2,262 Matching Annotations
  1. Oct 2019
    1. In 1917, the government contracted with a professor at the Universidad San Marcos to write a national history textbook, saying that history was one of the most efficient ways to “raise the character and form the national spirit of Peruvian citizens.”

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      Analytic Note: As discussed in the text, this initiative was one of many efforts to shape the Peruvian nation through curricular content.

      Source Excerpt: “la instrucción primaria comprende también la educación cívica, y convencido el Gobierno de toda la importancia que tiene el que ésta sea efectiva en nuestras masa populares para levantar el carácter y formar el espiritú nacional, y de que uno de los medios más eficaces para conseguir este objeto es la acertada y metódica enseñanza de la historia patria…” (on January 13th 1917 don José Galvez of the Universidad de San Marcos was hired to write a primary education history textbook) (xxvii)

      Source Excerpt Translation: “primary education also encompasses civic education, and the Government being convinced of all the importance that this will have among the popular mass in uplifting the character and forming the national spirit, and that one of the most effective ways to achieve this goal is the accurate and methodical teaching of national history…”

      Full Citation: Memoria del Ministerio de Justicia, Culto, e Instrucción Pública 1917 (Lima), Vol. 1, p.xxvii Found in the Archivo General de la Nación, Fondo Ministerio de Hacienda, Code H-6-1686

    2. Active resistance, too, erupted at times: Hazen cites “dynamite bombings” targeted against reformist officials in Puno, as well as the burning of schools and imprisonment of teachers and those who dared to enroll in school.

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      Analytic Note: Quote appears on p.428.

      Source Excerpt: “Despite a few heroic efforts like that of Camacho, local mestizo resistance was sufficient to overwhelm most Indian attempts to form private schools, and even subverted the progressive pronouncements of reformist officials. (One Subprefect not only faced impenetrable inertia from his highland subalterns, but was the victim of dynamite bombings and other assaults when he attempted to enforce humanitarian decrees.) While the struggle for instruction was viewed from Lima as part of an integral, national campaign for regeneration, it was seen very differently by actors on the Altiplano.”

      Full Citation: Hazen, Dan C. (1978) ‘The Politics of Schooling in the Nonliterate Third World: The Case of Highland Peru’ History of Education Quarterly vol.18 #4 (Winter)

    3. Even as the Liberal project took hold in Lima, local elites, especially in the highlands, remained hostile to educational development. They saw the Civilista reforms as “subversive modernization.”

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      Analytic Note: This quote reflects the wide gulf in policy priorities between the modernizing government and local elites in the southern highlands. Though Jacobsen’s book is a regional history of the Province of Azángaro in the Department of Puno, this claim in the original source refers to the southern highlands as a whole, as can be seen in the use of ‘altiplano’ in the first sentence. I draw on his language of “subversive modernization” to capture how highland landowners viewed educational development and other aspects of the Civilista state-building project.

      Source Excerpt: “It is true that beginning in the 1890s the provincial elite of the altiplano expected increasing support from the central government to consolidate their gains vis-à-vis the peasantry, both through distribution of funds and offices derived from Lima among their clients and through strengthened police and military contingents in the countryside. Yet the gamonales never saw themselves as junior partners of Lima’s oligarchy. They insisted on maintaining independent power in the provinces against what they perceived as the threat of subversive modernization pushed by the central government.” (212)

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6NP22C9/OOUKFX

      Full Citation: Jacobsen, Nils (1996) Mirages of Transition: The Peruvian Altiplano 1780-1930 (University of California Press)

    4. The “lack of will to implement reforms” on the part of local elites in administrative positions tempered the positive effects of administrative and fiscal centralization of education.

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      Analytic Note: Here I draw on the phrasing “lack of will to implement reforms” used by Muecke in a slightly different context. For a full discussion of the context for this quote, see activated citation 36-a.

      Source Excerpt: “Neither the prefects, the subprefects, nor other secondary government institutes developed any significant reforms during Pardo’s term in office. Even committed prefects limited themselves to funding small construction projects, which frequently served to feed their own vanity rather than further the development of their department. Both the social and economic structures and the mentality of state officials were likely to have played a role in the lack of will to implement reforms. Some of them despised the regions in which they worked.” (181)

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6NP22C9/D9CW1L

      Full Citation: Muecke, Ulrich (2004) Political Culture in Nineteenth Century Peru: The Rise of the Partido Civil (University of Pittsburgh Press)

    5. The Pardo administration sought to use the state in a variety of ways to assimilate the indigenous population. Implementing what Larson calls “the first state-directed civilizing project in the Indian sierra,”

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      Source Excerpt: “Yet Bustamante’s civilizing program soon became the centerpiece of reform under Manuel Pardo (1872-6). This new ‘civilista’ coalition of coastal oligarchs, intellectuals, and politicians launched the first state-directed civilizing project in the Indian sierra. Inspired by liberal precepts, the new government hoped to spread the railway across the mountainous backlands, bringing remote regions into the ambit of the centralizing state.” (159-60)

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6NP22C9/IUFG09

      Full Citation: Larson, Brooke (2004) Trials of Nation-Making: Liberalism, Race, and Ethnicity in the Andes (Cambridge University Press)

    6. Peruvian provincial and local authorities displayed little inclination to contribute to school building, and they failed to enforce the policies emanating from Lima.

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      Analytic Note: A central claim in scholarship on the failure of educational development, as discussed elsewhere in this paper, is that national governments, being controlled by economic elites, were disinclined to invest in public good provision, especially of this redistributive sort. My claim, by contrast, is that national-level policies sought educational development, but were stymied because of lack of implementation by local officials. This quote shows evidence for both parts of that claim – national project, and local lack of implementation – in 1870s Andean Peru. The footnote refers to pp.180-183, which provide a more general discussion of the failure of local governments to effectively implement any sorts of development policies at all.

