed particularly to be the case in Azerbaijan, where the two political prisoners cases were not originally prioritized by the U.S. government. Here, public pressure from civil society was likely an important factor in shaping the U.S. government’s decision to engage in human rights diplomacy around these women.

      Source Excerpt:

      “Q: So to the extent to which public attention was effective, how was it effective?

      A: When I say there was a large amount of public attention, I have to step back and say that’s purely in the eyes of the beholder. No one has ever heard of these people if you’re not a full time policy person. I would like to think that the answer to those questions was that there was some amount of pressure that is put on both the [U.S. government] and the [target] state.”

      Full Citation: Interview 6, September 17, 2018.

    31. QDR 01 Nov 2021
      Figure 4 plots

      <br>

      Analytic Note: In non-technical terms, this figure shows how news coverage and Internet searches about each of the women featured in #Freethe20 changed over time. Substantively, the plots show a small but statistically significant increase in media coverage and Internet searches for women featured in #Freethe20 during the month of the campaign’s launch. However, this attention did not seem to persist much beyond the launch in September 2015. This finding holds when we take into account each women’s country of origin and the timing of their arrests and releases. In an online supplement, we model the data in many different ways and find similar results.

    32. QDR 01 Nov 2021
      Table 4 uses

      <br>

      Analytic Note: In non-technical terms, this table compares the release rate of women featured in #Freethe20 to other female political prisoners featured by Amnesty International from the same 12 countries during the same time period. Substantively, the table shows that women featured in the #Freethe20 campaign spent a short time in prison relative to a comparable set of women. The different models show that this finding holds even when we take into account location and other characteristics about the individual case from Urgent Action reports.

    33. QDR 01 Nov 2021
      balancing human rights concerns with a set of competing security interests

      <br>

      Analytic Note: For example, we cannot rule out the concern that political prisoners in Bahrain may not have been included in the short list due to the strategic importance of Bahrain in US military presence in the Gulf Region.

      Full Citation: U.S. Security Cooperation with Bahrain. 2018. Bureau of Political-Military Affairs Fact Sheet, U.S. Department of State.

    34. QDR 01 Nov 2021
      Figure 2 displays

      <br>

      Analytic Note: In non-technical terms, this plot shows the probability that women from the #Freethe20 “short list” (dark gray) or “long list” (light gray) were still in prison (y-axis) based on the number of months that passed since the start of the campaign in September 2015 (x-axis). A statistical test shows that the two different curves are significantly different. Substantively, this shows that women featured in the #Freethe20 campaign were released from prison at a faster rate relative to women who were not featured in the campaign.

    35. QDR 01 Nov 2021
      hypocrisy of the Chinese government

      <br>

      Analytic Note: At the time, despite hosting a celebration of women’s rights, an estimated 23 percent of over 9,000 political prisoners in China were women.

      Full Citation: Lai, Pong. 2018. Who Are China's Political Prisoners? A Human Rights Assessment. Hong Kong Free Press, June 10.

    36. QDR 01 Nov 2021
      conflicting interests that emerge in the inter-agency process

      <br>

      Analytic Note: In US foreign policy, this dynamic is apparent with many states with whom the US has close security cooperation. For example, security cooperation between the United States and many Gulf States leads the US to prioritize security interests over human rights abuses in these countries. As a report by the Congressional Research Service notes, “Human rights observers assert that U.S. official criticism of the UAE’s measures against dissent has been muted because of the close U.S.-UAE strategic alliance.”

      Full Citation: Katzman, Kenneth. 2018. The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy. Congressional Research Service Report RS21852.

    37. QDR 01 Nov 2021
      alternatives are exhausted

      <br>

      Analytic Note: In many cases, the use of public pressure is a direct result of failed efforts to secure progress through private engagement. Our interviews with government officials conducting human rights diplomacy frequently revealed this pattern.

      Source Excerpt: "We start private. We'd say `We'd like to solve this [human rights issue] privately. We're happy to do this that way. If there's no movement on this, we'll go public."

      Full Citation: Interview 3, August 15, 2018.

    38. QDR 01 Nov 2021
      visible forms of coercive HRD

      <br>

      Analytic Note: In general, many of the public, coercive actions around human rights are taken by Congress. For example, Congress has repeatedly issued sanctions on the Iranian regime in part due to human rights violations.

      Full Citation: Katzman, Kenneth. 2020. Iran Sanctions. Congressional Research Service Report RS20871.

    39. QDR 01 Nov 2021
      greater concern

      <br>

      Analytic Note: In our interviews, for example, policymakers noted that some ambassadors from countries featured in #Freethe20 expressed frustration to senior US officials about the public nature of the human rights campaign.

      Source Excerpt: "One ambassador [to the U.S.] was not happy at all [about the campaign] ... He said this is the kind of thing that you should be raising with us privately."

      Full Citation: Interview 1, August 6, 2018.

    40. QDR 01 Nov 2021
      Making Sense of Human Rights Diplomacy: Evidence from a US Campaign to Free Political Prisoners

      <br> This is an Annotation for Transparent Inquiry project, published by the Qualitative Data Repository. Please cite as:

      Myrick, Rachel; Weinstein, Jeremy. 2021. "Making Sense of Human Rights Diplomacy: Evidence from a US Campaign to Free Political Prisoners". Qualitative Data Repository. https://doi.org/10.5064/F6OYTNPQ. QDR Main Collection.

      Additional documentation can be found on QDR.

      Learn more about ATI here.

    41. QDR 01 Nov 2021
      Figure 1. Scholarly attention to forms of international action around human rights

      <br>

      Analytic Note: The Google Books NGram Viewer is a text analysis tool that shows the relative frequency that terms appear in the Google Books corpus by year of publication. The corpus used in this analysis is of scanned books printed in the English language available on Google Books.

      Full Citation: Jean-Baptiste Michel, Yuan Kui Shen, Aviva Presser Aiden, Adrian Veres, Matthew K. Gray, William Brockman, The Google Books Team, Joseph P. Pickett, Dale Hoiberg, Dan Clancy, Peter Norvig, Jon Orwant, Steven Pinker, Martin A. Nowak, and Erez Lieberman Aiden. 2011. Quantitative Analysis of Culture Using Millions of Digitized Books. Science 331(6014): 176-182.

    42. QDR 01 Nov 2021
      political prisoners—

      <br>

      Analytic Note: According to the official guidelines outlined by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), a political prisoner is an individual that meets one of five criteria:

      "(1) The detention violates basic guarantees in the European Convention on Human Rights, particularly freedom of thought, conscience, and religion; freedom of expression and information; and freedom of assembly and association. (2) The detention is imposed for purely political reasons. (3) The length or conditions of detention are out of proportion to the offense. (4) He or she is detained in a discriminatory manner as compared to other persons. (5) The detention is the result of judicial proceedings that are clearly unfair and connected with the political motives of authorities."

