2,262 Matching Annotations
  1. Oct 2019
  2. www.sciencedirect.com www.sciencedirect.com
    Does Commercialization Undermine the Benefits of Decentralization for Local Services Provision? Evidence from Mexico’s Urban Water and Sanitation Sector
    31
    2. QDR 23 Oct 2019
      intestinal infectious disease in Mexico in 2005 was twice as high as in Argentina, four times as high as in Costa Rica, and 15 times as high as in Chile

      <br>

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6F769GQ/TQDT6P

      Full Citation: World Bank. (2005). Mexico infrastructure public expenditure review (IPER). Washington DC: World Bank, p. 28, footnote 56.

    11. QDR 23 Oct 2019
      national average of 91.2% water coverage and 89.9% sanitation coverage, increases from 81.9% to 65% respectively, since 1991

      <br>

      Data Source (Source 1): https://doi.org/10.5064/F6F769GQ/JQDN6T

      Data Source (Source 2): https://doi.org/10.5064/F6F769GQ/WZGRIC

      Full Citation (Source 1): CNA (1992). Situación del agua potable, alcantarillado y saneamiento. Comisión Nacional del Agua, p. 10.

      Full Citation (Source 2): CNA (2011b). Situación del agua potable, alcantarillado y saneamiento. Comisión Nacional del Agua, p. 22.

    12. QDR 23 Oct 2019
      decrease reliance on federal subsidies through cost recovery, and decrease environmental pollution

      <br>

      Data Source (Source 1): https://doi.org/10.5064/F6F769GQ/DRBB83

      Data Source (Source 2): https://doi.org/10.5064/F6F769GQ/XXRL4G

      Full Citation (Source 1): CNA (1994). Sintesis de la memoria de gestion 1988–1994. Comisión Nacional del Agua, pp. 9-10.

      Full Citation (Source 2): World Bank. (1990). Staff appraisal report for loan 3271-ME (No. 8973-ME). Washington, DC: World Bank, pp. 10-16.

    13. QDR 23 Oct 2019
      637 of which serve populations over 20,000

      <br>

      Data Source (Source 1): https://web.archive.org/web/20110930001515/http://www.pigoo.gob.mx/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=91&Itemid=

      Data Source (Source 2): https://doi.org/10.5064/F6F769GQ/CZQYJ3

      Full Citation (Source 1): IMTA. (2011). Programa de Indicadores de Gestión de Organismos Operadores del Instituto Mexicano de Tecnología del Agua. Instituto Mexicano de Tecnología del Agua.

      Full Citation (Source 2): INEGI. (2009). Panorama censal de los organismos operadores de agua en México. Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía, p. 9.

    16. QDR 23 Oct 2019
      account for less than 2% of all water services in the country

      <br>

      Data Source (Source 1): https://doi.org/10.5064/F6F769GQ/CZQYJ3

      Data Source (Source 2): https://doi.org/10.5064/F6F769GQ/6VOFTZ

      Data Source (Source 3): https://doi.org/10.5064/F6F769GQ/FSTP3P

      Full Citation (Source 1): INEGI. (2009). Panorama censal de los organismos operadores de agua en México. Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía.

      Full Citation (Source 2): CNA (1993). Informe 1989–1993. Comisión Nacional del Agua.

      Full Citation (Source 3): Estados Unidos Mexicanos (1992). Ley de Aguas Nacionales. Estados Unidos Mexicanos.

    18. QDR 23 Oct 2019
      a presidential decree transferred 1,549 federally administered systems to state and municipal governments

      <br>

      Data Source (Source 1): https://doi.org/10.5064/F6F769GQ/JIHUMX

      Data Source (Source 2): https://doi.org/10.5064/F6F769GQ/VDNX4R

      Full Citation (Source 1): DOF. (1980). Diario Oficial de la Federación. Estados Unidos Mexicanos (November 5).

      Full Citation (Source 2): SAHOP. (1981). Entrega de los sistemas de agua potable y alcantarillado a los gobiernos de los estados, fortalecimiento del federalismo. Secretaría de Asentamientos Humanos y Obras Públicas (February 5).

    24. QDR 23 Oct 2019
      transfer systems to locals who felt little ownership of the project and had few system maintenance resources

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      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6F769GQ/096DFW

      Full Citation: World Bank. (1992). Project completion report for loan 1186-ME, 1913-ME, 2281-ME (Infrastructure Division, Country Department II, Latin America and the Caribbean Regional Office No. Report No. 11448). Washington, DC: World Bank, p. 45.

    28. QDR 23 Oct 2019
      the rates have not been sufficiently increased because of inertia and political considerations”

      <br>

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6F769GQ/3YHUYR

      Full Citation: World Bank. (1964). An appraisal of the development program of Mexico: Volume VII, Annex VI, water supply, sewerage and public health. Department of Operations, Western Hemisphere. Washington DC: World Bank, p. 2.

    29. QDR 23 Oct 2019
      further control for variation in state level policy toward urban services

      <br>

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6F769GQ/KHDZO2

      Full Citation: Herrera, Veronica. 2015. "Herrera_GEM_1997.pdf". Data for: 'Does commercialization undermine the benefits of decentralization for local services provision? Evidence from Mexico’s urban water and sanitation sector'. Qualitative Data Repository.

    31. QDR 17 Oct 2019
      Does Commercialization Undermine the Benefits of Decentralization for Local Services Provision? Evidence from Mexico’s Urban Water and Sanitation Sector

      <br> This is an Annotation for Transparent Inquiry project, published by the Qualitative Data Repository. Please cite as:

      Herrera, Veronica. (2015) Data for: "Does Commercialization Undermine the Benefits of Decentralization for Local Services Provision? Evidence from Mexico’s Urban Water and Sanitation Sector." 2013. World Development, 56 (1):16-31. Active Citation Compilation, QDR:10050. Syracuse, NY: Qualitative Data Repository. http://doi.org/10.5064/F6F769GQ

      Additional documentation can be found on QDR.

      Learn more about ATI here.

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    sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0305750X13002209
  3. kellogg.nd.edu kellogg.nd.edu
    401Handlin WP final
    36
    2. QDR 17 Oct 2019
      1993.11.8

      <br>

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F66Q1V52/EXUPTY

      Full Citation: El Universal. 1993.11.8. “Hay sectores interesados en impedir las elecciones.” Caracas, Venezuela.

      Analytic Note: Once again, this interview with Chavez published before the 1993 elections, when he declines to give his support to the moderate-led LCR, shows that radicals saw a path to power that rested on maintaining a distinctive political identity that was not sullied by participation in a discredited system.

      Excerpt: En honor a la verdad, Andrés Velásquez merece nuestro respeto; sin embargo, él en su discurso coincide plenamente con los postulados de Fedecamaras. A nuestro entender, no existe en la actualidad ningún proyecto que apunte con certeza hacia la transformación de todo el sistema político, económico y social para salir de este laberinto.

      Translation: In truth, Andrés Velásquez deserves our respect, however, he, in his speech agrees fully with the postulates of Fedecámaras. As we understand it, no project currently exists that clearly aims to transform the entire political, economic, and social system to escape this labyrinth.

    3. QDR 17 Oct 2019
      1996

      <br>

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F66Q1V52/Q0MEWK

      Full Citation: Moviemiento Bolivariano Revolucionari-200. 1996. Agenda Alternativa Bolivariana. Caracas, Venezuela.

      Analytic Note: In this more mature policy document, written and disseminated after Chavez and other leaders of the MBR-200 had been released from prison, the MBR-200 focuses its attention on both proposals for radical economic policies (not in the excerpt, but elsewhere in the document) and sweeping proposals for state and institutional reform. Once again, this demonstrates how central governance-based appeals were to the radical strategy emerging in Venezuela.

      Excerpt: Así, la estrategia bolivariana se plantea no solamente la restructuración del Estado, sino de todo el sistema político, desde sus fundamentos filosóficos mismos hasta sus componentes y las relaciones que los regulan. Por esa razón, hablamos del proceso necesario de reconstitución o refundación del Poder Nacional en todas sus facetas, basado en la legitimidad y en la soberanía. El poder constituido no tiene, a estas alturas, la más mínima capacidad para hacerlo, por lo que habremos, necesariamente, de recurrir al Poder Constituyente, para ir hacia la instauración de la Quinta República: la República Bolivariana.

      Translation: Thus, the Bolivarian strategy proposes not only the restructuring of the State, but also the entire restructuring of the political system, from its philosophical foundations to its components, and the relationships that regulate them. For that reason, we speak of the necessary process of reconstituting or re-founding National Power in all its facets, based on legitimacy and sovereignty. The constituted power does not have, by now, the most minimal capacity to do this, which is why we will necessarily have to resort to the Constituent Power, in order to proceed toward the establishment of the Fifth Republic: the Bolivarian Republic.

    4. QDR 17 Oct 2019
      Movimiento Bolivariano Revolucionario ND

      <br>

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F66Q1V52/8QERY7

      Full Citation: Movimiento Bolivariano Revolucionario. ND.El Libro Azul. Caracas, Venezuela.

      Analytic Note: The “Libro Azul” lays out a broad vision of sweeping political, social, and institutional reform. The excerpt simply captures one part of this vision at the highest level, Chávez’s longstanding desire to fundamentally reorganize the state apparatus and to hold a National Constituent Assembly to decide how the state will be organized and to write a new constitution.

      Excerpt: La raíz bolivariana del proyecto hace renacer la estructura propuesta por el Libertador, en Angostura (1819); y en Bolivia (1826). De tal manera que el estado Federal Zamorano estará constituido por cinco poderes públicos: 1. Poder Ejecutivo 2. Poder Legislativo 3. Poder Judicial 4. Poder Electoral 5. Poder Moral La definición de las estructuras y atribuciones de cada uno de los poderes será producto de las deliberaciones que conducirá, a tono con la Nación, la Asamblea Nacional Constituyente durante la etapa de transición.

      Translation: The Bolivarian root of the project resurrects the structure proposed by the Liberator, in Angostura (1819) and in Bolivia (1826). In this manner, the Zamoran Federal State will be constituted by five public powers: 1. Executive Power 2. Legislative Power 3. Judicial Power 4. Electoral Power 5. Moral Power The definition of the structures and attributions of each of the powers will be a product of the deliberations that the National Constituent Assembly, in tune with the Nation, will conduct during the stage of transition.

    5. QDR 17 Oct 2019
      1996.1.19

      <br>

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F66Q1V52/3ILLHV

      Full Citation: El Universal. 1996.1.19. “Müller Rojas: La Causa R y Su Futuro.” Caracas, Venezuela.

      Analytic Note: In this op-ed, Alberto Müller Rojas, a prominent radical leader within LCR, discusses the connection between radical politics and periods of systemic crisis. This excerpt shows that radicals were consciously thinking along these lines, connecting the possibilities of more radical political positions with the appetite of the electoral for rejecting the status quo, and fearing that improvements in state performance and the end of the crisis might not only undermine the radical project, but empower moderates within the party.

      Excerpt: Señalaba en la última entrega de esta columna que el problema de la Causa R, como expresión del radicalismo democrático en Venezuela, se presentaba en términos de sus persistencia como una fuerza política significativa – la tercera en magnitud en el panorama nacional, si se consideran la cuantía de los votos obtenidos en el último proceso electoral – en un ambiente político que tiende a estabilizarse. Efectivamente, si se considera que el radicalismo es una manifestación política que adquiere fuerzas en las situaciones de crisis, para normalmente desvancerse o transformarse en meras maquinarias electorales, indudablemente tiene que considerarse que el cambio en la naturaleza de la situación política del país, hacia una estabilización de la estructura de poder, después de una grave crisis del sistema, tiene que producir la posibilidad de que le ocurra a la Causa R, lo que le ha ocurrido a las otras manifestaciones del radicalismo democrático, en otros momentos y circunstancias. Y, ciertamente, algunas declaraciones de sus dirigentes reconocidos, dan lugar a que, en las percepciones de la sociedad en general – expuestas a través de los medios de comunicación social – y, en las propias de muchos de sus adherentes, se sienta como posible un cambio profundo en la organización, que se vislumbra desde la posible moderación de sus actitudes hasta su fraccionamiento, al cual incluso juegan abiertamente, algunos de sus voceros calificados.

      Translation: I pointed out in the last installment of this column that the problem of the R Cause, as an expression of democratic radicalism in Venezuela, had to do with its persistence as a significant political force—the third in magnitude in the national panorama, if one considers the number of votes it obtained in the last election—in a political environment that tends towards stability. Indeed, if one considers that radicalism is a political manifestation that acquires force in situations of crisis and then normally disappears or transforms into merely electoral machinery, undoubtedly one must consider that the change in the nature of the political situation of the country, toward a stabilization of the power structure, after a grave crisis of the system, must lead to the possibility that what has happened to other manifestations of democratic radicalism, in other moments and circumstances, would happen to LCR. And, certainly, some statements by its recognized leaders make it so that, in the perceptions of the society in general— disseminated through social means of communication —and, in the hearts of many of these leaders’ supporters, it feels possible that there will be a profound change in the organization, which is discernible in the possible moderation of its attitudes, to its fragmentation, which some of the organization’s qualified spokespeople even trifle with openly.

    6. QDR 17 Oct 2019
      1999

      <br>

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F66Q1V52/RTJW2S

      Full Citation: Medina, Pablo. 1999. Rebeliones. Caracas, Venezuela: Piedra, Papel, o Tijera.

      Analytic Note: This excerpt from Medina’s memoirs demonstrate the great emphasis of LCR’s radical wing on governance-based issues and state reform, especially via the holding of a Constituent Assembly to rewrite the constitution, and the tepid support for this strategy among the party’s moderate wing, which wanted to work through established channels and forge pragmatic alliances.

      Excerpt: Inmediatamente en el mismo mes de diciembre se hizo el balance. En aquello reunión yo propuse que asumiéramos la Constituyente como política nacional. Hice cinco veces el planteamiento. No lo aceptaron. También propuse ir a hablar con Rafael Caldera porque él había prometido iniciar una política de cambios, y pensé que era el momento de exigirle la convocatoria a una Asamblea Nacional Constituyente. Pero prefirieron dejar las cosas de ese tamaño. Yo sí fui a hablar con Caldera. Qué le dije? Pues que no diera los auxilios financieros. Que nacionalizara la banca para evitar los auxilios y luego la reprivatizara. Que el 23 de enero no se instalara el Congreso y que en ese mismo mes de diciembre, ó durante los primeros días de enero del 94, saliera una campaña para informar a la gente del fraude electoral, impedir que continuara la farsa en el Congreso y convocar a la Constituyente. Esos fueron los planteamientos que le hice.

      Translation: Immediately, in the same month of December, we took stock. In that meeting, I proposed that we adopt the Constituent Assembly as a national policy. I made the proposal five times. They did not accept it. Also, I proposed to go speak with Rafael Caldera because he had promised to initiate a politics of change, and, I thought that this was the moment to demand from him the call for a National Constituent Assembly. But, they preferred to leave things as they were. I did go speak with Caldera. What did I tell him? Well, that he should not give aid to the financial sector. That he should nationalize banking to avoid the aid and that he should re-privatize it. That on the 23rd of January the Congress should not be installed, and that in that same month of December, or that during the first days of January of 1994, a campaign should emerge to inform the people of the fraudulent elections, to prevent the carrying on of the farce in the Congress and to convene the Constituent Assembly. Those were the proposals that I made to him.

    7. QDR 17 Oct 2019
      1992b

      <br>

      Data Source https://doi.org/10.5064/F66Q1V52/9UPASL

      Full Citation: Medina, Pablo. 1992b. “La Reforma de la Constitución.” In Farruco Sesto, ed., Pablo Medina en Entrevista. Caracas, Venezuela: Ediciones del Agua Mansa.

      Analytic Note: This excerpt again shows that Medina and the LCR radicals are focused primarily on issues of governance and state reform as the centerpiece of their political agenda.

      Excerpt: En este debate acerca de la Reforma de la Constitucin estn mezclados dos grandes problemas: un problema de coyuntura y un problema de estructura. Cuando hablamos de estructura no estamos refiriendo a la necesidad de modificar la estructura poltica del pas. Pero este debate que se vena realizando en la Comisin Bicameral desde hace cerca de dos aos, de repente tom una fuerza inusitada y esta fuerza, esta velocidad tiene que ver fundamentalmente con la discusin del momento poltico. Es decir, la crisis poltica del pas que venia cabalgando de manera subrepticia y que se abri de manera consciente a los ojos del pas y a los ojos del mundo: el problema de la legitimidad del presidente de la Repblica.

      Translation: In this debate surrounding the Rewriting of the Constitution, there are two big interrelated problems: a problem of circumstances and a problem of structure. When we speak of structure we are referring to the necessity to modify the political structure of the country. But this debate that was happening in the Bicameral Commission for around two years, suddenly took on an unusual force, and this force, this velocity, has to do fundamentally with the discussion of the political present. That is to say, the political crisis of the country that had come riding in surreptitiously and that opened itself consciously to the eyes of the country and to the eyes of the world: the problem of the legitimacy of the president of the Republic.

    8. QDR 17 Oct 2019
      1992a

      <br>

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F66Q1V52/CW0ALR

      Full Citation: Medina, Pablo. 1992a. “El Pueblo Soberano Está Hoy Hablando.” In Farruco Sesto, ed., Pablo Medina en Entrevista. Caracas, Venezuela: Ediciones del Agua Mansa.

      Analytic Note: This excerpt demonstrates the importance of governance-based appeals and issues to the radical wing of LCR and its most prominent public figure at the time, Pablo Medina. Themes of corruption, lack of access to basic services, and unequal citizenship are emphasized in his chronicle of mass complaints.

      Excerpt: El pueblo soberano est hoy hablando. Y qu dice el pueblo? Para el que sepa escuchar, el pueblo dice que los das de la corrupta clase poltica estn contados. Eso es lo que dice el pueblo. Que lleg la hora de cambiar las cosas. Eso es lo que dice el pueblo. Que la libertad, la seguridad, la justicia, la solidaridad, la igualdad, no son conceptos abstractos tiles para la retrica, sino que deben ser puntales de una vida en sociedad ms digna. Eso es lo que dice el pueblo. Que no quiere ms ladrones con la mano en los dineros pblicos. Que quiere acceso a la educacin, a la salud, a la vivienda, al trabajo, a la ciudadana real, a la cultura, a salir de la pobreza, a dejar atrs la injusticia. Eso es lo que quiere el pueblo. Que no haya ms gobiernos indecentes, que se recuperen los reales robados, que se encarcele a los bandidos, que se reconozca a los valientes, a los honestos, a los justos, eso es lo que el pueblo quiere.

      Translation: The sovereign people are speaking today. And what do the people say? For those who know how to listen, the people say that the days of the corrupt political class are numbered. That is what the people say. That the hour of change has arrived. That is what the people say. That liberty, security, justice, solidarity, equality, are not abstract concepts useful for rhetoric, but rather should be cornerstones of a life in a more dignified society. That is what the people say. That they do not want more thieves whose hands are in the public coffers. That they want access to education, health, housing, work, real citizenship, culture, and to leave behind poverty and injustice. That is what the people want. That there are no more wretched governments, that the stolen reales [currency] are recovered, that the bandits be imprisoned, that the valiant, the honest, and the just be recognized. That is what the people want.

    9. QDR 17 Oct 2019
      2001, 75

      <br>

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F66Q1V52/TULZOB

      Full Citation: Mujica, Felipe. 2001. “La Opción MAS-Chávez.” In Felipe Mujica, ed., La Reflexión del MAS. Caracas, Venezuela: Ediciones Polémica, 75.

      Analytic Note: This excerpt from the platform of Horizonte 2000 the opportunistic radicals led by Felipe Mujica and Leopoldo Puchi demonstrates how alternative viability calculations played into the radical takeover of MAS and the decision to back Chavez. The radical strategy is justified precisely by the argument that the country is looking for new leadership that is not tainted by association with status quo parties, and this kind of political coalition can only be constructed out of radical forces.

      Excerpt: Venezuela est hambrienta de propsito, de proyecto. No es posible entrar al XXI con un liderazgo que ofrezca slo ms do lo mismo. La articulacin del necesario proyecto de pas exitoso exige nuevos interlocutores tanto el mbito social como en el poltico. Esto significa el desarrollo de una fuerza que en su perfil y estructura, en su organizacin y su discurso, rena la superacin de los estilos de las antiguas formaciones con la capacidad para la innovacin de los nuevos actores sociales e institucionales. Esa fuerza con la flexibilidad necesaria para atender lo particular, lo regional, lo sectorial, lo especfico pero con la implantacin geogrfica y social necesaria para ofrecer propuestas de carcter nacional, es el Movimiento Al Socialismo. Por eso estamos decididos a acompaar a los nuevos lideres, constructores del proyecto de pas exitoso que merecemos ser. Por eso, tanto en la coyuntura electoral que se avecina como en los interesantes procesos que se abren ms all de 1999, el MAS debe ratificar su radical deslinde con las antiguas visiones conservadoras, y abrirse al encuentro de los nuevos planteamientos y los nuevos liderazgos.

      Translation: Venezuela is hungry for purpose and project. It is not possible to enter the 21st century with a leadership that offers only more of the same. The articulation of the necessary project for a successful country demands new interlocutors as much in the social as in the political environment. This means the development of a force whose profile and structure, organization and discourse, blends the overcoming of the ways of the old formations with the capacity for innovation of the new social and institutional agents. That force with the necessary flexibility to attend to the particular, the regional, the sectorial, the specific but with the geographic scope and social necessity to offer propositions of a national character, is the Movement to Socialism. That is why we are committed to accompanying the new leaders, builders of the project of the successful country that we deserve to be. That is why, both in the electoral situation that approaches, as in the interesting processes that look beyond 1999, the MAS should uphold its radical separation from the old conservative visions, and open itself to new proposals and new leadership.

    10. QDR 17 Oct 2019
      1996.1.28

      <br>

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F66Q1V52/ARSW0J

      Full Citation: El Universal. 1996.1.28. “Retirarse del Gobierno plantea dirigencia del MAS.” Caracas, Venezuela.

      Analytic Note: This excerpt offers an example of Puchi, less a true ideologue than an “opportunistic radical” attuned to the party’s waning electoral fortunes, arguing that the association with the Caldera government has been damaging and that the best strategy moving forward would be to reestablish the party’s more distinctive profile.

      Excerpt: Ante esa circunstancia, Puchi considera que de no producirse un cambio de actitud del presidente Rafael Caldera, los masistas “deben profundizar en la línea iniciada de distanciamiento y de independencia constructive, que permita actuar al partido sin estar atado de manos por el compromiso de solidarid propio de quienes comparten la toma de decisions y el ejercicio del poder.” …Además, piensa que deben estar atentos a la evolución de las decisions relacionadas con la Agenda Venezuela, “pues una ejecución conducida de manera desacertada, de manera incoherente, sin un manejo correcto de los tiempos, no puede llevar a una catástrofe. En estas circunstancias, el MAS no podria continuar acompañando al Gobierno.”

      Translation: Given that circumstance, Puchi is of the opinion that if president Rafael Caldera’s attitude does not change, the masistas “should continue the policy, already begun, of distancing themselves and being constructively independent, which allows the party to act, without being hand-cuffed by commitments to solidarity typical of those who share decision-making and the exercise of power.” …In addition, he thinks that they should be attentive to the evolution of the decisions related to the Venezuelan Agenda, “because an execution conducted in an imprudent manner, in an incoherent manner, without a correct reading of the times, can bring us to a catastrophe. En these circumstances, MAS cannot continue being part of the government.”

    11. QDR 17 Oct 2019
      1996.2.10

      <br>

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F66Q1V52/K3JORQ

      Full Citation: El Universal. 1996.2.10. “Los veinticinco anos del MAS y lo que se palpa.” Caracas, Venezuela.

      Analytic Note: This excerpt from an opinion piece by Moises Moleiro, a famously staunch radical within MAS, provides another example of the party’s radical wing stressing the need to differentiate the party from AD and Copei and the centrality of that differentation strategy to finding an alternative path to electoral viability.

      Excerpt: La fuerza cuestionadota y crítica, que concitó entusiasmos y adhesiones y logró presentarse como una esperanza, hace hoy (unreadable), sin nada que realmente la diferencie de AD y Copei. Partidos – como se sabe – contra cuyo predominio en la escena política nacional enderezó sus (unreadable). Respecto a los cuales se (unreadable) en diferenciarse y en constituir una alternativa viable.

      Translation: The questioning and critical force that stirred up enthusiasm and adherents and was able to present itself as a from of hope, is known today, without anything that really differentiates it from AD and Copei. These —as one knows—against whose domination on the national political scene MAS staked its claim. Against which it strived to differentiate itself and to build a viable alternative.

    12. QDR 17 Oct 2019
      1997c

      <br>

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F66Q1V52/UNFZGA

      Full Citation: Ochoa Antich, Enrique.1997c. “Balance y Perspectivas.” In Enrique Ochoa Antich, ed. Adios al MAS?: Documentos para una historia del MAS del socialism marxista al socialism liberal. Caracas, Venezuela: Domingo Fuentes.

      Analytic Note: This excerpt shows Ochoa Antich again making the strategic argument that joining forces with radical sectors and distancing the party from Convergencia offers the best way forward for the MAS if they want to be part of a triumphant coalition in 1998.

      Excerpt: Asimismo, opino que el diseño de un plan político para 1998 no tiene por qué y en realidad no puede estar supeditado a nuestra presencia o no en el Gobierno ni a nuestro respaldo a sus políticas fundamentales. El competidor real que se asoma en el horizonte en esa colosal disputa por el poder político que habrán de ser las elecciones generales – nacionales y regionales a la vez – del 98 es, por lo pronto, Acción Democrática. Una política probable, como ya hemos repetido varias veces en estas palabras, es la de conformar con otras fuerzas un amplio bloque electoral que pueda colocarnos como una opción victoriosa de cara a aquellos comicios. La pregunta resulta obvia: existe alguna fuerza, además de la disminuida aunque nunca despreciable Convergencia, con la que podamos coincidir de cara al 98 que no se encuentre en una postura de oposición al gobierno del Presidente Caldera? Resultará paradójico, exigirá de nosotros habilidades e inusitada inteligencia, pero el MAS va a verse necesariamente en la obligación, si quiere colocarse en la perspectiva del 98 en posición de expansión electoral, de combinar su respaldo al Gobierno, por una parte, con la coincidencia electoral, por la otra, con fuerzas que adversan y se oponen al gobierno y con la confrontación histórica a Acción Democrática al margen del discreto apoyo de este partido al Presidente Caldera. Lo mismo puede decirse, por cierto, de movimientos tácticos que también deben guardar la debida autonomía de la línea central de respaldo al gobierno (caso de la elección de las nuevas directivas del Congreso de la República, por ejemplo). En fin de cuentas, debe admitirse que los planes del Presidente Caldera no coinciden ni tienen por qué coincidir necesariamente con los del MAS: éste es un hecho que debemos observar como natural y que no tiene por qué causar, ni entre nosotros ni en el seno del Gobierno, posiciones de absurda e ilógica ansiedad.

      Translation: Likewise, I am of the opinion that the design of a new political plan for 1998 does not have to, and, in reality, cannot be subject to our presence, or not, in the Government, nor to our support of its fundamental politics. The real competitor peeking out from the horizon in that colossal dispute for political power coming into being as the general elections—national and regional simultaneously—of 1998, is, for the moment, Democratic Action. A probable policy, as we have already repeated various times in these pages, is that of uniting with other forces into a large electoral block that can place us as a victorious option facing those elections. The question becomes obvious: Is there some force, other than the crippled, though never contemptible, Convergence, with whom we can form a coalition in 1998, which does not find itself in a posture of opposition to the government of President Caldera? It will be paradoxical, it will demand ability and unprecedented intelligence, but the MAS will see itself necessarily required, if it wants to place itself in a position of electoral expansion from the viewpoint of 1998, to combine its support of the Government, on the one hand, with the electoral coalition, and on the other hand, with the forces that oppose the government and with the long-standing confrontation with Democratic Action, regardless of the moderate support of this party to President Caldera. The same can be said, incidentally, of tactical movements that also should maintain due autonomy from the central line of support of the government (as in the case of the election of the new directors of the Congress of the Republic, for example). In the end, one must admit that the plans of President Caldera do not coincide and do not necessarily have to coincide with those of the MAS: this is a fact that we should observe as natural, and it should not be a reason to cause among us, nor among those in the breast of the government, positions of absurd and illogical anxiety.

    13. QDR 17 Oct 2019
      1997b

      <br>

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F66Q1V52/MLMUSA

      Full Citation: Ochoa Antich, Enrique. 1997b. “Notas para un Balance del Gobierno.” In Enrique Ochoa Antich, ed. Adios al MAS?: Documentos para una historia del MAS del socialism marxista al socialism liberal. Caracas, Venezuela: Domingo Fuentes.

      Analytic Note: This excerpt is an example of Ochoa Antich’s emphasis on the costs involved with association with discredited status quo parties in a context of poor governance. These costs are an intrinsic part of the calculation that a more radical project differentiating the party from status quo forces would offer a better path to electoral viability moving forward.

      Excerpt: Alto precio ha pagado el MAS para estar en el Gobierno. Sin duda, el decrecimiento continuo del Movimiento durante estos últimos siete años, una vez que la antigua cúpula dirigente prácticamente impuso el Movimiento como un hecho el “Proyecto Caldera,” se debe a múltiples causas y no solamente a nuestra peculiar relación con Caldera, pero resulta claro que esa relación también tiene que ver con nuestros resultados. Ha llegado pues el momento de hacer un balance de eso que hemos dado en llamar el “Proyecto Caldera” así como de la gestión del primer gobierno del cual el MAS forma parte.

      Translation: The MAS has paid a high price to be in the Government. Without a doubt, the continual downturn of the Movement during these last seven years, after the old leadership practically imposed the “Caldera Project” on the Movement as a done deal, is due to multiple causes and not only to our peculiar relations with Caldera. But it is clear that that relationship also impacted our results. The moment has arrived then to make a reckoning with what we have taken to calling the “Caldera Project”, as well as of the administration of the first government of which MAS is a part.

    14. QDR 17 Oct 2019
      1997a

      <br>

      Date Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F66Q1V52/6FR6WR

      Full Citation: Ochoa Antich, Enrique. 1997a. “Las Tesis del Nuevo MAS.” In Enrique Ochoa Antich, ed. Adios al MAS?: Documentos para una historia del MAS del socialism marxista al socialism liberal. Caracas, Venezuela: Domingo Fuentes.

      Analytic Note: This excerpt shows the preoccupation of Ochoa Antich with finding an alternative agenda to the Venezuelan people that would sharply differentiate MAS from the status quo parties and, through doing so, allow MAS – potentially in a radical alliance with LCR and the MBR-200 – to chart an alternative path to electoral viability.

      Excerpt: El desenlace de este período turbulento que podríamos definir como de transición dependerá de la capacidad de hegemonía que las fuerzas del cambio sepan poner en juego. En fin de cuentas, nadie deja lo que tiene sino a cambio de algo, así que el perfil de la alternativa, su atractivo y su utilidad, constituyen el punto crucial del proceso. De la inteligencia, de la voluntad, de la sabiduría que muestren las fuerzas del cambio dependerá que este periodo de transición no termine siendo una elipse hacia el pasado. Para una fuerza que, como el MAS, significó durante dos décadas la única alternativa a Acción Democrática y Copei, el escenario que acabamos de describir resulta altamente comprometedor. No es un recurso retórico decir que acaso de la conducta del MAS, de que sea capaz de superar sus atrofias y potenciar sus virtudes, se derivará en buena medida el curso de los acontecimientos de la Venezuela contemporánea. Quizá la providencia ha colocado en nuestras manos la posibilidad de decidir el futuro del país: si nos equivocamos y desperdiciamos el momento histórico que vivimos, resulta altamente probable que las otras fuerzas del cambio – La Causa y los bolivarianos, entre otras – no puedan solas vencer la hegemonía aún latente de Acción Democrática y Copei y vuelvan las fuerzas de la conservación a imponer su dominio sobre la conciencia del pueblo; si acertamos, si comenzamos por cambiarnos a nosotros mismos, quizá seamos la pieza decisiva que incline la balanza de la historia a favor de las fuerzas del cambio.

      Translation: The outcome of this turbulent period, which we could define as the transition, will depend on the capacity to exert hegemony that the forces of change will know how to put into play. In the end, no one leaves what he has unless he exchanges it for something else, so the stature of the other possibility, its attractiveness and its utility, constitutes the crucial point of the process. On the intelligence, the will, the knowledge that the forces of change will show hinges this period of transition not ending as an ellipse toward the past… For a force that, as the MAS, constituted for two decades the only alternative to Democratic Action and Copei, the scene that we just finished describing is highly compromising. It is not a rhetorical gesture to say, perhaps, that from the behavior of the MAS, which is capable of overcoming its atrophies and strengthening its virtues, will be derived the course of events of contemporary Venezuela. Maybe providence has placed in our hands the possibility of deciding the future of the country: if we make a mistake and waste the historic moment we are living, it is highly probable that the other forces of change— Radical Cause and the Bolivarians, among others—will not be able to defeat alone the hegemony, although latent, of Democratic Action and Copei and the forces of conservation will return to impose their domination over the conscience of the people; if we are right, if we start by changing ourselves, maybe we will be the decisive piece that tilts the balancing scale of history in favor of the forces of change.

    15. QDR 17 Oct 2019
      1993

      <br>

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F66Q1V52/ZBENPV

      Full Citation: Thielen, Rafael. 1993. “Una estrategia equivoca frente a la crisis nacional.” In El MAS: Un proyecto político para el cambio o la conservación? Caracas, Venezuela: Fondo Editorial Tropykos.

      Analytic Note: This piece by Thielen provides a clear example of radicals within MAS using the systemic crisis of governance in Venezuela to argue for an alternative viability strategy, in which the party would differentiate itself from status quo contenders and emphasize its potential to transform discredited aspects of the current political system.

      Excerpt: En la intención de acometer inmediatamente una “revolución en el MAS” – que fue la conclusión globalizada más importante – que en otras palabras significa la refundación del partido para convertirlo en un instrumento que satisfaga las nuevas exigencias de la sociedad y cumpla cabalmente con su papel reformador y transformador de las estructuras económicas y sociales del país, hubo planteamientos y preocupaciones compartidos en relación a materias como el perfil y la condición del MAS, la ambigüedad de su política, desviaciones electoralistas, estilos dirigentes insatisfactorios, distorsión de la vida interna, carencias significativas en el funcionamiento institucional.