      Source Excerpt: “It proved impossible to push through educational reforms in the Andean south, although a detailed decree was issued at the beginning of 1876 that regulated the education system from elementary school through to university. It led to few changes, however, and compulsory elementary school attendance, in particular, was not enforced. Pardo’s followers showed as little interest in implementing educational reforms enacted in Lima as they did in realizing transport reforms.” (180)

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6NP22C9/D9CW1L

      Full Citation: Muecke, Ulrich (2004) Political Culture in Nineteenth Century Peru: The Rise of the Partido Civil (University of Pittsburgh Press)

    7. To the extent that they could, the highland provincial elite tried to undermine educational development in a variety of ways.

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      Analytic Note (Source 1): That various social actors act as an obstacle to the education of the indigenous population is the central theme of the two Málaga essays reprinted in the Montero collection.

      Analytic Note (Source 2): In the midst of a broader discussion of how indigenous communities responded to the entry of public school teachers, Contreras refers to the opposition of local landowners to the schools. His focus, however, is on how this opposition was one of the factors that generated resistance from some indigenous communities, rather than on landowner opposition itself.

      Analytic Note (Source 3): My notes do not reflect the context in which this quote appears, but it refers to resistance from municipal authorities to the educational decrees issued by the national government.

      Source Excerpt (Source 3): “conflictos diarios que hacen estancar, si no retroceder, la marcha de las escuelas.” (XX)

      Source Excerpt Translation (Source 3): “daily conflicts that stall, if not roll back, the progress of the schools.”

      Data Source:<br> Source 1: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6NP22C9/XYVWUN <br> Source 2: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6NP22C9/TNOAOH

      Full Citation (Source 1): Málaga in Cármen Montero, ed., La Escuela Rural: Variaciones sobre un Tema (Lima: FAO, 1990).

      Full Citation (Source 2): Contreras, Carlos (1996) ‘Maestros, Mistis, y Campesinos en el Perú rural del siglo XX’ (IEP Documento de Trabajo #80)

      Full Citation (Source 3): Memoria del Ministro de Justicia, Culto, e Instrucción Pública, 1915 (Archivo General de la Nación, Fondo Ministro de Hacienda, Document Number H-6-1682.)

    8. In 1915, the minister called for the decentralization of education and backed away from efforts to homogenize education across the whole country in favor of division into regional zonas escolares that included departments “with analogous climactic and sociological conditions.”

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      Analytic Note: The source cited here simply describes a division of the country into regional school zones that include departments with “analogous climactic and sociological conditions” and a plan to give regional authorities broad oversight. This appears to be an effort to allow for distinct educational policies to be put in place in heavily indigenous regions, and thus a step away from a standardized national education system. This was, in other words, most likely a policy intended to placate elites in the heavily indigenous highland regions.

      Full Citation: Memoria del Ministerio de Justicia, Culto, e Instrucción Pública 1915, (Lima) p.477 Found in the Archivo General de la Nación, Fondo Ministerio de Hacienda, Code H-6-1682

    9. While data collection appears to have been adequate in many of the country’s cities, and in provincial capitals, the caserios and haciendas that dotted Peru’s rural areas – and the country was still mostly rural at this time – were much less likely to be reached by census takers.

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      Analytic Note (Source 1): The broadest discussion of the absence of the state from the interior of the country can be found in the passage cited, which discusses the effects of the elimination of the 1854 indigenous head tax on state-society relations over the subsequent decades. Contreras, in various writings, refers to the state as nothing more than a “fiction” in the interior of the country, though he does not use this language in the work cited in this footnote.

      Analytic Note (Source 2): The description of education as a fiction mentioned in the text of footnote 12 can be found here, as a complement to the broader description of the absence of the state discussed in 12-a.

      Source Excerpt (Source 2): “la educación primaria… se había convertido en una entera ficción. Existían en papel, pero habían desaparecido en la práctica.”

      Source Excerpt Translation (Source 2): “primary education… had been converted into wholesale fiction. It existed on paper, but had disappeared in practice.”

      Data Sources:<br> Source 1: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6NP22C9/5SSZMF <br> Source 2: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6NP22C9/TNOAOH

      Full Citation (Source 1): Contreras, Carlos & Marcos Cueto (1999) Historia del Perú Contemporáneo (Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, Lima)

      Full Citation (Source 2): Contreras, Carlos (1996) ‘Maestros, Mistis, y Campesinos en el Perú rural del siglo XX’ (IEP Documento de Trabajo #80)

    10. A harbinger of this can be seen in 1910, when inspectors were urged to stick to the facts rather than currying favor by overstating the problems they observed.

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      Analytic Note: [AUTHOR’S NOTE: See FN 53 for another discussion of the same source material] Footnote 53 interpreted the increasingly critical tone of school inspectors as a sign that the systematization of education was increasing. Here I suggest that one can interpret the calls from the Minister of Education and the Director of Primary Education to tone down that criticism as an attempt to place limits on the overhaul of educational development.

      Full Citation: Memoria del Ministerio de Justicia, Culto, e Instrucción Pública 1910, vol.2 (Lima) pp.35 Found in the Archivo General de la Nación, Fondo Ministerio de Hacienda, Code H-6-1678

    11. Instead, they were given to local elites, who were in turn given “free rein” in the districts they dominated.

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      Analytic Note: Muecke describes the effects of the 1873 local government law in empowering local elites. In addition to using the cited language of “free rein” his description of the overall pattern of decentralization provides the broader context that echoes the education-specific claims I make about the autonomy enjoyed by local elites.

      Source Excerpt: “One of the most important measures employed to integrate the regional and provincial elites was a local government law, passed in 1873, which defined the organization, revenue, and tasks of the district, provincial, and departmental authorities down to the very last detail. This law limited central government powers by stipulating that all decisions of local significance must be made by local and departmental authorities and guaranteed financial support from the central government. The law enhanced the position of the local elites with the central government and also with the lower classes because it legitimated local power structures by giving them a legal basis and made a whole series of taxes available to the local government, which were henceforth established in law. This law even gave unpaid labor a legal status. The local government law was therefore tantamount to a promise by central government not to interfere in local issues and to give the provincial elites a free rein in their districts. Government powers, however, were not to be restricted at all in the sphere of national politics. The drive toward decentralization behind the local government law should not therefore be confused with federalism, although this was a concept that existed in Peruvian liberalism. On the contrary, federalism was one point that differentiated the Partido Civil from other liberal movements as it neither promulgated federal aims nor enacted federalist laws.” (38)

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6NP22C9/D9CW1L

      Full Citation: Muecke, Ulrich (2004) Political Culture in Nineteenth Century Peru: The Rise of the Partido Civil (University of Pittsburgh Press)

    12. Education was seen as a threat to their political and economic hegemony over the indigenous population.

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      Analytic Note: The footnote refers to p.428; the quote can actually be found on p.427.