      Full Citation: Parliamentary Assembly Council of Europe. “Resolution 1900.” Text adopted by the Assembly on 3 October 2012.

    43. QDR 01 Nov 2021
      case selection process,

      <br>

      Analytic Note: A variety of factors determined the #Freethe20 short list. In the opinion of officials working on the campaign, there were not substantial differences between women that made the short list and women that made the long list. However, there were some clear instances in which internal pushback against the inclusion of specific target countries in the campaign resulted in those individuals not making the short list.

      Source Excerpt:

      “Q: How were the specific cases selected?

      A: We were looking for a lot of things … We were looking for diversity in terms of regional balance and background. We didn’t want all human rights lawyers who were protesting. We also wanted to hit some countries that weren’t consistently being showcased in terms of their crackdown on political prisoners. We were looking at some of these countries that had negative human rights records but weren’t always in the spotlight for it … We also couldn’t leave off certain countries, like Syria and Iran, who were some of the worst [offenders] that we continued to highlight … Another point we looked at was what their story was. We wanted to make people care about cases and make them feel compelled to support the campaign and raise their voices … But there are definitely people we initially had on our list and there was pushback and we ended up not being able to use that… But there were some examples in which we also pushed back really strongly. An example was Sanaa Seif [from Egypt] because getting to be able to highlight her case was important.”

      Full Citation: Interview 1, August 6, 2018.

    44. QDR 01 Nov 2021
      largely transactional.

      <br>

      Source Excerpt:

      “Q: Once the U.S. government agreed on focusing on these prisoners, what was the strategy?

      A: …Formally, we adopted a transactional approach in which we would make certain concessions to Azerbaijan and they would make certain concessions to us.”

      Full Citation: Interview 6, September 17, 2018.

    45. QDR 01 Nov 2021
      minimum of two months.

      <br>

      Analytic Note: Many women who appeared in the Urgent Actions were detained for a few days before release. Since these women could not have plausibly been featured in the #Freethe20 campaign, we selected a threshold of two months of imprisonment or detention.

    46. QDR 01 Nov 2021
      usually only one made the short list.

      <br>

      Analytic Note: For example, women from Eritrea, Egypt, Uzbekistan, Syria, Russia, and Ethiopia were featured on both lists. In many of these cases, however, only 1 or 2 women were included in the final campaign. For example, two women from Egypt (Sanaa Seif and Yara Sallam) and three from Syria (Rasha Chorbaji, Razan Zeitouneh, and Safaa Lala) were in the list of 40, but only Sanaa Seif and Rasha Chorbaji were featured in #Freethe20.

    47. QDR 01 Nov 2021
      broader, symbolic functions

      <br>

      Analytic Note: The idea that the release of a political prisoner has a much broader impact was a theme that we repeatedly heard in interviews from both human rights advocates and government officials. We pushed our interviewees on this point by presenting a skeptic’s view of releasing political prisoners as “low-hanging fruit.”

      Source Excerpt:

      “Q: Let me offer a skeptic’s view of political prisoner diplomacy: Getting political prisoners released is low-hanging fruit and we end up giving up things to regimes without addressing the underlying issues and the regimes can then simply arrest other people or arrest the same people later.

      A: I don’t disagree with that comment, but I think the human impact of getting these people out is significant … I think there is merit to the people being able to tell their stories. Not all of them do, but a lot of them do. A lot of them continue their activism, even if they’re outside the country… It’s hard to measure the precise impact they have but the narrative that they provide, both inside and outside the country, is powerful.”

      Full Citation: Interview 7, September 17, 2018.

    48. QDR 01 Nov 2021
      major focus

      <br>

      Analytic Note: While there are no reliable estimates of the population of political prisoners worldwide, many of the world’s most repressive countries unjustly detain hundreds or thousands of individuals for their political beliefs. For example, human rights groups estimate over 9,000 political prisoners are held in China, 60,000 in Egypt, and well over 80,000 in North Korea (Lai 2018, Hammer 2017, BBC News 2018).

      Full Citations:

      Lai, Pong. 2018. Who Are China's Political Prisoners? A Human Rights Assessment. Hong Kong Free Press, June 10.

      Hammer, Joshua. How Egypt's Activists Became 'Generation Jail.' 2017. The New York Times Magazine, March 14.

      North Korea: How Many Political Prisoners Are Detained in Prison? 2018. BBC News, May 10.

    49. QDR 01 Nov 2021
      (Table 3).

      <br>

      Analytic Note: In non-technical terms, this table compares the release outcomes of women featured in #Freethe20 to other female political prisoners featured by Amnesty International from the same 12 countries during the same time period. Substantively, the table shows that women featured in the #Freethe20 campaign were more likely to be released within the three years following the start of the campaign in September 2015 relative to a comparable set of women. The different models show that this finding holds even when we take into account location and other characteristics about the individual case from Urgent Action reports.

    50. QDR 01 Nov 2021
      existing database of UA

      <br>

      Analytic Note: Importantly, this distribution is not reflective of all political prisoners but rather of the information on individual cases featured by Amnesty International. For example, while human rights groups suspect North Korea has among the most political prisoners, Amnesty International typically does not have enough information on these prisoners to profile their cases. In addition, scholars have previously noted that Amnesty International engages in “information politics” by “reporting more heavily on human rights abuses in some countries than others” (Ron et al. 2005, p. 575) to maximize the impact of their advocacy work.

      Full Citation: Ron, James, Howard Ramos, and Kathleen Rodgers. 2005. “Transnational Information Politics: NGO Human Rights Reporting, 1986-2000.” International Studies Quarterly 49: 557-587.

    51. QDR 01 Nov 2021
      struggled to balance economic and security interests

      <br>

      Analytic Note: Our interviews highlighted conflicting interests over the bilateral relationship with Azerbaijan between officials in the State Department pursuing concerns about human rights abuses and political prisoners, officials in the Energy Department who were pursuing progress on the Southern Gas Corridor, and officials in the Department of Defense who were prioritizing security cooperation on counter-terrorism. Therefore, officials working on political prisoner issues were unable to highlight these issues in Azerbaijan at a more senior level of government.

      Source Excerpt: “This is a real example of deadlock. Policy stopped at the Assistant Secretary level. We never had a Deputies committee meeting on Azerbaijan. We … asked for them all the time, but we [weren’t able] to get a senior level meeting.”

      Full Citation: Interview 6, September 17, 2018.

    52. QDR 01 Nov 2021
      likely unable to mobilizeforeign publics

      <br>

      Analytic Note: In particular, government officials expressed regret about not translating press releases into local languages in the target countries.

      Source Excerpt:

      “Q: On the operational side, for these 20 cases, what did the media strategy look like? Who did you think was going to cover these things? What was the balance of international versus national media in the countries that were targeted? How much take-up did you think you got?