      Translation: With the intention of immediately undertaking a “revolution in the MAS”—which was the most important global conclusion—that, in other words, amounted to re-founding the party to convert it into an instrument that satisfied the new demands of society and completely fulfilled its role as reformer and transformer of the economic and social structures of the country, there were shared plans and preoccupations regarding matters such as the profile and condition of the MAS, the ambiguity of its politics, electoralist detours, unsatisfactory leadership styles, distortion of its internal life, and significant deficiencies in its institutional operation.

    16. QDR 17 Oct 2019
      1993

      <br>

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F66Q1V52/TEWXZB

      Full Citation: Pérez Marcano, Héctor. 1993. “Debate para que?” In El MAS: Un proyecto politico para el cambio o la conservación? Caracas, Venezuela: Fondo Editorial Tropykos.

      Analytic Note: This provides another example of the rise in radical critiques of MAS’s moderate leadership during the early 1990s and the tendency of radicals to specifically point to the danger of becoming a status quo, rather than “transformative” party.

      Excerpt: La banalización de la vida interna del MAS ha llevado a nuestra organización a una serie de desviaciones, que, de no corregirse, terminarán por liquidar su cualidad de fuerza transformadora de la sociedad y la convertirán en simple aparato electoral, de las más disímiles características, al servicio de intereses grupales regionales. En algunos casos – como es evidente ya – grupos regionales imbricados con intereses de grupos económicos regionales y nacionales que terminan siendo los verdaderos detentadores del poder, tal como ha ocurrido en el plano nacional con Acción Democrática. Esta banalización de la vida interna impide que el MAS debata seriamente sobre sí mismo, analice profundamente los problemas nacionales y examine los cambios que en la economía mundial y en el cuadro político internacional se han dado y que afectan de una manera determinante a una fuerza política que – al menos en su denominación – todavía se reclama como fuerza socialista.

      Translation: The trivialization of the internal life of the MAS has led our organization on a series of detours that, if not corrected, will end by destroying its quality as a transformative force of society, and will turn it into a simple electoral apparatus, of the most different characteristics, at the service of regional group interests. In some cases—as is already evident— the true bearers of power will end up being regional groups connected with the interests of regional and national economic groups, as has occurred on the national stage with Democratic Action. This trivialization of internal life prevents the MAS from seriously debating about itself, deeply analyzing national problems, and examining the changes that have been dealt to the world economy and to the international political sphere, and that affect, in a deterministic way, a political force that—at least in name—still claims to be a socialist force.

    17. QDR 17 Oct 2019
      1993a

      <br>

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F66Q1V52/NLGZDN

      Full Citation: Valero, Jorge. 1993a. Razones y Sinrazones del Fallido Golpe de Estado del 4 de Febrero de 1992 en Venezuela. In El MAS: Un proyecto politico para el cambio o la conservacin? Caracas, Venezuela: Fondo Editorial Tropykos.

      Analytic Note: Valero makes clear and repeated reference to the systemic crisis of governance in the country, in the context of arguing that this crisis presents MAS with unprecedented opportunities, as long as the party can maintain its distinctive profile.

      Excerpt: Los acontecimientos del 4-F han evidenciado una crisis profunda del rgimen poltico-institucional inaugurado el 23 de Enero de 1958. La crisis tiene an dimensiones desconocidas tanto en el mbito civil como el militar. El rgimen que hace 34 aos resurgi con esperanzadores augurios y el cual haba sido fruto de la postrera accin libertaria de numerosos prceres de la democracia, ha colapsado definitivamente. Y es que no estamos simplemente ante una crisis de gobierno, sino del sistema como tal. Las soluciones para encararlas, por lo tanto, no pueden ser parciales ni fragmentarias. No ha sido suficiente con que el presidente Prez haya removido a varios miembros de su gabinete e instrumente si es que tiene la voluntad de hacerlo medidas compensatorias en el mbito econmico-social que atenuen el terrible impacto causado por el paquete neoliberal. No, no ha sido suficiente.

      Translation: The events of the 4th of February made evident a profound crisis of the political-institutional regime inaugurated on the 23rd of January 1958. The crisis still has unknown dimensions both in the civilian area as in the military area. The regime that 34 years ago resurfaced with hopeful signs, and which had been the fruits of the last actions for liberty of many leaders for democracy, has collapsed definitively. It is not that we are simply faced with a crisis of government, but rather, with a crisis of the whole system itself. The solutions used to confront this crisis, therefore, cannot be partial or fragmentary. It has not been enough for President Prez to remove various members of his cabinet and to arrange forif he were to have the will to do itcompensatory measures in the socio-economic realm to alleviate the terrible impact caused by the neoliberal package. No, this has not been enough.

    18. QDR 17 Oct 2019
      1995.4

      <br>

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F66Q1V52/L5FOAP

      Full Citation: Brasil Agora. 1995.4. “É Hora de Ser Duro Com o Governo.” Collected in Partido dos Trabalhadores Historical Archives, Projeto Memória e História, Fundação Perseu Abramo. Leiden, Netherlands: IDC.

      Analytic Note: This source provides evidence for the descriptive claim that the PT’s moderate leadership was concerned with holding the party together after its resumption of power and maintained a sharply oppositional stance to the Cardoso agenda, even as it plotted a course toward a more pragmatic and moderate politics that would eventually greatly overlap with that agenda.

      Excerpt: Ele quer destruir o Estado brasileiro e há exemplos de que isso não é prudente fazer: México, Argentina, a própria Inglaterra, onde os trabalhadores estão perdendo conquistas de 50 anos, além do desmonte do movimento sindical inglês. Ao mesmo tempo, FHC não apresenta uma agenda social. Ele efetivamente se transformou em prisioneiro das teses mais conservadoras e se tornou um conservador. Eu acho que a forma que o PT tem de contribuir para o país nesse instante é ser duro, sem querer fazer nenhum julgamento do mandato de FHC, que está no começo, mas já fazendo um julgamento dos primeiros três meses, que na minha ótica são muito negativos.

      Translation: He wants to destroy the Brazilian state and there are examples that this is not prudent thing to do: Mexico, Argentina, England itself, where workers have lost 50 years of achievements, in addition to the dismantling of the English labor movement. At the same time, FHC does not present a social agenda. He actually became a prisoner of the most conservative viewpoints and became a conservative. I think the PT has to be rigid right now, without making judgments on the entirely of the FHC mandate, which is just starting, but already judging the first three months, which in my view are very negative.

    19. QDR 17 Oct 2019
      1997.6.16

      <br>

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F66Q1V52/EHRCVP

      Full Citation: Folha de Sao Paulo. 1997.6.16. “Temer Lança Candidatura No PT E Critica ‘Hesitação’ Do Partido.” Collected in Partido dos Trabalhadores Historical Archives, Projeto Memória e História, Fundação Perseu Abramo. Leiden, Netherlands: IDC.

      Analytic Note: This news story simply gives evidence for the descriptive claim that Milton Temer’s candidacy for the PT leadership was at the center of the ill-fated radical attempts to regain a foothold and prevent the slow growth of moderate hegemony after 1994.

      Excerpt: "Um ato contra o governo Fernando Henrique Cardoso e a Articulação, corrente que atualmente dirige o PT, marcou ontem o lançamento oficial da candidatura do deputado federal Milton Temer (RJ), 58, à presidência nacional da legenda. A manifestação aconteceu na Uerj (Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro), onde o PT carioca encerrava o seu 10º Encontro Municipal, e teve cerca de 200 pessoas. Temer afirmou que sua candidatura não tem ligação com a crise aberta pelo caso Cpem (acusações de irregularidades envolvendo petistas), mas atacou a linha majoritária no PT, por supostas “hesitações” na oposição ao governo."

      Translation: "In an action against the government of Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Articulation, the faction that now runs the PT, yesterday marked the official launch of the candidacy of Congressman Milton Temer (RJ), 58, for the national presidency of the party. The demonstration took place at UERJ (State University of Rio de Janeiro), where the PT held its 10th Municipal Meeting, and had about 200 people. Temer said his candidacy has no connection with the crisis opened by the CPEM case (accusations of irregularities involving Petistas) but attacked the majority faction of the PT, for alleged "hesitation" in opposition to the government.”

    20. QDR 17 Oct 2019
      1994.12

      <br>

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F66Q1V52/ACNSV1

      Full Citation: Teoria e Debate. 1994.12 “3 de outubro e o futuro do PT.” Collected in Partido dos Trabalhadores Historical Archives, Projeto Memória e História, Fundação Perseu Abramo. Leiden, Netherlands: IDC.

      Analytic Note: The author, a Brazilian leftist intellectual but not a PT member, brings an outsider’s critical perspective to the state of factional conflict within the party in the aftermath of the 1994 electoral loss. The key point is that Mangabeira Unger highlights viability appeals as central to moderate arguments while noting that the radicals are incapable of formulating a coherent alternative, that they have programmatic preferences but no clear plan for how to build a majoritarian coalition in the post-Cold War world.

      Excerpt: Este não é um erro superficial. Ele está, pelo contrário, enraizado na vida interna do PT e nas atitudes de suas lideranças maiores. Organizam-se as tendências internas do PT num espectro de radicalização progressiva das reivindicações redistribuídas. É como se os mais moderados (e “modernos”) dissessem, como disse Fernando Henrique Cardoso, somos nós o viável, enquanto que os mais radicais protestassem, somos nós que queremos a redistribuição para valer mesmo á custa de amedrontar as classes proprietárias. O grave é que nem os mais radicais oferecem uma proposta que fundamente este distributivismo mais ou menos afoito numa concepção produtiva. Apenas compartilham a mesma confusão típica da esquerda mundial.

      Translation: This is no superficial error. On the contrary, it is ingrained in the internal life of the PT and in the attitudes of most of its leadership. The factions of the PT define themselves along a spectrum of radicalization of claims to redistribution. It is as if the more moderate (and “modern”) said, in the words of Fernando Henrique Cardoso, “we are what is viable,” while the more radical protested, “we want real redistribution, even at the cost of scaring off the monied classes.” What is disturbing is that not even the more radical voices offer a proposal this more or less bold claim to redistribution in a productivist program. They merely share the confusion typical of the left the world over.

    21. QDR 17 Oct 2019
      1994.10

      <br>

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F66Q1V52/PAEQK3

      Full Citation: Brasil Agora. 1994.10 “Perdemos e agora.” Collected in Partido dos Trabalhadores Historical Archives, Projeto Memória e História, Fundação Perseu Abramo. Leiden, Netherlands: IDC.

      Analytic Note: These responses in a post-electoral symposium, from radical leaders Markus Sokol and João Machado, are good examples of the inability of radicals to spin a convincing narrative regarding electoral viability in a context of improving governance and a Cardoso government attracting high approval ratings. Sokol blames the loss on the PT’s ambiguous position with respect to the Plano Real and suggests that it needed to be rejected more clearly, a position seemingly blind to the plan’s success and popular approval. Machado falls back on radical canards about the unity of the bourgeoisie, their resource advantages, and media manipulation. Neither radical leader articulates an argument about an alternative path to electoral viability that would not involve programmatic moderation and greater pragmatism.

      Excerpt: A que se deve a derrota de Lula no primeiro turno? Na minha opinião a questão chave foi o Plano Real e nossa posição diante dele. A resposta que o PT e a Frente Brasil Popular deram ao plano foi mais do que ambígua. Em algumas ocasiões dissemos que ele não daria certo, em outras que traria recessão e desemprego, depois falou-se que a estabilização de preços por ele proporcionada era boa, mas precisava ser completada por políticas de cunho social e houve até companheiros que falaram em aperfeiçoar o Plano Real. Tudo isto foi ambíguo e contraditório, ajudou a cimentar a aliança do campo adversário e levou vastos setores sociais a verem no real e no que ele representa uma coisa boa, que merecia ser mantida. Porque perdemos? Embora todos dissessem que as eleições de 94 seriam mais difíceis do que as de 89, que 05 adversários jogariam pesado, de fato tinha-se a ideia de um quadro semelhante: trabalhamos com a ideia uma burguesia dividida, sem um candidato de confiança, pensamos que ser oposição consequente era suficiente e renderia votos e que seria possível ganhar as eleições apenas com a força eleitoral de Lula. Muitas vezes o movimento social chegou a ser desconsiderado e fatos importantes foram vistos como “coisas que atrapalharão o Lula”. O quadro foi totalmente diferente. A burguesia unificou-se em torno de Fernando Henrique, articulou de forma profissional todos os recursos ao seu alcance, do aparelho do Estado ao Plano Real e fez o manejo competente dos meios de comunicação. Para enfrentar esta situação seria necessário muito mais do que o prestígio de Lula, que existe, é bom, mas não é o suficiente. Teríamos que deixar claro desde o início que estava em jogo um confronto entre nosso projeto e o projeto das elites e dos centros internacionais de poder econômico e financeiro. Também fizemos uma avaliação totalmente equivocada do Plano Real e não percebemos o que a burguesia estava fazendo. Enfim, estávamos preparados para uma situação e aconteceu outra.

      Translation: Why was Lula defeated in the first round? The main issue, in my opinion, was the "Plano Real" and our position on it. The answer that both the PT and the "Frente Brasil Popular" gave to the "Plano Real" was more than ambiguous. On some occasions we said it would not work, in other words it would bring recession and unemployment, then it was said that the price stabilization was good, but that it lacked some policies of a social nature and there were others who said that the "Plano Real" just needed improvement. All this was ambiguous and contradictory, helping cement the alliance in the opposition camp and leading many social sectors to see the "Plano Real" as a good thing, which deserved to be maintained. Why did we lose? Although everyone said that the 94’s elections would be more difficult than the 89’s, and the opponents would be playing hard, in fact there was an idea of a similar scenario: we worked with the idea of a divided bourgeoisie without a reliable candidate, we thought that being the consequential opposition was enough and that would win us votes and that a victory in the elections would be possible only with the electoral strength of Lula. Frequently, the social movements were downplayed and important facts were seen as "things that would stand in Lula’s way". The reality was totally different. The bourgeoisie was unified around Fernando Henrique, and used in a professional way all the resources at their disposal, from the state apparatus to the "Plano Real" and their competent management of the media. To confront this situation we would need much more than just Lula’s personal prestige, which existed, was good, but was not enough. We would have to make clear from the beginning that what was at stake was a clash between our project and the one from the elite and international centers of economic and financial power.

    22. QDR 17 Oct 2019
      1994.10.7

      <br>

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F66Q1V52/QDNNC7

      Full Citation: Folha de São Paulo. 1994.10.7. “A Missão Impossível.”

      Analytic Note: This opinion piece from Tarso Genro in the wake of the 1994 elections is another example of the return to viability appeals by moderates. Genro refers to the strategy of falling back on old radical Socialist ideas in order to win elections as a Mission Impossible, ridicules the notion of blaming the media for Lulas defeat, and posits that the left must find a new direction.

      Excerpt: "Hoje impossvel fundamentar um projeto estratgico no seu significado econmico-social, como foi possvel na cultura do velho socialismo revolucionrio e na social-democracia reformadora. Fernando Henrique compreendeu perfeitamente tudo isso e abdicou at da social-democracia. O PT no compreendeu e remendou o ``furo" do socialismo clssico com uma viso social-democrtica, obreirista reformista, to superada como o socialismo sovitico: foi um acordo com a conscincia antiga.... O pior, porm, que pode nos acontecer no momento , confirmada a derrota de Lula, culpar a grande mdia como se pudssemos ter uma estratgia de vitria com a solidariedade da mdia; buscando responsveis individuais como se a nossa linha de campanha no fosse resultado de uma cultura poltica."

      Translation: "Today it is impossible to support a strategic project in its economic and social sense, as it was possible in the culture of the old revolutionary socialism and that of progressive social democracy. Fernando Henrique fully understood all this and even renounced social democracy. The PT did not understand and fixed the problems of classic socialism with a social-democratic vision, a progressive working class, overcoming all as with Soviet socialism: it was an agreement with an old consciousness. The worst, however, that can happen to us at this moment, with the confirmed defeat of Lula, would be to blame the media - as if we could have a winning strategy with the solidarity of the media; seeking the guilty - as if the orientation of our campaign was not the result of our political culture."

    23. QDR 17 Oct 2019
      1995.6

      <br>

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F66Q1V52/WX2LBS

      Full Citation: Teoria e Debate. 1995.6. “Era possível ganhar no primeiro turno.” Collected in Partido dos Trabalhadores Historical Archives, Projeto Memória e História, Fundação Perseu Abramo. Leiden, Netherlands: IDC.

      Analytic Note: This opinion piece by leading moderate Eduardo Jorge is an example of the return to viability logic in the aftermath of the success of the Plano Real and the popularity of the Cardoso government. (In the broader piece, not just the excerpt above) Jorge argues that the PT could have demolished the Brazilian right completely by making an electoral pact with the PSDB, that the failure of the PT (and left in general) to be willing to share power and make programmatic concessions has been one of the party’s greatest weaknesses, that the radical takeover of the party has prevented program from occurring and the promise of the 1st Congress from being realized, and that if the PT is ever to win power it will have to become much more pragmatic and flexible.

      Excerpt: O PT está diante de um problema que continuará, senão for desvelado e enfrentado até ao fim, nos confinando como um partido importante e representativo, mas incapaz de compartilhar hegemonia e de governar na democracia. Refiro-me à ideologia, à regra, à cultura tradicional nos partidos de esquerda, que implica buscar a qualquer custo, por quaisquer meios, violentos ou pacíficos, uma hegemonia total e, portanto, totalitária. Segundo esta mentalidade, todos os sectores, da associação de escoteiros à seleção nacional de futebol do sindicato ao Parlamento, devem ser iluminados por nossa ‘luz’, onipresente, onipotente e onisciente. É verdade que o PT vem lutando contra isso desde o seu nascimento e que no seu 1º Congresso, em 1991, aprovou por 70% a 30% dos votos dos delegados, a rejeição da ditadura do proletariado, a regra máxima do autoritarismo na esquerda. Mas a tradição é forte , recusa-se a morrer e encontra caminhos para voltar a oprimir nossas consciências socialistas. Foi o que aconteceu em 1993 e 94, com a base e a direção do partido empolgadas diante do favoritismo inicial da candidatura Lula, com a possibilidade de vitória solitária ou com aliados tratados com menosprezo ou queridos desde que submissos. É essa matriz que precisa ser abandonada.”

      Translation: The PT is facing a problem that will continue, if not unveiled and confronted to the end, confining ourselves to being an important and representative party, but one incapable of sharing hegemony and governing under democracy. I refer to the ideology, the rule, the traditional culture in parties of the left, which means seeking at any cost, by any means, violent or peaceful, a hegemony that is total, and therefore, totalitarian. According to this mentality, all sectors from the scout association to the national football team, the unions to the Parliament, must be illuminated by our 'light', omnipresent, omnipotent and omniscient. It is true that the PT has been fighting it since its birth and in its 1st Congress in 1991, approved by 70% to 30% of the votes of the delegates, rejected the dictatorship of the proletariat, the extreme law of authoritarianism on the left. But the tradition is strong, and refuses to die, finding ways to return and subjugate our socialist consciousness. That’s what happened in 1993 and 94, with the base and the head of the party motivated with the early successes of Lula's candidacy, with the chance of a solo victory or one together with disrespected allies or those that would be submissive. It is this attitude that must be left behind.”

    24. QDR 17 Oct 2019
      1994.4.12

      <br>

      Full Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F66Q1V52/KJLASQ

      Full Citation: Folha de São Paulo. 1994.4.12. “Radicais reduzem influencia no partido.” Collected in Partido dos Trabalhadores Historical Archives, Projeto Memória e História, Fundação Perseu Abramo. Leiden, Netherlands: IDC.

      Analytic Note: This source provides evidence for the descriptive claim that some signs of decreasing radical influence could be found even before the 1994 presidential election and 1995 PT party congress (but after the implementation of the Plano Real). In the key state of São Paulo, moderates started to reassert control over the party machinery as the governance crisis began to abate.

      Excerpt: Os grupos de esquerda e extrema-esquerda diminuíram a vantagem que tinham em relação aos outros setores do PT paulista. A corrente interna que mais cresceu foi a “Unidade na Luta”, liderada por Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. O critério usado para a comparação é o número de delegados ao Encontro Nacional do partido que foram eleitos na convenção do PT paulista no último fim de semana. Em 93, as alas de esquerda e extrema apresentaram chapa conjunta e levaram 55,9% dos delegados. Em chapas separadas agora, somadas estas correntes ficaram com 50,9% dos eleitos. A “Unidade na Luta”, chamado de “centro” do PT, saltou de 32,3% dos delegados para 36,1%. Um pouco do acréscimo deve ser atribuído à queda do grupo liderado pelo deputado José Genoino, da “direita” do PT.

      Translation: Groups of the left and extreme-left saw their advantage decrease over other sectors of the PT of São Paulo. The internal current that grew the most was "Unity in Struggle", led by Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. The criterion used for comparison is the number of delegates to the National Meeting of the party who were elected at the convention of the PT in São Paulo last weekend. In 93, the left wing and extreme-left joined forces and took 55.9% of the delegates. Running separately now, together these factions got 50.9% of the vote. "Unity in Struggle," called the "center" of the PT, jumped from 32.3% to 36.1% of the delegates. A part of the increase should be attributed to the fall of the group led by Rep José Genoino, of the "right" of the PT.

    25. QDR 17 Oct 2019
      1994.1.25

      <br>

      Data Source:https://doi.org/10.5064/F66Q1V52/4XQCDA

      Full Citation: Folha de São Paulo. 1994.1.25. “Lula tenta retomar comando do partido.” Collected in Partido dos Trabalhadores Historical Archives, Projeto Memória e História, Fundação Perseu Abramo. Leiden, Netherlands: IDC.

      Analytic Note: This source simply provides evidence and further background for the descriptive claim that internal conflicts were occurring within the party, especially between the Lula campaign and the radical leadership of the National Directorate.

      Excerpt: “Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva acha que é hora de passar para a sociedade que um eventual governo seu não vai ser dominado pelos sectores radicais do petismo. "O ano passado foi para todo mundo falar. Agora é hora de pôr ordem na casa", vem repetindo a amigos desde que resolveu tentar inverter o curso político interno que sua campanha estava tomando. Ao falar de 93, Lula referia-se à ascensão dos grupos mais radicais do petismo ao comando da máquina partidária. A queda do grupo mais ligado a ele correu no 8.º Encontro Nacional do PT, em junho, em Brasília. Como estava fazendo nos últimos anos, naquela ocasião Lula ausentou-se da discussão depois de uma tímida e frustrada tentativa de manter a hegemonia de sua ala, a antiga tendência Articulação. Mas a decisão de abrir para PSDB, PDT e até PMDB a cabeça de chapa em alguns Estados –imposta por Lula na reunião do Diretório Nacional no último fim de semana– não foi assimilada facilmente.”

      Translation: Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva thinks it high time we showed society that a Lula government will not be dominated by radical sectors of the PT. "Last year everybody could talk. Now it is time to put the house in order", he has been saying to his friends, since he decided to reverse his campaign’s political course. When speaking about 1993, Lula referred to the rise of radical groups commanding the party machinery. The fall of the group most connected to Lula occurred in the 8th National Meeting of the PT, in June, in Brasilia. As he has been doing in recent years, Lula made himself absent from the discussion after a timid and unsuccessful attempt to maintain the hegemony of his ward, the old faction “Articulação". But the decision to allow the PSDB, PDT and even PMDB nominate the main candidate in some states - imposed by Lula at the meeting of the National Directorate in the last weekend – was not easily embraced.

    26. QDR 17 Oct 2019
      1993.3b

      <br>

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F66Q1V52/ER3ORW

      Full Citation: Boletim Nacional. 1993.3b. “Manifesto aos Petistas.” Collected in Partido dos Trabalhadores Historical Archives, Projeto Memória e História, Fundação Perseu Abramo. Leiden, Netherlands: IDC.

      Analytic Note: This manifesto from the faction Articulação de Esquerda in advance of the critical 1993 party congress offers another example radical groups drawing on the context of poor governance to make arguments about why the PT can maintain its radical posture and still succeed. The authors predict that governance-based issues will dominate the political agenda (the 1994 election will be a “referendum on the form of state and system of government”) and argue that only by recovering a radical posture and differentiating themselves from parties of the status quo will the PT be able to succeed in this political milieu.

      Excerpt: O PT só pode enfrentar a agenda política de curto prazo, que se desdobra no plebiscito sobre forma de estado e sistema de governo, na revisão constitucional e na oposição ao governo Itamar, caso recupere sua tradição radical, popular, democrática, socialista. É inaceitável que, em nome de malfeitos cálculos eleitorais, nosso partido deixe de apresentar uma alternativa global para a crise brasileira, é inaceitável que em nome de inexistentes “responsabilidades”, nosso partido não faça oposição firme contra um governo que, não obstantes suas diferenças com Collor, é nitidamente conservador, é inaceitável que nosso partido em nome da urgência de reformas políticas, aceite ficar sob a hegemonia conservadora na discussão sobre sistema de governo. O Partido que nós queremos não pode ser aquele que cogita apoiar governos que o PFL também apoia. O Partido que nós queremos não poder ser aquele em que dirigentes proclamam-se adeptos da monarquia. O partido que nós queremos não pode mais conviver com isso, sem deixar de ser PT.

      Translation: The only way the PT can achieve its short-term political agenda, which is divided into a referendum on the state and the system of government, the constitutional review, and the opposition to the Itamar government, is if it recovers its radical, popular, democratic, and socialist tradition. It is unacceptable that our party, in the name of corrupt electoral calculations, fails to present a complete alternative to the Brazilian crisis, and unacceptable that, in the name of non-existent "responsibilities", our party does not present a strong opposition against a government that, despite its differences with Collor, is clearly conservative, and unacceptable that our party, in the name of urgent political reform, agrees to be under this conservative hegemony during the discussion about the system of government. The Party that we want cannot support governments that are also supported by the PFL. The Party that we want cannot permit that its leaders declare themselves followers of the monarchy. The Party that we want cannot agree with this, without ceasing to be the PT.

    27. QDR 17 Oct 2019
      1993.3a

      <br>

      Data Source https://doi.org/10.5064/F66Q1V52/EFEORB

      Full Citation: Boletim Nacional. 1993.3a. “Carta de São Paulo.” Collected in Partido dos Trabalhadores Historical Archives, Projeto Memória e História, Fundação Perseu Abramo. Leiden, Netherlands: IDC.

      Analytic Note: This source, a formal position statement by the radical faction Na Luta PT in advance of the 1993 party congress, offers another example of radicals seizing on the context of poor governance to make arguments about why the PT should avoid compromising its beliefs and instead channel popular dissatisfaction with the status quo.

      Excerpt: “O Brasil atravessa um a situação social instável, fruto da crise econômica que se aprofundou com a implantação da política neoliberal de Collor e cujo aspecto econômico tende a permanecer no Governo Itamar, apesar da retórica de suas preocupações sociais. A dolarização crescente da economia brasileira. Os acordos com o FMI que impedem a retomada do nosso desenvolvimento. O programa de privatizações, que reforça o capital, subtrai conquistas trabalhistas e compromete a soberania nacional. O aumento da inflação e o aprofundamento da recessão, tudo isso gera a incerteza sobre o nosso futuro. Aumenta a violência e a criminalidade. Reforçam-se as propostas autoritárias. A direita se recicla. Os movimentos e as entidades sindicais e populares, embora se multipliquem, não veem a repercussão social de seu esforço. Em alguns momentos a insatisfação popular explode, buscando novas alternativas, como nas “Diretas Já”, na campanha Lula Presidente. O “Fora Collor” é o exemplo mais recente. Mas quando passa o vendaval a burguesia consegue apresentar propostas para continuar impedindo os avanços das lutas populares."

      Translation: "Brazil is going through an unstable social situation, due to the economic crisis that deepened with the implementation of Collor’s neoliberal policies and whose economic features tends to remain in the Itamar government, despite their rhetoric of social concerns. The increasing dollarization of the Brazilian economy. The agreements with the IMF that prevent the restarting of our development. The privatization program, which reinforces capital, undercuts labor achievements and compromises national sovereignty. The rising inflation and the deepening recession, all this creates uncertainty about our future. The increase of violence and criminality. Authoritarian proposals are reinforced. The right is renewed. Social movements, trade unions, and popular organizations, despite growing in number, cannot see the social impact of their efforts. At some moments, popular dissatisfaction explodes, searching for new alternatives, as in "Direct Elections Now" in Lula’s presidential campaign. The "Get Out Collor" is the latest example. But when the storm passes the bourgeoisie can submit proposals to continue preventing the growth of popular struggles."

    28. QDR 17 Oct 2019
      1992.5b

      <br>

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F66Q1V52/VMNGRO

      Full Citation: Boletim Nacional. 1992.5b. “Tracando os rumos ate 1994.” Collected in Partido dos Trabalhadores Historical Archives, Projeto Memória e História, Fundação Perseu Abramo. Leiden, Netherlands: IDC.

      Analytic Note: This opinion piece, written by radical leader Jorge Almeida, offers an example of radicals using references to the governance crisis in the country to articulate an alternative path to power. Almeida blasts the moderate leadership for not giving concrete response to the governance crisis, portrays the party as unwilling to challenge parties of the status quo, and links these developments to troubling prospects in the upcoming presidential elections. In sum, this is a good example of how the context of poor governance in Brazil during the early 1990s allowed radical factions within the PT to counter moderate viability arguments and articulate an alternative path to power based on responding to the governance crisis and distinguishing itself from discredited parties of the status quo.

      Excerpt: As resoluções sobre conjuntura e tática, aprovadas no I Congresso já eram insuficientes para armar o partido para a luta política contra Collor e por uma alternativa Democrática e Popular em nosso país, pois não davam uma reposta concreta á crise do governo existente já no período imediatamente anterior ao Congresso do PT. Mas a colocação em prática desta tática foi um verdadeiro desastre. O PT está há meses fora de cena, a reboque dos fatos, sem iniciativa, incapaz de mobilizar as bases para lutar contra o governo ou para fazer o que se decide nas direções. E isto é muito grave para um partido que se pretende o principal desafiante em 94. Mas em vez de agir como desafiante, não só do governo, como “Status Quo” da dominação burguesa, parece cada vez mais se comportar como alternativa de governo dentro do “Status Quo."

      Translation: The resolutions on the conjuncture and tactics, approved during the first Congress, were already inadequate to arm the party for the political struggle against Collor and for a Democratic and Popular alternative in our country, because they did not give a concrete answer to the governmental crisis already existing in the period immediately prior to the PT Congress. But the implementation of this tactic was a real disaster. The PT has been out of the picture for months, trailing the facts, without initiative, unable to mobilize the bases to fight against the government or to decide its direction. And this is very serious for a party that intends to be the main challenger in 94. But instead of acting as a challenger, not only to the government, but to the "status quo" of bourgeois domination, the party seems to increasingly behave as a governing alternative within the "status quo."

    29. QDR 17 Oct 2019
      1993.5

      <br>

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F66Q1V52/5EGTSX

      Full Citation: Brasil Agora. 1993.5. “Adivinhe quem vem para jantar.” Collected in Partido dos Trabalhadores Historical Archives, Projeto Memória e História, Fundação Perseu Abramo. Leiden, Netherlands: IDC.

      Analytic Note: This source provides another piece of evidence for the descriptive claim that the PT’s leadership was moving the party in a more pragmatic and moderate direction in the early 1990s. The story demonstrates the many meetings between Lula and major business leaders, as well as the perspective from an important business figure that Lula’s private and public images with respect to the business community were quite different.

      Excerpt: Primeiro foi uma reunião com latifundiários goianos. Em meados de março, foi um jantar com 25 empresários no apartamento de José Baia Sobrinho, dono do Banco Pontual. Depois foi na casa de Emerson Kapaz, candidato derrotado à presidência da Fiesp, com mais 18 empresários. E, no dia 5 de abril, um jantar com 16 empresários na casa de Hélio Mattar, coordenador do Pensamento Nacional das Bases Empresariais. Os encontros entre Lula e os empresários foram qualificados como “secretos e cheios de suspense” pela imprensa, que não deixou claro que o convite e a decisão de fazer reuniões discretas partiram dos próprios empresários. Segundo Hélio Mattar, “na medida em que Lula é presidente de um partido forte, os empresários têm interesse em conhecê-lo pessoalmente”, já que “a imagem pública do Lula não necessariamente vai coincidir com sua imagem privada. Frente a frente, descontraído, Lula vai poder colocar com menos defesas suas posições e suas dúvidas."

      Translation: First there was a meeting with landowners from Goiás. In mid-March, there was a dinner with 25 businessmen in the apartment of Joseph Baia Sobrinho, owner of Banco Pontual. Then it was in the home of Emerson Kapaz, defeated candidate for the presidency of Fiesp, with 18 more businessmen. And on April 5, a dinner with 16 businessmen at the home of Helio Mattar, coordinator of the National Thought of Entrepreneurial Bases. These meetings between Lula and businessmen were characterized as "secret and full of suspense" by the press, which did not make clear that the invitation and the decision to make discreet meetings was taken by the businessmen themselves. According to Helio Mattar, "to the extent that Lula is the president of a strong Party, the businessmen have interest in meeting him personally," since "the public image of Lula will not necessarily match his private image. Face to face, relaxed, Lula will be able to easily express his positions and doubts."

    30. QDR 17 Oct 2019
      1992.5a

      <br>

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F66Q1V52/RCQM9S

      Full Citation: Boletim Nacional. 1992.5a. “A Convergência esta fora do PT.” Collected in Partido dos Trabalhadores Historical Archives, Projeto Memória e História, Fundação Perseu Abramo. Leiden, Netherlands: IDC.

      Analytic Note: This source proves the claim that the PT’s leadership voted to expel the extremely radical faction Convergencia Socialista from the party in 1992, while also giving some important background on the rationale of party leaders. Dirceu’s point that Convergencia Socialista refused to accept the political direction of the party (a more pragmatic and moderate one) shows that politics was at the core of the decision.

      Excerpt: Após cinco horas de debate, o Diretório Nacional do PT decidiu acatar a representação da Comissão Executiva Nacional contra a Convergência Socialista, que teve anulada a sua condição de tendência interna ao PT. A decisão foi tomada na reunião dos dias 8 e 9 de maio, em São Paulo, com 35 votos a favor da proposta vencedora... Para o secretário-geral do PT, deputado federal José Dirceu o problema criado pela CS não poderia ser tratado de maneira meramente disciplinar. “A questão é política: a maioria do PT, democraticamente, optou por um caminho que a Convergência considera inaceitável”. Dirceu foi o autor da representação contra a CS acatada pela Comissão Executiva Nacional e submetida á apreciação do DN.