      Source Excerpt: “Even as many highlanders viewed indigenous education as a threat, more and more Limeños felt that Spanish-language literacy and the inculcation of patriotic values would mold the conscious citizenry required in an industrial, capitalist society.” (427)

      Full Citation: Hazen, Dan C. (1978) ‘The Politics of Schooling in the Nonliterate Third World: The Case of Highland Peru’ History of Education Quarterly vol.18 #4 (Winter)

    13. With this approach, the census was said to cost only 387 Peruvian pounds to administer (p. xii).

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      Analytic Note: As indicated in the paragraph in which this footnote appears, fiscal constraints played a primary role in the design of the census. The Argentine example was described in detail to contrast that model and the much cheaper approach taken in Peru. Its description appears, in fact, as the last item discussed in the introductory letter to the census, highlighting the claims of the census organizers to have carried out their task despite minimal expense.

      Source Excerpt: [AUTHOR’S NOTE: all italics and caps are in original text] “… conviene hacer notar que el censo escolar argentino, levantado en 1895 requirió el servicio de mas de 100 empleados durante varios años, ademas del de las personas que se encargaron de tomar los datos en toda la Republica, y esto, a pesar de que ese censo era el segundo que se formaba en el país y no ofrecía, por lo mismo, las dificultades y gastos consiquientes a un primero trabajo; que para la facción del censo de la población escolar de Buenos Aires exclusivamente, ejecutado en noviembre de 1901, se autorizó a CADA UNO DE LOS VEINTIDOS CONSEJOS ESCOLARES que funcionan alli, para que invirtesen CIENTO CINCUENTA PESOS en los gastos eventuales que demandese la operación, y se autorizó al Presidente del Consejo Nacional de Educación, para que pudiese aplicar hasta la suma de CUATRO MIL PESOS EN IMPRESIONES y demás gastos que reuiriese el levantamiento de dicho censo. Asi mismo, por mandato de la ley, el Gobierno Argentino se halla autorizado para gastar hasta CINCUENTA MIL PESOS NACIONALES EN LA EJECUCION BIENAL DEL CENSO ESCOLAR DE ESE PAIS.”

      Source Excerpt Translation: “it is worth noting that the Argentine schooling census, conducted in 1895 required the service of more than 100 employees during several years, as well as the service of those charged with taking the data in the whole Republic. And this, despite the fact that this census was the second carried out in the country and did not pose, therefore, the challenges and costs associated with a first undertaking. For the portion of the census of Buenos Aires alone, carried out in November 1901, EACH OF THE 22 EDUCATIONAL COUNCILS was authorized to spend 150 PESOS in the various costs that the operation required, and the President of the National Educational Council was authorized to spend up to 4,000 PESOS ON PRINTING and other expenses required for carrying out the census. In this way, according to the law, the Argentine Government was authorized to spend up to FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS IN THE BIENNIAL EXECUTION OF THE SCHOOLING CENSUS OF THAT COUNTRY.”

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6NP22C9/YOOYJ4

      Full Citation: Censo Escolar de la República Peruana 1902 (Lima: Imprenta Torres Aguirre, 1903)

    14. Castilla and his advisors intended to use the state to overcome the obstacles to development via free trade: to substitute for the lack of private capital, to promote immigration, and (most relevant for our purposes) to better integrate the indigenous population into the market economy.

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      Analytic Note: Footnotes 23-25 & 27-29 draw on Gootenberg (1993) for specific examples of the developmental projects of the guano era. As the annotation to FN 21 describes, this book is the most complete account of what he calls the “social history of ideas” about the role of the state during this period. This specific footnote refers to the projects pursued during the Castilla era, which marked the onset of the guano boom, and are discussed on pp.27-31.

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6NP22C9/PZ03HV

      Full Citation: Gootenberg, Paul (1993) Imagining Development: Economic Ideas in Peru’s ‘Fictitious Prosperity’ of Guano, 1840-1880 (Princeton University Press)

    15. They saw schooling as a crucial component of their efforts to bring progress and development by extending “the presence of the state to the length and breadth of its rural society.”

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      Analytic Note: This footnote directs the reader to evidence for central state efforts to impose educational statistics and other aspects of systematization against the wishes of local officials. The quotes cited in the sentence at which this footnote appears are sourced in the next footnote. p.xl, cited in the footnote, includes a call by the Minister of Education for the national government to take over the management of primary education from the municipalities. pp.893ff include a list of fines for incomplete educational statistics. Many provinces are fined 15 soles for partial completion, and the following were fined 25 soles because no statistics at all were turned in: Chachapoyas, Bolognesi, Cajatambo, Huaraz, Santa Aymaraes, Caylloma, Camaná, Castilla, La Mar, Lucanas, Contumazá, Chota, Ica, Pisco, Pasco, Chancay, Huallaga, Ucayali, Ayaviri, Chucuito, and Huancané.

      Full Citation: Memoria del Ministerio de Justicia, Culto, e Instrucción Pública 1905 (Lima), pp.xl & 893ff Found in the Archivo General de la Nación, Fondo Ministerio de Hacienda, Code H-6-1673

    16. Many elites, to whom oversight over education policy had been delegated over the past fifty years, held the view that the indigenous population under their purview could not be educated.

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      Analytic Note: The language used in the contemporary descriptions that Muecke cites shows the belief among officials at this time that the indigenous population (in both Puno and Cuzco) was backward, uncivilized, and incapable of modernization. He also provides anecdotal evidence in support of the more general claim in this section: that local officials were not motivated to pursue educational development.