      A: If we had tried #Freethe20 later and secured more buy-in from the regions, we might have been able to activate in a more comprehensive way on the media part. We definitely did, for example, DOA Ukraine … What we didn’t do, though, was in-language media (in Ukrainian or in Russian). We didn’t have those assets available at the time.”

      Full Citation: Interview 5, August 21, 2018.

    53. QDR 01 Nov 2021
      competing interests

      <br>

      Analytic Note: The fact that human rights concerns were preempted by security and economic interests in Azerbaijan at this time was also well-known outside the government. For example, in a January 2016 article in The Washington Post, Samuel Ramani writes: “In short, America’s reluctance to take action against the Aliyev regime can be explained by Azerbaijan’s cooperation with U.S. strategic objectives. Bringing in energy, combating ISIS and other Islamist terrorism and thwarting Russian aggression are urgent concerns for U.S. policymakers. Human rights aren’t.”

      Full Citation: Ramani, Samuel. 2016. Three Reasons the U.S. Won't Break with Azerbaijan Over Its Violations of Human Rights and Democratic Freedoms. The Washington Post, January 20.

    54. QDR 01 Nov 2021
      concrete “carrots and sticks”

      <br>

      Analytic Note: One U.S. official who had worked on dozens of political prisoner cases noted that specific sanctions or changes in financial and military assistance were powerful tools for releasing political prisoners:

      Source Excerpt: “In the last two years, we’ve put Visa removals for any officials in Country X responsible for the detention of Person X. That’s been quite successful …. We almost always look at these countries and see if there’s some aid we can pull … Sometimes we say that we can do more aid if we address these human rights abuses."

      Full Citation: Interview 3, August 15, 2018.

    55. QDR 01 Nov 2021
      leverage the ongoing TPP negotiations.

      <br>

      Analytic Note: In contrast to the direct, explicit sources of leverage in the Azerbaijan cases, the leverage in the Vietnam cases was broader and more indirect via the negotiation of TPP.

      Source Excerpt: "When you have something like TPP being negotiated, everyone in the Vietnamese government knows that it has to be voted on, then it's like a horse-trading of a sort."

      Full Citation: Interview 10, January 24, 2019.

    56. QDR 01 Nov 2021
      skeptics of diplomacy around political prisoners p

      <br>

      Analytic Note: It is important to note that our interviewees offered conflicting opinions in their long-run assessments of the US governments' focus on political prisoners. For example, some interviewees viewed political prisoner releases as token concessions (Interview 6) while others saw them as complementary to structural change (Interview 9) or important irrespective of the broader context (Interview 10).

      Source Excerpts:

      "There are elements within any administration that want to pat themselves on the back for promoting human rights and are okay with that boiling down to only diplomacy around political prisoners. For there to be real forward progress, [the release of political prisoners] has to be coupled with something related to systemic issues" (Interview 6).

      "The attention that was drawn to these individuals drew more attention to the structural problems... This [campaign] provided a window into... the ratcheting up of the repression in China, for example" (Interview 9).

      "I visited a prisoner of conscience we were able to get out, and he was flat out being tortured. There's nothing you can tell me that will make me think that if I see someone like that, and I'm able to land him in a life that he's free of that, that I shouldn't try. I don't know, I think that's a human question" (Interview 10).

      Full Citations:

      Interview 6, September 17, 2018.

      Interview 9, January 17, 2019.

      Interview 10, January 24, 2019.

    57. QDR 01 Nov 2021
      leadership transition

      <br>

      Analytic Note: One interviewee explained that the difference in outcomes of the two Vietnamese women featured in #Freethe20 could be explained by a combination of the loss of leverage from US negotiation of the TPP and changing leadership in the Vietnamese government.

      Source Excerpt:

      "Q: What about Bui Thi Minh Hang? How do you explain the different outcomes? Ta Phong Tan was released right after the launch but Bui Thi Minh Hanh served her full sentence.

      A: She was part of a large network that was cracked down on once the Politburo leadership in the presidency changed. In some ways, there was this sort of opening up and engagement [in Vietnam], and then a new group of the Politburo came in [in early 2016], and there was another faction. You don't have a multiparty system [in Vietnam], but you do have different factions, so it's almost like you have distinct parties."

      Full Citation: Interview 10, January 24, 2019.

    58. QDR 01 Nov 2021
      stave off meaningfulhuman rights reform

      <br>

      Analytic Note: An op-ed published in The Washington Post by one of the women featured in #Freethe20, Khadija Ismayilova, expresses the concern that dictators could use minor concessions in one issue area to avoid major reforms.

      Source Excerpt: “[Azerbaijani President] Aliyev is shamelessly trying to use political prisoners as bargaining chips to advance his foreign policy agenda” (Ismayilova 2016).

      Full Citation: Ismayilova, Khadija. "Don't Let Azerbaijan Use Political Prisoners as Props." The Washington Post, March 31, 2016.

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    cambridge.org/core/journals/international-organization/article/making-sense-of-human-rights-diplomacy-evidence-from-a-us-campaign-to-free-political-prisoners/40BE5114933EBBF0EDDDE6D20346C52F
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    Untitled document
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    1. QDR 01 Nov 2021
      largely transactional.

      <br>

      Source Excerpt:

      “Q: Once the U.S. government agreed on focusing on these prisoners, what was the strategy?

      A: …Formally, we adopted a transactional approach in which we would make certain concessions to Azerbaijan and they would make certain concessions to us.”

      Full Citation: Interview 6, September 17, 2018.

    2. QDR 01 Nov 2021
      Created using Google Books NgramViewer (http://books.google.com/ngrams)

      <br>

      Analytic Note: The Google Books NGram Viewer is a text analysis tool that shows the relative frequency that terms appear in the Google Books corpus by year of publication. The corpus used in this analysis is of scanned books printed in the English language available on Google Books.

      Full Citation: Jean-Baptiste Michel, Yuan Kui Shen, Aviva Presser Aiden, Adrian Veres, Matthew K. Gray, William Brockman, The Google Books Team, Joseph P. Pickett, Dale Hoiberg, Dan Clancy, Peter Norvig, Jon Orwant, Steven Pinker, Martin A. Nowak, and Erez Lieberman Aiden. 2011. Quantitative Analysis of Culture Using Millions of Digitized Books. Science 331(6014): 176-182.

    3. QDR 01 Nov 2021
      greaterconcern

      <br>

      Analytic Note: In our interviews, for example, policymakers noted that some ambassadors from countries featured in #Freethe20 expressed frustration to senior US officials about the public nature of the human rights campaign.

      Source Excerpt: "One ambassador [to the U.S.] was not happy at all [about the campaign] ... He said this is the kind of thing that you should be raising with us privately."