      Translation: After five hours of debate, the National Directorate of the PT decided to accept the actions of the National Executive Committee against Socialist Convergence, which had rescinded its charter as an internal faction of the PT. The decision was taken at the meeting of May 8th and 9th in São Paulo, with 35 votes in favor of the winning proposal. For the general secretary of the PT, Congressman José Dirceu, the problem created by CS could not be treated merely in a disciplinary way. "The question is political: most of the PT democratically chose a path that Convergence finds unacceptable." Dirceu was the author of the case against CS accepted by the National Executive Committee and submitted to the DN.

    31. QDR 17 Oct 2019
      1992.2

      <br>

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F66Q1V52/YFIZCC

      Full Citation: Boletim Nacional. 1992.2. “DN aprova tática e política de alianças.” Collected in Partido dos Trabalhadores Historical Archives, Projeto Memória e História, Fundação Perseu Abramo. Leiden, Netherlands: IDC.

      Analytic Note: This source demonstrates the PTs new more pragmatic direction in the early 1990s in the controversial area of alliance policy, with the partys national directorate approving the adoption of a formal alliance policy that sanctioned electoral pacts with many different parties to the left of center, including even center-left parties such as the PSDB among these potential allies and using terminology such as flexible to characterize the new direction.

      Excerpt: Embora seja necessária uma política de alianças nacional, as eleições de 92 exigem que se leve em conta a diversidade de realidade locais. Nossa política deve ser flexível: é uma política de alianças nacional, mas que se articula também com a dinâmica das disputas municipais. O PT tem desenvolvido alianças a partir de um projeto de construção de uma alternativa democrática e popular. Neste campo, se encontram os PCs, o PSB, o PV, o PSDB e o PPS. Ao propor uma política de alianças com o PSB, com os PCs e com o PPS, não desconhecemos as contradições e diferenças políticas que mantemos com esses partidos, mas levamos em consideração, principalmente, a posição política na luta contra o governo Collor, as nossas alianças em 89 na Frente Brasil Popular, o apoio de Roberto Freiré e do PSB a LULA no 2º turno, o amplo arco de alianças e acordos que realizamos em 89 e 90, inclusive governando algumas cidades conjuntamente.

      Translation: Although a policy of national alliances is necessary, the elections of 92 require taking into account the diversity of local realities. Our policy should be flexible: it is a policy of national alliances, but it also articulates with the dynamics of local disputes. The PT has developed alliances for a project to build a democratic and popular alternative. In this group, we find the PCs, PSB, PV, the PSDB and the PPS. By proposing a policy of alliances with the PSB, with PCs and with PPS, we are not unaware of contradictions and political differences we have with these parties, but we take into account mainly the political position in the fight against Collor government, our 1989 alliances in the Brazil Popular front, the support of Roberto Freire and the PSB to LULA in the 2nd round, the wide arc of alliances and agreements that we made in 89 and 90, including jointly ruling some cities.

    33. QDR 17 Oct 2019
      Klingemann (2005)

      <br>

      Full Citation: Klingemann, Hans-Dieter. 2005. “Political Parties and Party Systems.” In J. Thomassen, ed., The European Voter: A Comparative Study of Modern Democracies. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

    36. QDR 16 Oct 2019
      THE POLITICS OF POLARIZATION: GOVERNANCE AND PARTY SYSTEM CHANGE IN LATIN AMERICA, 1990–2010

      <br> This is an Annotation for Transparent Inquiry project, published by the Qualitative Data Repository. Please cite as:

      Handlin, Samuel. (2015) Data for: “The Politics of Polarization: Governance and Party System Change in Latin America, 1990-2010.” Annotation for Transparent Inquiry, QDR:10065. Syracuse, NY: Qualitative Data Repository [distributor]. https://doi.org/10.5064/F66Q1V52

      Additional documentation can be found on QDR.

      Learn more about ATI here.

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    URL

    kellogg.nd.edu/sites/default/files/old_files/documents/401_0.pdf
  4. www.cambridge.org www.cambridge.org
    LAPS_Summer13
    3
    1. QDR 17 Oct 2019
      an absence of political will to invest in AIDS

      <br>

      Data Source: http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2010/04/30/000334955_20100430023146/Rendered/PDF/540600PAD0P1131e0only10R20101009111.pdf

      Full Citation: World Bank. 2010. Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Loan in the Amount of US$67 Million to the Federative Republic of Brazil for the AIDS-SUS Project (National Aids Program—National Health Service). Report no. 54060-BR. (pp. 4-5).

    2. QDR 17 Oct 2019
      in evaluations of both Brazil’s public health pro-gram and its AIDS programs

      <br>

      Data Source (Source 1): http://oig.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/audit-reports/1-512-07-007-p.pdf

      Data Source (Source 2): http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2007/03/06/000090341_20070306085417/Rendered/PDF/366010BR.pdf

      Full Citation (Source 1): U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). 2007. Audit Report No. 1-512-07-007-P. (pp. 9-15).

      Full Citation (Source 2): World Bank. 2007. Governance in Brazils Unified Health System (SUS): Raising the Quality of Public Spending and Resource Management. Report no. 36601-BR. (pp. 65-66).

    3. QDR 17 Oct 2019
      Grassroots Bureaucracy:Intergovernmental Relations andPopular Mobilizationin Brazil’s AIDS Policy Sector

      <br> This is an Annotation for Transparent Inquiry project, published by the Qualitative Data Repository. Please cite as:

      Rich, Jessica. (2017) Data for: “Grassroots Bureaucracy: Intergovernmental Relations and Popular Mobilization in Brazil's AIDS Policy Sector.” 2013. Latin American Politics and Society, 55 (2): 1-25. Active Citation Compilation. Syracuse, NY: Qualitative Data Repository. http://doi.org/10.5064/F6SF2T3N

      Additional documentation can be found on QDR.

      Learn more about ATI here.

    Visit annotations in context

    Annotators

    URL

    cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/5B7032EC65FE454D6B9B5B790634D3ED/S1531426X00002570a.pdf/grassroots_bureaucracy_intergovernmental_relations_and_popular_mobilization_in_brazils_aids_policy_sector.pdf
  5. https: https:
    401Handlin WP final
    105
    1. QDR 16 Oct 2019
      1996.1.28

      <br> Full Citation: El Universal. 1996.1.28. “Retirarse del Gobierno plantea dirigencia del MAS.” Caracas, Venezuela. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: This excerpt offers an example of Puchi, less a true ideologue than an “opportunistic radical” attuned to the party’s waning electoral fortunes, arguing that the association with the Caldera government has been damaging and that the best strategy moving forward would be to reestablish the party’s more distinctive profile.

      Excerpt: Ante esa circunstancia, Puchi considera que de no producirse un cambio de actitud del presidente Rafael Caldera, los masistas “deben profundizar en la línea iniciada de distanciamiento y de independencia constructive, que permita actuar al partido sin estar atado de manos por el compromiso de solidarid propio de quienes comparten la toma de decisions y el ejercicio del poder.” …Además, piensa que deben estar atentos a la evolución de las decisions relacionadas con la Agenda Venezuela, “pues una ejecución conducida de manera desacertada, de manera incoherente, sin un manejo correcto de los tiempos, no puede llevar a una catástrofe. En estas circunstancias, el MAS no podria continuar acompañando al Gobierno.”

      Translation: Given that circumstance, Puchi is of the opinion that if president Rafael Caldera’s attitude does not change, the masistas “should continue the policy, already begun, of distancing themselves and being constructively independent, which allows the party to act, without being hand-cuffed by commitments to solidarity typical of those who share decision-making and the exercise of power.” …In addition, he thinks that they should be attentive to the evolution of the decisions related to the Venezuelan Agenda, “because an execution conducted in an imprudent manner, in an incoherent manner, without a correct reading of the times, can bring us to a catastrophe. En these circumstances, MAS cannot continue being part of the government.”

    2. QDR 16 Oct 2019
      1993.5

      <br> Full Citation: Brasil Agora. 1993.5. “Adivinhe quem vem para jantar.” Collected in Partido dos Trabalhadores Historical Archives, Projeto Memória e História, Fundação Perseu Abramo. Leiden, Netherlands: IDC. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: This source provides another piece of evidence for the descriptive claim that the PT’s leadership was moving the party in a more pragmatic and moderate direction in the early 1990s. The story demonstrates the many meetings between Lula and major business leaders, as well as the perspective from an important business figure that Lula’s private and public images with respect to the business community were quite different.

      Excerpt: Primeiro foi uma reunião com latifundiários goianos. Em meados de março, foi um jantar com 25 empresários no apartamento de José Baia Sobrinho, dono do Banco Pontual. Depois foi na casa de Emerson Kapaz, candidato derrotado à presidência da Fiesp, com mais 18 empresários. E, no dia 5 de abril, um jantar com 16 empresários na casa de Hélio Mattar, coordenador do Pensamento Nacional das Bases Empresariais. Os encontros entre Lula e os empresários foram qualificados como “secretos e cheios de suspense” pela imprensa, que não deixou claro que o convite e a decisão de fazer reuniões discretas partiram dos próprios empresários. Segundo Hélio Mattar, “na medida em que Lula é presidente de um partido forte, os empresários têm interesse em conhecê-lo pessoalmente”, já que “a imagem pública do Lula não necessariamente vai coincidir com sua imagem privada. Frente a frente, descontraído, Lula vai poder colocar com menos defesas suas posições e suas dúvidas."

      Translation: First there was a meeting with landowners from Goiás. In mid-March, there was a dinner with 25 businessmen in the apartment of Joseph Baia Sobrinho, owner of Banco Pontual. Then it was in the home of Emerson Kapaz, defeated candidate for the presidency of Fiesp, with 18 more businessmen. And on April 5, a dinner with 16 businessmen at the home of Helio Mattar, coordinator of the National Thought of Entrepreneurial Bases. These meetings between Lula and businessmen were characterized as "secret and full of suspense" by the press, which did not make clear that the invitation and the decision to make discreet meetings was taken by the businessmen themselves. According to Helio Mattar, "to the extent that Lula is the president of a strong Party, the businessmen have interest in meeting him personally," since "the public image of Lula will not necessarily match his private image. Face to face, relaxed, Lula will be able to easily express his positions and doubts."

    3. QDR 16 Oct 2019
      1996.1.19

      <br> Full Citation: El Universal. 1996.1.19. “Müller Rojas: La Causa R y Su Futuro.” Caracas, Venezuela. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: In this op-ed, Alberto Müller Rojas, a prominent radical leader within LCR, discusses the connection between radical politics and periods of systemic crisis. This excerpt shows that radicals were consciously thinking along these lines, connecting the possibilities of more radical political positions with the appetite of the electoral for rejecting the status quo, and fearing that improvements in state performance and the end of the crisis might not only undermine the radical project, but empower moderates within the party.

      Excerpt: Señalaba en la última entrega de esta columna que el problema de la Causa R, como expresión del radicalismo democrático en Venezuela, se presentaba en términos de sus persistencia como una fuerza política significativa – la tercera en magnitud en el panorama nacional, si se consideran la cuantía de los votos obtenidos en el último proceso electoral – en un ambiente político que tiende a estabilizarse. Efectivamente, si se considera que el radicalismo es una manifestación política que adquiere fuerzas en las situaciones de crisis, para normalmente desvancerse o transformarse en meras maquinarias electorales, indudablemente tiene que considerarse que el cambio en la naturaleza de la situación política del país, hacia una estabilización de la estructura de poder, después de una grave crisis del sistema, tiene que producir la posibilidad de que le ocurra a la Causa R, lo que le ha ocurrido a las otras manifestaciones del radicalismo democrático, en otros momentos y circunstancias. Y, ciertamente, algunas declaraciones de sus dirigentes reconocidos, dan lugar a que, en las percepciones de la sociedad en general – expuestas a través de los medios de comunicación social – y, en las propias de muchos de sus adherentes, se sienta como posible un cambio profundo en la organización, que se vislumbra desde la posible moderación de sus actitudes hasta su fraccionamiento, al cual incluso juegan abiertamente, algunos de sus voceros calificados.

      Translation: I pointed out in the last installment of this column that the problem of the R Cause, as an expression of democratic radicalism in Venezuela, had to do with its persistence as a significant political force—the third in magnitude in the national panorama, if one considers the number of votes it obtained in the last election—in a political environment that tends towards stability. Indeed, if one considers that radicalism is a political manifestation that acquires force in situations of crisis and then normally disappears or transforms into merely electoral machinery, undoubtedly one must consider that the change in the nature of the political situation of the country, toward a stabilization of the power structure, after a grave crisis of the system, must lead to the possibility that what has happened to other manifestations of democratic radicalism, in other moments and circumstances, would happen to LCR. And, certainly, some statements by its recognized leaders make it so that, in the perceptions of the society in general— disseminated through social means of communication —and, in the hearts of many of these leaders’ supporters, it feels possible that there will be a profound change in the organization, which is discernible in the possible moderation of its attitudes, to its fragmentation, which some of the organization’s qualified spokespeople even trifle with openly.

    4. QDR 16 Oct 2019
      1995.6

      <br> Full Citation: Teoria e Debate. 1995.6. “Era possível ganhar no primeiro turno.” Collected in Partido dos Trabalhadores Historical Archives, Projeto Memória e História, Fundação Perseu Abramo. Leiden, Netherlands: IDC. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: This opinion piece by leading moderate Eduardo Jorge is an example of the return to viability logic in the aftermath of the success of the Plano Real and the popularity of the Cardoso government. (In the broader piece, not just the excerpt above) Jorge argues that the PT could have demolished the Brazilian right completely by making an electoral pact with the PSDB, that the failure of the PT (and left in general) to be willing to share power and make programmatic concessions has been one of the party’s greatest weaknesses, that the radical takeover of the party has prevented program from occurring and the promise of the 1st Congress from being realized, and that if the PT is ever to win power it will have to become much more pragmatic and flexible.

      Excerpt: O PT está diante de um problema que continuará, senão for desvelado e enfrentado até ao fim, nos confinando como um partido importante e representativo, mas incapaz de compartilhar hegemonia e de governar na democracia. Refiro-me à ideologia, à regra, à cultura tradicional nos partidos de esquerda, que implica buscar a qualquer custo, por quaisquer meios, violentos ou pacíficos, uma hegemonia total e, portanto, totalitária. Segundo esta mentalidade, todos os sectores, da associação de escoteiros à seleção nacional de futebol do sindicato ao Parlamento, devem ser iluminados por nossa ‘luz’, onipresente, onipotente e onisciente. É verdade que o PT vem lutando contra isso desde o seu nascimento e que no seu 1º Congresso, em 1991, aprovou por 70% a 30% dos votos dos delegados, a rejeição da ditadura do proletariado, a regra máxima do autoritarismo na esquerda. Mas a tradição é forte , recusa-se a morrer e encontra caminhos para voltar a oprimir nossas consciências socialistas. Foi o que aconteceu em 1993 e 94, com a base e a direção do partido empolgadas diante do favoritismo inicial da candidatura Lula, com a possibilidade de vitória solitária ou com aliados tratados com menosprezo ou queridos desde que submissos. É essa matriz que precisa ser abandonada.”

      Translation: The PT is facing a problem that will continue, if not unveiled and confronted to the end, confining ourselves to being an important and representative party, but one incapable of sharing hegemony and governing under democracy. I refer to the ideology, the rule, the traditional culture in parties of the left, which means seeking at any cost, by any means, violent or peaceful, a hegemony that is total, and therefore, totalitarian. According to this mentality, all sectors from the scout association to the national football team, the unions to the Parliament, must be illuminated by our 'light', omnipresent, omnipotent and omniscient. It is true that the PT has been fighting it since its birth and in its 1st Congress in 1991, approved by 70% to 30% of the votes of the delegates, rejected the dictatorship of the proletariat, the extreme law of authoritarianism on the left. But the tradition is strong, and refuses to die, finding ways to return and subjugate our socialist consciousness. That’s what happened in 1993 and 94, with the base and the head of the party motivated with the early successes of Lula's candidacy, with the chance of a solo victory or one together with disrespected allies or those that would be submissive. It is this attitude that must be left behind.”

    5. QDR 16 Oct 2019
      1996

      <br> Full Citation: Moviemiento Bolivariano Revolucionari-200. 1996. Agenda Alternativa Bolivariana. Caracas, Venezuela. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: In this more mature policy document, written and disseminated after Chavez and other leaders of the MBR-200 had been released from prison, the MBR-200 focuses its attention on both proposals for radical economic policies (not in the excerpt, but elsewhere in the document) and sweeping proposals for state and institutional reform. Once again, this demonstrates how central governance-based appeals were to the radical strategy emerging in Venezuela.

      Excerpt: Así, la estrategia bolivariana se plantea no solamente la restructuración del Estado, sino de todo el sistema político, desde sus fundamentos filosóficos mismos hasta sus componentes y las relaciones que los regulan. Por esa razón, hablamos del proceso necesario de reconstitución o refundación del Poder Nacional en todas sus facetas, basado en la legitimidad y en la soberanía. El poder constituido no tiene, a estas alturas, la más mínima capacidad para hacerlo, por lo que habremos, necesariamente, de recurrir al Poder Constituyente, para ir hacia la instauración de la Quinta República: la República Bolivariana.

      Translation: Thus, the Bolivarian strategy proposes not only the restructuring of the State, but also the entire restructuring of the political system, from its philosophical foundations to its components, and the relationships that regulate them. For that reason, we speak of the necessary process of reconstituting or re-founding National Power in all its facets, based on legitimacy and sovereignty. The constituted power does not have, by now, the most minimal capacity to do this, which is why we will necessarily have to resort to the Constituent Power, in order to proceed toward the establishment of the Fifth Republic: the Bolivarian Republic.

    7. QDR 16 Oct 2019
      1999

      <br> Full Citation: Medina, Pablo. 1999. Rebeliones. Caracas, Venezuela: Piedra, Papel, o Tijera. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: This excerpt from Medina’s memoirs demonstrate the great emphasis of LCR’s radical wing on governance-based issues and state reform, especially via the holding of a Constituent Assembly to rewrite the constitution, and the tepid support for this strategy among the party’s moderate wing, which wanted to work through established channels and forge pragmatic alliances.

      Excerpt: Inmediatamente en el mismo mes de diciembre se hizo el balance. En aquello reunión yo propuse que asumiéramos la Constituyente como política nacional. Hice cinco veces el planteamiento. No lo aceptaron. También propuse ir a hablar con Rafael Caldera porque él había prometido iniciar una política de cambios, y pensé que era el momento de exigirle la convocatoria a una Asamblea Nacional Constituyente. Pero prefirieron dejar las cosas de ese tamaño. Yo sí fui a hablar con Caldera. Qué le dije? Pues que no diera los auxilios financieros. Que nacionalizara la banca para evitar los auxilios y luego la reprivatizara. Que el 23 de enero no se instalara el Congreso y que en ese mismo mes de diciembre, ó durante los primeros días de enero del 94, saliera una campaña para informar a la gente del fraude electoral, impedir que continuara la farsa en el Congreso y convocar a la Constituyente. Esos fueron los planteamientos que le hice.

      Translation: Immediately, in the same month of December, we took stock. In that meeting, I proposed that we adopt the Constituent Assembly as a national policy. I made the proposal five times. They did not accept it. Also, I proposed to go speak with Rafael Caldera because he had promised to initiate a politics of change, and, I thought that this was the moment to demand from him the call for a National Constituent Assembly. But, they preferred to leave things as they were. I did go speak with Caldera. What did I tell him? Well, that he should not give aid to the financial sector. That he should nationalize banking to avoid the aid and that he should re-privatize it. That on the 23rd of January the Congress should not be installed, and that in that same month of December, or that during the first days of January of 1994, a campaign should emerge to inform the people of the fraudulent elections, to prevent the carrying on of the farce in the Congress and to convene the Constituent Assembly. Those were the proposals that I made to him.

    8. QDR 16 Oct 2019
      2001, 75

      <br> Full Citation: Mujica, Felipe. 2001. “La Opción MAS-Chávez.” In Felipe Mujica, ed., La Reflexión del MAS. Caracas, Venezuela: Ediciones Polémica, 75. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: This excerpt from the platform of Horizonte 2000 the opportunistic radicals led by Felipe Mujica and Leopoldo Puchi demonstrates how alternative viability calculations played into the radical takeover of MAS and the decision to back Chavez. The radical strategy is justified precisely by the argument that the country is looking for new leadership that is not tainted by association with status quo parties, and this kind of political coalition can only be constructed out of radical forces.

      Excerpt: Venezuela est hambrienta de propsito, de proyecto. No es posible entrar al XXI con un liderazgo que ofrezca slo ms do lo mismo. La articulacin del necesario proyecto de pas exitoso exige nuevos interlocutores tanto el mbito social como en el poltico. Esto significa el desarrollo de una fuerza que en su perfil y estructura, en su organizacin y su discurso, rena la superacin de los estilos de las antiguas formaciones con la capacidad para la innovacin de los nuevos actores sociales e institucionales. Esa fuerza con la flexibilidad necesaria para atender lo particular, lo regional, lo sectorial, lo especfico pero con la implantacin geogrfica y social necesaria para ofrecer propuestas de carcter nacional, es el Movimiento Al Socialismo. Por eso estamos decididos a acompaar a los nuevos lideres, constructores del proyecto de pas exitoso que merecemos ser. Por eso, tanto en la coyuntura electoral que se avecina como en los interesantes procesos que se abren ms all de 1999, el MAS debe ratificar su radical deslinde con las antiguas visiones conservadoras, y abrirse al encuentro de los nuevos planteamientos y los nuevos liderazgos.

      Translation: Venezuela is hungry for purpose and project. It is not possible to enter the 21st century with a leadership that offers only more of the same. The articulation of the necessary project for a successful country demands new interlocutors as much in the social as in the political environment. This means the development of a force whose profile and structure, organization and discourse, blends the overcoming of the ways of the old formations with the capacity for innovation of the new social and institutional agents. That force with the necessary flexibility to attend to the particular, the regional, the sectorial, the specific but with the geographic scope and social necessity to offer propositions of a national character, is the Movement to Socialism. That is why we are committed to accompanying the new leaders, builders of the project of the successful country that we deserve to be. That is why, both in the electoral situation that approaches, as in the interesting processes that look beyond 1999, the MAS should uphold its radical separation from the old conservative visions, and open itself to new proposals and new leadership.

    9. QDR 16 Oct 2019
      1993

      <br> Full Citation: Pérez Marcano, Héctor. 1993. “Debate para que?” In El MAS: Un proyecto politico para el cambio o la conservación? Caracas, Venezuela: Fondo Editorial Tropykos. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: This provides another example of the rise in radical critiques of MAS’s moderate leadership during the early 1990s and the tendency of radicals to specifically point to the danger of becoming a status quo, rather than “transformative” party.

      Excerpt: La banalización de la vida interna del MAS ha llevado a nuestra organización a una serie de desviaciones, que, de no corregirse, terminarán por liquidar su cualidad de fuerza transformadora de la sociedad y la convertirán en simple aparato electoral, de las más disímiles características, al servicio de intereses grupales regionales. En algunos casos – como es evidente ya – grupos regionales imbricados con intereses de grupos económicos regionales y nacionales que terminan siendo los verdaderos detentadores del poder, tal como ha ocurrido en el plano nacional con Acción Democrática. Esta banalización de la vida interna impide que el MAS debata seriamente sobre sí mismo, analice profundamente los problemas nacionales y examine los cambios que en la economía mundial y en el cuadro político internacional se han dado y que afectan de una manera determinante a una fuerza política que – al menos en su denominación – todavía se reclama como fuerza socialista.

      Translation: The trivialization of the internal life of the MAS has led our organization on a series of detours that, if not corrected, will end by destroying its quality as a transformative force of society, and will turn it into a simple electoral apparatus, of the most different characteristics, at the service of regional group interests. In some cases—as is already evident— the true bearers of power will end up being regional groups connected with the interests of regional and national economic groups, as has occurred on the national stage with Democratic Action. This trivialization of internal life prevents the MAS from seriously debating about itself, deeply analyzing national problems, and examining the changes that have been dealt to the world economy and to the international political sphere, and that affect, in a deterministic way, a political force that—at least in name—still claims to be a socialist force.

    11. QDR 16 Oct 2019
      Klingemann (2005)

      <br> Klingemann, Hans-Dieter. 2005. “Political Parties and Party Systems.” In J. Thomassen, ed., The European Voter: A Comparative Study of Modern Democracies. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

    12. QDR 16 Oct 2019
      1993a

      <br> Full Citation: Valero, Jorge. 1993a. Razones y Sinrazones del Fallido Golpe de Estado del 4 de Febrero de 1992 en Venezuela. In El MAS: Un proyecto politico para el cambio o la conservacin? Caracas, Venezuela: Fondo Editorial Tropykos. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: Valero makes clear and repeated reference to the systemic crisis of governance in the country, in the context of arguing that this crisis presents MAS with unprecedented opportunities, as long as the party can maintain its distinctive profile.

      Excerpt: Los acontecimientos del 4-F han evidenciado una crisis profunda del rgimen poltico-institucional inaugurado el 23 de Enero de 1958. La crisis tiene an dimensiones desconocidas tanto en el mbito civil como el militar. El rgimen que hace 34 aos resurgi con esperanzadores augurios y el cual haba sido fruto de la postrera accin libertaria de numerosos prceres de la democracia, ha colapsado definitivamente. Y es que no estamos simplemente ante una crisis de gobierno, sino del sistema como tal. Las soluciones para encararlas, por lo tanto, no pueden ser parciales ni fragmentarias. No ha sido suficiente con que el presidente Prez haya removido a varios miembros de su gabinete e instrumente si es que tiene la voluntad de hacerlo medidas compensatorias en el mbito econmico-social que atenuen el terrible impacto causado por el paquete neoliberal. No, no ha sido suficiente.

      Translation: The events of the 4th of February made evident a profound crisis of the political-institutional regime inaugurated on the 23rd of January 1958. The crisis still has unknown dimensions both in the civilian area as in the military area. The regime that 34 years ago resurfaced with hopeful signs, and which had been the fruits of the last actions for liberty of many leaders for democracy, has collapsed definitively. It is not that we are simply faced with a crisis of government, but rather, with a crisis of the whole system itself. The solutions used to confront this crisis, therefore, cannot be partial or fragmentary. It has not been enough for President Prez to remove various members of his cabinet and to arrange forif he were to have the will to do itcompensatory measures in the socio-economic realm to alleviate the terrible impact caused by the neoliberal package. No, this has not been enough.

    13. QDR 16 Oct 2019
      1993.3b

      <br> Full Citation: Boletim Nacional. 1993.3b. “Manifesto aos Petistas.” Collected in Partido dos Trabalhadores Historical Archives, Projeto Memória e História, Fundação Perseu Abramo. Leiden, Netherlands: IDC. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: This manifesto from the faction Articulação de Esquerda in advance of the critical 1993 party congress offers another example radical groups drawing on the context of poor governance to make arguments about why the PT can maintain its radical posture and still succeed. The authors predict that governance-based issues will dominate the political agenda (the 1994 election will be a “referendum on the form of state and system of government”) and argue that only by recovering a radical posture and differentiating themselves from parties of the status quo will the PT be able to succeed in this political milieu.

      Excerpt: O PT só pode enfrentar a agenda política de curto prazo, que se desdobra no plebiscito sobre forma de estado e sistema de governo, na revisão constitucional e na oposição ao governo Itamar, caso recupere sua tradição radical, popular, democrática, socialista. É inaceitável que, em nome de malfeitos cálculos eleitorais, nosso partido deixe de apresentar uma alternativa global para a crise brasileira, é inaceitável que em nome de inexistentes “responsabilidades”, nosso partido não faça oposição firme contra um governo que, não obstantes suas diferenças com Collor, é nitidamente conservador, é inaceitável que nosso partido em nome da urgência de reformas políticas, aceite ficar sob a hegemonia conservadora na discussão sobre sistema de governo. O Partido que nós queremos não pode ser aquele que cogita apoiar governos que o PFL também apoia. O Partido que nós queremos não poder ser aquele em que dirigentes proclamam-se adeptos da monarquia. O partido que nós queremos não pode mais conviver com isso, sem deixar de ser PT.

      Translation: The only way the PT can achieve its short-term political agenda, which is divided into a referendum on the state and the system of government, the constitutional review, and the opposition to the Itamar government, is if it recovers its radical, popular, democratic, and socialist tradition. It is unacceptable that our party, in the name of corrupt electoral calculations, fails to present a complete alternative to the Brazilian crisis, and unacceptable that, in the name of non-existent "responsibilities", our party does not present a strong opposition against a government that, despite its differences with Collor, is clearly conservative, and unacceptable that our party, in the name of urgent political reform, agrees to be under this conservative hegemony during the discussion about the system of government. The Party that we want cannot support governments that are also supported by the PFL. The Party that we want cannot permit that its leaders declare themselves followers of the monarchy. The Party that we want cannot agree with this, without ceasing to be the PT.

    14. QDR 16 Oct 2019
      1997a

      <br> Full Citation: Ochoa Antich, Enrique. 1997a. “Las Tesis del Nuevo MAS.” In Enrique Ochoa Antich, ed. Adios al MAS?: Documentos para una historia del MAS del socialism marxista al socialism liberal. Caracas, Venezuela: Domingo Fuentes. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: This excerpt shows the preoccupation of Ochoa Antich with finding an alternative agenda to the Venezuelan people that would sharply differentiate MAS from the status quo parties and, through doing so, allow MAS – potentially in a radical alliance with LCR and the MBR-200 – to chart an alternative path to electoral viability.

      Excerpt: El desenlace de este período turbulento que podríamos definir como de transición dependerá de la capacidad de hegemonía que las fuerzas del cambio sepan poner en juego. En fin de cuentas, nadie deja lo que tiene sino a cambio de algo, así que el perfil de la alternativa, su atractivo y su utilidad, constituyen el punto crucial del proceso. De la inteligencia, de la voluntad, de la sabiduría que muestren las fuerzas del cambio dependerá que este periodo de transición no termine siendo una elipse hacia el pasado. Para una fuerza que, como el MAS, significó durante dos décadas la única alternativa a Acción Democrática y Copei, el escenario que acabamos de describir resulta altamente comprometedor. No es un recurso retórico decir que acaso de la conducta del MAS, de que sea capaz de superar sus atrofias y potenciar sus virtudes, se derivará en buena medida el curso de los acontecimientos de la Venezuela contemporánea. Quizá la providencia ha colocado en nuestras manos la posibilidad de decidir el futuro del país: si nos equivocamos y desperdiciamos el momento histórico que vivimos, resulta altamente probable que las otras fuerzas del cambio – La Causa y los bolivarianos, entre otras – no puedan solas vencer la hegemonía aún latente de Acción Democrática y Copei y vuelvan las fuerzas de la conservación a imponer su dominio sobre la conciencia del pueblo; si acertamos, si comenzamos por cambiarnos a nosotros mismos, quizá seamos la pieza decisiva que incline la balanza de la historia a favor de las fuerzas del cambio.

      Translation: The outcome of this turbulent period, which we could define as the transition, will depend on the capacity to exert hegemony that the forces of change will know how to put into play. In the end, no one leaves what he has unless he exchanges it for something else, so the stature of the other possibility, its attractiveness and its utility, constitutes the crucial point of the process. On the intelligence, the will, the knowledge that the forces of change will show hinges this period of transition not ending as an ellipse toward the past… For a force that, as the MAS, constituted for two decades the only alternative to Democratic Action and Copei, the scene that we just finished describing is highly compromising. It is not a rhetorical gesture to say, perhaps, that from the behavior of the MAS, which is capable of overcoming its atrophies and strengthening its virtues, will be derived the course of events of contemporary Venezuela. Maybe providence has placed in our hands the possibility of deciding the future of the country: if we make a mistake and waste the historic moment we are living, it is highly probable that the other forces of change— Radical Cause and the Bolivarians, among others—will not be able to defeat alone the hegemony, although latent, of Democratic Action and Copei and the forces of conservation will return to impose their domination over the conscience of the people; if we are right, if we start by changing ourselves, maybe we will be the decisive piece that tilts the balancing scale of history in favor of the forces of change.

    15. QDR 16 Oct 2019
      1994.10.7

      <br> Full Citation: Folha de São Paulo. 1994.10.7. “A Missão Impossível.” Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: This opinion piece from Tarso Genro in the wake of the 1994 elections is another example of the return to viability appeals by moderates. Genro refers to the strategy of falling back on old radical Socialist ideas in order to win elections as a Mission Impossible, ridicules the notion of blaming the media for Lulas defeat, and posits that the left must find a new direction.

      Excerpt: "Hoje impossvel fundamentar um projeto estratgico no seu significado econmico-social, como foi possvel na cultura do velho socialismo revolucionrio e na social-democracia reformadora. Fernando Henrique compreendeu perfeitamente tudo isso e abdicou at da social-democracia. O PT no compreendeu e remendou o ``furo" do socialismo clssico com uma viso social-democrtica, obreirista reformista, to superada como o socialismo sovitico: foi um acordo com a conscincia antiga.... O pior, porm, que pode nos acontecer no momento , confirmada a derrota de Lula, culpar a grande mdia como se pudssemos ter uma estratgia de vitria com a solidariedade da mdia; buscando responsveis individuais como se a nossa linha de campanha no fosse resultado de uma cultura poltica."

      Translation: "Today it is impossible to support a strategic project in its economic and social sense, as it was possible in the culture of the old revolutionary socialism and that of progressive social democracy. Fernando Henrique fully understood all this and even renounced social democracy. The PT did not understand and fixed the problems of classic socialism with a social-democratic vision, a progressive working class, overcoming all as with Soviet socialism: it was an agreement with an old consciousness. The worst, however, that can happen to us at this moment, with the confirmed defeat of Lula, would be to blame the media - as if we could have a winning strategy with the solidarity of the media; seeking the guilty - as if the orientation of our campaign was not the result of our political culture."

    16. QDR 16 Oct 2019
      1994.10

      <br> Full Citation: Brasil Agora. 1994.10 “Perdemos e agora.” Collected in Partido dos Trabalhadores Historical Archives, Projeto Memória e História, Fundação Perseu Abramo. Leiden, Netherlands: IDC.

      Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: These responses in a post-electoral symposium, from radical leaders Markus Sokol and João Machado, are good examples of the inability of radicals to spin a convincing narrative regarding electoral viability in a context of improving governance and a Cardoso government attracting high approval ratings. Sokol blames the loss on the PT’s ambiguous position with respect to the Plano Real and suggests that it needed to be rejected more clearly, a position seemingly blind to the plan’s success and popular approval. Machado falls back on radical canards about the unity of the bourgeoisie, their resource advantages, and media manipulation. Neither radical leader articulates an argument about an alternative path to electoral viability that would not involve programmatic moderation and greater pragmatism.

      Excerpt: A que se deve a derrota de Lula no primeiro turno? Na minha opinião a questão chave foi o Plano Real e nossa posição diante dele. A resposta que o PT e a Frente Brasil Popular deram ao plano foi mais do que ambígua. Em algumas ocasiões dissemos que ele não daria certo, em outras que traria recessão e desemprego, depois falou-se que a estabilização de preços por ele proporcionada era boa, mas precisava ser completada por políticas de cunho social e houve até companheiros que falaram em aperfeiçoar o Plano Real. Tudo isto foi ambíguo e contraditório, ajudou a cimentar a aliança do campo adversário e levou vastos setores sociais a verem no real e no que ele representa uma coisa boa, que merecia ser mantida. Porque perdemos? Embora todos dissessem que as eleições de 94 seriam mais difíceis do que as de 89, que 05 adversários jogariam pesado, de fato tinha-se a ideia de um quadro semelhante: trabalhamos com a ideia uma burguesia dividida, sem um candidato de confiança, pensamos que ser oposição consequente era suficiente e renderia votos e que seria possível ganhar as eleições apenas com a força eleitoral de Lula. Muitas vezes o movimento social chegou a ser desconsiderado e fatos importantes foram vistos como “coisas que atrapalharão o Lula”. O quadro foi totalmente diferente. A burguesia unificou-se em torno de Fernando Henrique, articulou de forma profissional todos os recursos ao seu alcance, do aparelho do Estado ao Plano Real e fez o manejo competente dos meios de comunicação. Para enfrentar esta situação seria necessário muito mais do que o prestígio de Lula, que existe, é bom, mas não é o suficiente. Teríamos que deixar claro desde o início que estava em jogo um confronto entre nosso projeto e o projeto das elites e dos centros internacionais de poder econômico e financeiro. Também fizemos uma avaliação totalmente equivocada do Plano Real e não percebemos o que a burguesia estava fazendo. Enfim, estávamos preparados para uma situação e aconteceu outra.

      Translation: Why was Lula defeated in the first round? The main issue, in my opinion, was the "Plano Real" and our position on it. The answer that both the PT and the "Frente Brasil Popular" gave to the "Plano Real" was more than ambiguous. On some occasions we said it would not work, in other words it would bring recession and unemployment, then it was said that the price stabilization was good, but that it lacked some policies of a social nature and there were others who said that the "Plano Real" just needed improvement. All this was ambiguous and contradictory, helping cement the alliance in the opposition camp and leading many social sectors to see the "Plano Real" as a good thing, which deserved to be maintained. Why did we lose? Although everyone said that the 94’s elections would be more difficult than the 89’s, and the opponents would be playing hard, in fact there was an idea of a similar scenario: we worked with the idea of a divided bourgeoisie without a reliable candidate, we thought that being the consequential opposition was enough and that would win us votes and that a victory in the elections would be possible only with the electoral strength of Lula. Frequently, the social movements were downplayed and important facts were seen as "things that would stand in Lula’s way". The reality was totally different. The bourgeoisie was unified around Fernando Henrique, and used in a professional way all the resources at their disposal, from the state apparatus to the "Plano Real" and their competent management of the media. To confront this situation we would need much more than just Lula’s personal prestige, which existed, was good, but was not enough. We would have to make clear from the beginning that what was at stake was a clash between our project and the one from the elite and international centers of economic and financial power.

    17. QDR 16 Oct 2019
      1996.2.10

      <imgsrc="https://qdr.syr.edu/drupal_data/public/ati_banner_long.png" align="left"/></a><br>Full Citation: El Universal. 1996.2.10. “Los veinticinco anos del MAS y lo que se palpa.” Caracas, Venezuela. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: This excerpt from an opinion piece by Moises Moleiro, a famously staunch radical within MAS, provides another example of the party’s radical wing stressing the need to differentiate the party from AD and Copei and the centrality of that differentation strategy to finding an alternative path to electoral viability.

      Excerpt: La fuerza cuestionadota y crítica, que concitó entusiasmos y adhesiones y logró presentarse como una esperanza, hace hoy (unreadable), sin nada que realmente la diferencie de AD y Copei. Partidos – como se sabe – contra cuyo predominio en la escena política nacional enderezó sus (unreadable). Respecto a los cuales se (unreadable) en diferenciarse y en constituir una alternativa viable.

      Translation: The questioning and critical force that stirred up enthusiasm and adherents and was able to present itself as a from of hope, is known today, without anything that really differentiates it from AD and Copei. These —as one knows—against whose domination on the national political scene MAS staked its claim. Against which it strived to differentiate itself and to build a viable alternative.

    18. QDR 16 Oct 2019
      1992a

      <br> Full Citation: Medina, Pablo. 1992a. “El Pueblo Soberano Está Hoy Hablando.” In Farruco Sesto, ed., Pablo Medina en Entrevista. Caracas, Venezuela: Ediciones del Agua Mansa. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: This excerpt demonstrates the importance of governance-based appeals and issues to the radical wing of LCR and its most prominent public figure at the time, Pablo Medina. Themes of corruption, lack of access to basic services, and unequal citizenship are emphasized in his chronicle of mass complaints.

      Excerpt: El pueblo soberano est hoy hablando. Y qu dice el pueblo? Para el que sepa escuchar, el pueblo dice que los das de la corrupta clase poltica estn contados. Eso es lo que dice el pueblo. Que lleg la hora de cambiar las cosas. Eso es lo que dice el pueblo. Que la libertad, la seguridad, la justicia, la solidaridad, la igualdad, no son conceptos abstractos tiles para la retrica, sino que deben ser puntales de una vida en sociedad ms digna. Eso es lo que dice el pueblo. Que no quiere ms ladrones con la mano en los dineros pblicos. Que quiere acceso a la educacin, a la salud, a la vivienda, al trabajo, a la ciudadana real, a la cultura, a salir de la pobreza, a dejar atrs la injusticia. Eso es lo que quiere el pueblo. Que no haya ms gobiernos indecentes, que se recuperen los reales robados, que se encarcele a los bandidos, que se reconozca a los valientes, a los honestos, a los justos, eso es lo que el pueblo quiere.

      Translation: The sovereign people are speaking today. And what do the people say? For those who know how to listen, the people say that the days of the corrupt political class are numbered. That is what the people say. That the hour of change has arrived. That is what the people say. That liberty, security, justice, solidarity, equality, are not abstract concepts useful for rhetoric, but rather should be cornerstones of a life in a more dignified society. That is what the people say. That they do not want more thieves whose hands are in the public coffers. That they want access to education, health, housing, work, real citizenship, culture, and to leave behind poverty and injustice. That is what the people want. That there are no more wretched governments, that the stolen reales [currency] are recovered, that the bandits be imprisoned, that the valiant, the honest, and the just be recognized. That is what the people want.

    19. QDR 16 Oct 2019
      1994.12

      <br> Full Citation: Teoria e Debate. 1994.12 “3 de outubro e o futuro do PT.” Collected in Partido dos Trabalhadores Historical Archives, Projeto Memória e História, Fundação Perseu Abramo. Leiden, Netherlands: IDC. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: The author, a Brazilian leftist intellectual but not a PT member, brings an outsider’s critical perspective to the state of factional conflict within the party in the aftermath of the 1994 electoral loss. The key point is that Mangabeira Unger highlights viability appeals as central to moderate arguments while noting that the radicals are incapable of formulating a coherent alternative, that they have programmatic preferences but no clear plan for how to build a majoritarian coalition in the post-Cold War world.

      Excerpt: Este não é um erro superficial. Ele está, pelo contrário, enraizado na vida interna do PT e nas atitudes de suas lideranças maiores. Organizam-se as tendências internas do PT num espectro de radicalização progressiva das reivindicações redistribuídas. É como se os mais moderados (e “modernos”) dissessem, como disse Fernando Henrique Cardoso, somos nós o viável, enquanto que os mais radicais protestassem, somos nós que queremos a redistribuição para valer mesmo á custa de amedrontar as classes proprietárias. O grave é que nem os mais radicais oferecem uma proposta que fundamente este distributivismo mais ou menos afoito numa concepção produtiva. Apenas compartilham a mesma confusão típica da esquerda mundial.

      Translation: This is no superficial error. On the contrary, it is ingrained in the internal life of the PT and in the attitudes of most of its leadership. The factions of the PT define themselves along a spectrum of radicalization of claims to redistribution. It is as if the more moderate (and “modern”) said, in the words of Fernando Henrique Cardoso, “we are what is viable,” while the more radical protested, “we want real redistribution, even at the cost of scaring off the monied classes.” What is disturbing is that not even the more radical voices offer a proposal this more or less bold claim to redistribution in a productivist program. They merely share the confusion typical of the left the world over.

    20. QDR 16 Oct 2019
      1997c

      <br> Full Citation: Ochoa Antich, Enrique.1997c. “Balance y Perspectivas.” In Enrique Ochoa Antich, ed. Adios al MAS?: Documentos para una historia del MAS del socialism marxista al socialism liberal. Caracas, Venezuela: Domingo Fuentes. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: This excerpt shows Ochoa Antich again making the strategic argument that joining forces with radical sectors and distancing the party from Convergencia offers the best way forward for the MAS if they want to be part of a triumphant coalition in 1998.

      Excerpt: Asimismo, opino que el diseño de un plan político para 1998 no tiene por qué y en realidad no puede estar supeditado a nuestra presencia o no en el Gobierno ni a nuestro respaldo a sus políticas fundamentales. El competidor real que se asoma en el horizonte en esa colosal disputa por el poder político que habrán de ser las elecciones generales – nacionales y regionales a la vez – del 98 es, por lo pronto, Acción Democrática. Una política probable, como ya hemos repetido varias veces en estas palabras, es la de conformar con otras fuerzas un amplio bloque electoral que pueda colocarnos como una opción victoriosa de cara a aquellos comicios. La pregunta resulta obvia: existe alguna fuerza, además de la disminuida aunque nunca despreciable Convergencia, con la que podamos coincidir de cara al 98 que no se encuentre en una postura de oposición al gobierno del Presidente Caldera? Resultará paradójico, exigirá de nosotros habilidades e inusitada inteligencia, pero el MAS va a verse necesariamente en la obligación, si quiere colocarse en la perspectiva del 98 en posición de expansión electoral, de combinar su respaldo al Gobierno, por una parte, con la coincidencia electoral, por la otra, con fuerzas que adversan y se oponen al gobierno y con la confrontación histórica a Acción Democrática al margen del discreto apoyo de este partido al Presidente Caldera. Lo mismo puede decirse, por cierto, de movimientos tácticos que también deben guardar la debida autonomía de la línea central de respaldo al gobierno (caso de la elección de las nuevas directivas del Congreso de la República, por ejemplo). En fin de cuentas, debe admitirse que los planes del Presidente Caldera no coinciden ni tienen por qué coincidir necesariamente con los del MAS: éste es un hecho que debemos observar como natural y que no tiene por qué causar, ni entre nosotros ni en el seno del Gobierno, posiciones de absurda e ilógica ansiedad.

      Translation: Likewise, I am of the opinion that the design of a new political plan for 1998 does not have to, and, in reality, cannot be subject to our presence, or not, in the Government, nor to our support of its fundamental politics. The real competitor peeking out from the horizon in that colossal dispute for political power coming into being as the general elections—national and regional simultaneously—of 1998, is, for the moment, Democratic Action. A probable policy, as we have already repeated various times in these pages, is that of uniting with other forces into a large electoral block that can place us as a victorious option facing those elections. The question becomes obvious: Is there some force, other than the crippled, though never contemptible, Convergence, with whom we can form a coalition in 1998, which does not find itself in a posture of opposition to the government of President Caldera? It will be paradoxical, it will demand ability and unprecedented intelligence, but the MAS will see itself necessarily required, if it wants to place itself in a position of electoral expansion from the viewpoint of 1998, to combine its support of the Government, on the one hand, with the electoral coalition, and on the other hand, with the forces that oppose the government and with the long-standing confrontation with Democratic Action, regardless of the moderate support of this party to President Caldera. The same can be said, incidentally, of tactical movements that also should maintain due autonomy from the central line of support of the government (as in the case of the election of the new directors of the Congress of the Republic, for example). In the end, one must admit that the plans of President Caldera do not coincide and do not necessarily have to coincide with those of the MAS: this is a fact that we should observe as natural, and it should not be a reason to cause among us, nor among those in the breast of the government, positions of absurd and illogical anxiety.

    21. QDR 16 Oct 2019
      1992b

      <br> Full Citation: Medina, Pablo. 1992b. “La Reforma de la Constitución.” In Farruco Sesto, ed., Pablo Medina en Entrevista. Caracas, Venezuela: Ediciones del Agua Mansa.

      Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: This excerpt again shows that Medina and the LCR radicals are focused primarily on issues of governance and state reform as the centerpiece of their political agenda.

      Excerpt: En este debate acerca de la Reforma de la Constitucin estn mezclados dos grandes problemas: un problema de coyuntura y un problema de estructura. Cuando hablamos de estructura no estamos refiriendo a la necesidad de modificar la estructura poltica del pas. Pero este debate que se vena realizando en la Comisin Bicameral desde hace cerca de dos aos, de repente tom una fuerza inusitada y esta fuerza, esta velocidad tiene que ver fundamentalmente con la discusin del momento poltico. Es decir, la crisis poltica del pas que venia cabalgando de manera subrepticia y que se abri de manera consciente a los ojos del pas y a los ojos del mundo: el problema de la legitimidad del presidente de la Repblica.

      Translation: In this debate surrounding the Rewriting of the Constitution, there are two big interrelated problems: a problem of circumstances and a problem of structure. When we speak of structure we are referring to the necessity to modify the political structure of the country. But this debate that was happening in the Bicameral Commission for around two years, suddenly took on an unusual force, and this force, this velocity, has to do fundamentally with the discussion of the political present. That is to say, the political crisis of the country that had come riding in surreptitiously and that opened itself consciously to the eyes of the country and to the eyes of the world: the problem of the legitimacy of the president of the Republic.

    22. QDR 16 Oct 2019
      1994.1.25

      <br> Full Citation: Folha de São Paulo. 1994.1.25. “Lula tenta retomar comando do partido.” Collected in Partido dos Trabalhadores Historical Archives, Projeto Memória e História, Fundação Perseu Abramo. Leiden, Netherlands: IDC. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: This source simply provides evidence and further background for the descriptive claim that internal conflicts were occurring within the party, especially between the Lula campaign and the radical leadership of the National Directorate.

      Excerpt: “Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva acha que é hora de passar para a sociedade que um eventual governo seu não vai ser dominado pelos sectores radicais do petismo. "O ano passado foi para todo mundo falar. Agora é hora de pôr ordem na casa", vem repetindo a amigos desde que resolveu tentar inverter o curso político interno que sua campanha estava tomando. Ao falar de 93, Lula referia-se à ascensão dos grupos mais radicais do petismo ao comando da máquina partidária. A queda do grupo mais ligado a ele correu no 8.º Encontro Nacional do PT, em junho, em Brasília. Como estava fazendo nos últimos anos, naquela ocasião Lula ausentou-se da discussão depois de uma tímida e frustrada tentativa de manter a hegemonia de sua ala, a antiga tendência Articulação. Mas a decisão de abrir para PSDB, PDT e até PMDB a cabeça de chapa em alguns Estados –imposta por Lula na reunião do Diretório Nacional no último fim de semana– não foi assimilada facilmente.”

      Translation: Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva thinks it high time we showed society that a Lula government will not be dominated by radical sectors of the PT. "Last year everybody could talk. Now it is time to put the house in order", he has been saying to his friends, since he decided to reverse his campaign’s political course. When speaking about 1993, Lula referred to the rise of radical groups commanding the party machinery. The fall of the group most connected to Lula occurred in the 8th National Meeting of the PT, in June, in Brasilia. As he has been doing in recent years, Lula made himself absent from the discussion after a timid and unsuccessful attempt to maintain the hegemony of his ward, the old faction “Articulação". But the decision to allow the PSDB, PDT and even PMDB nominate the main candidate in some states - imposed by Lula at the meeting of the National Directorate in the last weekend – was not easily embraced.

    23. QDR 16 Oct 2019
      1997b

      <br> Full Citation: Ochoa Antich, Enrique. 1997b. “Notas para un Balance del Gobierno.” In Enrique Ochoa Antich, ed. Adios al MAS?: Documentos para una historia del MAS del socialism marxista al socialism liberal. Caracas, Venezuela: Domingo Fuentes. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: This excerpt is an example of Ochoa Antich’s emphasis on the costs involved with association with discredited status quo parties in a context of poor governance. These costs are an intrinsic part of the calculation that a more radical project differentiating the party from status quo forces would offer a better path to electoral viability moving forward.

      Excerpt: Alto precio ha pagado el MAS para estar en el Gobierno. Sin duda, el decrecimiento continuo del Movimiento durante estos últimos siete años, una vez que la antigua cúpula dirigente prácticamente impuso el Movimiento como un hecho el “Proyecto Caldera,” se debe a múltiples causas y no solamente a nuestra peculiar relación con Caldera, pero resulta claro que esa relación también tiene que ver con nuestros resultados. Ha llegado pues el momento de hacer un balance de eso que hemos dado en llamar el “Proyecto Caldera” así como de la gestión del primer gobierno del cual el MAS forma parte.

      Translation: The MAS has paid a high price to be in the Government. Without a doubt, the continual downturn of the Movement during these last seven years, after the old leadership practically imposed the “Caldera Project” on the Movement as a done deal, is due to multiple causes and not only to our peculiar relations with Caldera. But it is clear that that relationship also impacted our results. The moment has arrived then to make a reckoning with what we have taken to calling the “Caldera Project”, as well as of the administration of the first government of which MAS is a part.

    25. QDR 16 Oct 2019
      1992.5b

      <br> Full Citation: Boletim Nacional. 1992.5b. “Tracando os rumos ate 1994.” Collected in Partido dos Trabalhadores Historical Archives, Projeto Memória e História, Fundação Perseu Abramo. Leiden, Netherlands: IDC. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: This opinion piece, written by radical leader Jorge Almeida, offers an example of radicals using references to the governance crisis in the country to articulate an alternative path to power. Almeida blasts the moderate leadership for not giving concrete response to the governance crisis, portrays the party as unwilling to challenge parties of the status quo, and links these developments to troubling prospects in the upcoming presidential elections. In sum, this is a good example of how the context of poor governance in Brazil during the early 1990s allowed radical factions within the PT to counter moderate viability arguments and articulate an alternative path to power based on responding to the governance crisis and distinguishing itself from discredited parties of the status quo.

      Excerpt: As resoluções sobre conjuntura e tática, aprovadas no I Congresso já eram insuficientes para armar o partido para a luta política contra Collor e por uma alternativa Democrática e Popular em nosso país, pois não davam uma reposta concreta á crise do governo existente já no período imediatamente anterior ao Congresso do PT. Mas a colocação em prática desta tática foi um verdadeiro desastre. O PT está há meses fora de cena, a reboque dos fatos, sem iniciativa, incapaz de mobilizar as bases para lutar contra o governo ou para fazer o que se decide nas direções. E isto é muito grave para um partido que se pretende o principal desafiante em 94. Mas em vez de agir como desafiante, não só do governo, como “Status Quo” da dominação burguesa, parece cada vez mais se comportar como alternativa de governo dentro do “Status Quo."

      Translation: The resolutions on the conjuncture and tactics, approved during the first Congress, were already inadequate to arm the party for the political struggle against Collor and for a Democratic and Popular alternative in our country, because they did not give a concrete answer to the governmental crisis already existing in the period immediately prior to the PT Congress. But the implementation of this tactic was a real disaster. The PT has been out of the picture for months, trailing the facts, without initiative, unable to mobilize the bases to fight against the government or to decide its direction. And this is very serious for a party that intends to be the main challenger in 94. But instead of acting as a challenger, not only to the government, but to the "status quo" of bourgeois domination, the party seems to increasingly behave as a governing alternative within the "status quo."

    26. QDR 16 Oct 2019
      1992.2

      <br> Full Citation: Boletim Nacional. 1992.2. “DN aprova tática e política de alianças.” Collected in Partido dos Trabalhadores Historical Archives, Projeto Memória e História, Fundação Perseu Abramo. Leiden, Netherlands: IDC. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: This source demonstrates the PTs new more pragmatic direction in the early 1990s in the controversial area of alliance policy, with the partys national directorate approving the adoption of a formal alliance policy that sanctioned electoral pacts with many different parties to the left of center, including even center-left parties such as the PSDB among these potential allies and using terminology such as flexible to characterize the new direction.

      Excerpt: Embora seja necessária uma política de alianças nacional, as eleições de 92 exigem que se leve em conta a diversidade de realidade locais. Nossa política deve ser flexível: é uma política de alianças nacional, mas que se articula também com a dinâmica das disputas municipais. O PT tem desenvolvido alianças a partir de um projeto de construção de uma alternativa democrática e popular. Neste campo, se encontram os PCs, o PSB, o PV, o PSDB e o PPS. Ao propor uma política de alianças com o PSB, com os PCs e com o PPS, não desconhecemos as contradições e diferenças políticas que mantemos com esses partidos, mas levamos em consideração, principalmente, a posição política na luta contra o governo Collor, as nossas alianças em 89 na Frente Brasil Popular, o apoio de Roberto Freiré e do PSB a LULA no 2º turno, o amplo arco de alianças e acordos que realizamos em 89 e 90, inclusive governando algumas cidades conjuntamente.

      Translation: Although a policy of national alliances is necessary, the elections of 92 require taking into account the diversity of local realities. Our policy should be flexible: it is a policy of national alliances, but it also articulates with the dynamics of local disputes. The PT has developed alliances for a project to build a democratic and popular alternative. In this group, we find the PCs, PSB, PV, the PSDB and the PPS. By proposing a policy of alliances with the PSB, with PCs and with PPS, we are not unaware of contradictions and political differences we have with these parties, but we take into account mainly the political position in the fight against Collor government, our 1989 alliances in the Brazil Popular front, the support of Roberto Freire and the PSB to LULA in the 2nd round, the wide arc of alliances and agreements that we made in 89 and 90, including jointly ruling some cities.

    27. QDR 16 Oct 2019
      THE POLITICS OF POLARIZATION: GOVERNANCE AND PARTY SYSTEM CHANGE IN LATIN AMERICA, 1990–2010

      <br> This is an Annotation for Transparent Inquiry project, published by the Qualitative Data Repository. Please cite as:

      Handlin, Samuel. (2015) Data for: “The Politics of Polarization: Governance and Party System Change in Latin America, 1990-2010.” Annotation for Transparent Inquiry, QDR:10065. Syracuse, NY: Qualitative Data Repository [distributor]. https://doi.org/10.5064/F66Q1V52

      Additional documentation can be found on QDR.

      Learn more about ATI here.

    28. QDR 16 Oct 2019
      1993.11.8

      <br> Full Citation: El Universal. 1993.11.8. “Hay sectores interesados en impedir las elecciones.” Caracas, Venezuela. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: Once again, this interview with Chavez published before the 1993 elections, when he declines to give his support to the moderate-led LCR, shows that radicals saw a path to power that rested on maintaining a distinctive political identity that was not sullied by participation in a discredited system.

      Excerpt: En honor a la verdad, Andrés Velásquez merece nuestro respeto; sin embargo, él en su discurso coincide plenamente con los postulados de Fedecamaras. A nuestro entender, no existe en la actualidad ningún proyecto que apunte con certeza hacia la transformación de todo el sistema político, económico y social para salir de este laberinto.

      Translation: In truth, Andrés Velásquez deserves our respect, however, he, in his speech agrees fully with the postulates of Fedecámaras. As we understand it, no project currently exists that clearly aims to transform the entire political, economic, and social system to escape this labyrinth.

    29. QDR 16 Oct 2019
      1992.5a

      <br> Full Citation: Boletim Nacional. 1992.5a. “A Convergência esta fora do PT.” Collected in Partido dos Trabalhadores Historical Archives, Projeto Memória e História, Fundação Perseu Abramo. Leiden, Netherlands: IDC. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: This source proves the claim that the PT’s leadership voted to expel the extremely radical faction Convergencia Socialista from the party in 1992, while also giving some important background on the rationale of party leaders. Dirceu’s point that Convergencia Socialista refused to accept the political direction of the party (a more pragmatic and moderate one) shows that politics was at the core of the decision.

      Excerpt: Após cinco horas de debate, o Diretório Nacional do PT decidiu acatar a representação da Comissão Executiva Nacional contra a Convergência Socialista, que teve anulada a sua condição de tendência interna ao PT. A decisão foi tomada na reunião dos dias 8 e 9 de maio, em São Paulo, com 35 votos a favor da proposta vencedora... Para o secretário-geral do PT, deputado federal José Dirceu o problema criado pela CS não poderia ser tratado de maneira meramente disciplinar. “A questão é política: a maioria do PT, democraticamente, optou por um caminho que a Convergência considera inaceitável”. Dirceu foi o autor da representação contra a CS acatada pela Comissão Executiva Nacional e submetida á apreciação do DN.

      Translation: After five hours of debate, the National Directorate of the PT decided to accept the actions of the National Executive Committee against Socialist Convergence, which had rescinded its charter as an internal faction of the PT. The decision was taken at the meeting of May 8th and 9th in São Paulo, with 35 votes in favor of the winning proposal. For the general secretary of the PT, Congressman José Dirceu, the problem created by CS could not be treated merely in a disciplinary way. "The question is political: most of the PT democratically chose a path that Convergence finds unacceptable." Dirceu was the author of the case against CS accepted by the National Executive Committee and submitted to the DN.

    30. QDR 16 Oct 2019
      1994.4.12

      <br> Full Citation: Folha de São Paulo. 1994.4.12. “Radicais reduzem influencia no partido.” Collected in Partido dos Trabalhadores Historical Archives, Projeto Memória e História, Fundação Perseu Abramo. Leiden, Netherlands: IDC. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: This source provides evidence for the descriptive claim that some signs of decreasing radical influence could be found even before the 1994 presidential election and 1995 PT party congress (but after the implementation of the Plano Real). In the key state of São Paulo, moderates started to reassert control over the party machinery as the governance crisis began to abate.

      Excerpt: Os grupos de esquerda e extrema-esquerda diminuíram a vantagem que tinham em relação aos outros setores do PT paulista. A corrente interna que mais cresceu foi a “Unidade na Luta”, liderada por Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. O critério usado para a comparação é o número de delegados ao Encontro Nacional do partido que foram eleitos na convenção do PT paulista no último fim de semana. Em 93, as alas de esquerda e extrema apresentaram chapa conjunta e levaram 55,9% dos delegados. Em chapas separadas agora, somadas estas correntes ficaram com 50,9% dos eleitos. A “Unidade na Luta”, chamado de “centro” do PT, saltou de 32,3% dos delegados para 36,1%. Um pouco do acréscimo deve ser atribuído à queda do grupo liderado pelo deputado José Genoino, da “direita” do PT.

      Translation: Groups of the left and extreme-left saw their advantage decrease over other sectors of the PT of São Paulo. The internal current that grew the most was "Unity in Struggle", led by Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. The criterion used for comparison is the number of delegates to the National Meeting of the party who were elected at the convention of the PT in São Paulo last weekend. In 93, the left wing and extreme-left joined forces and took 55.9% of the delegates. Running separately now, together these factions got 50.9% of the vote. "Unity in Struggle," called the "center" of the PT, jumped from 32.3% to 36.1% of the delegates. A part of the increase should be attributed to the fall of the group led by Rep José Genoino, of the "right" of the PT.

    31. QDR 16 Oct 2019
      Movimiento Bolivariano Revolucionario ND

      <br> Full Citation: Movimiento Bolivariano Revolucionario. ND.El Libro Azul. Caracas, Venezuela. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: The “Libro Azul” lays out a broad vision of sweeping political, social, and institutional reform. The excerpt simply captures one part of this vision at the highest level, Chávez’s longstanding desire to fundamentally reorganize the state apparatus and to hold a National Constituent Assembly to decide how the state will be organized and to write a new constitution.

      Excerpt: La raíz bolivariana del proyecto hace renacer la estructura propuesta por el Libertador, en Angostura (1819); y en Bolivia (1826). De tal manera que el estado Federal Zamorano estará constituido por cinco poderes públicos: 1. Poder Ejecutivo 2. Poder Legislativo 3. Poder Judicial 4. Poder Electoral 5. Poder Moral La definición de las estructuras y atribuciones de cada uno de los poderes será producto de las deliberaciones que conducirá, a tono con la Nación, la Asamblea Nacional Constituyente durante la etapa de transición.

      Translation: The Bolivarian root of the project resurrects the structure proposed by the Liberator, in Angostura (1819) and in Bolivia (1826). In this manner, the Zamoran Federal State will be constituted by five public powers: 1. Executive Power 2. Legislative Power 3. Judicial Power 4. Electoral Power 5. Moral Power The definition of the structures and attributions of each of the powers will be a product of the deliberations that the National Constituent Assembly, in tune with the Nation, will conduct during the stage of transition.

    32. QDR 16 Oct 2019
      1993.3a

      <br> Full Citation: Boletim Nacional. 1993.3a. “Carta de São Paulo.” Collected in Partido dos Trabalhadores Historical Archives, Projeto Memória e História, Fundação Perseu Abramo. Leiden, Netherlands: IDC. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: This source, a formal position statement by the radical faction Na Luta PT in advance of the 1993 party congress, offers another example of radicals seizing on the context of poor governance to make arguments about why the PT should avoid compromising its beliefs and instead channel popular dissatisfaction with the status quo.

      Excerpt: “O Brasil atravessa um a situação social instável, fruto da crise econômica que se aprofundou com a implantação da política neoliberal de Collor e cujo aspecto econômico tende a permanecer no Governo Itamar, apesar da retórica de suas preocupações sociais. A dolarização crescente da economia brasileira. Os acordos com o FMI que impedem a retomada do nosso desenvolvimento. O programa de privatizações, que reforça o capital, subtrai conquistas trabalhistas e compromete a soberania nacional. O aumento da inflação e o aprofundamento da recessão, tudo isso gera a incerteza sobre o nosso futuro. Aumenta a violência e a criminalidade. Reforçam-se as propostas autoritárias. A direita se recicla. Os movimentos e as entidades sindicais e populares, embora se multipliquem, não veem a repercussão social de seu esforço. Em alguns momentos a insatisfação popular explode, buscando novas alternativas, como nas “Diretas Já”, na campanha Lula Presidente. O “Fora Collor” é o exemplo mais recente. Mas quando passa o vendaval a burguesia consegue apresentar propostas para continuar impedindo os avanços das lutas populares."

      Translation: "Brazil is going through an unstable social situation, due to the economic crisis that deepened with the implementation of Collor’s neoliberal policies and whose economic features tends to remain in the Itamar government, despite their rhetoric of social concerns. The increasing dollarization of the Brazilian economy. The agreements with the IMF that prevent the restarting of our development. The privatization program, which reinforces capital, undercuts labor achievements and compromises national sovereignty. The rising inflation and the deepening recession, all this creates uncertainty about our future. The increase of violence and criminality. Authoritarian proposals are reinforced. The right is renewed. Social movements, trade unions, and popular organizations, despite growing in number, cannot see the social impact of their efforts. At some moments, popular dissatisfaction explodes, searching for new alternatives, as in "Direct Elections Now" in Lula’s presidential campaign. The "Get Out Collor" is the latest example. But when the storm passes the bourgeoisie can submit proposals to continue preventing the growth of popular struggles."

    33. QDR 16 Oct 2019
      1995.4

      <br> Full Citation: Brasil Agora. 1995.4. “É Hora de Ser Duro Com o Governo.” Collected in Partido dos Trabalhadores Historical Archives, Projeto Memória e História, Fundação Perseu Abramo. Leiden, Netherlands: IDC. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: This source provides evidence for the descriptive claim that the PT’s moderate leadership was concerned with holding the party together after its resumption of power and maintained a sharply oppositional stance to the Cardoso agenda, even as it plotted a course toward a more pragmatic and moderate politics that would eventually greatly overlap with that agenda.

      Excerpt: Ele quer destruir o Estado brasileiro e há exemplos de que isso não é prudente fazer: México, Argentina, a própria Inglaterra, onde os trabalhadores estão perdendo conquistas de 50 anos, além do desmonte do movimento sindical inglês. Ao mesmo tempo, FHC não apresenta uma agenda social. Ele efetivamente se transformou em prisioneiro das teses mais conservadoras e se tornou um conservador. Eu acho que a forma que o PT tem de contribuir para o país nesse instante é ser duro, sem querer fazer nenhum julgamento do mandato de FHC, que está no começo, mas já fazendo um julgamento dos primeiros três meses, que na minha ótica são muito negativos.

      Translation: He wants to destroy the Brazilian state and there are examples that this is not prudent thing to do: Mexico, Argentina, England itself, where workers have lost 50 years of achievements, in addition to the dismantling of the English labor movement. At the same time, FHC does not present a social agenda. He actually became a prisoner of the most conservative viewpoints and became a conservative. I think the PT has to be rigid right now, without making judgments on the entirely of the FHC mandate, which is just starting, but already judging the first three months, which in my view are very negative.

    34. QDR 16 Oct 2019
      1993

      <br> Full Citation: Thielen, Rafael. 1993. “Una estrategia equivoca frente a la crisis nacional.” In El MAS: Un proyecto político para el cambio o la conservación? Caracas, Venezuela: Fondo Editorial Tropykos. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: This piece by Thielen provides a clear example of radicals within MAS using the systemic crisis of governance in Venezuela to argue for an alternative viability strategy, in which the party would differentiate itself from status quo contenders and emphasize its potential to transform discredited aspects of the current political system.