      Source Excerpt: “Neither the prefects, the subprefects, nor other secondary government institutes developed any significant reforms during Pardo’s term in office. Even committed prefects limited themselves to funding small construction projects, which frequently served to feed their own vanity rather than further the development of their department. Both the social and economic structures and the mentality of state officials were likely to have played a role in the lack of will to implement reforms. Some of them despised the regions in which they worked. Cuzco’s prefect, Baltazar La Torre, wrote of the departmental capital: “Looking like it does, this cannot be a civilized place. It has nothing more to offer than ruins and rubbish heaps.” Masías Llosa, a railroad inspector, suggested that a return to the colonial system would be preferable in Puno to administration modernization measures: “Four fifths of the population [of Puno city] are like wild animals, and the few who call themselves educated have – with the exception of four or five people – succumbed to vice. The judiciary does not have much to do here, and the prefect still less. The city of Puno, with its 6,000 inhabitants, would have been better served by a regidor [councilor] from the old municipal authorities, that guarded over people’s morals, then by these state employees.” (181)

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6NP22C9/D9CW1L

      Full Citation: Muecke, Ulrich (2004) Political Culture in Nineteenth Century Peru: The Rise of the Partido Civil (University of Pittsburgh Press)

    17. These inspectors laid the blame for the failures of Peru’s schools on the inability or unwillingness of local authorities to raise the necessary funds from their communities.

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      Analytic Note (Source 1): The two sources cited in this footnote are instances of school inspectors laying the blame for the failures of educational development on the actions (or the inactions) of local authorities. Both instances cited here were found in late 1890s editions of the annual ministerial report on the state of education, which includes every year large excerpts from reports filed by regional inspectors and other educational officials with the ministry. Unfortunately, my notes do not include the portion between the two quoted passages above. But it is clear that (1) educational development is evaluated negatively by the school inspectors, and (2) at least some of the blame for this is laid at the feet of local authorities.

      Analytic Note (Source 2): MIP 1898, p.415ff Here I refer to a series of reports by school inspectors appended to the annual report of the ministry. These include many references to the failures of educational development, and many quotes from school inspectors assigning blame to local officials.

      Source Excerpt (Source 1): MIP 1897 p.lxi. “los informes de los visitadores escolares han puesto de manifiesto el deplorable estado en que se encuentra la instrucción primaria, pues no sólo no existen escuelas en muchos de los distritos visitados, sino que gran número de las que funcionan carecen de los útiles de enseñanza mas indispensables y de locales aparentes e higiénicos.” [in part this is due to] “el poco celo de los encargados de los asuntos comunales.”

      Source Excerpt Translation (Source 1): “the reports of the school inspectors have made evident the deplorable state in which primary education is found, as not only are schools lacking in many of the districts visited, but a large number of those that are functioning lack the most indispensable teaching materials and adequate and hygienic locations.” [in part this is due to] “the limited oversight of those charged with community affairs.”

      Source Excerpt (Source 2): a report from a school inspector visiting southern Peru includes the claim that “las juntas departamentales y consejos municipales, con excepción de la de Arequipa, no atienden debidamente al sostenimiento y desarrollo de la institución, y el insuficiente número de escuelas que funcionan carecen de locales adecuados, de mueblaje y útiles de enseñanza.” (424) [...] inspector in the department of Puno claims that “La causa casi única de mal tan trascedental es la [???] de las municipalidades y su falta de puntualidad en el pago de los haberes a los preceptores.” (431-2)

      Source Excerpt Translation (Source 2): A school inspector visiting the Departments of Ica, Junín, Apurímca, Ayacucho, and Huancavelia reports that many districts lack schools, “whether for lack of interest or lack of funds”. (415) [...] “the departmental juntas and municipal councils, with the exception of the one in Arequipa, do not attend sufficiently to the support and development of the institution, and the insufficient number of schools that are functioning lack adequate sites, furnishings, and educational materials.” (424) [...] “The nearly sole cause of such transcendental failings is the [worm hole in original book] of the municipalities and their lack of promptness in paying the salaries of teachers.” (431-2)

      Full Citation (Source 1): Memoria del Ministerio de Justicia, Culto, e Instrucción Pública 1897 (Lima) Found in the Archivo General de la Nación, Fondo Ministerio de Hacienda, Code H-6-1666

      Full Citation (Source 2): Memoria del Ministerio de Justicia, Culto, e Instrucción Pública 1898 (Lima) Found in the Archivo General de la Nación, Fondo Ministerio de Hacienda, Code H-6-1667

    18. In addition to textbooks, the government distributed four thousand political and physical maps of Peru to primary schools.

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      Analytic Note: The physical and political maps of Peru, years in the making, were finally completed, and four thousand copies of each were printed and distributed. See the statistics in activated footnote 48 for province-level data on map distribution.

      Full Citation: Memoria del Ministerio de Justicia, Culto, e Instrucción Pública 1919 (Lima), p.xx Found in the Archivo General de la Nación, Fondo Ministerio de Hacienda, Code H-6-1690

    19. Keeping “order in the provinces” was beyond the capacity of even a newly strengthened central state.

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      Analytic Note: I refer to Klarén here simply because I took from his book the phrasing “order in the provinces” as a description of something that was a central concern for state leaders. The citation here simply acknowledges the phrasing, not any broader claim about politics during this period. Like this set of footnotes (#62-67) in general, the purpose is to buttress the claim that subaltern mobilization was growing over the course of the Civilista period, and becoming severe enough that the ability of the central state to stem it was called into question.

      Source Excerpt: “Despite its increased authority and reach, the central government nevertheless continued to rely on the regional power of the gamonales to keep order in the provinces.” (206)

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6NP22C9/1NDDL0

      Full Citation: Klarén, Peter F. (2000) Peru: Society and Nationhood in the Andes (Oxford University Press)

    20. For example, central ministry bureaucrats complained that departments were declining the opportunity to hire normal school graduates into the teaching corps because they did not want to pay their legal minimum wage of 50 soles per month.

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      Full Citation: Memoria del Ministro de Justicia, Culto e Instrucción Pública de 1897. Located in the Archivo General de la Nación, Fondo Ministerio de Hacienda, Document Number H-6-1666.