      Full Citation: Interview 1, August 6, 2018.

    4. QDR 01 Nov 2021
      alternatives are exhausted a

      <br>

      Analytic Note: In many cases, the use of public pressure is a direct result of failed efforts to secure progress through private engagement. Our interviews with government officials conducting human rights diplomacy frequently revealed this pattern.

      Source Excerpt: "We start private. We'd say `We'd like to solve this [human rights issue] privately. We're happy to do this that way. If there's no movement on this, we'll go public."

      Full Citation: Interview 3, August 15, 2018.

    5. QDR 01 Nov 2021
      major focus

      <br>

      Analytic Note: While there are no reliable estimates of the population of political prisoners worldwide, many of the world’s most repressive countries unjustly detain hundreds or thousands of individuals for their political beliefs. For example, human rights groups estimate over 9,000 political prisoners are held in China, 60,000 in Egypt, and well over 80,000 in North Korea (Lai 2018, Hammer 2017, BBC News 2018).

      Full Citations:

      Lai, Pong. 2018. Who Are China's Political Prisoners? A Human Rights Assessment. Hong Kong Free Press, June 10.

      Hammer, Joshua. How Egypt's Activists Became 'Generation Jail.' 2017. The New York Times Magazine, March 14.

      North Korea: How Many Political Prisoners Are Detained in Prison? 2018. BBC News, May 10.

    6. QDR 01 Nov 2021
      hypocrisyof the Chinese government

      <br>

      Analytic Note: At the time, despite hosting a celebration of women’s rights, an estimated 23 percent of over 9,000 political prisoners in China were women.

      Full Citation: Lai, Pong. 2018. Who Are China's Political Prisoners? A Human Rights Assessment. Hong Kong Free Press, June 10.

    7. QDR 01 Nov 2021
      broader, symbolic functions

      <br>

      Analytic Note: The idea that the release of a political prisoner has a much broader impact was a theme that we repeatedly heard in interviews from both human rights advocates and government officials. We pushed our interviewees on this point by presenting a skeptic’s view of releasing political prisoners as “low-hanging fruit.”

      Source Excerpt:

      “Q: Let me offer a skeptic’s view of political prisoner diplomacy: Getting political prisoners released is low-hanging fruit and we end up giving up things to regimes without addressing the underlying issues and the regimes can then simply arrest other people or arrest the same people later.

      A: I don’t disagree with that comment, but I think the human impact of getting these people out is significant … I think there is merit to the people being able to tell their stories. Not all of them do, but a lot of them do. A lot of them continue their activism, even if they’re outside the country… It’s hard to measure the precise impact they have but the narrative that they provide, both inside and outside the country, is powerful.”

      Full Citation: Interview 7, September 17, 2018.

    8. QDR 01 Nov 2021
      usually only one made the short list.

      <br>

      Analytic Note: For example, women from Eritrea, Egypt, Uzbekistan, Syria, Russia, and Ethiopia were featured on both lists. In many of these cases, however, only 1 or 2 women were included in the final campaign. For example, two women from Egypt (Sanaa Seif and Yara Sallam) and three from Syria (Rasha Chorbaji, Razan Zeitouneh, and Safaa Lala) were in the list of 40, but only Sanaa Seif and Rasha Chorbaji were featured in #Freethe20.

    9. QDR 01 Nov 2021
      Figure 2 d

      <br>

      Analytic Note: In non-technical terms, this plot shows the probability that women from the #Freethe20 “short list” (dark gray) or “long list” (light gray) were still in prison (y-axis) based on the number of months that passed since the start of the campaign in September 2015 (x-axis). A statistical test shows that the two different curves are significantly different. Substantively, this shows that women featured in the #Freethe20 campaign were released from prison at a faster rate relative to women who were not featured in the campaign.

    10. QDR 01 Nov 2021
      visible forms of coercive HRD i

      <br>

      Analytic Note: In general, many of the public, coercive actions around human rights are taken by Congress. For example, Congress has repeatedly issued sanctions on the Iranian regime in part due to human rights violations.

      Full Citation: Katzman, Kenneth. 2020. Iran Sanctions. Congressional Research Service Report RS20871.

    11. QDR 01 Nov 2021
      struggled to balance economic and security interests

      <br>

      Analytic Note: Our interviews highlighted conflicting interests over the bilateral relationship with Azerbaijan between officials in the State Department pursuing concerns about human rights abuses and political prisoners, officials in the Energy Department who were pursuing progress on the Southern Gas Corridor, and officials in the Department of Defense who were prioritizing security cooperation on counter-terrorism. Therefore, officials working on political prisoner issues were unable to highlight these issues in Azerbaijan at a more senior level of government.

      Source Excerpt: “This is a real example of deadlock. Policy stopped at the Assistant Secretary level. We never had a Deputies committee meeting on Azerbaijan. We … asked for them all the time, but we [weren’t able] to get a senior level meeting.”

      Full Citation: Interview 6, September 17, 2018.

    12. QDR 01 Nov 2021
      balancing human rights concerns with a set of competing securityinterests.

      <br>

      Analytic Note: For example, we cannot rule out the concern that political prisoners in Bahrain may not have been included in the short list due to the strategic importance of Bahrain in US military presence in the Gulf Region.

      Full Citation: U.S. Security Cooperation with Bahrain. 2018. Bureau of Political-Military Affairs Fact Sheet, U.S. Department of State.

    13. QDR 01 Nov 2021
      conflicting interests that emerge in the inter-agencyprocess

      <br>

      Analytic Note: In US foreign policy, this dynamic is apparent with many states with whom the US has close security cooperation. For example, security cooperation between the United States and many Gulf States leads the US to prioritize security interests over human rights abuses in these countries. As a report by the Congressional Research Service notes, “Human rights observers assert that U.S. official criticism of the UAE’s measures against dissent has been muted because of the close U.S.-UAE strategic alliance.”

      Full Citation: Katzman, Kenneth. 2018. The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy. Congressional Research Service Report RS21852.

    14. QDR 01 Nov 2021
      ublic pressure generated bythe campaign was essentia

      <br>

      Analytic Note: This seemed particularly to be the case in Azerbaijan, where the two political prisoners cases were not originally prioritized by the U.S. government. Here, public pressure from civil society was likely an important factor in shaping the U.S. government’s decision to engage in human rights diplomacy around these women.

      Source Excerpt:

      “Q: So to the extent to which public attention was effective, how was it effective?

      A: When I say there was a large amount of public attention, I have to step back and say that’s purely in the eyes of the beholder. No one has ever heard of these people if you’re not a full time policy person. I would like to think that the answer to those questions was that there was some amount of pressure that is put on both the [U.S. government] and the [target] state.”

      Full Citation: Interview 6, September 17, 2018.