      Excerpt: En la intención de acometer inmediatamente una “revolución en el MAS” – que fue la conclusión globalizada más importante – que en otras palabras significa la refundación del partido para convertirlo en un instrumento que satisfaga las nuevas exigencias de la sociedad y cumpla cabalmente con su papel reformador y transformador de las estructuras económicas y sociales del país, hubo planteamientos y preocupaciones compartidos en relación a materias como el perfil y la condición del MAS, la ambigüedad de su política, desviaciones electoralistas, estilos dirigentes insatisfactorios, distorsión de la vida interna, carencias significativas en el funcionamiento institucional.

      Translation: With the intention of immediately undertaking a “revolution in the MAS”—which was the most important global conclusion—that, in other words, amounted to re-founding the party to convert it into an instrument that satisfied the new demands of society and completely fulfilled its role as reformer and transformer of the economic and social structures of the country, there were shared plans and preoccupations regarding matters such as the profile and condition of the MAS, the ambiguity of its politics, electoralist detours, unsatisfactory leadership styles, distortion of its internal life, and significant deficiencies in its institutional operation.

    35. QDR 16 Oct 2019
      1997.6.16

      <br> Full Citation: Folha de Sao Paulo. 1997.6.16. “Temer Lança Candidatura No PT E Critica ‘Hesitação’ Do Partido.” Collected in Partido dos Trabalhadores Historical Archives, Projeto Memória e História, Fundação Perseu Abramo. Leiden, Netherlands: IDC. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: This news story simply gives evidence for the descriptive claim that Milton Temer’s candidacy for the PT leadership was at the center of the ill-fated radical attempts to regain a foothold and prevent the slow growth of moderate hegemony after 1994.

      Excerpt: "Um ato contra o governo Fernando Henrique Cardoso e a Articulação, corrente que atualmente dirige o PT, marcou ontem o lançamento oficial da candidatura do deputado federal Milton Temer (RJ), 58, à presidência nacional da legenda. A manifestação aconteceu na Uerj (Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro), onde o PT carioca encerrava o seu 10º Encontro Municipal, e teve cerca de 200 pessoas. Temer afirmou que sua candidatura não tem ligação com a crise aberta pelo caso Cpem (acusações de irregularidades envolvendo petistas), mas atacou a linha majoritária no PT, por supostas “hesitações” na oposição ao governo."

      Translation: "In an action against the government of Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Articulation, the faction that now runs the PT, yesterday marked the official launch of the candidacy of Congressman Milton Temer (RJ), 58, for the national presidency of the party. The demonstration took place at UERJ (State University of Rio de Janeiro), where the PT held its 10th Municipal Meeting, and had about 200 people. Temer said his candidacy has no connection with the crisis opened by the CPEM case (accusations of irregularities involving Petistas) but attacked the majority faction of the PT, for alleged "hesitation" in opposition to the government.”

    36. QDR 16 Oct 2019
      1996.1.28

      <br> Full Citation: El Universal. 1996.1.28. “Retirarse del Gobierno plantea dirigencia del MAS.” Caracas, Venezuela. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: This excerpt offers an example of Puchi, less a true ideologue than an “opportunistic radical” attuned to the party’s waning electoral fortunes, arguing that the association with the Caldera government has been damaging and that the best strategy moving forward would be to reestablish the party’s more distinctive profile.

      Excerpt: Ante esa circunstancia, Puchi considera que de no producirse un cambio de actitud del presidente Rafael Caldera, los masistas “deben profundizar en la línea iniciada de distanciamiento y de independencia constructive, que permita actuar al partido sin estar atado de manos por el compromiso de solidarid propio de quienes comparten la toma de decisions y el ejercicio del poder.” …Además, piensa que deben estar atentos a la evolución de las decisions relacionadas con la Agenda Venezuela, “pues una ejecución conducida de manera desacertada, de manera incoherente, sin un manejo correcto de los tiempos, no puede llevar a una catástrofe. En estas circunstancias, el MAS no podria continuar acompañando al Gobierno.”

      Translation: Given that circumstance, Puchi is of the opinion that if president Rafael Caldera’s attitude does not change, the masistas “should continue the policy, already begun, of distancing themselves and being constructively independent, which allows the party to act, without being hand-cuffed by commitments to solidarity typical of those who share decision-making and the exercise of power.” …In addition, he thinks that they should be attentive to the evolution of the decisions related to the Venezuelan Agenda, “because an execution conducted in an imprudent manner, in an incoherent manner, without a correct reading of the times, can bring us to a catastrophe. En these circumstances, MAS cannot continue being part of the government.”

    37. QDR 16 Oct 2019
      1995.6

      <br> Full Citation: Teoria e Debate. 1995.6. “Era possível ganhar no primeiro turno.” Collected in Partido dos Trabalhadores Historical Archives, Projeto Memória e História, Fundação Perseu Abramo. Leiden, Netherlands: IDC. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: This opinion piece by leading moderate Eduardo Jorge is an example of the return to viability logic in the aftermath of the success of the Plano Real and the popularity of the Cardoso government. (In the broader piece, not just the excerpt above) Jorge argues that the PT could have demolished the Brazilian right completely by making an electoral pact with the PSDB, that the failure of the PT (and left in general) to be willing to share power and make programmatic concessions has been one of the party’s greatest weaknesses, that the radical takeover of the party has prevented program from occurring and the promise of the 1st Congress from being realized, and that if the PT is ever to win power it will have to become much more pragmatic and flexible.

      Excerpt: O PT está diante de um problema que continuará, senão for desvelado e enfrentado até ao fim, nos confinando como um partido importante e representativo, mas incapaz de compartilhar hegemonia e de governar na democracia. Refiro-me à ideologia, à regra, à cultura tradicional nos partidos de esquerda, que implica buscar a qualquer custo, por quaisquer meios, violentos ou pacíficos, uma hegemonia total e, portanto, totalitária. Segundo esta mentalidade, todos os sectores, da associação de escoteiros à seleção nacional de futebol do sindicato ao Parlamento, devem ser iluminados por nossa ‘luz’, onipresente, onipotente e onisciente. É verdade que o PT vem lutando contra isso desde o seu nascimento e que no seu 1º Congresso, em 1991, aprovou por 70% a 30% dos votos dos delegados, a rejeição da ditadura do proletariado, a regra máxima do autoritarismo na esquerda. Mas a tradição é forte , recusa-se a morrer e encontra caminhos para voltar a oprimir nossas consciências socialistas. Foi o que aconteceu em 1993 e 94, com a base e a direção do partido empolgadas diante do favoritismo inicial da candidatura Lula, com a possibilidade de vitória solitária ou com aliados tratados com menosprezo ou queridos desde que submissos. É essa matriz que precisa ser abandonada.”

      Translation: The PT is facing a problem that will continue, if not unveiled and confronted to the end, confining ourselves to being an important and representative party, but one incapable of sharing hegemony and governing under democracy. I refer to the ideology, the rule, the traditional culture in parties of the left, which means seeking at any cost, by any means, violent or peaceful, a hegemony that is total, and therefore, totalitarian. According to this mentality, all sectors from the scout association to the national football team, the unions to the Parliament, must be illuminated by our 'light', omnipresent, omnipotent and omniscient. It is true that the PT has been fighting it since its birth and in its 1st Congress in 1991, approved by 70% to 30% of the votes of the delegates, rejected the dictatorship of the proletariat, the extreme law of authoritarianism on the left. But the tradition is strong, and refuses to die, finding ways to return and subjugate our socialist consciousness. That’s what happened in 1993 and 94, with the base and the head of the party motivated with the early successes of Lula's candidacy, with the chance of a solo victory or one together with disrespected allies or those that would be submissive. It is this attitude that must be left behind.”

    38. QDR 16 Oct 2019
      1995.4

      <br> Full Citation: Brasil Agora. 1995.4. “É Hora de Ser Duro Com o Governo.” Collected in Partido dos Trabalhadores Historical Archives, Projeto Memória e História, Fundação Perseu Abramo. Leiden, Netherlands: IDC. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: This source provides evidence for the descriptive claim that the PT’s moderate leadership was concerned with holding the party together after its resumption of power and maintained a sharply oppositional stance to the Cardoso agenda, even as it plotted a course toward a more pragmatic and moderate politics that would eventually greatly overlap with that agenda.

      Excerpt: Ele quer destruir o Estado brasileiro e há exemplos de que isso não é prudente fazer: México, Argentina, a própria Inglaterra, onde os trabalhadores estão perdendo conquistas de 50 anos, além do desmonte do movimento sindical inglês. Ao mesmo tempo, FHC não apresenta uma agenda social. Ele efetivamente se transformou em prisioneiro das teses mais conservadoras e se tornou um conservador. Eu acho que a forma que o PT tem de contribuir para o país nesse instante é ser duro, sem querer fazer nenhum julgamento do mandato de FHC, que está no começo, mas já fazendo um julgamento dos primeiros três meses, que na minha ótica são muito negativos.

      Translation: He wants to destroy the Brazilian state and there are examples that this is not prudent thing to do: Mexico, Argentina, England itself, where workers have lost 50 years of achievements, in addition to the dismantling of the English labor movement. At the same time, FHC does not present a social agenda. He actually became a prisoner of the most conservative viewpoints and became a conservative. I think the PT has to be rigid right now, without making judgments on the entirely of the FHC mandate, which is just starting, but already judging the first three months, which in my view are very negative.

    40. QDR 16 Oct 2019
      1993a

      <br> Full Citation: Valero, Jorge. 1993a. Razones y Sinrazones del Fallido Golpe de Estado del 4 de Febrero de 1992 en Venezuela. In El MAS: Un proyecto politico para el cambio o la conservacin? Caracas, Venezuela: Fondo Editorial Tropykos. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: Valero makes clear and repeated reference to the systemic crisis of governance in the country, in the context of arguing that this crisis presents MAS with unprecedented opportunities, as long as the party can maintain its distinctive profile.

      Excerpt: Los acontecimientos del 4-F han evidenciado una crisis profunda del rgimen poltico-institucional inaugurado el 23 de Enero de 1958. La crisis tiene an dimensiones desconocidas tanto en el mbito civil como el militar. El rgimen que hace 34 aos resurgi con esperanzadores augurios y el cual haba sido fruto de la postrera accin libertaria de numerosos prceres de la democracia, ha colapsado definitivamente. Y es que no estamos simplemente ante una crisis de gobierno, sino del sistema como tal. Las soluciones para encararlas, por lo tanto, no pueden ser parciales ni fragmentarias. No ha sido suficiente con que el presidente Prez haya removido a varios miembros de su gabinete e instrumente si es que tiene la voluntad de hacerlo medidas compensatorias en el mbito econmico-social que atenuen el terrible impacto causado por el paquete neoliberal. No, no ha sido suficiente.

      Translation: The events of the 4th of February made evident a profound crisis of the political-institutional regime inaugurated on the 23rd of January 1958. The crisis still has unknown dimensions both in the civilian area as in the military area. The regime that 34 years ago resurfaced with hopeful signs, and which had been the fruits of the last actions for liberty of many leaders for democracy, has collapsed definitively. It is not that we are simply faced with a crisis of government, but rather, with a crisis of the whole system itself. The solutions used to confront this crisis, therefore, cannot be partial or fragmentary. It has not been enough for President Prez to remove various members of his cabinet and to arrange forif he were to have the will to do itcompensatory measures in the socio-economic realm to alleviate the terrible impact caused by the neoliberal package. No, this has not been enough.

    41. QDR 16 Oct 2019
      Movimiento Bolivariano Revolucionario ND

      <br> Full Citation: Movimiento Bolivariano Revolucionario. ND.El Libro Azul. Caracas, Venezuela. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: The “Libro Azul” lays out a broad vision of sweeping political, social, and institutional reform. The excerpt simply captures one part of this vision at the highest level, Chávez’s longstanding desire to fundamentally reorganize the state apparatus and to hold a National Constituent Assembly to decide how the state will be organized and to write a new constitution.

      Excerpt: La raíz bolivariana del proyecto hace renacer la estructura propuesta por el Libertador, en Angostura (1819); y en Bolivia (1826). De tal manera que el estado Federal Zamorano estará constituido por cinco poderes públicos: 1. Poder Ejecutivo 2. Poder Legislativo 3. Poder Judicial 4. Poder Electoral 5. Poder Moral La definición de las estructuras y atribuciones de cada uno de los poderes será producto de las deliberaciones que conducirá, a tono con la Nación, la Asamblea Nacional Constituyente durante la etapa de transición.

      Translation: The Bolivarian root of the project resurrects the structure proposed by the Liberator, in Angostura (1819) and in Bolivia (1826). In this manner, the Zamoran Federal State will be constituted by five public powers: 1. Executive Power 2. Legislative Power 3. Judicial Power 4. Electoral Power 5. Moral Power The definition of the structures and attributions of each of the powers will be a product of the deliberations that the National Constituent Assembly, in tune with the Nation, will conduct during the stage of transition.

    42. QDR 16 Oct 2019
      1996

      <br> Full Citation: Moviemiento Bolivariano Revolucionari-200. 1996. Agenda Alternativa Bolivariana. Caracas, Venezuela. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: In this more mature policy document, written and disseminated after Chavez and other leaders of the MBR-200 had been released from prison, the MBR-200 focuses its attention on both proposals for radical economic policies (not in the excerpt, but elsewhere in the document) and sweeping proposals for state and institutional reform. Once again, this demonstrates how central governance-based appeals were to the radical strategy emerging in Venezuela.

      Excerpt: Así, la estrategia bolivariana se plantea no solamente la restructuración del Estado, sino de todo el sistema político, desde sus fundamentos filosóficos mismos hasta sus componentes y las relaciones que los regulan. Por esa razón, hablamos del proceso necesario de reconstitución o refundación del Poder Nacional en todas sus facetas, basado en la legitimidad y en la soberanía. El poder constituido no tiene, a estas alturas, la más mínima capacidad para hacerlo, por lo que habremos, necesariamente, de recurrir al Poder Constituyente, para ir hacia la instauración de la Quinta República: la República Bolivariana.

      Translation: Thus, the Bolivarian strategy proposes not only the restructuring of the State, but also the entire restructuring of the political system, from its philosophical foundations to its components, and the relationships that regulate them. For that reason, we speak of the necessary process of reconstituting or re-founding National Power in all its facets, based on legitimacy and sovereignty. The constituted power does not have, by now, the most minimal capacity to do this, which is why we will necessarily have to resort to the Constituent Power, in order to proceed toward the establishment of the Fifth Republic: the Bolivarian Republic.

    43. QDR 16 Oct 2019
      1993.3b

      <br> Full Citation: Boletim Nacional. 1993.3b. “Manifesto aos Petistas.” Collected in Partido dos Trabalhadores Historical Archives, Projeto Memória e História, Fundação Perseu Abramo. Leiden, Netherlands: IDC. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: This manifesto from the faction Articulação de Esquerda in advance of the critical 1993 party congress offers another example radical groups drawing on the context of poor governance to make arguments about why the PT can maintain its radical posture and still succeed. The authors predict that governance-based issues will dominate the political agenda (the 1994 election will be a “referendum on the form of state and system of government”) and argue that only by recovering a radical posture and differentiating themselves from parties of the status quo will the PT be able to succeed in this political milieu.

      Excerpt: O PT só pode enfrentar a agenda política de curto prazo, que se desdobra no plebiscito sobre forma de estado e sistema de governo, na revisão constitucional e na oposição ao governo Itamar, caso recupere sua tradição radical, popular, democrática, socialista. É inaceitável que, em nome de malfeitos cálculos eleitorais, nosso partido deixe de apresentar uma alternativa global para a crise brasileira, é inaceitável que em nome de inexistentes “responsabilidades”, nosso partido não faça oposição firme contra um governo que, não obstantes suas diferenças com Collor, é nitidamente conservador, é inaceitável que nosso partido em nome da urgência de reformas políticas, aceite ficar sob a hegemonia conservadora na discussão sobre sistema de governo. O Partido que nós queremos não pode ser aquele que cogita apoiar governos que o PFL também apoia. O Partido que nós queremos não poder ser aquele em que dirigentes proclamam-se adeptos da monarquia. O partido que nós queremos não pode mais conviver com isso, sem deixar de ser PT.

      Translation: The only way the PT can achieve its short-term political agenda, which is divided into a referendum on the state and the system of government, the constitutional review, and the opposition to the Itamar government, is if it recovers its radical, popular, democratic, and socialist tradition. It is unacceptable that our party, in the name of corrupt electoral calculations, fails to present a complete alternative to the Brazilian crisis, and unacceptable that, in the name of non-existent "responsibilities", our party does not present a strong opposition against a government that, despite its differences with Collor, is clearly conservative, and unacceptable that our party, in the name of urgent political reform, agrees to be under this conservative hegemony during the discussion about the system of government. The Party that we want cannot support governments that are also supported by the PFL. The Party that we want cannot permit that its leaders declare themselves followers of the monarchy. The Party that we want cannot agree with this, without ceasing to be the PT.

    44. QDR 16 Oct 2019
      1992.5a

      <br> Full Citation: Boletim Nacional. 1992.5a. “A Convergência esta fora do PT.” Collected in Partido dos Trabalhadores Historical Archives, Projeto Memória e História, Fundação Perseu Abramo. Leiden, Netherlands: IDC. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: This source proves the claim that the PT’s leadership voted to expel the extremely radical faction Convergencia Socialista from the party in 1992, while also giving some important background on the rationale of party leaders. Dirceu’s point that Convergencia Socialista refused to accept the political direction of the party (a more pragmatic and moderate one) shows that politics was at the core of the decision.

      Excerpt: Após cinco horas de debate, o Diretório Nacional do PT decidiu acatar a representação da Comissão Executiva Nacional contra a Convergência Socialista, que teve anulada a sua condição de tendência interna ao PT. A decisão foi tomada na reunião dos dias 8 e 9 de maio, em São Paulo, com 35 votos a favor da proposta vencedora... Para o secretário-geral do PT, deputado federal José Dirceu o problema criado pela CS não poderia ser tratado de maneira meramente disciplinar. “A questão é política: a maioria do PT, democraticamente, optou por um caminho que a Convergência considera inaceitável”. Dirceu foi o autor da representação contra a CS acatada pela Comissão Executiva Nacional e submetida á apreciação do DN.

      Translation: After five hours of debate, the National Directorate of the PT decided to accept the actions of the National Executive Committee against Socialist Convergence, which had rescinded its charter as an internal faction of the PT. The decision was taken at the meeting of May 8th and 9th in São Paulo, with 35 votes in favor of the winning proposal. For the general secretary of the PT, Congressman José Dirceu, the problem created by CS could not be treated merely in a disciplinary way. "The question is political: most of the PT democratically chose a path that Convergence finds unacceptable." Dirceu was the author of the case against CS accepted by the National Executive Committee and submitted to the DN.

    45. QDR 16 Oct 2019
      1996.1.19

      <br> Full Citation: El Universal. 1996.1.19. “Müller Rojas: La Causa R y Su Futuro.” Caracas, Venezuela. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: In this op-ed, Alberto Müller Rojas, a prominent radical leader within LCR, discusses the connection between radical politics and periods of systemic crisis. This excerpt shows that radicals were consciously thinking along these lines, connecting the possibilities of more radical political positions with the appetite of the electoral for rejecting the status quo, and fearing that improvements in state performance and the end of the crisis might not only undermine the radical project, but empower moderates within the party.

      Excerpt: Señalaba en la última entrega de esta columna que el problema de la Causa R, como expresión del radicalismo democrático en Venezuela, se presentaba en términos de sus persistencia como una fuerza política significativa – la tercera en magnitud en el panorama nacional, si se consideran la cuantía de los votos obtenidos en el último proceso electoral – en un ambiente político que tiende a estabilizarse. Efectivamente, si se considera que el radicalismo es una manifestación política que adquiere fuerzas en las situaciones de crisis, para normalmente desvancerse o transformarse en meras maquinarias electorales, indudablemente tiene que considerarse que el cambio en la naturaleza de la situación política del país, hacia una estabilización de la estructura de poder, después de una grave crisis del sistema, tiene que producir la posibilidad de que le ocurra a la Causa R, lo que le ha ocurrido a las otras manifestaciones del radicalismo democrático, en otros momentos y circunstancias. Y, ciertamente, algunas declaraciones de sus dirigentes reconocidos, dan lugar a que, en las percepciones de la sociedad en general – expuestas a través de los medios de comunicación social – y, en las propias de muchos de sus adherentes, se sienta como posible un cambio profundo en la organización, que se vislumbra desde la posible moderación de sus actitudes hasta su fraccionamiento, al cual incluso juegan abiertamente, algunos de sus voceros calificados.

      Translation: I pointed out in the last installment of this column that the problem of the R Cause, as an expression of democratic radicalism in Venezuela, had to do with its persistence as a significant political force—the third in magnitude in the national panorama, if one considers the number of votes it obtained in the last election—in a political environment that tends towards stability. Indeed, if one considers that radicalism is a political manifestation that acquires force in situations of crisis and then normally disappears or transforms into merely electoral machinery, undoubtedly one must consider that the change in the nature of the political situation of the country, toward a stabilization of the power structure, after a grave crisis of the system, must lead to the possibility that what has happened to other manifestations of democratic radicalism, in other moments and circumstances, would happen to LCR. And, certainly, some statements by its recognized leaders make it so that, in the perceptions of the society in general— disseminated through social means of communication —and, in the hearts of many of these leaders’ supporters, it feels possible that there will be a profound change in the organization, which is discernible in the possible moderation of its attitudes, to its fragmentation, which some of the organization’s qualified spokespeople even trifle with openly.

    46. QDR 16 Oct 2019
      1997c

      <br> Full Citation: Ochoa Antich, Enrique.1997c. “Balance y Perspectivas.” In Enrique Ochoa Antich, ed. Adios al MAS?: Documentos para una historia del MAS del socialism marxista al socialism liberal. Caracas, Venezuela: Domingo Fuentes. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: This excerpt shows Ochoa Antich again making the strategic argument that joining forces with radical sectors and distancing the party from Convergencia offers the best way forward for the MAS if they want to be part of a triumphant coalition in 1998.

      Excerpt: Asimismo, opino que el diseño de un plan político para 1998 no tiene por qué y en realidad no puede estar supeditado a nuestra presencia o no en el Gobierno ni a nuestro respaldo a sus políticas fundamentales. El competidor real que se asoma en el horizonte en esa colosal disputa por el poder político que habrán de ser las elecciones generales – nacionales y regionales a la vez – del 98 es, por lo pronto, Acción Democrática. Una política probable, como ya hemos repetido varias veces en estas palabras, es la de conformar con otras fuerzas un amplio bloque electoral que pueda colocarnos como una opción victoriosa de cara a aquellos comicios. La pregunta resulta obvia: existe alguna fuerza, además de la disminuida aunque nunca despreciable Convergencia, con la que podamos coincidir de cara al 98 que no se encuentre en una postura de oposición al gobierno del Presidente Caldera? Resultará paradójico, exigirá de nosotros habilidades e inusitada inteligencia, pero el MAS va a verse necesariamente en la obligación, si quiere colocarse en la perspectiva del 98 en posición de expansión electoral, de combinar su respaldo al Gobierno, por una parte, con la coincidencia electoral, por la otra, con fuerzas que adversan y se oponen al gobierno y con la confrontación histórica a Acción Democrática al margen del discreto apoyo de este partido al Presidente Caldera. Lo mismo puede decirse, por cierto, de movimientos tácticos que también deben guardar la debida autonomía de la línea central de respaldo al gobierno (caso de la elección de las nuevas directivas del Congreso de la República, por ejemplo). En fin de cuentas, debe admitirse que los planes del Presidente Caldera no coinciden ni tienen por qué coincidir necesariamente con los del MAS: éste es un hecho que debemos observar como natural y que no tiene por qué causar, ni entre nosotros ni en el seno del Gobierno, posiciones de absurda e ilógica ansiedad.

      Translation: Likewise, I am of the opinion that the design of a new political plan for 1998 does not have to, and, in reality, cannot be subject to our presence, or not, in the Government, nor to our support of its fundamental politics. The real competitor peeking out from the horizon in that colossal dispute for political power coming into being as the general elections—national and regional simultaneously—of 1998, is, for the moment, Democratic Action. A probable policy, as we have already repeated various times in these pages, is that of uniting with other forces into a large electoral block that can place us as a victorious option facing those elections. The question becomes obvious: Is there some force, other than the crippled, though never contemptible, Convergence, with whom we can form a coalition in 1998, which does not find itself in a posture of opposition to the government of President Caldera? It will be paradoxical, it will demand ability and unprecedented intelligence, but the MAS will see itself necessarily required, if it wants to place itself in a position of electoral expansion from the viewpoint of 1998, to combine its support of the Government, on the one hand, with the electoral coalition, and on the other hand, with the forces that oppose the government and with the long-standing confrontation with Democratic Action, regardless of the moderate support of this party to President Caldera. The same can be said, incidentally, of tactical movements that also should maintain due autonomy from the central line of support of the government (as in the case of the election of the new directors of the Congress of the Republic, for example). In the end, one must admit that the plans of President Caldera do not coincide and do not necessarily have to coincide with those of the MAS: this is a fact that we should observe as natural, and it should not be a reason to cause among us, nor among those in the breast of the government, positions of absurd and illogical anxiety.

    47. QDR 16 Oct 2019
      1993.3a

      <br> Full Citation: Boletim Nacional. 1993.3a. “Carta de São Paulo.” Collected in Partido dos Trabalhadores Historical Archives, Projeto Memória e História, Fundação Perseu Abramo. Leiden, Netherlands: IDC. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: This source, a formal position statement by the radical faction Na Luta PT in advance of the 1993 party congress, offers another example of radicals seizing on the context of poor governance to make arguments about why the PT should avoid compromising its beliefs and instead channel popular dissatisfaction with the status quo.

      Excerpt: “O Brasil atravessa um a situação social instável, fruto da crise econômica que se aprofundou com a implantação da política neoliberal de Collor e cujo aspecto econômico tende a permanecer no Governo Itamar, apesar da retórica de suas preocupações sociais. A dolarização crescente da economia brasileira. Os acordos com o FMI que impedem a retomada do nosso desenvolvimento. O programa de privatizações, que reforça o capital, subtrai conquistas trabalhistas e compromete a soberania nacional. O aumento da inflação e o aprofundamento da recessão, tudo isso gera a incerteza sobre o nosso futuro. Aumenta a violência e a criminalidade. Reforçam-se as propostas autoritárias. A direita se recicla. Os movimentos e as entidades sindicais e populares, embora se multipliquem, não veem a repercussão social de seu esforço. Em alguns momentos a insatisfação popular explode, buscando novas alternativas, como nas “Diretas Já”, na campanha Lula Presidente. O “Fora Collor” é o exemplo mais recente. Mas quando passa o vendaval a burguesia consegue apresentar propostas para continuar impedindo os avanços das lutas populares."

      Translation: "Brazil is going through an unstable social situation, due to the economic crisis that deepened with the implementation of Collor’s neoliberal policies and whose economic features tends to remain in the Itamar government, despite their rhetoric of social concerns. The increasing dollarization of the Brazilian economy. The agreements with the IMF that prevent the restarting of our development. The privatization program, which reinforces capital, undercuts labor achievements and compromises national sovereignty. The rising inflation and the deepening recession, all this creates uncertainty about our future. The increase of violence and criminality. Authoritarian proposals are reinforced. The right is renewed. Social movements, trade unions, and popular organizations, despite growing in number, cannot see the social impact of their efforts. At some moments, popular dissatisfaction explodes, searching for new alternatives, as in "Direct Elections Now" in Lula’s presidential campaign. The "Get Out Collor" is the latest example. But when the storm passes the bourgeoisie can submit proposals to continue preventing the growth of popular struggles."

    48. QDR 16 Oct 2019
      2001, 75

      <br> Full Citation: Mujica, Felipe. 2001. “La Opción MAS-Chávez.” In Felipe Mujica, ed., La Reflexión del MAS. Caracas, Venezuela: Ediciones Polémica, 75. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: This excerpt from the platform of Horizonte 2000 the opportunistic radicals led by Felipe Mujica and Leopoldo Puchi demonstrates how alternative viability calculations played into the radical takeover of MAS and the decision to back Chavez. The radical strategy is justified precisely by the argument that the country is looking for new leadership that is not tainted by association with status quo parties, and this kind of political coalition can only be constructed out of radical forces.

      Excerpt: Venezuela est hambrienta de propsito, de proyecto. No es posible entrar al XXI con un liderazgo que ofrezca slo ms do lo mismo. La articulacin del necesario proyecto de pas exitoso exige nuevos interlocutores tanto el mbito social como en el poltico. Esto significa el desarrollo de una fuerza que en su perfil y estructura, en su organizacin y su discurso, rena la superacin de los estilos de las antiguas formaciones con la capacidad para la innovacin de los nuevos actores sociales e institucionales. Esa fuerza con la flexibilidad necesaria para atender lo particular, lo regional, lo sectorial, lo especfico pero con la implantacin geogrfica y social necesaria para ofrecer propuestas de carcter nacional, es el Movimiento Al Socialismo. Por eso estamos decididos a acompaar a los nuevos lideres, constructores del proyecto de pas exitoso que merecemos ser. Por eso, tanto en la coyuntura electoral que se avecina como en los interesantes procesos que se abren ms all de 1999, el MAS debe ratificar su radical deslinde con las antiguas visiones conservadoras, y abrirse al encuentro de los nuevos planteamientos y los nuevos liderazgos.

      Translation: Venezuela is hungry for purpose and project. It is not possible to enter the 21st century with a leadership that offers only more of the same. The articulation of the necessary project for a successful country demands new interlocutors as much in the social as in the political environment. This means the development of a force whose profile and structure, organization and discourse, blends the overcoming of the ways of the old formations with the capacity for innovation of the new social and institutional agents. That force with the necessary flexibility to attend to the particular, the regional, the sectorial, the specific but with the geographic scope and social necessity to offer propositions of a national character, is the Movement to Socialism. That is why we are committed to accompanying the new leaders, builders of the project of the successful country that we deserve to be. That is why, both in the electoral situation that approaches, as in the interesting processes that look beyond 1999, the MAS should uphold its radical separation from the old conservative visions, and open itself to new proposals and new leadership.

    49. QDR 16 Oct 2019
      1992b

      <br> Full Citation: Medina, Pablo. 1992b. “La Reforma de la Constitución.” In Farruco Sesto, ed., Pablo Medina en Entrevista. Caracas, Venezuela: Ediciones del Agua Mansa.

      Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: This excerpt again shows that Medina and the LCR radicals are focused primarily on issues of governance and state reform as the centerpiece of their political agenda.

      Excerpt: En este debate acerca de la Reforma de la Constitucin estn mezclados dos grandes problemas: un problema de coyuntura y un problema de estructura. Cuando hablamos de estructura no estamos refiriendo a la necesidad de modificar la estructura poltica del pas. Pero este debate que se vena realizando en la Comisin Bicameral desde hace cerca de dos aos, de repente tom una fuerza inusitada y esta fuerza, esta velocidad tiene que ver fundamentalmente con la discusin del momento poltico. Es decir, la crisis poltica del pas que venia cabalgando de manera subrepticia y que se abri de manera consciente a los ojos del pas y a los ojos del mundo: el problema de la legitimidad del presidente de la Repblica.

      Translation: In this debate surrounding the Rewriting of the Constitution, there are two big interrelated problems: a problem of circumstances and a problem of structure. When we speak of structure we are referring to the necessity to modify the political structure of the country. But this debate that was happening in the Bicameral Commission for around two years, suddenly took on an unusual force, and this force, this velocity, has to do fundamentally with the discussion of the political present. That is to say, the political crisis of the country that had come riding in surreptitiously and that opened itself consciously to the eyes of the country and to the eyes of the world: the problem of the legitimacy of the president of the Republic.

    50. QDR 16 Oct 2019
      1994.12

      <br> Full Citation: Teoria e Debate. 1994.12 “3 de outubro e o futuro do PT.” Collected in Partido dos Trabalhadores Historical Archives, Projeto Memória e História, Fundação Perseu Abramo. Leiden, Netherlands: IDC. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: The author, a Brazilian leftist intellectual but not a PT member, brings an outsider’s critical perspective to the state of factional conflict within the party in the aftermath of the 1994 electoral loss. The key point is that Mangabeira Unger highlights viability appeals as central to moderate arguments while noting that the radicals are incapable of formulating a coherent alternative, that they have programmatic preferences but no clear plan for how to build a majoritarian coalition in the post-Cold War world.

      Excerpt: Este não é um erro superficial. Ele está, pelo contrário, enraizado na vida interna do PT e nas atitudes de suas lideranças maiores. Organizam-se as tendências internas do PT num espectro de radicalização progressiva das reivindicações redistribuídas. É como se os mais moderados (e “modernos”) dissessem, como disse Fernando Henrique Cardoso, somos nós o viável, enquanto que os mais radicais protestassem, somos nós que queremos a redistribuição para valer mesmo á custa de amedrontar as classes proprietárias. O grave é que nem os mais radicais oferecem uma proposta que fundamente este distributivismo mais ou menos afoito numa concepção produtiva. Apenas compartilham a mesma confusão típica da esquerda mundial.

      Translation: This is no superficial error. On the contrary, it is ingrained in the internal life of the PT and in the attitudes of most of its leadership. The factions of the PT define themselves along a spectrum of radicalization of claims to redistribution. It is as if the more moderate (and “modern”) said, in the words of Fernando Henrique Cardoso, “we are what is viable,” while the more radical protested, “we want real redistribution, even at the cost of scaring off the monied classes.” What is disturbing is that not even the more radical voices offer a proposal this more or less bold claim to redistribution in a productivist program. They merely share the confusion typical of the left the world over.

    51. QDR 16 Oct 2019
      1994.10

      <br> Full Citation: Brasil Agora. 1994.10 “Perdemos e agora.” Collected in Partido dos Trabalhadores Historical Archives, Projeto Memória e História, Fundação Perseu Abramo. Leiden, Netherlands: IDC.

      Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: These responses in a post-electoral symposium, from radical leaders Markus Sokol and João Machado, are good examples of the inability of radicals to spin a convincing narrative regarding electoral viability in a context of improving governance and a Cardoso government attracting high approval ratings. Sokol blames the loss on the PT’s ambiguous position with respect to the Plano Real and suggests that it needed to be rejected more clearly, a position seemingly blind to the plan’s success and popular approval. Machado falls back on radical canards about the unity of the bourgeoisie, their resource advantages, and media manipulation. Neither radical leader articulates an argument about an alternative path to electoral viability that would not involve programmatic moderation and greater pragmatism.