    21. Yet the majority of teachers continued to lack basic pedagogical training, or more than a primary school education – in 1916, about 11 per- cent were normal school graduates.

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      Analytic Note: In the introductory essay to this (1917) edition of the annual Memoria, the Minister provides some statistics on teacher training: of 3,304 teachers, 365 were graduates of normal schools.

      Full Citation: Memoria del Ministerio de Justicia, Culto, e Instrucción Pública 1915 (Lima), p.xxxvi Found in the Archivo General de la Nación, Fondo Ministerio de Hacienda, Code H-6-1686

    22. By 1916, the use of this primary school reader was mandatory in all public schools.

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      Analytic Note: This page of the annual education report includes a reference to a legal or policy change that made the use of the new reader mandatory in all escuelas fiscales. The source also refers to the beginning of new competitions for a reader to cover the last three years of primary education.

      Full Citation: Memoria del Ministerio de Justicia, Culto, e Instrucción Pública 1916 (Lima), Vol.3, p.48E Found in the Archivo General de la Nación, Fondo Ministerio de Hacienda, Code H-6-1684

    23. Unrest in Puno continued through the next decade as well.

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      Analytic Note: The Rumi Maqui rebellion, cited in the previous footnote, was far from the only instance of unrest in Puno. In his detailed study of the rural province of Azángaro, Jacobsen finds evidence of many other instances of rural mobilization in subsequent decades. Like this set of footnotes (#62-67) in general, the purpose is to buttress the claim that subaltern mobilization was growing over the course of the Civilista period, and becoming severe enough that the ability of the central state to stem it was called into question.

      Source Excerpt: “In 1917, with the bloody attack on Pio León Cabrera’s Hacienda Hanccoyo in the mountainous border region between Azángaro and Sandia provinces and a little known uprising in Hacienda Huasacona, Muñani district, colonos rose up against their patrones for the first time. During the 1920s they organized militant protests on numerous haciendas in Azángaro and adjacent provinces in Puno and southern Cuzco. Often in contact with the broad movement of community peasants sweeping the southern highlands, the colonos nevertheless pursued their own agenda. (320) [...] “Riots, protests, and participation in rebellions by colonos began to block and channel changes in the labor regime. By 1930 the grand designs for transforming the region’s sheep and alpaca industry into a high-productivity business based on wage labor had failed.” (321)

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6NP22C9/OOUKFX

      Full Citation: Jacobsen, Nils (1993) Mirages of Transition: The Peruvian Altiplano 1780-1930 (University of California Press)

    24. Beyond its economic effects, industry was also seen as a symbol of progress in Peru.

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      Analytic Note: Footnotes 23-25 & 27-29 draw on Gootenberg (1993) for specific examples of the developmental projects of the guano era. As the annotation to FN 21 describes, this book is the most complete account of what he calls the “social history of ideas” about the role of the state during this period. Here I highlight the view of industry as a symbol of progress; fn 25 highlights visions of its role as a force of social transformation.

      Source Excerpt: “What was clearly shaping here by 1848 was a concerted effort to legitimize an elite industrial lobby at the advent of the guano age. The press campaign, particularly the effusions from Peru’s official gazette, was far out of proportion to the handful of factories underway. It was as if modern industry were the foremost symbol of a progressing Peru – and, at last, a respectable alternative to its increasingly disreputable artisans.” (44)

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6NP22C9/PZ03HV

      Full Citation: Gootenberg, Paul (1993) Imagining Development: Economic Ideas in Peru’s ‘Fictitious Prosperity’ of Guano, 1840-1880 (Princeton University Press)

    25. This plan was centered on boosting production in the heavily indigenous southern highlands, which – among other political and social benefits – would draw the indigenous population into the market economy.

      <br>

      Source Excerpt: “Peru’s booming coastal economy in the 1850s and 1860s turned ever seaward for its markets, and imported food, technology, investment capital, and European values. By contrast, the mountainous interior – a land of somnolent Indian villages, feudal landlords, and unruly caudillos – seemed to lag ever farther behind the coastal engine of outward growth. Such structural disparities so common to the misdevelopment of nineteenth century Latin America took vivid shape in the political imaginary of Lima’s liberal vanguard. Peru’s familiar geo-racial fissuring into two incompatible republics – one coastal, white, and modern, the other mountainous, Indian, and backward – began to reemerge in the third quarter of the nineteenth century. Among other things, this spatial-racial idiom was a product of triumphal export liberalism turning its back on the Indian past. This vanguard put its faith, however, in the power of free-trade liberalism to open the backlands to the benefits of order and progress. Booming exports encouraged the Lima-based oligarchy to imagine a nation of bustling markets and billowing smokestacks, industrious yeomen and European immigrants, commercial haciendas and teeming cities.” (150)

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6NP22C9/IUFG09

      Full Citation: Larson, Brooke (2004) Trials of Nation-Making: Liberalism, Race, and Ethnicity in the Andes (Cambridge University Press)

    26. By 1915, several other normal schools had opened, and the minister of Education, in his annual Memoria, cited the improvement in teacher quality as an achievement of recent years.

      <br>

      Analytic Note: In the introductory essay to this edition of the annual Memoria, the Minister points to the lack of adequate school locations, furnishings, and educational materials as obstacles to educational development, but highlights that the quality of teachers has improved.

      Full Citation: Memoria del Ministerio de Justicia, Culto, e Instrucción Pública 1915 (Lima), p.xviii Found in the Archivo General de la Nación, Fondo Ministerio de Hacienda, Code H-6-1682

    27. It was also seen – in the writings of Juan Norberto Casanova in the 1840s – as a means of social transformation: the movement of Peru’s poor and indigenous population into the factory would provide an opportunity to discipline them and introduce order into Peru’s unstable social fabric.