    15. QDR 01 Nov 2021
      minimum of two months.

      <br>

      Analytic Note: Many women who appeared in the Urgent Actions were detained for a few days before release. Since these women could not have plausibly been featured in the #Freethe20 campaign, we selected a threshold of two months of imprisonment or detention.

    16. QDR 01 Nov 2021
      political prisoners—

      <br>

      Analytic Note: According to the official guidelines outlined by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), a political prisoner is an individual that meets one of five criteria:

      "(1) The detention violates basic guarantees in the European Convention on Human Rights, particularly freedom of thought, conscience, and religion; freedom of expression and information; and freedom of assembly and association. (2) The detention is imposed for purely political reasons. (3) The length or conditions of detention are out of proportion to the offense. (4) He or she is detained in a discriminatory manner as compared to other persons. (5) The detention is the result of judicial proceedings that are clearly unfair and connected with the political motives of authorities."

      Full Citation: Parliamentary Assembly Council of Europe. “Resolution 1900.” Text adopted by the Assembly on 3 October 2012.

    17. QDR 01 Nov 2021
      leadership transition

      <br>

      Analytic Note: One interviewee explained that the difference in outcomes of the two Vietnamese women featured in #Freethe20 could be explained by a combination of the loss of leverage from US negotiation of the TPP and changing leadership in the Vietnamese government.

      Source Excerpt:

      "Q: What about Bui Thi Minh Hang? How do you explain the different outcomes? Ta Phong Tan was released right after the launch but Bui Thi Minh Hanh served her full sentence.

      A: She was part of a large network that was cracked down on once the Politburo leadership in the presidency changed. In some ways, there was this sort of opening up and engagement [in Vietnam], and then a new group of the Politburo came in [in early 2016], and there was another faction. You don't have a multiparty system [in Vietnam], but you do have different factions, so it's almost like you have distinct parties."

      Full Citation: Interview 10, January 24, 2019.

    18. QDR 01 Nov 2021
      Table 4 u

      <br>

      Analytic Note: In non-technical terms, this table compares the release rate of women featured in #Freethe20 to other female political prisoners featured by Amnesty International from the same 12 countries during the same time period. Substantively, the table shows that women featured in the #Freethe20 campaign spent a short time in prison relative to a comparable set of women. The different models show that this finding holds even when we take into account location and other characteristics about the individual case from Urgent Action reports.

    19. QDR 01 Nov 2021
      case selection process,

      <br>

      Analytic Note: A variety of factors determined the #Freethe20 short list. In the opinion of officials working on the campaign, there were not substantial differences between women that made the short list and women that made the long list. However, there were some clear instances in which internal pushback against the inclusion of specific target countries in the campaign resulted in those individuals not making the short list.

      Source Excerpt:

      “Q: How were the specific cases selected?

      A: We were looking for a lot of things … We were looking for diversity in terms of regional balance and background. We didn’t want all human rights lawyers who were protesting. We also wanted to hit some countries that weren’t consistently being showcased in terms of their crackdown on political prisoners. We were looking at some of these countries that had negative human rights records but weren’t always in the spotlight for it … We also couldn’t leave off certain countries, like Syria and Iran, who were some of the worst [offenders] that we continued to highlight … Another point we looked at was what their story was. We wanted to make people care about cases and make them feel compelled to support the campaign and raise their voices … But there are definitely people we initially had on our list and there was pushback and we ended up not being able to use that… But there were some examples in which we also pushed back really strongly. An example was Sanaa Seif [from Egypt] because getting to be able to highlight her case was important.”

      Full Citation: Interview 1, August 6, 2018.

    20. QDR 01 Nov 2021
      likely unable to mobilizeforeign publics

      <br>

      Analytic Note: In particular, government officials expressed regret about not translating press releases into local languages in the target countries.

      Source Excerpt:

      “Q: On the operational side, for these 20 cases, what did the media strategy look like? Who did you think was going to cover these things? What was the balance of international versus national media in the countries that were targeted? How much take-up did you think you got?

      A: If we had tried #Freethe20 later and secured more buy-in from the regions, we might have been able to activate in a more comprehensive way on the media part. We definitely did, for example, DOA Ukraine … What we didn’t do, though, was in-language media (in Ukrainian or in Russian). We didn’t have those assets available at the time.”

      Full Citation: Interview 5, August 21, 2018.

    21. QDR 01 Nov 2021
      existing database of UA

      <br>

      Analytic Note: Importantly, this distribution is not reflective of all political prisoners but rather of the information on individual cases featured by Amnesty International. For example, while human rights groups suspect North Korea has among the most political prisoners, Amnesty International typically does not have enough information on these prisoners to profile their cases. In addition, scholars have previously noted that Amnesty International engages in “information politics” by “reporting more heavily on human rights abuses in some countries than others” (Ron et al. 2005, p. 575) to maximize the impact of their advocacy work.

      Full Citation: Ron, James, Howard Ramos, and Kathleen Rodgers. 2005. “Transnational Information Politics: NGO Human Rights Reporting, 1986-2000.” International Studies Quarterly 49: 557-587.

    22. QDR 01 Nov 2021
      Figure 4 p

      <br>

      Analytic Note: In non-technical terms, this figure shows how news coverage and Internet searches about each of the women featured in #Freethe20 changed over time. Substantively, the plots show a small but statistically significant increase in media coverage and Internet searches for women featured in #Freethe20 during the month of the campaign’s launch. However, this attention did not seem to persist much beyond the launch in September 2015. This finding holds when we take into account each women’s country of origin and the timing of their arrests and releases. In an online supplement, we model the data in many different ways and find similar results.

    23. QDR 01 Nov 2021
      (Table 3).

      <br>

      Analytic Note: In non-technical terms, this table compares the release outcomes of women featured in #Freethe20 to other female political prisoners featured by Amnesty International from the same 12 countries during the same time period. Substantively, the table shows that women featured in the #Freethe20 campaign were more likely to be released within the three years following the start of the campaign in September 2015 relative to a comparable set of women. The different models show that this finding holds even when we take into account location and other characteristics about the individual case from Urgent Action reports.

    24. QDR 01 Nov 2021
      skeptics of diplomacy around political prisoners p

      <br>

      Analytic Note: It is important to note that our interviewees offered conflicting opinions in their long-run assessments of the US governments' focus on political prisoners. For example, some interviewees viewed political prisoner releases as token concessions (Interview 6) while others saw them as complementary to structural change (Interview 9) or important irrespective of the broader context (Interview 10).

      Source Excerpts:

      "There are elements within any administration that want to pat themselves on the back for promoting human rights and are okay with that boiling down to only diplomacy around political prisoners. For there to be real forward progress, [the release of political prisoners] has to be coupled with something related to systemic issues" (Interview 6).

      "The attention that was drawn to these individuals drew more attention to the structural problems... This [campaign] provided a window into... the ratcheting up of the repression in China, for example" (Interview 9).