      Excerpt: A que se deve a derrota de Lula no primeiro turno? Na minha opinião a questão chave foi o Plano Real e nossa posição diante dele. A resposta que o PT e a Frente Brasil Popular deram ao plano foi mais do que ambígua. Em algumas ocasiões dissemos que ele não daria certo, em outras que traria recessão e desemprego, depois falou-se que a estabilização de preços por ele proporcionada era boa, mas precisava ser completada por políticas de cunho social e houve até companheiros que falaram em aperfeiçoar o Plano Real. Tudo isto foi ambíguo e contraditório, ajudou a cimentar a aliança do campo adversário e levou vastos setores sociais a verem no real e no que ele representa uma coisa boa, que merecia ser mantida. Porque perdemos? Embora todos dissessem que as eleições de 94 seriam mais difíceis do que as de 89, que 05 adversários jogariam pesado, de fato tinha-se a ideia de um quadro semelhante: trabalhamos com a ideia uma burguesia dividida, sem um candidato de confiança, pensamos que ser oposição consequente era suficiente e renderia votos e que seria possível ganhar as eleições apenas com a força eleitoral de Lula. Muitas vezes o movimento social chegou a ser desconsiderado e fatos importantes foram vistos como “coisas que atrapalharão o Lula”. O quadro foi totalmente diferente. A burguesia unificou-se em torno de Fernando Henrique, articulou de forma profissional todos os recursos ao seu alcance, do aparelho do Estado ao Plano Real e fez o manejo competente dos meios de comunicação. Para enfrentar esta situação seria necessário muito mais do que o prestígio de Lula, que existe, é bom, mas não é o suficiente. Teríamos que deixar claro desde o início que estava em jogo um confronto entre nosso projeto e o projeto das elites e dos centros internacionais de poder econômico e financeiro. Também fizemos uma avaliação totalmente equivocada do Plano Real e não percebemos o que a burguesia estava fazendo. Enfim, estávamos preparados para uma situação e aconteceu outra.

      Translation: Why was Lula defeated in the first round? The main issue, in my opinion, was the "Plano Real" and our position on it. The answer that both the PT and the "Frente Brasil Popular" gave to the "Plano Real" was more than ambiguous. On some occasions we said it would not work, in other words it would bring recession and unemployment, then it was said that the price stabilization was good, but that it lacked some policies of a social nature and there were others who said that the "Plano Real" just needed improvement. All this was ambiguous and contradictory, helping cement the alliance in the opposition camp and leading many social sectors to see the "Plano Real" as a good thing, which deserved to be maintained. Why did we lose? Although everyone said that the 94’s elections would be more difficult than the 89’s, and the opponents would be playing hard, in fact there was an idea of a similar scenario: we worked with the idea of a divided bourgeoisie without a reliable candidate, we thought that being the consequential opposition was enough and that would win us votes and that a victory in the elections would be possible only with the electoral strength of Lula. Frequently, the social movements were downplayed and important facts were seen as "things that would stand in Lula’s way". The reality was totally different. The bourgeoisie was unified around Fernando Henrique, and used in a professional way all the resources at their disposal, from the state apparatus to the "Plano Real" and their competent management of the media. To confront this situation we would need much more than just Lula’s personal prestige, which existed, was good, but was not enough. We would have to make clear from the beginning that what was at stake was a clash between our project and the one from the elite and international centers of economic and financial power.

    52. QDR 16 Oct 2019
      1999

      <br> Full Citation: Medina, Pablo. 1999. Rebeliones. Caracas, Venezuela: Piedra, Papel, o Tijera. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: This excerpt from Medina’s memoirs demonstrate the great emphasis of LCR’s radical wing on governance-based issues and state reform, especially via the holding of a Constituent Assembly to rewrite the constitution, and the tepid support for this strategy among the party’s moderate wing, which wanted to work through established channels and forge pragmatic alliances.

      Excerpt: Inmediatamente en el mismo mes de diciembre se hizo el balance. En aquello reunión yo propuse que asumiéramos la Constituyente como política nacional. Hice cinco veces el planteamiento. No lo aceptaron. También propuse ir a hablar con Rafael Caldera porque él había prometido iniciar una política de cambios, y pensé que era el momento de exigirle la convocatoria a una Asamblea Nacional Constituyente. Pero prefirieron dejar las cosas de ese tamaño. Yo sí fui a hablar con Caldera. Qué le dije? Pues que no diera los auxilios financieros. Que nacionalizara la banca para evitar los auxilios y luego la reprivatizara. Que el 23 de enero no se instalara el Congreso y que en ese mismo mes de diciembre, ó durante los primeros días de enero del 94, saliera una campaña para informar a la gente del fraude electoral, impedir que continuara la farsa en el Congreso y convocar a la Constituyente. Esos fueron los planteamientos que le hice.

      Translation: Immediately, in the same month of December, we took stock. In that meeting, I proposed that we adopt the Constituent Assembly as a national policy. I made the proposal five times. They did not accept it. Also, I proposed to go speak with Rafael Caldera because he had promised to initiate a politics of change, and, I thought that this was the moment to demand from him the call for a National Constituent Assembly. But, they preferred to leave things as they were. I did go speak with Caldera. What did I tell him? Well, that he should not give aid to the financial sector. That he should nationalize banking to avoid the aid and that he should re-privatize it. That on the 23rd of January the Congress should not be installed, and that in that same month of December, or that during the first days of January of 1994, a campaign should emerge to inform the people of the fraudulent elections, to prevent the carrying on of the farce in the Congress and to convene the Constituent Assembly. Those were the proposals that I made to him.

    53. QDR 16 Oct 2019
      1993

      <br> Full Citation: Thielen, Rafael. 1993. “Una estrategia equivoca frente a la crisis nacional.” In El MAS: Un proyecto político para el cambio o la conservación? Caracas, Venezuela: Fondo Editorial Tropykos. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: This piece by Thielen provides a clear example of radicals within MAS using the systemic crisis of governance in Venezuela to argue for an alternative viability strategy, in which the party would differentiate itself from status quo contenders and emphasize its potential to transform discredited aspects of the current political system.

      Excerpt: En la intención de acometer inmediatamente una “revolución en el MAS” – que fue la conclusión globalizada más importante – que en otras palabras significa la refundación del partido para convertirlo en un instrumento que satisfaga las nuevas exigencias de la sociedad y cumpla cabalmente con su papel reformador y transformador de las estructuras económicas y sociales del país, hubo planteamientos y preocupaciones compartidos en relación a materias como el perfil y la condición del MAS, la ambigüedad de su política, desviaciones electoralistas, estilos dirigentes insatisfactorios, distorsión de la vida interna, carencias significativas en el funcionamiento institucional.

      Translation: With the intention of immediately undertaking a “revolution in the MAS”—which was the most important global conclusion—that, in other words, amounted to re-founding the party to convert it into an instrument that satisfied the new demands of society and completely fulfilled its role as reformer and transformer of the economic and social structures of the country, there were shared plans and preoccupations regarding matters such as the profile and condition of the MAS, the ambiguity of its politics, electoralist detours, unsatisfactory leadership styles, distortion of its internal life, and significant deficiencies in its institutional operation.

    54. QDR 16 Oct 2019
      1993.5

      <br> Full Citation: Brasil Agora. 1993.5. “Adivinhe quem vem para jantar.” Collected in Partido dos Trabalhadores Historical Archives, Projeto Memória e História, Fundação Perseu Abramo. Leiden, Netherlands: IDC. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: This source provides another piece of evidence for the descriptive claim that the PT’s leadership was moving the party in a more pragmatic and moderate direction in the early 1990s. The story demonstrates the many meetings between Lula and major business leaders, as well as the perspective from an important business figure that Lula’s private and public images with respect to the business community were quite different.

      Excerpt: Primeiro foi uma reunião com latifundiários goianos. Em meados de março, foi um jantar com 25 empresários no apartamento de José Baia Sobrinho, dono do Banco Pontual. Depois foi na casa de Emerson Kapaz, candidato derrotado à presidência da Fiesp, com mais 18 empresários. E, no dia 5 de abril, um jantar com 16 empresários na casa de Hélio Mattar, coordenador do Pensamento Nacional das Bases Empresariais. Os encontros entre Lula e os empresários foram qualificados como “secretos e cheios de suspense” pela imprensa, que não deixou claro que o convite e a decisão de fazer reuniões discretas partiram dos próprios empresários. Segundo Hélio Mattar, “na medida em que Lula é presidente de um partido forte, os empresários têm interesse em conhecê-lo pessoalmente”, já que “a imagem pública do Lula não necessariamente vai coincidir com sua imagem privada. Frente a frente, descontraído, Lula vai poder colocar com menos defesas suas posições e suas dúvidas."

      Translation: First there was a meeting with landowners from Goiás. In mid-March, there was a dinner with 25 businessmen in the apartment of Joseph Baia Sobrinho, owner of Banco Pontual. Then it was in the home of Emerson Kapaz, defeated candidate for the presidency of Fiesp, with 18 more businessmen. And on April 5, a dinner with 16 businessmen at the home of Helio Mattar, coordinator of the National Thought of Entrepreneurial Bases. These meetings between Lula and businessmen were characterized as "secret and full of suspense" by the press, which did not make clear that the invitation and the decision to make discreet meetings was taken by the businessmen themselves. According to Helio Mattar, "to the extent that Lula is the president of a strong Party, the businessmen have interest in meeting him personally," since "the public image of Lula will not necessarily match his private image. Face to face, relaxed, Lula will be able to easily express his positions and doubts."

    55. QDR 16 Oct 2019
      1993.11.8

      <br> Full Citation: El Universal. 1993.11.8. “Hay sectores interesados en impedir las elecciones.” Caracas, Venezuela. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: Once again, this interview with Chavez published before the 1993 elections, when he declines to give his support to the moderate-led LCR, shows that radicals saw a path to power that rested on maintaining a distinctive political identity that was not sullied by participation in a discredited system.

      Excerpt: En honor a la verdad, Andrés Velásquez merece nuestro respeto; sin embargo, él en su discurso coincide plenamente con los postulados de Fedecamaras. A nuestro entender, no existe en la actualidad ningún proyecto que apunte con certeza hacia la transformación de todo el sistema político, económico y social para salir de este laberinto.

      Translation: In truth, Andrés Velásquez deserves our respect, however, he, in his speech agrees fully with the postulates of Fedecámaras. As we understand it, no project currently exists that clearly aims to transform the entire political, economic, and social system to escape this labyrinth.

    56. QDR 16 Oct 2019
      1994.10.7

      <br> Full Citation: Folha de São Paulo. 1994.10.7. “A Missão Impossível.” Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: This opinion piece from Tarso Genro in the wake of the 1994 elections is another example of the return to viability appeals by moderates. Genro refers to the strategy of falling back on old radical Socialist ideas in order to win elections as a Mission Impossible, ridicules the notion of blaming the media for Lulas defeat, and posits that the left must find a new direction.

      Excerpt: "Hoje impossvel fundamentar um projeto estratgico no seu significado econmico-social, como foi possvel na cultura do velho socialismo revolucionrio e na social-democracia reformadora. Fernando Henrique compreendeu perfeitamente tudo isso e abdicou at da social-democracia. O PT no compreendeu e remendou o ``furo" do socialismo clssico com uma viso social-democrtica, obreirista reformista, to superada como o socialismo sovitico: foi um acordo com a conscincia antiga.... O pior, porm, que pode nos acontecer no momento , confirmada a derrota de Lula, culpar a grande mdia como se pudssemos ter uma estratgia de vitria com a solidariedade da mdia; buscando responsveis individuais como se a nossa linha de campanha no fosse resultado de uma cultura poltica."

      Translation: "Today it is impossible to support a strategic project in its economic and social sense, as it was possible in the culture of the old revolutionary socialism and that of progressive social democracy. Fernando Henrique fully understood all this and even renounced social democracy. The PT did not understand and fixed the problems of classic socialism with a social-democratic vision, a progressive working class, overcoming all as with Soviet socialism: it was an agreement with an old consciousness. The worst, however, that can happen to us at this moment, with the confirmed defeat of Lula, would be to blame the media - as if we could have a winning strategy with the solidarity of the media; seeking the guilty - as if the orientation of our campaign was not the result of our political culture."

    58. QDR 16 Oct 2019
      Klingemann (2005)

      <br> Klingemann, Hans-Dieter. 2005. “Political Parties and Party Systems.” In J. Thomassen, ed., The European Voter: A Comparative Study of Modern Democracies. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

    59. QDR 16 Oct 2019
      THE POLITICS OF POLARIZATION: GOVERNANCE AND PARTY SYSTEM CHANGE IN LATIN AMERICA, 1990–2010

      <br> This is an Annotation for Transparent Inquiry project, published by the Qualitative Data Repository. Please cite as:

      Handlin, Samuel. (2015) Data for: “The Politics of Polarization: Governance and Party System Change in Latin America, 1990-2010.” Annotation for Transparent Inquiry, QDR:10065. Syracuse, NY: Qualitative Data Repository [distributor]. https://doi.org/10.5064/F66Q1V52

      Additional documentation can be found on QDR.

      Learn more about ATI here.

    61. QDR 16 Oct 2019
      1994.1.25

      <br> Full Citation: Folha de São Paulo. 1994.1.25. “Lula tenta retomar comando do partido.” Collected in Partido dos Trabalhadores Historical Archives, Projeto Memória e História, Fundação Perseu Abramo. Leiden, Netherlands: IDC. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: This source simply provides evidence and further background for the descriptive claim that internal conflicts were occurring within the party, especially between the Lula campaign and the radical leadership of the National Directorate.

      Excerpt: “Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva acha que é hora de passar para a sociedade que um eventual governo seu não vai ser dominado pelos sectores radicais do petismo. "O ano passado foi para todo mundo falar. Agora é hora de pôr ordem na casa", vem repetindo a amigos desde que resolveu tentar inverter o curso político interno que sua campanha estava tomando. Ao falar de 93, Lula referia-se à ascensão dos grupos mais radicais do petismo ao comando da máquina partidária. A queda do grupo mais ligado a ele correu no 8.º Encontro Nacional do PT, em junho, em Brasília. Como estava fazendo nos últimos anos, naquela ocasião Lula ausentou-se da discussão depois de uma tímida e frustrada tentativa de manter a hegemonia de sua ala, a antiga tendência Articulação. Mas a decisão de abrir para PSDB, PDT e até PMDB a cabeça de chapa em alguns Estados –imposta por Lula na reunião do Diretório Nacional no último fim de semana– não foi assimilada facilmente.”

      Translation: Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva thinks it high time we showed society that a Lula government will not be dominated by radical sectors of the PT. "Last year everybody could talk. Now it is time to put the house in order", he has been saying to his friends, since he decided to reverse his campaign’s political course. When speaking about 1993, Lula referred to the rise of radical groups commanding the party machinery. The fall of the group most connected to Lula occurred in the 8th National Meeting of the PT, in June, in Brasilia. As he has been doing in recent years, Lula made himself absent from the discussion after a timid and unsuccessful attempt to maintain the hegemony of his ward, the old faction “Articulação". But the decision to allow the PSDB, PDT and even PMDB nominate the main candidate in some states - imposed by Lula at the meeting of the National Directorate in the last weekend – was not easily embraced.

    62. QDR 16 Oct 2019
      1997.6.16

      <br> Full Citation: Folha de Sao Paulo. 1997.6.16. “Temer Lança Candidatura No PT E Critica ‘Hesitação’ Do Partido.” Collected in Partido dos Trabalhadores Historical Archives, Projeto Memória e História, Fundação Perseu Abramo. Leiden, Netherlands: IDC. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: This news story simply gives evidence for the descriptive claim that Milton Temer’s candidacy for the PT leadership was at the center of the ill-fated radical attempts to regain a foothold and prevent the slow growth of moderate hegemony after 1994.

      Excerpt: "Um ato contra o governo Fernando Henrique Cardoso e a Articulação, corrente que atualmente dirige o PT, marcou ontem o lançamento oficial da candidatura do deputado federal Milton Temer (RJ), 58, à presidência nacional da legenda. A manifestação aconteceu na Uerj (Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro), onde o PT carioca encerrava o seu 10º Encontro Municipal, e teve cerca de 200 pessoas. Temer afirmou que sua candidatura não tem ligação com a crise aberta pelo caso Cpem (acusações de irregularidades envolvendo petistas), mas atacou a linha majoritária no PT, por supostas “hesitações” na oposição ao governo."

      Translation: "In an action against the government of Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Articulation, the faction that now runs the PT, yesterday marked the official launch of the candidacy of Congressman Milton Temer (RJ), 58, for the national presidency of the party. The demonstration took place at UERJ (State University of Rio de Janeiro), where the PT held its 10th Municipal Meeting, and had about 200 people. Temer said his candidacy has no connection with the crisis opened by the CPEM case (accusations of irregularities involving Petistas) but attacked the majority faction of the PT, for alleged "hesitation" in opposition to the government.”

    63. QDR 16 Oct 2019
      1992a

      <br> Full Citation: Medina, Pablo. 1992a. “El Pueblo Soberano Está Hoy Hablando.” In Farruco Sesto, ed., Pablo Medina en Entrevista. Caracas, Venezuela: Ediciones del Agua Mansa. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: This excerpt demonstrates the importance of governance-based appeals and issues to the radical wing of LCR and its most prominent public figure at the time, Pablo Medina. Themes of corruption, lack of access to basic services, and unequal citizenship are emphasized in his chronicle of mass complaints.

      Excerpt: El pueblo soberano est hoy hablando. Y qu dice el pueblo? Para el que sepa escuchar, el pueblo dice que los das de la corrupta clase poltica estn contados. Eso es lo que dice el pueblo. Que lleg la hora de cambiar las cosas. Eso es lo que dice el pueblo. Que la libertad, la seguridad, la justicia, la solidaridad, la igualdad, no son conceptos abstractos tiles para la retrica, sino que deben ser puntales de una vida en sociedad ms digna. Eso es lo que dice el pueblo. Que no quiere ms ladrones con la mano en los dineros pblicos. Que quiere acceso a la educacin, a la salud, a la vivienda, al trabajo, a la ciudadana real, a la cultura, a salir de la pobreza, a dejar atrs la injusticia. Eso es lo que quiere el pueblo. Que no haya ms gobiernos indecentes, que se recuperen los reales robados, que se encarcele a los bandidos, que se reconozca a los valientes, a los honestos, a los justos, eso es lo que el pueblo quiere.

      Translation: The sovereign people are speaking today. And what do the people say? For those who know how to listen, the people say that the days of the corrupt political class are numbered. That is what the people say. That the hour of change has arrived. That is what the people say. That liberty, security, justice, solidarity, equality, are not abstract concepts useful for rhetoric, but rather should be cornerstones of a life in a more dignified society. That is what the people say. That they do not want more thieves whose hands are in the public coffers. That they want access to education, health, housing, work, real citizenship, culture, and to leave behind poverty and injustice. That is what the people want. That there are no more wretched governments, that the stolen reales [currency] are recovered, that the bandits be imprisoned, that the valiant, the honest, and the just be recognized. That is what the people want.

    64. QDR 16 Oct 2019
      1997b

      <br> Full Citation: Ochoa Antich, Enrique. 1997b. “Notas para un Balance del Gobierno.” In Enrique Ochoa Antich, ed. Adios al MAS?: Documentos para una historia del MAS del socialism marxista al socialism liberal. Caracas, Venezuela: Domingo Fuentes. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: This excerpt is an example of Ochoa Antich’s emphasis on the costs involved with association with discredited status quo parties in a context of poor governance. These costs are an intrinsic part of the calculation that a more radical project differentiating the party from status quo forces would offer a better path to electoral viability moving forward.

      Excerpt: Alto precio ha pagado el MAS para estar en el Gobierno. Sin duda, el decrecimiento continuo del Movimiento durante estos últimos siete años, una vez que la antigua cúpula dirigente prácticamente impuso el Movimiento como un hecho el “Proyecto Caldera,” se debe a múltiples causas y no solamente a nuestra peculiar relación con Caldera, pero resulta claro que esa relación también tiene que ver con nuestros resultados. Ha llegado pues el momento de hacer un balance de eso que hemos dado en llamar el “Proyecto Caldera” así como de la gestión del primer gobierno del cual el MAS forma parte.

      Translation: The MAS has paid a high price to be in the Government. Without a doubt, the continual downturn of the Movement during these last seven years, after the old leadership practically imposed the “Caldera Project” on the Movement as a done deal, is due to multiple causes and not only to our peculiar relations with Caldera. But it is clear that that relationship also impacted our results. The moment has arrived then to make a reckoning with what we have taken to calling the “Caldera Project”, as well as of the administration of the first government of which MAS is a part.

    65. QDR 16 Oct 2019
      1996.2.10

      <imgsrc="https://qdr.syr.edu/drupal_data/public/ati_banner_long.png" align="left"/></a><br>Full Citation: El Universal. 1996.2.10. “Los veinticinco anos del MAS y lo que se palpa.” Caracas, Venezuela. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: This excerpt from an opinion piece by Moises Moleiro, a famously staunch radical within MAS, provides another example of the party’s radical wing stressing the need to differentiate the party from AD and Copei and the centrality of that differentation strategy to finding an alternative path to electoral viability.

      Excerpt: La fuerza cuestionadota y crítica, que concitó entusiasmos y adhesiones y logró presentarse como una esperanza, hace hoy (unreadable), sin nada que realmente la diferencie de AD y Copei. Partidos – como se sabe – contra cuyo predominio en la escena política nacional enderezó sus (unreadable). Respecto a los cuales se (unreadable) en diferenciarse y en constituir una alternativa viable.

      Translation: The questioning and critical force that stirred up enthusiasm and adherents and was able to present itself as a from of hope, is known today, without anything that really differentiates it from AD and Copei. These —as one knows—against whose domination on the national political scene MAS staked its claim. Against which it strived to differentiate itself and to build a viable alternative.

    66. QDR 16 Oct 2019
      1992.2

      <br> Full Citation: Boletim Nacional. 1992.2. “DN aprova tática e política de alianças.” Collected in Partido dos Trabalhadores Historical Archives, Projeto Memória e História, Fundação Perseu Abramo. Leiden, Netherlands: IDC. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: This source demonstrates the PTs new more pragmatic direction in the early 1990s in the controversial area of alliance policy, with the partys national directorate approving the adoption of a formal alliance policy that sanctioned electoral pacts with many different parties to the left of center, including even center-left parties such as the PSDB among these potential allies and using terminology such as flexible to characterize the new direction.

      Excerpt: Embora seja necessária uma política de alianças nacional, as eleições de 92 exigem que se leve em conta a diversidade de realidade locais. Nossa política deve ser flexível: é uma política de alianças nacional, mas que se articula também com a dinâmica das disputas municipais. O PT tem desenvolvido alianças a partir de um projeto de construção de uma alternativa democrática e popular. Neste campo, se encontram os PCs, o PSB, o PV, o PSDB e o PPS. Ao propor uma política de alianças com o PSB, com os PCs e com o PPS, não desconhecemos as contradições e diferenças políticas que mantemos com esses partidos, mas levamos em consideração, principalmente, a posição política na luta contra o governo Collor, as nossas alianças em 89 na Frente Brasil Popular, o apoio de Roberto Freiré e do PSB a LULA no 2º turno, o amplo arco de alianças e acordos que realizamos em 89 e 90, inclusive governando algumas cidades conjuntamente.

      Translation: Although a policy of national alliances is necessary, the elections of 92 require taking into account the diversity of local realities. Our policy should be flexible: it is a policy of national alliances, but it also articulates with the dynamics of local disputes. The PT has developed alliances for a project to build a democratic and popular alternative. In this group, we find the PCs, PSB, PV, the PSDB and the PPS. By proposing a policy of alliances with the PSB, with PCs and with PPS, we are not unaware of contradictions and political differences we have with these parties, but we take into account mainly the political position in the fight against Collor government, our 1989 alliances in the Brazil Popular front, the support of Roberto Freire and the PSB to LULA in the 2nd round, the wide arc of alliances and agreements that we made in 89 and 90, including jointly ruling some cities.

    67. QDR 16 Oct 2019
      1994.4.12

      <br> Full Citation: Folha de São Paulo. 1994.4.12. “Radicais reduzem influencia no partido.” Collected in Partido dos Trabalhadores Historical Archives, Projeto Memória e História, Fundação Perseu Abramo. Leiden, Netherlands: IDC. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: This source provides evidence for the descriptive claim that some signs of decreasing radical influence could be found even before the 1994 presidential election and 1995 PT party congress (but after the implementation of the Plano Real). In the key state of São Paulo, moderates started to reassert control over the party machinery as the governance crisis began to abate.

      Excerpt: Os grupos de esquerda e extrema-esquerda diminuíram a vantagem que tinham em relação aos outros setores do PT paulista. A corrente interna que mais cresceu foi a “Unidade na Luta”, liderada por Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. O critério usado para a comparação é o número de delegados ao Encontro Nacional do partido que foram eleitos na convenção do PT paulista no último fim de semana. Em 93, as alas de esquerda e extrema apresentaram chapa conjunta e levaram 55,9% dos delegados. Em chapas separadas agora, somadas estas correntes ficaram com 50,9% dos eleitos. A “Unidade na Luta”, chamado de “centro” do PT, saltou de 32,3% dos delegados para 36,1%. Um pouco do acréscimo deve ser atribuído à queda do grupo liderado pelo deputado José Genoino, da “direita” do PT.

      Translation: Groups of the left and extreme-left saw their advantage decrease over other sectors of the PT of São Paulo. The internal current that grew the most was "Unity in Struggle", led by Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. The criterion used for comparison is the number of delegates to the National Meeting of the party who were elected at the convention of the PT in São Paulo last weekend. In 93, the left wing and extreme-left joined forces and took 55.9% of the delegates. Running separately now, together these factions got 50.9% of the vote. "Unity in Struggle," called the "center" of the PT, jumped from 32.3% to 36.1% of the delegates. A part of the increase should be attributed to the fall of the group led by Rep José Genoino, of the "right" of the PT.

    68. QDR 16 Oct 2019
      1993

      <br> Full Citation: Pérez Marcano, Héctor. 1993. “Debate para que?” In El MAS: Un proyecto politico para el cambio o la conservación? Caracas, Venezuela: Fondo Editorial Tropykos. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: This provides another example of the rise in radical critiques of MAS’s moderate leadership during the early 1990s and the tendency of radicals to specifically point to the danger of becoming a status quo, rather than “transformative” party.

      Excerpt: La banalización de la vida interna del MAS ha llevado a nuestra organización a una serie de desviaciones, que, de no corregirse, terminarán por liquidar su cualidad de fuerza transformadora de la sociedad y la convertirán en simple aparato electoral, de las más disímiles características, al servicio de intereses grupales regionales. En algunos casos – como es evidente ya – grupos regionales imbricados con intereses de grupos económicos regionales y nacionales que terminan siendo los verdaderos detentadores del poder, tal como ha ocurrido en el plano nacional con Acción Democrática. Esta banalización de la vida interna impide que el MAS debata seriamente sobre sí mismo, analice profundamente los problemas nacionales y examine los cambios que en la economía mundial y en el cuadro político internacional se han dado y que afectan de una manera determinante a una fuerza política que – al menos en su denominación – todavía se reclama como fuerza socialista.

      Translation: The trivialization of the internal life of the MAS has led our organization on a series of detours that, if not corrected, will end by destroying its quality as a transformative force of society, and will turn it into a simple electoral apparatus, of the most different characteristics, at the service of regional group interests. In some cases—as is already evident— the true bearers of power will end up being regional groups connected with the interests of regional and national economic groups, as has occurred on the national stage with Democratic Action. This trivialization of internal life prevents the MAS from seriously debating about itself, deeply analyzing national problems, and examining the changes that have been dealt to the world economy and to the international political sphere, and that affect, in a deterministic way, a political force that—at least in name—still claims to be a socialist force.

    69. QDR 16 Oct 2019
      1997a

      <br> Full Citation: Ochoa Antich, Enrique. 1997a. “Las Tesis del Nuevo MAS.” In Enrique Ochoa Antich, ed. Adios al MAS?: Documentos para una historia del MAS del socialism marxista al socialism liberal. Caracas, Venezuela: Domingo Fuentes. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: This excerpt shows the preoccupation of Ochoa Antich with finding an alternative agenda to the Venezuelan people that would sharply differentiate MAS from the status quo parties and, through doing so, allow MAS – potentially in a radical alliance with LCR and the MBR-200 – to chart an alternative path to electoral viability.

      Excerpt: El desenlace de este período turbulento que podríamos definir como de transición dependerá de la capacidad de hegemonía que las fuerzas del cambio sepan poner en juego. En fin de cuentas, nadie deja lo que tiene sino a cambio de algo, así que el perfil de la alternativa, su atractivo y su utilidad, constituyen el punto crucial del proceso. De la inteligencia, de la voluntad, de la sabiduría que muestren las fuerzas del cambio dependerá que este periodo de transición no termine siendo una elipse hacia el pasado. Para una fuerza que, como el MAS, significó durante dos décadas la única alternativa a Acción Democrática y Copei, el escenario que acabamos de describir resulta altamente comprometedor. No es un recurso retórico decir que acaso de la conducta del MAS, de que sea capaz de superar sus atrofias y potenciar sus virtudes, se derivará en buena medida el curso de los acontecimientos de la Venezuela contemporánea. Quizá la providencia ha colocado en nuestras manos la posibilidad de decidir el futuro del país: si nos equivocamos y desperdiciamos el momento histórico que vivimos, resulta altamente probable que las otras fuerzas del cambio – La Causa y los bolivarianos, entre otras – no puedan solas vencer la hegemonía aún latente de Acción Democrática y Copei y vuelvan las fuerzas de la conservación a imponer su dominio sobre la conciencia del pueblo; si acertamos, si comenzamos por cambiarnos a nosotros mismos, quizá seamos la pieza decisiva que incline la balanza de la historia a favor de las fuerzas del cambio.

      Translation: The outcome of this turbulent period, which we could define as the transition, will depend on the capacity to exert hegemony that the forces of change will know how to put into play. In the end, no one leaves what he has unless he exchanges it for something else, so the stature of the other possibility, its attractiveness and its utility, constitutes the crucial point of the process. On the intelligence, the will, the knowledge that the forces of change will show hinges this period of transition not ending as an ellipse toward the past… For a force that, as the MAS, constituted for two decades the only alternative to Democratic Action and Copei, the scene that we just finished describing is highly compromising. It is not a rhetorical gesture to say, perhaps, that from the behavior of the MAS, which is capable of overcoming its atrophies and strengthening its virtues, will be derived the course of events of contemporary Venezuela. Maybe providence has placed in our hands the possibility of deciding the future of the country: if we make a mistake and waste the historic moment we are living, it is highly probable that the other forces of change— Radical Cause and the Bolivarians, among others—will not be able to defeat alone the hegemony, although latent, of Democratic Action and Copei and the forces of conservation will return to impose their domination over the conscience of the people; if we are right, if we start by changing ourselves, maybe we will be the decisive piece that tilts the balancing scale of history in favor of the forces of change.

    70. QDR 16 Oct 2019
      1992.5b

      <br> Full Citation: Boletim Nacional. 1992.5b. “Tracando os rumos ate 1994.” Collected in Partido dos Trabalhadores Historical Archives, Projeto Memória e História, Fundação Perseu Abramo. Leiden, Netherlands: IDC. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: This opinion piece, written by radical leader Jorge Almeida, offers an example of radicals using references to the governance crisis in the country to articulate an alternative path to power. Almeida blasts the moderate leadership for not giving concrete response to the governance crisis, portrays the party as unwilling to challenge parties of the status quo, and links these developments to troubling prospects in the upcoming presidential elections. In sum, this is a good example of how the context of poor governance in Brazil during the early 1990s allowed radical factions within the PT to counter moderate viability arguments and articulate an alternative path to power based on responding to the governance crisis and distinguishing itself from discredited parties of the status quo.

      Excerpt: As resoluções sobre conjuntura e tática, aprovadas no I Congresso já eram insuficientes para armar o partido para a luta política contra Collor e por uma alternativa Democrática e Popular em nosso país, pois não davam uma reposta concreta á crise do governo existente já no período imediatamente anterior ao Congresso do PT. Mas a colocação em prática desta tática foi um verdadeiro desastre. O PT está há meses fora de cena, a reboque dos fatos, sem iniciativa, incapaz de mobilizar as bases para lutar contra o governo ou para fazer o que se decide nas direções. E isto é muito grave para um partido que se pretende o principal desafiante em 94. Mas em vez de agir como desafiante, não só do governo, como “Status Quo” da dominação burguesa, parece cada vez mais se comportar como alternativa de governo dentro do “Status Quo."

      Translation: The resolutions on the conjuncture and tactics, approved during the first Congress, were already inadequate to arm the party for the political struggle against Collor and for a Democratic and Popular alternative in our country, because they did not give a concrete answer to the governmental crisis already existing in the period immediately prior to the PT Congress. But the implementation of this tactic was a real disaster. The PT has been out of the picture for months, trailing the facts, without initiative, unable to mobilize the bases to fight against the government or to decide its direction. And this is very serious for a party that intends to be the main challenger in 94. But instead of acting as a challenger, not only to the government, but to the "status quo" of bourgeois domination, the party seems to increasingly behave as a governing alternative within the "status quo."

    71. QDR 15 Oct 2019
      1994.10.7

      <br> Full Citation: Folha de São Paulo. 1994.10.7. “A Missão Impossível.” Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: This opinion piece from Tarso Genro in the wake of the 1994 elections is another example of the return to viability appeals by moderates. Genro refers to the strategy of falling back on old radical Socialist ideas in order to win elections as a Mission Impossible, ridicules the notion of blaming the media for Lulas defeat, and posits that the left must find a new direction.

      Excerpt: "Hoje impossvel fundamentar um projeto estratgico no seu significado econmico-social, como foi possvel na cultura do velho socialismo revolucionrio e na social-democracia reformadora. Fernando Henrique compreendeu perfeitamente tudo isso e abdicou at da social-democracia. O PT no compreendeu e remendou o ``furo" do socialismo clssico com uma viso social-democrtica, obreirista reformista, to superada como o socialismo sovitico: foi um acordo com a conscincia antiga.... O pior, porm, que pode nos acontecer no momento , confirmada a derrota de Lula, culpar a grande mdia como se pudssemos ter uma estratgia de vitria com a solidariedade da mdia; buscando responsveis individuais como se a nossa linha de campanha no fosse resultado de uma cultura poltica."