      <br>

      Analytic Note: Footnotes 23-25 & 27-29 draw on Gootenberg (1993) for specific examples of the developmental projects of the guano era. As the annotation to FN 21 describes, this book is the most complete account of what he calls the “social history of ideas” about the role of the state during this period. On pp.45-50 Gootenberg discusses the writings of Juan Norberto Casanova, and his Ensayo económico-político in particular, which argue that a focus on industrialization would lead to massive social transformation in Peru. Gootenberg also highlights the reception of these ideas (and on succeeding pages, the writings of Casanova’s critics) to show that industry played a central role in visions of social transformation in guano-era Peru.

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6NP22C9/PZ03HV

      Full Citation: Gootenberg, Paul (1993) Imagining Development: Economic Ideas in Peru’s ‘Fictitious Prosperity’ of Guano, 1840-1880 (Princeton University Press)

    28. By 1907, more than 150,000 copies of the reader, as well as nearly 58,000 first-year readers and more than 27,000 second-year readers had been printed, while texts for upper years of primary school appeared more slowly.

      <br>

      Analytic Note: Original footnote contains an error: both references should be to the MIP for 1907. Page xxxiii refers to the distribution of more than 150,000 copies of the reader. Pp.644-649 provide detailed information in the form of a table on textbook distribution by province (see attached file fn48-1 data.docx)

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6NP22C9/QQMHNH

      Full Citation: Memoria del Ministerio de Justicia, Culto, e Instrucción Pública 1907 (Lima) Found in the Archivo General de la Nación, Fondo Ministerio de Hacienda, Code H-6-1675, pp.xxxiii and 644-9.

    29. Piérola’s program, which emphasized “the value of liberal economic theory, centralized administration, and an ordered society designed to protect the interests of the elite against the unruly masses,” captures the Civilista project of state building and social intervention that would dominate Peruvian politics for the next twenty-five years.

      <br>

      Analytic Note: The purpose of the quoted passage is to characterize the broad outlines of the Civilista political project, which underpinned the state-building effort that this chapter explores.

      Source Excerpt: “It was not until 1895 that the Civilista party re-emerged as an important political force one the national level. In that year it supported the successful presidential candidacy of Nicolás de Piérola, an old political adversary of the Civilista party, who was the only civilian politician popular enough to win the election. The party’s strategy was subsequently vindicated, as Piérola’s four year administration served as an important transitional phase to a longer period of Civilista control. Piérola and the Civilistas in the past had differed over who was to rule, rather than over actual policies. Both sides were in general agreement over the value of liberal economic theory, centralized administration, and an ordered society designed to protect the interest of the elite against the unruly masses.”

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6NP22C9/PK4N6J

      Full Citation: Gonzales, Michael J. (1985) Plantation Agriculture and Social Control in Northern Peru, 1875-1933 (University of Texas Press)

    30. Some local officials did their best to “actively thwart education.”

      <br>

      Analytic Note: This source is found in a collection of essays compiled by Carmen Montero. No bibliographic information on the original is found, beyond the reference on p.96 to the fact that the original essay appeared in El Ariete, published in Arequipa, on March 1, 1911.

      Source Excerpt: “Las autoridades, en la sierra, raras veces cumplen con las obligaciones que tienen para favorecer la instruccion; y hay muchas que no solo no cumplen sino que obstaculizan la enseñanza.”

      Source Excerpt Translation: The authorities in the sierra rarely fulfill the obligations they have to favor instruction, and there are many that not only do not fulfill but even place obstacles in the path of teaching.”

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6NP22C9/XYVWUN

      Full Citation: Málaga in Cármen Montero, ed., La Escuela Rural: Variaciones sobre un Tema (Lima: FAO, 1990), 95.

    31. This would allow more effective response to local unrest and would reduce the remoteness of far-flung communities, creating “moral uplifting,” “rural mobility, cultural contact, and thus enlightenment among peasants.”

      <br>

      Analytic Note: Footnotes 23-25 & 27-29 draw on Gootenberg (1993) for specific examples of the developmental projects of the guano era. As the annotation to FN 21 describes, this book is the most complete account of what he calls the “social history of ideas” about the role of the state during this period. Here he discusses the writings of Manuel Pardo, later to become president of Peru, about the central place of railroads in fomenting development

      Source Excerpt: “Stock liberal concerns about Indian ‘lethargy’, the violence of rustic caudillos, and the specter of urban breakdown colored Pardo’s vision of a national ‘moral uplifting’ through railroads. To Pardo, productive ‘work’ disciplines and forges modern citizenries, as well as disciplining an unruly balance of payments. Railways would accelerate rural mobility, cultural contact, and thus enlightenment among peasants.” (87)

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6NP22C9/PZ03HV

      Full Citation: Gootenberg, Paul (1993) Imagining Development: Economic Ideas in Peru’s ‘Fictitious Prosperity’ of Guano, 1840-1880 (Princeton University Press)

    32. He wondered what effect education could have on those who, to him, “were not yet people, who did not know how to live like people, and had not managed to differentiate themselves from the animals.”

      <br>

      Analytic Note: This source is found in a collection of essays compiled by Carmen Montero. No bibliographic information on the original is found, beyond the reference on p.85 to the fact that the original essay appeared in November 1904, and was reprinted in a 1937 collection entitled La Cultura Nacional (Lima, 1937, 2nd edition, pp.13-15)

      Source Excerpt: “La población del Perú, puede dividirse, por razón de su cultura, en cuatro grupos: habitantes de las punas y caseríos, poblaciones de la sierra que están en constante comunicación con las capitales de departamentos, población de estas capitales, y población de Lima. Respecto al primer grupo, puede decirse que carece de toda cultura, que no solo no la tiene, sino que le falta la condición primera para poseerla, el interés de saber. … ¿Qué influencia podrá tener sobre esos seres, que sólo poseen la forma humana, las escuelas primarias más elementales? ¿Para qué aprenderán a leer, escribir y contar, la geografía y la historia y tantas otras cosas, los que no son personas todavía, los que no saben vivir como personas, los que no han llegado a establecer una diferencia profunda con los animales, ni tener este sentimiento de dignidad humana principio de toda cultura?”