      "I visited a prisoner of conscience we were able to get out, and he was flat out being tortured. There's nothing you can tell me that will make me think that if I see someone like that, and I'm able to land him in a life that he's free of that, that I shouldn't try. I don't know, I think that's a human question" (Interview 10).

      Full Citations:

      Interview 6, September 17, 2018.

      Interview 9, January 17, 2019.

      Interview 10, January 24, 2019.

    25. QDR 01 Nov 2021
      competing interests

      <br>

      Analytic Note: The fact that human rights concerns were preempted by security and economic interests in Azerbaijan at this time was also well-known outside the government. For example, in a January 2016 article in The Washington Post, Samuel Ramani writes: “In short, America’s reluctance to take action against the Aliyev regime can be explained by Azerbaijan’s cooperation with U.S. strategic objectives. Bringing in energy, combating ISIS and other Islamist terrorism and thwarting Russian aggression are urgent concerns for U.S. policymakers. Human rights aren’t.”

      Full Citation: Ramani, Samuel. 2016. Three Reasons the U.S. Won't Break with Azerbaijan Over Its Violations of Human Rights and Democratic Freedoms. The Washington Post, January 20.

    26. QDR 01 Nov 2021
      leverage the ongoing TPP negotiations.

      <br>

      Analytic Note: In contrast to the direct, explicit sources of leverage in the Azerbaijan cases, the leverage in the Vietnam cases was broader and more indirect via the negotiation of TPP.

      Source Excerpt: "When you have something like TPP being negotiated, everyone in the Vietnamese government knows that it has to be voted on, then it's like a horse-trading of a sort."

      Full Citation: Interview 10, January 24, 2019.

    27. QDR 01 Nov 2021
      stave off meaningfulhuman rights reform

      <br>

      Analytic Note: An op-ed published in The Washington Post by one of the women featured in #Freethe20, Khadija Ismayilova, expresses the concern that dictators could use minor concessions in one issue area to avoid major reforms.

      Source Excerpt: “[Azerbaijani President] Aliyev is shamelessly trying to use political prisoners as bargaining chips to advance his foreign policy agenda” (Ismayilova 2016).

      Full Citation: Ismayilova, Khadija. "Don't Let Azerbaijan Use Political Prisoners as Props." The Washington Post, March 31, 2016.

    28. QDR 01 Nov 2021
      concrete “carrots and sticks”

      <br>

      Analytic Note: One U.S. official who had worked on dozens of political prisoner cases noted that specific sanctions or changes in financial and military assistance were powerful tools for releasing political prisoners:

      Source Excerpt: “In the last two years, we’ve put Visa removals for any officials in Country X responsible for the detention of Person X. That’s been quite successful …. We almost always look at these countries and see if there’s some aid we can pull … Sometimes we say that we can do more aid if we address these human rights abuses."

      Full Citation: Interview 3, August 15, 2018.

    29. QDR 01 Nov 2021
      Making Sense of Human Rights Diplomacy:Evidence from a US Campaign to FreePolitical Prisoners

      <br> This is an Annotation for Transparent Inquiry project, published by the Qualitative Data Repository. Please cite as:

      Myrick, Rachel; Weinstein, Jeremy. 2021. "Making Sense of Human Rights Diplomacy: Evidence from a US Campaign to Free Political Prisoners". Qualitative Data Repository. https://doi.org/10.5064/F6OYTNPQ. QDR Main Collection.

      Additional documentation can be found on QDR.

      Learn more about ATI here.

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    cambridge.org/core/journals/international-organization/article/abs/making-sense-of-human-rights-diplomacy-evidence-from-a-us-campaign-to-free-political-prisoners/40BE5114933EBBF0EDDDE6D20346C52F
  7. Aug 2021
  8. qdr.syr.edu qdr.syr.edu
    Ideational Factors and Civilian Contention in Civil War: How normative commitments and political ideas shape civilian collective responses to armed groups | Qualitative Data Repository
    1
    1. QDR 10 Aug 2021
      However, I have identified instances of noncooperation in at least 18 different countries that have experienced or are experiencing civil war and, in Colombia alone, I have identified more than 50 experiences of nonviolent noncooperation in at least 19 of the country’s 32 departments (Masullo 2017b, 2017a).3

      <br>

      Analytic Note: The count of experiences of noncooperation around the world is based on secondary literature and informal surveys with a limited number of country experts. While it provides a good indication of the scope of the phenomenon, it does not result from any systematic search.

      The count of experiences of noncooperation in Colombia comes from a dataset that I have been compiling from both secondary literature and information from the field. For a case to enter into the dataset, at least two sources should make reference to it. If the information comes directly from informants in the field, the case is included after double-checking with at least one more informant (unless the original informant was directly involved in the case). If the information comes from secondary sources, at least two sources (newspaper articles, NGO reports and/or academic literature) should make reference to the case. Even if these data is much more systematic than the global one, it does not constitute a census of experiences of noncooperation in Colombia. Very localized instances, experiences that lasted for very short periods of time, or oblique/indirect forms of noncooperation are hard to capture without spending sustained periods of time in the field.

      Data Source: See Masullo 2017a; contact the author at j.masullo@fsw.leidenuniv.nl

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    qdr.syr.edu/atipaper/ideational-factors-and-civilian-contention
  9. Apr 2021
  10. qdr.syr.edu qdr.syr.edu
    Ideational Factors and Civilian Contention in Civil War: How normative commitments and political ideas shape civilian collective responses to armed groups | Qualitative Data Repository
    1
    1. QDR 05 Apr 2021
      Ideational Factors and Civilian Contention in Civil War: How normative commitments and political ideas shape civilian collective responses to armed groups

      <br> This is an Annotation for Transparent Inquiry project, published by the Qualitative Data Repository. Please cite as:

      Masullo, Juan. 2021. "Data for: Ideational Factors and Civilian Contention in Civil War". Qualitative Data Repository. https://doi.org/10.5064/F6Z5A2A7

      Additional documentation can be found on QDR.

      Learn more about ATI here.

    Visit annotations in context

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    URL

    qdr.syr.edu/atipaper/ideational-factors-and-civilian-contention
  11. direct.mit.edu direct.mit.edu
    MIT Press Journals
    4
    1. QDR 02 Apr 2021
      the event in modern Iranian history whose significance and impact rival that of the revolution itself: the 1980–88 Iran-Iraq War.

      <br>

      Analytic Note: In his September 21, 2017 column in Foreign Policy, Stephen Walt highlights our article in his discussion of the impact of great wars on states. Walt, perfectly capturing and broadening what we observed in the case of Iran and the Iran-Iraq War, writes that our article demonstrates “that major wars have powerful and long-lasting effects on a nation’s subsequent foreign or military policy.”