      Translation: "Today it is impossible to support a strategic project in its economic and social sense, as it was possible in the culture of the old revolutionary socialism and that of progressive social democracy. Fernando Henrique fully understood all this and even renounced social democracy. The PT did not understand and fixed the problems of classic socialism with a social-democratic vision, a progressive working class, overcoming all as with Soviet socialism: it was an agreement with an old consciousness. The worst, however, that can happen to us at this moment, with the confirmed defeat of Lula, would be to blame the media - as if we could have a winning strategy with the solidarity of the media; seeking the guilty - as if the orientation of our campaign was not the result of our political culture."

    72. QDR 15 Oct 2019
      1997.6.16

      <br> Full Citation: Folha de Sao Paulo. 1997.6.16. “Temer Lança Candidatura No PT E Critica ‘Hesitação’ Do Partido.” Collected in Partido dos Trabalhadores Historical Archives, Projeto Memória e História, Fundação Perseu Abramo. Leiden, Netherlands: IDC. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: This news story simply gives evidence for the descriptive claim that Milton Temer’s candidacy for the PT leadership was at the center of the ill-fated radical attempts to regain a foothold and prevent the slow growth of moderate hegemony after 1994.

      Excerpt: "Um ato contra o governo Fernando Henrique Cardoso e a Articulação, corrente que atualmente dirige o PT, marcou ontem o lançamento oficial da candidatura do deputado federal Milton Temer (RJ), 58, à presidência nacional da legenda. A manifestação aconteceu na Uerj (Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro), onde o PT carioca encerrava o seu 10º Encontro Municipal, e teve cerca de 200 pessoas. Temer afirmou que sua candidatura não tem ligação com a crise aberta pelo caso Cpem (acusações de irregularidades envolvendo petistas), mas atacou a linha majoritária no PT, por supostas “hesitações” na oposição ao governo."

      Translation: "In an action against the government of Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Articulation, the faction that now runs the PT, yesterday marked the official launch of the candidacy of Congressman Milton Temer (RJ), 58, for the national presidency of the party. The demonstration took place at UERJ (State University of Rio de Janeiro), where the PT held its 10th Municipal Meeting, and had about 200 people. Temer said his candidacy has no connection with the crisis opened by the CPEM case (accusations of irregularities involving Petistas) but attacked the majority faction of the PT, for alleged "hesitation" in opposition to the government.”

    74. QDR 15 Oct 2019
      Movimiento Bolivariano Revolucionario ND

      <br> Full Citation: Movimiento Bolivariano Revolucionario. ND.El Libro Azul. Caracas, Venezuela. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: The “Libro Azul” lays out a broad vision of sweeping political, social, and institutional reform. The excerpt simply captures one part of this vision at the highest level, Chávez’s longstanding desire to fundamentally reorganize the state apparatus and to hold a National Constituent Assembly to decide how the state will be organized and to write a new constitution.

      Excerpt: La raíz bolivariana del proyecto hace renacer la estructura propuesta por el Libertador, en Angostura (1819); y en Bolivia (1826). De tal manera que el estado Federal Zamorano estará constituido por cinco poderes públicos: 1. Poder Ejecutivo 2. Poder Legislativo 3. Poder Judicial 4. Poder Electoral 5. Poder Moral La definición de las estructuras y atribuciones de cada uno de los poderes será producto de las deliberaciones que conducirá, a tono con la Nación, la Asamblea Nacional Constituyente durante la etapa de transición.

      Translation: The Bolivarian root of the project resurrects the structure proposed by the Liberator, in Angostura (1819) and in Bolivia (1826). In this manner, the Zamoran Federal State will be constituted by five public powers: 1. Executive Power 2. Legislative Power 3. Judicial Power 4. Electoral Power 5. Moral Power The definition of the structures and attributions of each of the powers will be a product of the deliberations that the National Constituent Assembly, in tune with the Nation, will conduct during the stage of transition.

    75. QDR 15 Oct 2019
      1994.1.25

      <br> Full Citation: Folha de São Paulo. 1994.1.25. “Lula tenta retomar comando do partido.” Collected in Partido dos Trabalhadores Historical Archives, Projeto Memória e História, Fundação Perseu Abramo. Leiden, Netherlands: IDC. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: This source simply provides evidence and further background for the descriptive claim that internal conflicts were occurring within the party, especially between the Lula campaign and the radical leadership of the National Directorate.

      Excerpt: “Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva acha que é hora de passar para a sociedade que um eventual governo seu não vai ser dominado pelos sectores radicais do petismo. "O ano passado foi para todo mundo falar. Agora é hora de pôr ordem na casa", vem repetindo a amigos desde que resolveu tentar inverter o curso político interno que sua campanha estava tomando. Ao falar de 93, Lula referia-se à ascensão dos grupos mais radicais do petismo ao comando da máquina partidária. A queda do grupo mais ligado a ele correu no 8.º Encontro Nacional do PT, em junho, em Brasília. Como estava fazendo nos últimos anos, naquela ocasião Lula ausentou-se da discussão depois de uma tímida e frustrada tentativa de manter a hegemonia de sua ala, a antiga tendência Articulação. Mas a decisão de abrir para PSDB, PDT e até PMDB a cabeça de chapa em alguns Estados –imposta por Lula na reunião do Diretório Nacional no último fim de semana– não foi assimilada facilmente.”

      Translation: Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva thinks it high time we showed society that a Lula government will not be dominated by radical sectors of the PT. "Last year everybody could talk. Now it is time to put the house in order", he has been saying to his friends, since he decided to reverse his campaign’s political course. When speaking about 1993, Lula referred to the rise of radical groups commanding the party machinery. The fall of the group most connected to Lula occurred in the 8th National Meeting of the PT, in June, in Brasilia. As he has been doing in recent years, Lula made himself absent from the discussion after a timid and unsuccessful attempt to maintain the hegemony of his ward, the old faction “Articulação". But the decision to allow the PSDB, PDT and even PMDB nominate the main candidate in some states - imposed by Lula at the meeting of the National Directorate in the last weekend – was not easily embraced.

    76. QDR 15 Oct 2019
      1993.11.8

      <br> Full Citation: El Universal. 1993.11.8. “Hay sectores interesados en impedir las elecciones.” Caracas, Venezuela. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: Once again, this interview with Chavez published before the 1993 elections, when he declines to give his support to the moderate-led LCR, shows that radicals saw a path to power that rested on maintaining a distinctive political identity that was not sullied by participation in a discredited system.

      Excerpt: En honor a la verdad, Andrés Velásquez merece nuestro respeto; sin embargo, él en su discurso coincide plenamente con los postulados de Fedecamaras. A nuestro entender, no existe en la actualidad ningún proyecto que apunte con certeza hacia la transformación de todo el sistema político, económico y social para salir de este laberinto.

      Translation: In truth, Andrés Velásquez deserves our respect, however, he, in his speech agrees fully with the postulates of Fedecámaras. As we understand it, no project currently exists that clearly aims to transform the entire political, economic, and social system to escape this labyrinth.

    77. QDR 15 Oct 2019
      1999

      <br> Full Citation: Medina, Pablo. 1999. Rebeliones. Caracas, Venezuela: Piedra, Papel, o Tijera. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: This excerpt from Medina’s memoirs demonstrate the great emphasis of LCR’s radical wing on governance-based issues and state reform, especially via the holding of a Constituent Assembly to rewrite the constitution, and the tepid support for this strategy among the party’s moderate wing, which wanted to work through established channels and forge pragmatic alliances.

      Excerpt: Inmediatamente en el mismo mes de diciembre se hizo el balance. En aquello reunión yo propuse que asumiéramos la Constituyente como política nacional. Hice cinco veces el planteamiento. No lo aceptaron. También propuse ir a hablar con Rafael Caldera porque él había prometido iniciar una política de cambios, y pensé que era el momento de exigirle la convocatoria a una Asamblea Nacional Constituyente. Pero prefirieron dejar las cosas de ese tamaño. Yo sí fui a hablar con Caldera. Qué le dije? Pues que no diera los auxilios financieros. Que nacionalizara la banca para evitar los auxilios y luego la reprivatizara. Que el 23 de enero no se instalara el Congreso y que en ese mismo mes de diciembre, ó durante los primeros días de enero del 94, saliera una campaña para informar a la gente del fraude electoral, impedir que continuara la farsa en el Congreso y convocar a la Constituyente. Esos fueron los planteamientos que le hice.

      Translation: Immediately, in the same month of December, we took stock. In that meeting, I proposed that we adopt the Constituent Assembly as a national policy. I made the proposal five times. They did not accept it. Also, I proposed to go speak with Rafael Caldera because he had promised to initiate a politics of change, and, I thought that this was the moment to demand from him the call for a National Constituent Assembly. But, they preferred to leave things as they were. I did go speak with Caldera. What did I tell him? Well, that he should not give aid to the financial sector. That he should nationalize banking to avoid the aid and that he should re-privatize it. That on the 23rd of January the Congress should not be installed, and that in that same month of December, or that during the first days of January of 1994, a campaign should emerge to inform the people of the fraudulent elections, to prevent the carrying on of the farce in the Congress and to convene the Constituent Assembly. Those were the proposals that I made to him.

    78. QDR 15 Oct 2019
      1992.5b

      <br> Full Citation: Boletim Nacional. 1992.5b. “Tracando os rumos ate 1994.” Collected in Partido dos Trabalhadores Historical Archives, Projeto Memória e História, Fundação Perseu Abramo. Leiden, Netherlands: IDC. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: This opinion piece, written by radical leader Jorge Almeida, offers an example of radicals using references to the governance crisis in the country to articulate an alternative path to power. Almeida blasts the moderate leadership for not giving concrete response to the governance crisis, portrays the party as unwilling to challenge parties of the status quo, and links these developments to troubling prospects in the upcoming presidential elections. In sum, this is a good example of how the context of poor governance in Brazil during the early 1990s allowed radical factions within the PT to counter moderate viability arguments and articulate an alternative path to power based on responding to the governance crisis and distinguishing itself from discredited parties of the status quo.

      Excerpt: As resoluções sobre conjuntura e tática, aprovadas no I Congresso já eram insuficientes para armar o partido para a luta política contra Collor e por uma alternativa Democrática e Popular em nosso país, pois não davam uma reposta concreta á crise do governo existente já no período imediatamente anterior ao Congresso do PT. Mas a colocação em prática desta tática foi um verdadeiro desastre. O PT está há meses fora de cena, a reboque dos fatos, sem iniciativa, incapaz de mobilizar as bases para lutar contra o governo ou para fazer o que se decide nas direções. E isto é muito grave para um partido que se pretende o principal desafiante em 94. Mas em vez de agir como desafiante, não só do governo, como “Status Quo” da dominação burguesa, parece cada vez mais se comportar como alternativa de governo dentro do “Status Quo."

      Translation: The resolutions on the conjuncture and tactics, approved during the first Congress, were already inadequate to arm the party for the political struggle against Collor and for a Democratic and Popular alternative in our country, because they did not give a concrete answer to the governmental crisis already existing in the period immediately prior to the PT Congress. But the implementation of this tactic was a real disaster. The PT has been out of the picture for months, trailing the facts, without initiative, unable to mobilize the bases to fight against the government or to decide its direction. And this is very serious for a party that intends to be the main challenger in 94. But instead of acting as a challenger, not only to the government, but to the "status quo" of bourgeois domination, the party seems to increasingly behave as a governing alternative within the "status quo."

    79. QDR 15 Oct 2019
      1993

      <br> Full Citation: Thielen, Rafael. 1993. “Una estrategia equivoca frente a la crisis nacional.” In El MAS: Un proyecto político para el cambio o la conservación? Caracas, Venezuela: Fondo Editorial Tropykos. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: This piece by Thielen provides a clear example of radicals within MAS using the systemic crisis of governance in Venezuela to argue for an alternative viability strategy, in which the party would differentiate itself from status quo contenders and emphasize its potential to transform discredited aspects of the current political system.

      Excerpt: En la intención de acometer inmediatamente una “revolución en el MAS” – que fue la conclusión globalizada más importante – que en otras palabras significa la refundación del partido para convertirlo en un instrumento que satisfaga las nuevas exigencias de la sociedad y cumpla cabalmente con su papel reformador y transformador de las estructuras económicas y sociales del país, hubo planteamientos y preocupaciones compartidos en relación a materias como el perfil y la condición del MAS, la ambigüedad de su política, desviaciones electoralistas, estilos dirigentes insatisfactorios, distorsión de la vida interna, carencias significativas en el funcionamiento institucional.

      Translation: With the intention of immediately undertaking a “revolution in the MAS”—which was the most important global conclusion—that, in other words, amounted to re-founding the party to convert it into an instrument that satisfied the new demands of society and completely fulfilled its role as reformer and transformer of the economic and social structures of the country, there were shared plans and preoccupations regarding matters such as the profile and condition of the MAS, the ambiguity of its politics, electoralist detours, unsatisfactory leadership styles, distortion of its internal life, and significant deficiencies in its institutional operation.

    80. QDR 15 Oct 2019
      1992.2

      <br> Full Citation: Boletim Nacional. 1992.2. “DN aprova tática e política de alianças.” Collected in Partido dos Trabalhadores Historical Archives, Projeto Memória e História, Fundação Perseu Abramo. Leiden, Netherlands: IDC. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: This source demonstrates the PTs new more pragmatic direction in the early 1990s in the controversial area of alliance policy, with the partys national directorate approving the adoption of a formal alliance policy that sanctioned electoral pacts with many different parties to the left of center, including even center-left parties such as the PSDB among these potential allies and using terminology such as flexible to characterize the new direction.

      Excerpt: Embora seja necessária uma política de alianças nacional, as eleições de 92 exigem que se leve em conta a diversidade de realidade locais. Nossa política deve ser flexível: é uma política de alianças nacional, mas que se articula também com a dinâmica das disputas municipais. O PT tem desenvolvido alianças a partir de um projeto de construção de uma alternativa democrática e popular. Neste campo, se encontram os PCs, o PSB, o PV, o PSDB e o PPS. Ao propor uma política de alianças com o PSB, com os PCs e com o PPS, não desconhecemos as contradições e diferenças políticas que mantemos com esses partidos, mas levamos em consideração, principalmente, a posição política na luta contra o governo Collor, as nossas alianças em 89 na Frente Brasil Popular, o apoio de Roberto Freiré e do PSB a LULA no 2º turno, o amplo arco de alianças e acordos que realizamos em 89 e 90, inclusive governando algumas cidades conjuntamente.

      Translation: Although a policy of national alliances is necessary, the elections of 92 require taking into account the diversity of local realities. Our policy should be flexible: it is a policy of national alliances, but it also articulates with the dynamics of local disputes. The PT has developed alliances for a project to build a democratic and popular alternative. In this group, we find the PCs, PSB, PV, the PSDB and the PPS. By proposing a policy of alliances with the PSB, with PCs and with PPS, we are not unaware of contradictions and political differences we have with these parties, but we take into account mainly the political position in the fight against Collor government, our 1989 alliances in the Brazil Popular front, the support of Roberto Freire and the PSB to LULA in the 2nd round, the wide arc of alliances and agreements that we made in 89 and 90, including jointly ruling some cities.

    81. QDR 15 Oct 2019
      1992a

      <br> Full Citation: Medina, Pablo. 1992a. “El Pueblo Soberano Está Hoy Hablando.” In Farruco Sesto, ed., Pablo Medina en Entrevista. Caracas, Venezuela: Ediciones del Agua Mansa. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: This excerpt demonstrates the importance of governance-based appeals and issues to the radical wing of LCR and its most prominent public figure at the time, Pablo Medina. Themes of corruption, lack of access to basic services, and unequal citizenship are emphasized in his chronicle of mass complaints.

      Excerpt: El pueblo soberano est hoy hablando. Y qu dice el pueblo? Para el que sepa escuchar, el pueblo dice que los das de la corrupta clase poltica estn contados. Eso es lo que dice el pueblo. Que lleg la hora de cambiar las cosas. Eso es lo que dice el pueblo. Que la libertad, la seguridad, la justicia, la solidaridad, la igualdad, no son conceptos abstractos tiles para la retrica, sino que deben ser puntales de una vida en sociedad ms digna. Eso es lo que dice el pueblo. Que no quiere ms ladrones con la mano en los dineros pblicos. Que quiere acceso a la educacin, a la salud, a la vivienda, al trabajo, a la ciudadana real, a la cultura, a salir de la pobreza, a dejar atrs la injusticia. Eso es lo que quiere el pueblo. Que no haya ms gobiernos indecentes, que se recuperen los reales robados, que se encarcele a los bandidos, que se reconozca a los valientes, a los honestos, a los justos, eso es lo que el pueblo quiere.

      Translation: The sovereign people are speaking today. And what do the people say? For those who know how to listen, the people say that the days of the corrupt political class are numbered. That is what the people say. That the hour of change has arrived. That is what the people say. That liberty, security, justice, solidarity, equality, are not abstract concepts useful for rhetoric, but rather should be cornerstones of a life in a more dignified society. That is what the people say. That they do not want more thieves whose hands are in the public coffers. That they want access to education, health, housing, work, real citizenship, culture, and to leave behind poverty and injustice. That is what the people want. That there are no more wretched governments, that the stolen reales [currency] are recovered, that the bandits be imprisoned, that the valiant, the honest, and the just be recognized. That is what the people want.

    82. QDR 15 Oct 2019
      1993a

      <br> Full Citation: Valero, Jorge. 1993a. Razones y Sinrazones del Fallido Golpe de Estado del 4 de Febrero de 1992 en Venezuela. In El MAS: Un proyecto politico para el cambio o la conservacin? Caracas, Venezuela: Fondo Editorial Tropykos. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: Valero makes clear and repeated reference to the systemic crisis of governance in the country, in the context of arguing that this crisis presents MAS with unprecedented opportunities, as long as the party can maintain its distinctive profile.

      Excerpt: Los acontecimientos del 4-F han evidenciado una crisis profunda del rgimen poltico-institucional inaugurado el 23 de Enero de 1958. La crisis tiene an dimensiones desconocidas tanto en el mbito civil como el militar. El rgimen que hace 34 aos resurgi con esperanzadores augurios y el cual haba sido fruto de la postrera accin libertaria de numerosos prceres de la democracia, ha colapsado definitivamente. Y es que no estamos simplemente ante una crisis de gobierno, sino del sistema como tal. Las soluciones para encararlas, por lo tanto, no pueden ser parciales ni fragmentarias. No ha sido suficiente con que el presidente Prez haya removido a varios miembros de su gabinete e instrumente si es que tiene la voluntad de hacerlo medidas compensatorias en el mbito econmico-social que atenuen el terrible impacto causado por el paquete neoliberal. No, no ha sido suficiente.

      Translation: The events of the 4th of February made evident a profound crisis of the political-institutional regime inaugurated on the 23rd of January 1958. The crisis still has unknown dimensions both in the civilian area as in the military area. The regime that 34 years ago resurfaced with hopeful signs, and which had been the fruits of the last actions for liberty of many leaders for democracy, has collapsed definitively. It is not that we are simply faced with a crisis of government, but rather, with a crisis of the whole system itself. The solutions used to confront this crisis, therefore, cannot be partial or fragmentary. It has not been enough for President Prez to remove various members of his cabinet and to arrange forif he were to have the will to do itcompensatory measures in the socio-economic realm to alleviate the terrible impact caused by the neoliberal package. No, this has not been enough.

    83. QDR 15 Oct 2019
      1993.3a

      <br> Full Citation: Boletim Nacional. 1993.3a. “Carta de São Paulo.” Collected in Partido dos Trabalhadores Historical Archives, Projeto Memória e História, Fundação Perseu Abramo. Leiden, Netherlands: IDC. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: This source, a formal position statement by the radical faction Na Luta PT in advance of the 1993 party congress, offers another example of radicals seizing on the context of poor governance to make arguments about why the PT should avoid compromising its beliefs and instead channel popular dissatisfaction with the status quo.

      Excerpt: “O Brasil atravessa um a situação social instável, fruto da crise econômica que se aprofundou com a implantação da política neoliberal de Collor e cujo aspecto econômico tende a permanecer no Governo Itamar, apesar da retórica de suas preocupações sociais. A dolarização crescente da economia brasileira. Os acordos com o FMI que impedem a retomada do nosso desenvolvimento. O programa de privatizações, que reforça o capital, subtrai conquistas trabalhistas e compromete a soberania nacional. O aumento da inflação e o aprofundamento da recessão, tudo isso gera a incerteza sobre o nosso futuro. Aumenta a violência e a criminalidade. Reforçam-se as propostas autoritárias. A direita se recicla. Os movimentos e as entidades sindicais e populares, embora se multipliquem, não veem a repercussão social de seu esforço. Em alguns momentos a insatisfação popular explode, buscando novas alternativas, como nas “Diretas Já”, na campanha Lula Presidente. O “Fora Collor” é o exemplo mais recente. Mas quando passa o vendaval a burguesia consegue apresentar propostas para continuar impedindo os avanços das lutas populares."

      Translation: "Brazil is going through an unstable social situation, due to the economic crisis that deepened with the implementation of Collor’s neoliberal policies and whose economic features tends to remain in the Itamar government, despite their rhetoric of social concerns. The increasing dollarization of the Brazilian economy. The agreements with the IMF that prevent the restarting of our development. The privatization program, which reinforces capital, undercuts labor achievements and compromises national sovereignty. The rising inflation and the deepening recession, all this creates uncertainty about our future. The increase of violence and criminality. Authoritarian proposals are reinforced. The right is renewed. Social movements, trade unions, and popular organizations, despite growing in number, cannot see the social impact of their efforts. At some moments, popular dissatisfaction explodes, searching for new alternatives, as in "Direct Elections Now" in Lula’s presidential campaign. The "Get Out Collor" is the latest example. But when the storm passes the bourgeoisie can submit proposals to continue preventing the growth of popular struggles."

    84. QDR 15 Oct 2019
      1996.1.19

      <br> Full Citation: El Universal. 1996.1.19. “Müller Rojas: La Causa R y Su Futuro.” Caracas, Venezuela. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: In this op-ed, Alberto Müller Rojas, a prominent radical leader within LCR, discusses the connection between radical politics and periods of systemic crisis. This excerpt shows that radicals were consciously thinking along these lines, connecting the possibilities of more radical political positions with the appetite of the electoral for rejecting the status quo, and fearing that improvements in state performance and the end of the crisis might not only undermine the radical project, but empower moderates within the party.

      Excerpt: Señalaba en la última entrega de esta columna que el problema de la Causa R, como expresión del radicalismo democrático en Venezuela, se presentaba en términos de sus persistencia como una fuerza política significativa – la tercera en magnitud en el panorama nacional, si se consideran la cuantía de los votos obtenidos en el último proceso electoral – en un ambiente político que tiende a estabilizarse. Efectivamente, si se considera que el radicalismo es una manifestación política que adquiere fuerzas en las situaciones de crisis, para normalmente desvancerse o transformarse en meras maquinarias electorales, indudablemente tiene que considerarse que el cambio en la naturaleza de la situación política del país, hacia una estabilización de la estructura de poder, después de una grave crisis del sistema, tiene que producir la posibilidad de que le ocurra a la Causa R, lo que le ha ocurrido a las otras manifestaciones del radicalismo democrático, en otros momentos y circunstancias. Y, ciertamente, algunas declaraciones de sus dirigentes reconocidos, dan lugar a que, en las percepciones de la sociedad en general – expuestas a través de los medios de comunicación social – y, en las propias de muchos de sus adherentes, se sienta como posible un cambio profundo en la organización, que se vislumbra desde la posible moderación de sus actitudes hasta su fraccionamiento, al cual incluso juegan abiertamente, algunos de sus voceros calificados.

      Translation: I pointed out in the last installment of this column that the problem of the R Cause, as an expression of democratic radicalism in Venezuela, had to do with its persistence as a significant political force—the third in magnitude in the national panorama, if one considers the number of votes it obtained in the last election—in a political environment that tends towards stability. Indeed, if one considers that radicalism is a political manifestation that acquires force in situations of crisis and then normally disappears or transforms into merely electoral machinery, undoubtedly one must consider that the change in the nature of the political situation of the country, toward a stabilization of the power structure, after a grave crisis of the system, must lead to the possibility that what has happened to other manifestations of democratic radicalism, in other moments and circumstances, would happen to LCR. And, certainly, some statements by its recognized leaders make it so that, in the perceptions of the society in general— disseminated through social means of communication —and, in the hearts of many of these leaders’ supporters, it feels possible that there will be a profound change in the organization, which is discernible in the possible moderation of its attitudes, to its fragmentation, which some of the organization’s qualified spokespeople even trifle with openly.

    85. QDR 15 Oct 2019
      1994.10

      <br> Full Citation: Brasil Agora. 1994.10 “Perdemos e agora.” Collected in Partido dos Trabalhadores Historical Archives, Projeto Memória e História, Fundação Perseu Abramo. Leiden, Netherlands: IDC.

      Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: These responses in a post-electoral symposium, from radical leaders Markus Sokol and João Machado, are good examples of the inability of radicals to spin a convincing narrative regarding electoral viability in a context of improving governance and a Cardoso government attracting high approval ratings. Sokol blames the loss on the PT’s ambiguous position with respect to the Plano Real and suggests that it needed to be rejected more clearly, a position seemingly blind to the plan’s success and popular approval. Machado falls back on radical canards about the unity of the bourgeoisie, their resource advantages, and media manipulation. Neither radical leader articulates an argument about an alternative path to electoral viability that would not involve programmatic moderation and greater pragmatism.

      Excerpt: A que se deve a derrota de Lula no primeiro turno? Na minha opinião a questão chave foi o Plano Real e nossa posição diante dele. A resposta que o PT e a Frente Brasil Popular deram ao plano foi mais do que ambígua. Em algumas ocasiões dissemos que ele não daria certo, em outras que traria recessão e desemprego, depois falou-se que a estabilização de preços por ele proporcionada era boa, mas precisava ser completada por políticas de cunho social e houve até companheiros que falaram em aperfeiçoar o Plano Real. Tudo isto foi ambíguo e contraditório, ajudou a cimentar a aliança do campo adversário e levou vastos setores sociais a verem no real e no que ele representa uma coisa boa, que merecia ser mantida. Porque perdemos? Embora todos dissessem que as eleições de 94 seriam mais difíceis do que as de 89, que 05 adversários jogariam pesado, de fato tinha-se a ideia de um quadro semelhante: trabalhamos com a ideia uma burguesia dividida, sem um candidato de confiança, pensamos que ser oposição consequente era suficiente e renderia votos e que seria possível ganhar as eleições apenas com a força eleitoral de Lula. Muitas vezes o movimento social chegou a ser desconsiderado e fatos importantes foram vistos como “coisas que atrapalharão o Lula”. O quadro foi totalmente diferente. A burguesia unificou-se em torno de Fernando Henrique, articulou de forma profissional todos os recursos ao seu alcance, do aparelho do Estado ao Plano Real e fez o manejo competente dos meios de comunicação. Para enfrentar esta situação seria necessário muito mais do que o prestígio de Lula, que existe, é bom, mas não é o suficiente. Teríamos que deixar claro desde o início que estava em jogo um confronto entre nosso projeto e o projeto das elites e dos centros internacionais de poder econômico e financeiro. Também fizemos uma avaliação totalmente equivocada do Plano Real e não percebemos o que a burguesia estava fazendo. Enfim, estávamos preparados para uma situação e aconteceu outra.

      Translation: Why was Lula defeated in the first round? The main issue, in my opinion, was the "Plano Real" and our position on it. The answer that both the PT and the "Frente Brasil Popular" gave to the "Plano Real" was more than ambiguous. On some occasions we said it would not work, in other words it would bring recession and unemployment, then it was said that the price stabilization was good, but that it lacked some policies of a social nature and there were others who said that the "Plano Real" just needed improvement. All this was ambiguous and contradictory, helping cement the alliance in the opposition camp and leading many social sectors to see the "Plano Real" as a good thing, which deserved to be maintained. Why did we lose? Although everyone said that the 94’s elections would be more difficult than the 89’s, and the opponents would be playing hard, in fact there was an idea of a similar scenario: we worked with the idea of a divided bourgeoisie without a reliable candidate, we thought that being the consequential opposition was enough and that would win us votes and that a victory in the elections would be possible only with the electoral strength of Lula. Frequently, the social movements were downplayed and important facts were seen as "things that would stand in Lula’s way". The reality was totally different. The bourgeoisie was unified around Fernando Henrique, and used in a professional way all the resources at their disposal, from the state apparatus to the "Plano Real" and their competent management of the media. To confront this situation we would need much more than just Lula’s personal prestige, which existed, was good, but was not enough. We would have to make clear from the beginning that what was at stake was a clash between our project and the one from the elite and international centers of economic and financial power.

    86. QDR 15 Oct 2019
      1993.5

      <br> Full Citation: Brasil Agora. 1993.5. “Adivinhe quem vem para jantar.” Collected in Partido dos Trabalhadores Historical Archives, Projeto Memória e História, Fundação Perseu Abramo. Leiden, Netherlands: IDC. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: This source provides another piece of evidence for the descriptive claim that the PT’s leadership was moving the party in a more pragmatic and moderate direction in the early 1990s. The story demonstrates the many meetings between Lula and major business leaders, as well as the perspective from an important business figure that Lula’s private and public images with respect to the business community were quite different.

      Excerpt: Primeiro foi uma reunião com latifundiários goianos. Em meados de março, foi um jantar com 25 empresários no apartamento de José Baia Sobrinho, dono do Banco Pontual. Depois foi na casa de Emerson Kapaz, candidato derrotado à presidência da Fiesp, com mais 18 empresários. E, no dia 5 de abril, um jantar com 16 empresários na casa de Hélio Mattar, coordenador do Pensamento Nacional das Bases Empresariais. Os encontros entre Lula e os empresários foram qualificados como “secretos e cheios de suspense” pela imprensa, que não deixou claro que o convite e a decisão de fazer reuniões discretas partiram dos próprios empresários. Segundo Hélio Mattar, “na medida em que Lula é presidente de um partido forte, os empresários têm interesse em conhecê-lo pessoalmente”, já que “a imagem pública do Lula não necessariamente vai coincidir com sua imagem privada. Frente a frente, descontraído, Lula vai poder colocar com menos defesas suas posições e suas dúvidas."

      Translation: First there was a meeting with landowners from Goiás. In mid-March, there was a dinner with 25 businessmen in the apartment of Joseph Baia Sobrinho, owner of Banco Pontual. Then it was in the home of Emerson Kapaz, defeated candidate for the presidency of Fiesp, with 18 more businessmen. And on April 5, a dinner with 16 businessmen at the home of Helio Mattar, coordinator of the National Thought of Entrepreneurial Bases. These meetings between Lula and businessmen were characterized as "secret and full of suspense" by the press, which did not make clear that the invitation and the decision to make discreet meetings was taken by the businessmen themselves. According to Helio Mattar, "to the extent that Lula is the president of a strong Party, the businessmen have interest in meeting him personally," since "the public image of Lula will not necessarily match his private image. Face to face, relaxed, Lula will be able to easily express his positions and doubts."

    87. QDR 15 Oct 2019
      1995.4

      <br> Full Citation: Brasil Agora. 1995.4. “É Hora de Ser Duro Com o Governo.” Collected in Partido dos Trabalhadores Historical Archives, Projeto Memória e História, Fundação Perseu Abramo. Leiden, Netherlands: IDC. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: This source provides evidence for the descriptive claim that the PT’s moderate leadership was concerned with holding the party together after its resumption of power and maintained a sharply oppositional stance to the Cardoso agenda, even as it plotted a course toward a more pragmatic and moderate politics that would eventually greatly overlap with that agenda.

      Excerpt: Ele quer destruir o Estado brasileiro e há exemplos de que isso não é prudente fazer: México, Argentina, a própria Inglaterra, onde os trabalhadores estão perdendo conquistas de 50 anos, além do desmonte do movimento sindical inglês. Ao mesmo tempo, FHC não apresenta uma agenda social. Ele efetivamente se transformou em prisioneiro das teses mais conservadoras e se tornou um conservador. Eu acho que a forma que o PT tem de contribuir para o país nesse instante é ser duro, sem querer fazer nenhum julgamento do mandato de FHC, que está no começo, mas já fazendo um julgamento dos primeiros três meses, que na minha ótica são muito negativos.

      Translation: He wants to destroy the Brazilian state and there are examples that this is not prudent thing to do: Mexico, Argentina, England itself, where workers have lost 50 years of achievements, in addition to the dismantling of the English labor movement. At the same time, FHC does not present a social agenda. He actually became a prisoner of the most conservative viewpoints and became a conservative. I think the PT has to be rigid right now, without making judgments on the entirely of the FHC mandate, which is just starting, but already judging the first three months, which in my view are very negative.

    88. QDR 15 Oct 2019
      2001, 75

      <br> Full Citation: Mujica, Felipe. 2001. “La Opción MAS-Chávez.” In Felipe Mujica, ed., La Reflexión del MAS. Caracas, Venezuela: Ediciones Polémica, 75. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: This excerpt from the platform of Horizonte 2000 the opportunistic radicals led by Felipe Mujica and Leopoldo Puchi demonstrates how alternative viability calculations played into the radical takeover of MAS and the decision to back Chavez. The radical strategy is justified precisely by the argument that the country is looking for new leadership that is not tainted by association with status quo parties, and this kind of political coalition can only be constructed out of radical forces.

      Excerpt: Venezuela est hambrienta de propsito, de proyecto. No es posible entrar al XXI con un liderazgo que ofrezca slo ms do lo mismo. La articulacin del necesario proyecto de pas exitoso exige nuevos interlocutores tanto el mbito social como en el poltico. Esto significa el desarrollo de una fuerza que en su perfil y estructura, en su organizacin y su discurso, rena la superacin de los estilos de las antiguas formaciones con la capacidad para la innovacin de los nuevos actores sociales e institucionales. Esa fuerza con la flexibilidad necesaria para atender lo particular, lo regional, lo sectorial, lo especfico pero con la implantacin geogrfica y social necesaria para ofrecer propuestas de carcter nacional, es el Movimiento Al Socialismo. Por eso estamos decididos a acompaar a los nuevos lideres, constructores del proyecto de pas exitoso que merecemos ser. Por eso, tanto en la coyuntura electoral que se avecina como en los interesantes procesos que se abren ms all de 1999, el MAS debe ratificar su radical deslinde con las antiguas visiones conservadoras, y abrirse al encuentro de los nuevos planteamientos y los nuevos liderazgos.