      Source Excerpt Translation: “The population of Peru can be divided, in terms of its enlightenment, into four groups: inhabitants of the highland plains and remote small towns, populations of the highlands that are in constant communication with the capitals of the departments, the population of those capitals, and the population of Lima. With respect to the first group, one can say that they lack all enlightenment, that not only do they lack it, but that the lack the first condition for possessing it; interest in knowledge. … What influence could basic primary schools have on these beings, that only possess the human form? For what purpose should they learn to read, write, and count, geography and history and so many other things, those that are not yet people, those who do not know how to live like people, those who have not managed to establish a profound difference from animals, nor to have the sense of human dignity that is the root of all enlightenment?”

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6NP22C9/XYVWUN

      Full Citation: Málaga in Cármen Montero, ed., La Escuela Rural: Variaciones sobre un Tema (Lima: FAO, 1990), 85 - 87.

    33. “the railroad [would] be the most efficacious means for creating the healthy and intelligent proletariat” through increasing “communication of [indigenous Peruvians] with whites.”

      <br>

      Analytic Note: Footnotes 23-25 & 27-29 draw on Gootenberg (1993) for specific examples of the developmental projects of the guano era. As the annotation to FN 21 describes, this book is the most complete account of what he calls the “social history of ideas” about the role of the state during this period. Here I quote from Gootenberg’s recounting of a proposal for the construction of a railroad in Arequipa, published in 1864 which made the case that railroad development and increased national integration would have a transformative effect on the country’s indigenous population and thus contribute to political order and social peace as well as economic development.

      Source Excerpt: “The third theme of the Ferrocarril de Arequipa concerned the Indians themselves. Arequipa constituted a white and mestizo beachhead in a sea of native community hinterlands, and its Europeanized spokespersons contemplated a wider technological regeneration of Indian workers – at first glance a strange association with trains. This analysis was also among the first open discussions of the Indian problem since the 1840s talk of native welfare and vanishing obrajes. The project stressed: ‘When we study the possible advancement of Peru, and especially the south, it is absolutely necessary to consider the condition of the Indian.’ ‘Well known’ are the Indians’ paltry ‘wants’ and disincentive to betterment, ran the familiar colonial refrain. But after five years of steam engines ‘he won’t be the same Indian of today! We don’t need so-called useful European immigration’ – the usual despairing whitening recipe in Peru – when ‘apt’ Indian workers abound. ‘Frequent communications of this race with the whites will help to mix them; thus the railroad will be the most efficacious means for creating the healthy and intelligent proletariat that, content as the English peón, his place fit in the world, will make the base of a democratic republic – moderated to law and friend of national progress.” (95)

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6NP22C9/PZ03HV

      Full Citation: Gootenberg, Paul (1993) Imagining Development: Economic Ideas in Peru’s ‘Fictitious Prosperity’ of Guano, 1840-1880 (Princeton University Press)

    34. They rarely complained, for example, about the quality of teachers they oversaw, and did not pressure the national government to develop the school system.

      <br>

      Analytic Note: The sentence to which this footnote is attached claims that local officials placed no pressure on the national government to replace poor quality teachers. Muecke, in the text quoted here, shows that local officials did press for the removal and replacement of teachers, but that they did so for reasons of patronage not because of concerns over school quality, and that they did so during an anomalous moment of national government change rather than as a regular pattern.

      Source Excerpt: “Schools and universities were generally used to provide sinecures for friends and relations. The change in government in 1872 was therefore followed by a spate of recommendations to Lima from the provinces to replace school heads, or sometimes even ordinary teachers. Just as in the case of workers in public administration the qualifications of newly appointed employees in the educational sector chiefly consisted of their political views or connection to Pardo’s followers.” (180-181)

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6NP22C9/D9CW1L

      Full Citation: Muecke, Ulrich (2004) Political Culture in Nineteenth Century Peru: The Rise of the Partido Civil (University of Pittsburgh Press)

    35. The cross-district variation in enrollment and literacy is sizable, as reflected in the fact that the standard deviations around the district averages vary from 17.4 percent (for writing proficiency) to 24.9 percent for enrollment rate.

      <br>

      Analytic Note: These correlations are calculated from the linked dataset.

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6NP22C9/VBMJLW

      Full Citation: Soifer, Hillel (2009) Dataset from Censo Escolar (Qualitative Data Repository [distributor])

    36. State officials were committed to education as an avenue toward the “civilization” and “incorporation” of the indigenous population, their assimi lation into a Peruvian national community.

      <br>

      Analytic Note (Source 1): The original document refers to p.218. This is a typographical error which I did not catch in the proof-reading process. The discussion of education as part of a civilizing project during this period appears on p.212.

      Source Excerpt (Source 1): “Para los gobiernos civilistas, la promoción de una economía de exportación de matrias primas y la atracción de capitales e inmigrantes extranjeros, especialmente europeos, parecían resumir sus propuestas económicas. Con respecto al Estado y sus políticas sociales no tuvieron (212) una actitud indiferente. Pensaron que el Estado debía empezar a cumplir un rol moderador, promotor e integrador y que el éjercito, la educación, y la salud pública debían servir para integrar y formar la población indígena. Por ello los civilistas continuaron con el objetivo más importante del gobierno de Piérola: la modernización del aparato fiscal y administrativo del Estado. A esto añadieron la profesionalización del ejército y su sometimiento a la autoridad civil, lo que lograron por un tiempo, así como el desarrollo de la educación básica y de sanidad pública. Esto último significó la concepción de la educación y la salud como instrumentos civilizadores, formadores de ciudadanos, y una mayor injerencia del Estado en la sociedad a costa de atribuciones que en parte tenían las municipalidades.” (211)

      Source Excerpt Translation (Source 1): “For the civilista governments, the promotion of an economy based on primary product exports and the attraction of capital and immigrants from foreign sources, especially Europe, seem to summarize their economic proposals. With respect to the state and their social policies they did not have an indifferent attitude. They believed that the state had to begin to fulfill a moderating, promoting, and integrating role, and that the army, the educational experience, and public health were to serve to integrate and form the indigenous population. To this end the Civilistas continued with the most important objective of the Piérola government: the modernization of the fiscal and administrative apparatus of the state. To this they added the professionalization of the army and its submission to civilian authority, which they achieved for a certain time, as well as the development of basic education and public sanitation. This signified the conception of education and health as civilizing instruments, forming citizens, and a greater interference of the state in society at the cost of the functions that had been attributed to the municipalities.”