      Source excerpt: We show, Walt continues, “[H]ow the Iran-Iraq War had a profound and enduring effect on how Iran’s ruling elites perceive the outside world and how they think about different foreign-policy tools, including their approach to nuclear weapons. … “When you think about it, these insights make perfect sense. Great wars are wrenching, costly, and frightening events that affect all of society; they are episodes where the future of the entire country is on the line. Those who fight in these wars are often scarred by the experience, and the lessons drawn from victory or defeat will be etched deeply into the nation’s collective memory. The experience of past wars is central to most national identities, and national security remains one of the paramount justifications for having a strong state apparatus. The narratives that states construct about great wars help define what it means to be a patriot, or a ‘good citizen,’ and help set the boundaries for political discourse for years to come.

      “If you want to understand the foreign policy of a great power, therefore (and probably lesser powers as well), a good place to start is to look at the great wars it has fought.”

      Link: http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/09/21/great-powers-are-defined-by-their-great-wars/ <br> Permanent link: https://perma.cc/GLT9-JK2D <br>

      Full Citation: Stephen M. Walt, “Great Powers Are Defined by their Great Wars,” Foreign Policy, September 21, 2017.

    2. QDR 02 Apr 2021
      Khamenei distanced himself from the deal and from the moderate president, Hassan Rouhani, who delivered it

      <br>

      Analytic Note: Since the JCPOA’s implementation process started in January 2016, the regime’s leadership has become more divided on what course of action will best ensure economic rejuvenation for the country. The debate has brought out key lessons from the war, including how the country should balance self-reliance and much-needed economic exchange with the world community and how it should deal with enduring distrust of foreign powers. While moderates and reformists largely continue to see economic interdependence as the right way forward, others have instead emphasized self-reliance. In particular, Khamenei has used his public appearances and televised remarks a number of times since the end of the talks to tell his base that he was right in advocating for caution when dealing with the United States in particular, whose leaders, Khamenei argues, cannot be trusted. Khamenei has repeated this sentiment multiple times since the JCPOA was signed. The following excerpt from July 2016, a year after the conclusion of the JCPOA and six months into its implementation, captures Khamenei’s distrust of the United States, what he views as European complicity in obstructing Iranian economic recovery, and belief that the JCPOA will not translate into prosperity for the nation.

      Source Excerpt: نمونهاش همین مذاکرات هستهای و برجام است که امروز مسئولین دستگاه دیپلماسی خود ما و همان کسانی که در این مذاکرات از اوّل تا آخر حضور داشتند، همینها دارند میگویند آمریکا نقض عهد کرده است، آمریکا زیر ظاهر آرام و زبان چرب و نرم مسئولانش و وزیر خارجهاش و دیگران، از پشت دارد تخریب میکند، مانع ارتباطات اقتصادی کشور با کشورهای دیگر دنیا است؛ این را مسئولین خود برجام دارند میگویند. این حرفی است که بنده البتّه از یک سال پیش و یکسالونیم پیش، مرتّب تکرار کردم که به آمریکاییها نمیشود اعتماد کرد - بعضیها سختشان بود قبول کنند - امّا امروز خود مسئولین ما میگویند. همین هفتهی گذشته، مسئولین محترم مذاکره کنندهیما با طرفهایشان در اروپا جلسه داشتند؛ همین حرفها را مسئولین ما به آنها گفتند و آنها جواب نداشتن. ... شش ماه هم از امضای برجام میگذرد، هیچ تأثیر محسوس و ملموسی هم در وضع معیشت مردم به وجود نیامده است؛ درحالیکه خب، برجام اصلاً برای برداشتن تحریمها بود؛ برای اینکه تحریمهای ظالمانه برداشته بشود. مگر غیر از این است؟ خب برداشته نشده؟ ...بنده سال گذشته در سخنرانی عمومی … گفتم برجام و این مذاکرات هستهای، برای ما یک نمونه خواهد بود؛ ببینیم آمریکاییها چهکار میکنند؛ اینها که حالا با زبان چرب و نرم میآیند، گاهی نامه مینویسند... خیلی خب ببینیم در عمل چهکار میکنند. حالا معلوم شد در عمل چهکار میکنند! در ظاهر وعده میدهند، با زبان چرب و نرم حرف میزنند امّا در عمل توطئه میکنند، تخریب میکنند، مانع از پیشرفت کارها میشوند؛ این شد آمریکا؛ این شد تجربه. حالا آمریکاییها میگویند بیایید دربارهی مسائل منطقه با شما صحبت کنیم! خب، این تجربه به ما میگوید این کار برای ما سمّ مهلک است.

      Source Excerpt Translation: An example [of U.S. untrustworthiness] lies in the nuclear negotiations and the JCPOA. Today, our own diplomats and the very people who were present in the negotiations from start to end, these very people are saying that the United States has violated the deal. America, under its calm surface and the nice words of its officials and its Secretary of State and others, is damaging [the JCPOA]. They pose an obstacle to [Iran’s] economic relations with other countries. This is what those responsible for the JCPOA are saying themselves. But that America cannot be trusted is what I had said repeatedly from a year ago and a year and a half ago. Some would hardly accept it. But today our own officials say this. This past week, our honorable negotiators had a meeting with their European counterparts. Our negotiators said the same thing and [the Europeans] did not have an answer.

      … Six months have passed from the signature of the JCPOA and there has been no tangible impact on the daily lives of people. And this is while, well, the JCPOA was fundamentally to remove the sanctions, it was so that the unjust sanctions would be removed. Is it not so? Well, they have not been removed. … Last year in a speech I said that the JCPOA and these nuclear negotiations would be an example for us; we will see what the Americans do. These [Americans] who now come with nice words, sometimes write letters… let’s see what they do in practice. Now it has become obvious what they do in practice! On the surface, they make promises and speak nice words, but in practice, they conspire and destroy. They pose an obstacle to things moving forward. That’s America. Now the Americans say come and let’s talk about regional issues! Well, this experience tells us that this is a deadly poison.

      Link: http://www.ghatreh.com/news/nn41019143/گفتم-برجام-این-مذاکرات-هسته-برای-نمونه-خواهد-بود-ظاهر. <br> Permanent link: https://perma.cc/F4HE-MTAH <br>

      Full Citation: “Guftam Barjām va īn muzākirāt-i Hastih-yi barā-yi Mā yik Nimūnih Khāhad Būd [I Said the JCPOA and these Nuclear Negotiations Would Be an Example for Us]” Qatrih (Ghatreh), July 22, 2016.