      Translation: Venezuela is hungry for purpose and project. It is not possible to enter the 21st century with a leadership that offers only more of the same. The articulation of the necessary project for a successful country demands new interlocutors as much in the social as in the political environment. This means the development of a force whose profile and structure, organization and discourse, blends the overcoming of the ways of the old formations with the capacity for innovation of the new social and institutional agents. That force with the necessary flexibility to attend to the particular, the regional, the sectorial, the specific but with the geographic scope and social necessity to offer propositions of a national character, is the Movement to Socialism. That is why we are committed to accompanying the new leaders, builders of the project of the successful country that we deserve to be. That is why, both in the electoral situation that approaches, as in the interesting processes that look beyond 1999, the MAS should uphold its radical separation from the old conservative visions, and open itself to new proposals and new leadership.

    89. QDR 15 Oct 2019
      1996.1.28

      <br> Full Citation: El Universal. 1996.1.28. “Retirarse del Gobierno plantea dirigencia del MAS.” Caracas, Venezuela. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: This excerpt offers an example of Puchi, less a true ideologue than an “opportunistic radical” attuned to the party’s waning electoral fortunes, arguing that the association with the Caldera government has been damaging and that the best strategy moving forward would be to reestablish the party’s more distinctive profile.

      Excerpt: Ante esa circunstancia, Puchi considera que de no producirse un cambio de actitud del presidente Rafael Caldera, los masistas “deben profundizar en la línea iniciada de distanciamiento y de independencia constructive, que permita actuar al partido sin estar atado de manos por el compromiso de solidarid propio de quienes comparten la toma de decisions y el ejercicio del poder.” …Además, piensa que deben estar atentos a la evolución de las decisions relacionadas con la Agenda Venezuela, “pues una ejecución conducida de manera desacertada, de manera incoherente, sin un manejo correcto de los tiempos, no puede llevar a una catástrofe. En estas circunstancias, el MAS no podria continuar acompañando al Gobierno.”

      Translation: Given that circumstance, Puchi is of the opinion that if president Rafael Caldera’s attitude does not change, the masistas “should continue the policy, already begun, of distancing themselves and being constructively independent, which allows the party to act, without being hand-cuffed by commitments to solidarity typical of those who share decision-making and the exercise of power.” …In addition, he thinks that they should be attentive to the evolution of the decisions related to the Venezuelan Agenda, “because an execution conducted in an imprudent manner, in an incoherent manner, without a correct reading of the times, can bring us to a catastrophe. En these circumstances, MAS cannot continue being part of the government.”

    90. QDR 15 Oct 2019
      1996

      <br> Full Citation: Moviemiento Bolivariano Revolucionari-200. 1996. Agenda Alternativa Bolivariana. Caracas, Venezuela. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: In this more mature policy document, written and disseminated after Chavez and other leaders of the MBR-200 had been released from prison, the MBR-200 focuses its attention on both proposals for radical economic policies (not in the excerpt, but elsewhere in the document) and sweeping proposals for state and institutional reform. Once again, this demonstrates how central governance-based appeals were to the radical strategy emerging in Venezuela.

      Excerpt: Así, la estrategia bolivariana se plantea no solamente la restructuración del Estado, sino de todo el sistema político, desde sus fundamentos filosóficos mismos hasta sus componentes y las relaciones que los regulan. Por esa razón, hablamos del proceso necesario de reconstitución o refundación del Poder Nacional en todas sus facetas, basado en la legitimidad y en la soberanía. El poder constituido no tiene, a estas alturas, la más mínima capacidad para hacerlo, por lo que habremos, necesariamente, de recurrir al Poder Constituyente, para ir hacia la instauración de la Quinta República: la República Bolivariana.

      Translation: Thus, the Bolivarian strategy proposes not only the restructuring of the State, but also the entire restructuring of the political system, from its philosophical foundations to its components, and the relationships that regulate them. For that reason, we speak of the necessary process of reconstituting or re-founding National Power in all its facets, based on legitimacy and sovereignty. The constituted power does not have, by now, the most minimal capacity to do this, which is why we will necessarily have to resort to the Constituent Power, in order to proceed toward the establishment of the Fifth Republic: the Bolivarian Republic.

    91. QDR 15 Oct 2019
      1993

      <br> Full Citation: Pérez Marcano, Héctor. 1993. “Debate para que?” In El MAS: Un proyecto politico para el cambio o la conservación? Caracas, Venezuela: Fondo Editorial Tropykos. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: This provides another example of the rise in radical critiques of MAS’s moderate leadership during the early 1990s and the tendency of radicals to specifically point to the danger of becoming a status quo, rather than “transformative” party.

      Excerpt: La banalización de la vida interna del MAS ha llevado a nuestra organización a una serie de desviaciones, que, de no corregirse, terminarán por liquidar su cualidad de fuerza transformadora de la sociedad y la convertirán en simple aparato electoral, de las más disímiles características, al servicio de intereses grupales regionales. En algunos casos – como es evidente ya – grupos regionales imbricados con intereses de grupos económicos regionales y nacionales que terminan siendo los verdaderos detentadores del poder, tal como ha ocurrido en el plano nacional con Acción Democrática. Esta banalización de la vida interna impide que el MAS debata seriamente sobre sí mismo, analice profundamente los problemas nacionales y examine los cambios que en la economía mundial y en el cuadro político internacional se han dado y que afectan de una manera determinante a una fuerza política que – al menos en su denominación – todavía se reclama como fuerza socialista.

      Translation: The trivialization of the internal life of the MAS has led our organization on a series of detours that, if not corrected, will end by destroying its quality as a transformative force of society, and will turn it into a simple electoral apparatus, of the most different characteristics, at the service of regional group interests. In some cases—as is already evident— the true bearers of power will end up being regional groups connected with the interests of regional and national economic groups, as has occurred on the national stage with Democratic Action. This trivialization of internal life prevents the MAS from seriously debating about itself, deeply analyzing national problems, and examining the changes that have been dealt to the world economy and to the international political sphere, and that affect, in a deterministic way, a political force that—at least in name—still claims to be a socialist force.

    92. QDR 15 Oct 2019
      1997c

      <br> Full Citation: Ochoa Antich, Enrique.1997c. “Balance y Perspectivas.” In Enrique Ochoa Antich, ed. Adios al MAS?: Documentos para una historia del MAS del socialism marxista al socialism liberal. Caracas, Venezuela: Domingo Fuentes. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: This excerpt shows Ochoa Antich again making the strategic argument that joining forces with radical sectors and distancing the party from Convergencia offers the best way forward for the MAS if they want to be part of a triumphant coalition in 1998.

      Excerpt: Asimismo, opino que el diseño de un plan político para 1998 no tiene por qué y en realidad no puede estar supeditado a nuestra presencia o no en el Gobierno ni a nuestro respaldo a sus políticas fundamentales. El competidor real que se asoma en el horizonte en esa colosal disputa por el poder político que habrán de ser las elecciones generales – nacionales y regionales a la vez – del 98 es, por lo pronto, Acción Democrática. Una política probable, como ya hemos repetido varias veces en estas palabras, es la de conformar con otras fuerzas un amplio bloque electoral que pueda colocarnos como una opción victoriosa de cara a aquellos comicios. La pregunta resulta obvia: existe alguna fuerza, además de la disminuida aunque nunca despreciable Convergencia, con la que podamos coincidir de cara al 98 que no se encuentre en una postura de oposición al gobierno del Presidente Caldera? Resultará paradójico, exigirá de nosotros habilidades e inusitada inteligencia, pero el MAS va a verse necesariamente en la obligación, si quiere colocarse en la perspectiva del 98 en posición de expansión electoral, de combinar su respaldo al Gobierno, por una parte, con la coincidencia electoral, por la otra, con fuerzas que adversan y se oponen al gobierno y con la confrontación histórica a Acción Democrática al margen del discreto apoyo de este partido al Presidente Caldera. Lo mismo puede decirse, por cierto, de movimientos tácticos que también deben guardar la debida autonomía de la línea central de respaldo al gobierno (caso de la elección de las nuevas directivas del Congreso de la República, por ejemplo). En fin de cuentas, debe admitirse que los planes del Presidente Caldera no coinciden ni tienen por qué coincidir necesariamente con los del MAS: éste es un hecho que debemos observar como natural y que no tiene por qué causar, ni entre nosotros ni en el seno del Gobierno, posiciones de absurda e ilógica ansiedad.

      Translation: Likewise, I am of the opinion that the design of a new political plan for 1998 does not have to, and, in reality, cannot be subject to our presence, or not, in the Government, nor to our support of its fundamental politics. The real competitor peeking out from the horizon in that colossal dispute for political power coming into being as the general elections—national and regional simultaneously—of 1998, is, for the moment, Democratic Action. A probable policy, as we have already repeated various times in these pages, is that of uniting with other forces into a large electoral block that can place us as a victorious option facing those elections. The question becomes obvious: Is there some force, other than the crippled, though never contemptible, Convergence, with whom we can form a coalition in 1998, which does not find itself in a posture of opposition to the government of President Caldera? It will be paradoxical, it will demand ability and unprecedented intelligence, but the MAS will see itself necessarily required, if it wants to place itself in a position of electoral expansion from the viewpoint of 1998, to combine its support of the Government, on the one hand, with the electoral coalition, and on the other hand, with the forces that oppose the government and with the long-standing confrontation with Democratic Action, regardless of the moderate support of this party to President Caldera. The same can be said, incidentally, of tactical movements that also should maintain due autonomy from the central line of support of the government (as in the case of the election of the new directors of the Congress of the Republic, for example). In the end, one must admit that the plans of President Caldera do not coincide and do not necessarily have to coincide with those of the MAS: this is a fact that we should observe as natural, and it should not be a reason to cause among us, nor among those in the breast of the government, positions of absurd and illogical anxiety.

    93. QDR 15 Oct 2019
      1994.12

      <br> Full Citation: Teoria e Debate. 1994.12 “3 de outubro e o futuro do PT.” Collected in Partido dos Trabalhadores Historical Archives, Projeto Memória e História, Fundação Perseu Abramo. Leiden, Netherlands: IDC. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: The author, a Brazilian leftist intellectual but not a PT member, brings an outsider’s critical perspective to the state of factional conflict within the party in the aftermath of the 1994 electoral loss. The key point is that Mangabeira Unger highlights viability appeals as central to moderate arguments while noting that the radicals are incapable of formulating a coherent alternative, that they have programmatic preferences but no clear plan for how to build a majoritarian coalition in the post-Cold War world.

      Excerpt: Este não é um erro superficial. Ele está, pelo contrário, enraizado na vida interna do PT e nas atitudes de suas lideranças maiores. Organizam-se as tendências internas do PT num espectro de radicalização progressiva das reivindicações redistribuídas. É como se os mais moderados (e “modernos”) dissessem, como disse Fernando Henrique Cardoso, somos nós o viável, enquanto que os mais radicais protestassem, somos nós que queremos a redistribuição para valer mesmo á custa de amedrontar as classes proprietárias. O grave é que nem os mais radicais oferecem uma proposta que fundamente este distributivismo mais ou menos afoito numa concepção produtiva. Apenas compartilham a mesma confusão típica da esquerda mundial.

      Translation: This is no superficial error. On the contrary, it is ingrained in the internal life of the PT and in the attitudes of most of its leadership. The factions of the PT define themselves along a spectrum of radicalization of claims to redistribution. It is as if the more moderate (and “modern”) said, in the words of Fernando Henrique Cardoso, “we are what is viable,” while the more radical protested, “we want real redistribution, even at the cost of scaring off the monied classes.” What is disturbing is that not even the more radical voices offer a proposal this more or less bold claim to redistribution in a productivist program. They merely share the confusion typical of the left the world over.

    94. QDR 15 Oct 2019
      1995.6

      <br> Full Citation: Teoria e Debate. 1995.6. “Era possível ganhar no primeiro turno.” Collected in Partido dos Trabalhadores Historical Archives, Projeto Memória e História, Fundação Perseu Abramo. Leiden, Netherlands: IDC. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: This opinion piece by leading moderate Eduardo Jorge is an example of the return to viability logic in the aftermath of the success of the Plano Real and the popularity of the Cardoso government. (In the broader piece, not just the excerpt above) Jorge argues that the PT could have demolished the Brazilian right completely by making an electoral pact with the PSDB, that the failure of the PT (and left in general) to be willing to share power and make programmatic concessions has been one of the party’s greatest weaknesses, that the radical takeover of the party has prevented program from occurring and the promise of the 1st Congress from being realized, and that if the PT is ever to win power it will have to become much more pragmatic and flexible.

      Excerpt: O PT está diante de um problema que continuará, senão for desvelado e enfrentado até ao fim, nos confinando como um partido importante e representativo, mas incapaz de compartilhar hegemonia e de governar na democracia. Refiro-me à ideologia, à regra, à cultura tradicional nos partidos de esquerda, que implica buscar a qualquer custo, por quaisquer meios, violentos ou pacíficos, uma hegemonia total e, portanto, totalitária. Segundo esta mentalidade, todos os sectores, da associação de escoteiros à seleção nacional de futebol do sindicato ao Parlamento, devem ser iluminados por nossa ‘luz’, onipresente, onipotente e onisciente. É verdade que o PT vem lutando contra isso desde o seu nascimento e que no seu 1º Congresso, em 1991, aprovou por 70% a 30% dos votos dos delegados, a rejeição da ditadura do proletariado, a regra máxima do autoritarismo na esquerda. Mas a tradição é forte , recusa-se a morrer e encontra caminhos para voltar a oprimir nossas consciências socialistas. Foi o que aconteceu em 1993 e 94, com a base e a direção do partido empolgadas diante do favoritismo inicial da candidatura Lula, com a possibilidade de vitória solitária ou com aliados tratados com menosprezo ou queridos desde que submissos. É essa matriz que precisa ser abandonada.”

      Translation: The PT is facing a problem that will continue, if not unveiled and confronted to the end, confining ourselves to being an important and representative party, but one incapable of sharing hegemony and governing under democracy. I refer to the ideology, the rule, the traditional culture in parties of the left, which means seeking at any cost, by any means, violent or peaceful, a hegemony that is total, and therefore, totalitarian. According to this mentality, all sectors from the scout association to the national football team, the unions to the Parliament, must be illuminated by our 'light', omnipresent, omnipotent and omniscient. It is true that the PT has been fighting it since its birth and in its 1st Congress in 1991, approved by 70% to 30% of the votes of the delegates, rejected the dictatorship of the proletariat, the extreme law of authoritarianism on the left. But the tradition is strong, and refuses to die, finding ways to return and subjugate our socialist consciousness. That’s what happened in 1993 and 94, with the base and the head of the party motivated with the early successes of Lula's candidacy, with the chance of a solo victory or one together with disrespected allies or those that would be submissive. It is this attitude that must be left behind.”

    96. QDR 15 Oct 2019
      1996.2.10

      <imgsrc="https://qdr.syr.edu/drupal_data/public/ati_banner_long.png" align="left"/></a><br>Full Citation: El Universal. 1996.2.10. “Los veinticinco anos del MAS y lo que se palpa.” Caracas, Venezuela. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: This excerpt from an opinion piece by Moises Moleiro, a famously staunch radical within MAS, provides another example of the party’s radical wing stressing the need to differentiate the party from AD and Copei and the centrality of that differentation strategy to finding an alternative path to electoral viability.

      Excerpt: La fuerza cuestionadota y crítica, que concitó entusiasmos y adhesiones y logró presentarse como una esperanza, hace hoy (unreadable), sin nada que realmente la diferencie de AD y Copei. Partidos – como se sabe – contra cuyo predominio en la escena política nacional enderezó sus (unreadable). Respecto a los cuales se (unreadable) en diferenciarse y en constituir una alternativa viable.

      Translation: The questioning and critical force that stirred up enthusiasm and adherents and was able to present itself as a from of hope, is known today, without anything that really differentiates it from AD and Copei. These —as one knows—against whose domination on the national political scene MAS staked its claim. Against which it strived to differentiate itself and to build a viable alternative.

    97. QDR 15 Oct 2019
      1994.4.12

      <br> Full Citation: Folha de São Paulo. 1994.4.12. “Radicais reduzem influencia no partido.” Collected in Partido dos Trabalhadores Historical Archives, Projeto Memória e História, Fundação Perseu Abramo. Leiden, Netherlands: IDC. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: This source provides evidence for the descriptive claim that some signs of decreasing radical influence could be found even before the 1994 presidential election and 1995 PT party congress (but after the implementation of the Plano Real). In the key state of São Paulo, moderates started to reassert control over the party machinery as the governance crisis began to abate.

      Excerpt: Os grupos de esquerda e extrema-esquerda diminuíram a vantagem que tinham em relação aos outros setores do PT paulista. A corrente interna que mais cresceu foi a “Unidade na Luta”, liderada por Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. O critério usado para a comparação é o número de delegados ao Encontro Nacional do partido que foram eleitos na convenção do PT paulista no último fim de semana. Em 93, as alas de esquerda e extrema apresentaram chapa conjunta e levaram 55,9% dos delegados. Em chapas separadas agora, somadas estas correntes ficaram com 50,9% dos eleitos. A “Unidade na Luta”, chamado de “centro” do PT, saltou de 32,3% dos delegados para 36,1%. Um pouco do acréscimo deve ser atribuído à queda do grupo liderado pelo deputado José Genoino, da “direita” do PT.

      Translation: Groups of the left and extreme-left saw their advantage decrease over other sectors of the PT of São Paulo. The internal current that grew the most was "Unity in Struggle", led by Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. The criterion used for comparison is the number of delegates to the National Meeting of the party who were elected at the convention of the PT in São Paulo last weekend. In 93, the left wing and extreme-left joined forces and took 55.9% of the delegates. Running separately now, together these factions got 50.9% of the vote. "Unity in Struggle," called the "center" of the PT, jumped from 32.3% to 36.1% of the delegates. A part of the increase should be attributed to the fall of the group led by Rep José Genoino, of the "right" of the PT.

    98. QDR 15 Oct 2019
      Klingemann (2005)

      <br> Klingemann, Hans-Dieter. 2005. “Political Parties and Party Systems.” In J. Thomassen, ed., The European Voter: A Comparative Study of Modern Democracies. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

    99. QDR 15 Oct 2019
      1993.3b

      <br> Full Citation: Boletim Nacional. 1993.3b. “Manifesto aos Petistas.” Collected in Partido dos Trabalhadores Historical Archives, Projeto Memória e História, Fundação Perseu Abramo. Leiden, Netherlands: IDC. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: This manifesto from the faction Articulação de Esquerda in advance of the critical 1993 party congress offers another example radical groups drawing on the context of poor governance to make arguments about why the PT can maintain its radical posture and still succeed. The authors predict that governance-based issues will dominate the political agenda (the 1994 election will be a “referendum on the form of state and system of government”) and argue that only by recovering a radical posture and differentiating themselves from parties of the status quo will the PT be able to succeed in this political milieu.

      Excerpt: O PT só pode enfrentar a agenda política de curto prazo, que se desdobra no plebiscito sobre forma de estado e sistema de governo, na revisão constitucional e na oposição ao governo Itamar, caso recupere sua tradição radical, popular, democrática, socialista. É inaceitável que, em nome de malfeitos cálculos eleitorais, nosso partido deixe de apresentar uma alternativa global para a crise brasileira, é inaceitável que em nome de inexistentes “responsabilidades”, nosso partido não faça oposição firme contra um governo que, não obstantes suas diferenças com Collor, é nitidamente conservador, é inaceitável que nosso partido em nome da urgência de reformas políticas, aceite ficar sob a hegemonia conservadora na discussão sobre sistema de governo. O Partido que nós queremos não pode ser aquele que cogita apoiar governos que o PFL também apoia. O Partido que nós queremos não poder ser aquele em que dirigentes proclamam-se adeptos da monarquia. O partido que nós queremos não pode mais conviver com isso, sem deixar de ser PT.

      Translation: The only way the PT can achieve its short-term political agenda, which is divided into a referendum on the state and the system of government, the constitutional review, and the opposition to the Itamar government, is if it recovers its radical, popular, democratic, and socialist tradition. It is unacceptable that our party, in the name of corrupt electoral calculations, fails to present a complete alternative to the Brazilian crisis, and unacceptable that, in the name of non-existent "responsibilities", our party does not present a strong opposition against a government that, despite its differences with Collor, is clearly conservative, and unacceptable that our party, in the name of urgent political reform, agrees to be under this conservative hegemony during the discussion about the system of government. The Party that we want cannot support governments that are also supported by the PFL. The Party that we want cannot permit that its leaders declare themselves followers of the monarchy. The Party that we want cannot agree with this, without ceasing to be the PT.

    100. QDR 15 Oct 2019
      THE POLITICS OF POLARIZATION: GOVERNANCE AND PARTY SYSTEM CHANGE IN LATIN AMERICA, 1990–2010

      <br> This is an Annotation for Transparent Inquiry project, published by the Qualitative Data Repository. Please cite as:

      Handlin, Samuel. (2015) Data for: “The Politics of Polarization: Governance and Party System Change in Latin America, 1990-2010.” Annotation for Transparent Inquiry, QDR:10065. Syracuse, NY: Qualitative Data Repository [distributor]. https://doi.org/10.5064/F66Q1V52

      Additional documentation can be found on QDR.

      Learn more about ATI here.

    101. QDR 15 Oct 2019
      1992b

      <br> Full Citation: Medina, Pablo. 1992b. “La Reforma de la Constitución.” In Farruco Sesto, ed., Pablo Medina en Entrevista. Caracas, Venezuela: Ediciones del Agua Mansa.

      Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: This excerpt again shows that Medina and the LCR radicals are focused primarily on issues of governance and state reform as the centerpiece of their political agenda.

      Excerpt: En este debate acerca de la Reforma de la Constitucin estn mezclados dos grandes problemas: un problema de coyuntura y un problema de estructura. Cuando hablamos de estructura no estamos refiriendo a la necesidad de modificar la estructura poltica del pas. Pero este debate que se vena realizando en la Comisin Bicameral desde hace cerca de dos aos, de repente tom una fuerza inusitada y esta fuerza, esta velocidad tiene que ver fundamentalmente con la discusin del momento poltico. Es decir, la crisis poltica del pas que venia cabalgando de manera subrepticia y que se abri de manera consciente a los ojos del pas y a los ojos del mundo: el problema de la legitimidad del presidente de la Repblica.

      Translation: In this debate surrounding the Rewriting of the Constitution, there are two big interrelated problems: a problem of circumstances and a problem of structure. When we speak of structure we are referring to the necessity to modify the political structure of the country. But this debate that was happening in the Bicameral Commission for around two years, suddenly took on an unusual force, and this force, this velocity, has to do fundamentally with the discussion of the political present. That is to say, the political crisis of the country that had come riding in surreptitiously and that opened itself consciously to the eyes of the country and to the eyes of the world: the problem of the legitimacy of the president of the Republic.

    102. QDR 15 Oct 2019
      1997a

      <br> Full Citation: Ochoa Antich, Enrique. 1997a. “Las Tesis del Nuevo MAS.” In Enrique Ochoa Antich, ed. Adios al MAS?: Documentos para una historia del MAS del socialism marxista al socialism liberal. Caracas, Venezuela: Domingo Fuentes. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: This excerpt shows the preoccupation of Ochoa Antich with finding an alternative agenda to the Venezuelan people that would sharply differentiate MAS from the status quo parties and, through doing so, allow MAS – potentially in a radical alliance with LCR and the MBR-200 – to chart an alternative path to electoral viability.

      Excerpt: El desenlace de este período turbulento que podríamos definir como de transición dependerá de la capacidad de hegemonía que las fuerzas del cambio sepan poner en juego. En fin de cuentas, nadie deja lo que tiene sino a cambio de algo, así que el perfil de la alternativa, su atractivo y su utilidad, constituyen el punto crucial del proceso. De la inteligencia, de la voluntad, de la sabiduría que muestren las fuerzas del cambio dependerá que este periodo de transición no termine siendo una elipse hacia el pasado. Para una fuerza que, como el MAS, significó durante dos décadas la única alternativa a Acción Democrática y Copei, el escenario que acabamos de describir resulta altamente comprometedor. No es un recurso retórico decir que acaso de la conducta del MAS, de que sea capaz de superar sus atrofias y potenciar sus virtudes, se derivará en buena medida el curso de los acontecimientos de la Venezuela contemporánea. Quizá la providencia ha colocado en nuestras manos la posibilidad de decidir el futuro del país: si nos equivocamos y desperdiciamos el momento histórico que vivimos, resulta altamente probable que las otras fuerzas del cambio – La Causa y los bolivarianos, entre otras – no puedan solas vencer la hegemonía aún latente de Acción Democrática y Copei y vuelvan las fuerzas de la conservación a imponer su dominio sobre la conciencia del pueblo; si acertamos, si comenzamos por cambiarnos a nosotros mismos, quizá seamos la pieza decisiva que incline la balanza de la historia a favor de las fuerzas del cambio.

      Translation: The outcome of this turbulent period, which we could define as the transition, will depend on the capacity to exert hegemony that the forces of change will know how to put into play. In the end, no one leaves what he has unless he exchanges it for something else, so the stature of the other possibility, its attractiveness and its utility, constitutes the crucial point of the process. On the intelligence, the will, the knowledge that the forces of change will show hinges this period of transition not ending as an ellipse toward the past… For a force that, as the MAS, constituted for two decades the only alternative to Democratic Action and Copei, the scene that we just finished describing is highly compromising. It is not a rhetorical gesture to say, perhaps, that from the behavior of the MAS, which is capable of overcoming its atrophies and strengthening its virtues, will be derived the course of events of contemporary Venezuela. Maybe providence has placed in our hands the possibility of deciding the future of the country: if we make a mistake and waste the historic moment we are living, it is highly probable that the other forces of change— Radical Cause and the Bolivarians, among others—will not be able to defeat alone the hegemony, although latent, of Democratic Action and Copei and the forces of conservation will return to impose their domination over the conscience of the people; if we are right, if we start by changing ourselves, maybe we will be the decisive piece that tilts the balancing scale of history in favor of the forces of change.

    104. QDR 15 Oct 2019
      1992.5a

      <br> Full Citation: Boletim Nacional. 1992.5a. “A Convergência esta fora do PT.” Collected in Partido dos Trabalhadores Historical Archives, Projeto Memória e História, Fundação Perseu Abramo. Leiden, Netherlands: IDC. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: This source proves the claim that the PT’s leadership voted to expel the extremely radical faction Convergencia Socialista from the party in 1992, while also giving some important background on the rationale of party leaders. Dirceu’s point that Convergencia Socialista refused to accept the political direction of the party (a more pragmatic and moderate one) shows that politics was at the core of the decision.

      Excerpt: Após cinco horas de debate, o Diretório Nacional do PT decidiu acatar a representação da Comissão Executiva Nacional contra a Convergência Socialista, que teve anulada a sua condição de tendência interna ao PT. A decisão foi tomada na reunião dos dias 8 e 9 de maio, em São Paulo, com 35 votos a favor da proposta vencedora... Para o secretário-geral do PT, deputado federal José Dirceu o problema criado pela CS não poderia ser tratado de maneira meramente disciplinar. “A questão é política: a maioria do PT, democraticamente, optou por um caminho que a Convergência considera inaceitável”. Dirceu foi o autor da representação contra a CS acatada pela Comissão Executiva Nacional e submetida á apreciação do DN.

      Translation: After five hours of debate, the National Directorate of the PT decided to accept the actions of the National Executive Committee against Socialist Convergence, which had rescinded its charter as an internal faction of the PT. The decision was taken at the meeting of May 8th and 9th in São Paulo, with 35 votes in favor of the winning proposal. For the general secretary of the PT, Congressman José Dirceu, the problem created by CS could not be treated merely in a disciplinary way. "The question is political: most of the PT democratically chose a path that Convergence finds unacceptable." Dirceu was the author of the case against CS accepted by the National Executive Committee and submitted to the DN.

    105. QDR 15 Oct 2019
      1997b

      <br> Full Citation: Ochoa Antich, Enrique. 1997b. “Notas para un Balance del Gobierno.” In Enrique Ochoa Antich, ed. Adios al MAS?: Documentos para una historia del MAS del socialism marxista al socialism liberal. Caracas, Venezuela: Domingo Fuentes. Click to access full source.

      Analytic Note: This excerpt is an example of Ochoa Antich’s emphasis on the costs involved with association with discredited status quo parties in a context of poor governance. These costs are an intrinsic part of the calculation that a more radical project differentiating the party from status quo forces would offer a better path to electoral viability moving forward.

      Excerpt: Alto precio ha pagado el MAS para estar en el Gobierno. Sin duda, el decrecimiento continuo del Movimiento durante estos últimos siete años, una vez que la antigua cúpula dirigente prácticamente impuso el Movimiento como un hecho el “Proyecto Caldera,” se debe a múltiples causas y no solamente a nuestra peculiar relación con Caldera, pero resulta claro que esa relación también tiene que ver con nuestros resultados. Ha llegado pues el momento de hacer un balance de eso que hemos dado en llamar el “Proyecto Caldera” así como de la gestión del primer gobierno del cual el MAS forma parte.

      Translation: The MAS has paid a high price to be in the Government. Without a doubt, the continual downturn of the Movement during these last seven years, after the old leadership practically imposed the “Caldera Project” on the Movement as a done deal, is due to multiple causes and not only to our peculiar relations with Caldera. But it is clear that that relationship also impacted our results. The moment has arrived then to make a reckoning with what we have taken to calling the “Caldera Project”, as well as of the administration of the first government of which MAS is a part.

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    https://kellogg.nd.edu/sites/default/files/old_files/documents/401_0.pdf
  6. qdr.syr.edu qdr.syr.edu
    Sir Edward Grey’s Ambiguous Policy and the July Crisis, 1914 | Qualitative Data Repository
    25
    3. QDR 10 Oct 2019
      it fell on deaf ears.

      <br>

      Data Sources: <br> Source 1: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/4DD7G3 <br> Source 2: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/HTTUGO <br>

      Full Citation (Source 1): Grey to Goschen (31 July 1914), British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914, ed. G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley (London: HMSO, 1926), vol. 11, no. 340 <br>

      Full Citation (Source 2): Lichnowsky to Jagow (31 July 1914) in Outbreak of the World War: German Documents, ed. Max Montgelas and Walter Schucking, collected by Karl Kautsky (New York: Oxford University Press, 1924), no. 489. <br>

    6. QDR 10 Oct 2019
      kaiser and Bethmann both applied more pressure.

      <br>

      Data Sources:<br> Source 1: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/LCKDOB <br> Source 2: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/TGQJ1N <br>

      Full Citation (Source 1): Kaiser Wilhelm to Emperor Fracis Josiph (30 July 1914) in Outbreak of the World War: German Documents, ed. Max Montgelas and Walter Schucking, collected by Karl Kautsky (New York: Oxford University Press, 1924), no. 437

      Full Citation (Source 2): Luigi Albertini, The Origins of the War of 1914, 3 vols. (London: Oxford University Press, 1957), 3:29.

    7. QDR 10 Oct 2019
      rebuffed direct negotiations in St. Petersburg

      <br>

      Data Sources:<br> Source 1: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/VW4CYF <br> Source 2: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/QRQP23 <br>

      Full Citation (Source 1): Lichnowsky to Jagow (29 July 1914) in Outbreak of the World War: German Documents, ed. Max Montgelas and Walter Schucking, collected by Karl Kautsky (New York: Oxford University Press, 1924), no. 357

      Full Citation (Source 2): Pourtales to Jagow (29 July 1914) in Outbreak of the World War: German Documents, ed. Max Montgelas and Walter Schucking, collected by Karl Kautsky (New York: Oxford University Press, 1924), no. 365.

    8. QDR 10 Oct 2019
      to negotiate a solution to the dispute

      <br>

      Data Sources:<br> Source 1: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/T0FZLA <br> Source 2: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/CIWFFU <br> Source 3: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/SMJDJW <br>

      Full Citation (Source 1): Lichnowsky to Jagow (29 July 1914) in Outbreak of the World War: German Documents, ed. Max Montgelas and Walter Schucking, collected by Karl Kautsky (New York: Oxford University Press, 1924), no. 357

      Full Citation (Source 2): Lichnowsky to Jagow (29 July 1914) in Outbreak of the World War: German Documents, ed. Max Montgelas and Walter Schucking, collected by Karl Kautsky (New York: Oxford University Press, 1924), no. 368.

      Full Citation (Source 3): Immanuel Geiss, July 1914: The Outbreak of the First World War, Selected Documents (London: Batsford, 1967), 269.

    10. QDR 10 Oct 2019
      ultimatum to France came on 31 July.

      <br>

      Data Sources:<br> Source 1: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/E66CEY <br> Source 2: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/GSXVLU <br>

      Full Citation (Source 1): Bethmann to Schoen (31 July 1914) in Outbreak of the World War: German Documents, ed. Max Montgelas and Walter Schucking, collected by Karl Kautsky (New York: Oxford University Press, 1924), no. 491.

      Full Citation (Source 2): Schoen to Jagow (31 July 1914) in Outbreak of the World War: German Documents, ed. Max Montgelas and Walter Schucking, collected by Karl Kautsky (New York: Oxford University Press, 1924), no. 528.

    13. QDR 10 Oct 2019
      sealed it for Sazanov.

      <br>

      Data Sources:<br> Source 1: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/HJTSAB <br> Source 2: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/YVXHJF <br>

      Full Citation (Source 1): Goschen to Grey (27 July 1914), British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914, ed. G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley (London: HMSO, 1926), vol. 11, no. 185, 128.

      Full Citation (Source 2): J. Cambon to Bienvenu-Martin (27 July 1914) in Immanuel Geiss, July 1914: The Outbreak of the First World War, Selected Documents (London: Batsford, 1967), no. 103

    20. QDR 10 Oct 2019
      to be a compliant Serbian response.

      <br>

      Data Sources:<br> Source 1: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/JRHM4I <br> Source 2: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/FEWZPM <br>

      Full Citation (Source 1): Grey to Lichnowsky(25 July 1914), British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914, ed. G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley (London: HMSO, 1926), vol. 11, no. 115

      Full Citation (Source 2): Lichnowsky to Jagow (25 July 1914) in Outbreak of the World War: German Documents, ed. Max Montgelas and Walter Schucking, collected by Karl Kautsky (New York: Oxford University Press, 1924), no. 186.

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    qdr.syr.edu/atipaper/sir-edward-greys-ambiguous-policy