    3. QDR 02 Apr 2021
      Iran's occupation of Iraq's Faw Peninsula and its drive toward Basra in January 1987

      <br>

      Analytic Note: Several volumes of the War Chronology contend that there was a direct connection between changes in the balance between the belligerents and increased international involvement, with any substantial shift in Iran’s favor leading to efforts on the part of other countries to restore the balance or give Iraq the advantage. The forty-seventh volume points to two key shifts in the second half of the war as fitting that pattern. The first was Iran’s taking of Iraq’s Fav Peninsula. Though the success of that operation is often overstated in the Iranian sources, the capture of the strategic territory did represent one of Iran’s most significant incursions into Iraq. The second was the revelation of the Iran-Contra Affair, which in Iran is often referred to as “MacFarlane’s adventure” in honor of U.S. National Security Advisor Robert MacFarlane’s expedition to Iran to arrange the deal.

      Source Excerpt: سقوط فاو در آخر سال ۱۳۶۴، لطمۀ شدیدی بر موقعیت نظامی عراق وارد آورد و مسئولان جمهوری اسلامی ایران، آمادگی خود را برای بررسی زمینههای پایان جنگ نشان دادند. عراق نیز از اوایل سال ۱۳۶۵ با اتخاذ استراتژی 'دفاع متحرک' در زمین و تهاجم گسترده هوایی و موشکی به اهداف اقتصادی و صنعتی ایران کوشید از پیآمدهای منفی سقوط فاو بکاهد. قبل از افشا شدن ماجرای مک فارلین، بخشی از مسئولان جمهوری اسلامی امیدوار بودند که با به دست آوردن یک هدف نظامی مهم، میتوان در حوزه سیاسی به پایان جنگ نزدیک شد؛ امریکا هم به طور مستقیم به مذاکره با ایران برای خاتمه دادن به جنگ امیدوار بود. لیکن افشای ماجرای مک فارلین ضربه شدیدی بر اعتبار امریکا در نزد کشورهای حامی عراق در منطقه وارد کرد و معادلات دیپلماتیک در منطقه دستخوش تغییر. ... در چنین وضعیتی که تلاشهای دیپلماتیک با فشارهای آشکار علیه جمهوری اسلامی ایران در جریان بود، پیروزی در عرصه نظامی و دستیابی به منطقه استراتژیک بصره میتوانست موقعیت سیاسی ایران را در وضع به مراتب بهتری برای پایان دادن به جنگ قرار دهد. بنابراین با وجود تغییر در مواضع امریکا و تشدید فشار علیه ایران، این تحلیل در میان برخی از مسئولان تقویت شده بود که اجرای موفقیتآمیز یک عملیات مهم میتواند تحقق خواستههای جمهوری اسلامی ایران را تسهیل سازد.

      Source Excerpt Translation: “The fall of Fav at the end of 1364 [February-March 1986] was an intense shock for Iraq’s military position and Islamic Republic of Iran officials indicated their readiness to examine bases for ending the war. In the beginning of 1365 [spring 1986] Iraq tried to diminish the negative consequences of the conquest of Fav by adopting its ‘mobile defense’ strategy on the land and its widespread air and missile assaults on Iranian economic and industrial targets. Before the revelation of MacFarlane’s adventure, some Islamic Republic of Iran officials hoped that the realization of an important military aim would bring them closer to an end to the war in the political realm; America had also hoped to engage in direct discussions with Iran in order to end the war. But the revelation of MacFarlane’s adventure was a severe hit to America’s credibility with the regional states supporting Iraq and the diplomatic equations [of who was the victim in the war] in the region changed. … In this situation of diplomatic efforts with overt pressure against the Islamic Republic of Iran, a military victory and success in the strategic area of [the Iraqi city of] Basrah could improve Iran’s political position and put it in a better position to end the war. Therefore, with the change in the American position and the intensification of pressure against Iran, the analysis of some [Iranian] officials was strengthened that the successful execution of an important operation could facilitate the realization of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s wishes.

      Full Citation: Rūzshumār-i Jang-i Īrān va ‘Irāq, Jild-i 47: Ākharīn Talāsh’hā dar Junūb [Chronology of the Iran-Iraq War, Vol. 47: Last Struggles in the South] (Markaz-i Muṭāla‘āt va Taḥqīqāt-i Jang [Center for War Studies and Research],1381/2002-2003), 18.

    4. QDR 02 Apr 2021
      Iranian leaders define the Iran-Iraq War as a conflict between Iran and a powerful group of states.

      <br>

      Analytic Note: The Revolutionary Guards connect the Iran-Iraq War to Iran’s contemporary security situation in the way they narrate the history of the conflict. They began issuing publications on the war in 1981, and have steadily produced new material since then. The monographs published during the war focused on promoting the political and social issues that were important to the Guards. Several periodicals documented the progress of the war, relevant political developments, and information on Iranian martyrs. The IRGC publications produced after 1988 include studies of the war’s causes and effects, its phases, its impact on Iranian cities, and the roles of the participants. Several IRGC organizations, including its political, education, and propaganda departments, produce publications on the war. Imam Husayn University, founded by the IRGC in 1986, publishes a journal on defense policy that often includes articles about the conflict. The Center for War Studies and Research (now called the Center for Holy Defense Documentation and Research), which the IRGC established after the war to produce analytical studies and general-use reference works about the conflict, is responsible for many other publications. All together, the Revolutionary Guards have published numerous periodicals and more than one hundred books on the subject.

      Source Excerpt: This quote from a study published by the Center for War Studies and Research demonstrates well how the IRGC views the war: جنگ ایران و عراق پیوندی تنگاتنگ با انقلاب اسلامی دارد به گونهای که بدون درک درست آن، نمیتوان به تحلیلی فراگیر از انقلاب اسلامی دست یافت. همچنین این پدیده به دلیل تأثیرات و پیآمدهای فراوانش، دست کم تا چند دهه آینده، بر همه موضوعات مربوط به سیاست داخلی و خارجی جمهوری اسلامی ایران مؤثر خواهد بود.

      Source Excerpt Translation: “The Iran-Iraq war is linked closely to the Islamic Revolution, so without a correct understanding of [the war], it is impossible to understand the Islamic Revolution. This [war], because of its vast impact and outcomes, will affect every issue of internal and foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran for at least the next several decades.”

      Link: https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/samuel_perceptions.pdf <br> Permanent link: https://perma.cc/UQE2-MZJT <br>

      Full Citations: Tajzīyah va Taḥlīl-i Jang-i Īrān va ‘Irāq Jild-i 1: Rīshah’hā-yi Tahājum (Analysis of the Iran-Iraq War, Vol. 1: Roots of Invasion), 2nd ed. (Markaz-i Muṭāla‘āt va Taḥqīqāt-i Jang (Center for War Studies and Research), 1380/2001-02), 15.

      Description of IRGC sources from Annie Tracy Samuel, “Perceptions and Narratives of Security: The Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps and the Iran-Iraq War,” International Security Program Discussion Paper 2012-06 (Cambridge, Mass.: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 2012),

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