      Source Excerpt (Source 2): “A grandes rasgos puede decirse que hubo dos grandes proyectos educativos hasta 1970. El primero fue el civilista, desarrollado en lo fundamental en los dos primeras décadas del siglo y que tuvo la ‘civilización’ del indio como bandera, lo que significaba su castellanización a toda costa y el desarrollo de hábitos occidentales en los campos de la salud, la nutrición, las relaciones sociales y la economía.” (9)

      Source Excerpt Translation (Source 2): “In broad strokes one can say that there were two grand educational projects before 1970. The first was the Civilista one, developed fundamentally in the first two decades of the century and which had the ‘civilization’ of the Indian as its flag, which meant the inculcation of the Spanish language at all costs and the development of western habits in the realms of health, nutrition, social relations, and the economy.”

      Data Source:<br> Source 1: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6NP22C9/5SSZMF <br> Source 2: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6NP22C9/TNOAOH

      Full Citation (Source1): Contreras, Carlos & Marcos Cueto (1999) Historia del Perú Contemporáneo (Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, Lima)

      Full Citation (Source2): Contreras, Carlos (1996) Maestros, Mistis, y Campesinos en el Perú rural del siglo XIX (Working Paper #80, Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, Lima)

    37. In 1917, school inspection was removed from the portfolio of the national education ministry and turned over to the municipalities, despite ministerial opposition.

      <br>

      Analytic Note: The cited page refers to Law 2044 of 1917, which eliminated the national and provincial school inspectors, and turned inspection over to the municipal governments. The Minister of Education, in this Memoria, registers his objection to the law, and states that a bill proposing the re-centralization of inspection remains stuck in the national legislature.

      Full Citation: Memoria del Ministerio de Justicia, Culto, e Instrucción Pública 1917, vol.1 (Lima) p.xxxviii Found in the Archivo General de la Nación, Fondo Ministerio de Hacienda, Code H-6-1686

  2. Sep 2019
    1. John F. Kennedy

      The following Note should be at the beginning of every ATI, annotating the title: <br> This is an Annotation for Transparent Inquiry project, published by the Qualitative Data Repository. Please cite as:

      Saunders, Elizabeth. 2015. "Data for: “John F. Kennedy,” in: Leaders at war: How presidents shape military interventions". Qualitative Data Repository. https://doi.org/10.5064/F68G8HMM

      Additional documentation can be found on QDR.

      Learn more about ATI here.

    2. equally legitimate economic and political programs have been obscured.”

      <br>

      Source Excerpt: Letter to Galbraith that discusses overemphasis of Democrats on the military challenge. Says he will give special attention this year to developing some new policy toward the underdeveloped areas, a field in which I know you also have special interest and far greater competence. Mentions Progressive article on India which JFK wrote.

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F68G8HMM/AYEALM

      Full Citation: JFK to Galbraith, February 4, 1958, Pre-presidential Papers-Senate Files, Box 691, JFK Library.

    3. a very curious policy of ‘non-intervention’ in Cuba.”

      <br>

      Source Excerpt: "There is no simple principle which will solve all of the difficult policy issues which are raised by the presence of governments such as the recent one of Batista in Cuba. After all, we do give assistance to President Tito and General Franco and a number of other governments which are far from democratic models. However, I agree that in Latin America there is a good and sound case to be made for granting recognized preferences to governments of a genuinely democratic nature. This will mean that we would grant such priority to democratic governments and that for all practical purposes dictatorships would receive little economic assistance and no moral sanction. I quite agree with you that both the British and Americans followed a very curious policy of 'non-intervention' in Cuba and that we are in no position to throw stones at the actions which have been taken by the new government of Fidel Castro."

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F68G8HMM/0MOZOR

      Full Citation: JFK to Mr. and Mrs. Robert Ross, February 12, 1959, Pre-presidential Papers-Senate Files, Box 717, JFK Library. (NP)

    4. it can become a stable, popular regime.”

      <br>

      Source Excerpt: "However, I do not think that the Cuban revolution was primarily a Communist inspiration. I think there are genuine elements in the revolutionary situation which arise from the dictatorship and from the supression [sic] of popular rights by the Batista regime. Although the Castro movement is a radical movement, it is not Communist - and it will probably remain so if the regime is able to come to grips with Cuba's social and economic problems. It is very difficult at this moment of a revolutionary upheaval to foresee the outline of the future Cuban regime, but there is a good chance that it can become a stable, popular regime."

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F68G8HMM/3DLLOI

      Full Citation: JFK to Douglas T. Barrett, January 20, 1959, Pre-presidential Papers-Senate Files, Box 717, JFK Library. (NP)

    5. Noting that the previous Batista regime was also “cruel and oppressive,”

      <br>

      Source Excerpt: "There is nothing more difficult for human leadership than to control popular passions once they have been unleashed. The problem of terror is common in the aftermath of most revolutions, and unfortunately this is true at present in Cuba. [para break] I am afraid there is very little that the United States can do of practical benefit in this situation. There is only danger for the United States in setting itself up as a critic of this new regime, since it is likely that American intervention would itself become a further excuse for terrorist activity. Moreover, it is a fact that the previous government was a cruel and oppressive one which spared few men once they were suspected of being opponents of the regime. One of the differences is that under Batista the press was not allowed to report these happenings, whereas at present there has been considerable reportorial freedom on the Island. It is little consolation, but the best we can hope for is that passions will subside and that the revolution can make an effective transition to stable popular government."

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F68G8HMM/54ZSID

      Full Citation: JFK to Paul Jameson, January 22, 1959, Pre-presidential Papers-Senate Files, Box 717, JFK Library. (NP)

    6. . as it has helped to solve.”

      <br>

      Source Excerpt: "As you know, I was opposed to this intervention and did not feel that it made much sense either in terms of the evidence about the internal situation in Lebanon and Iraq or in terms of providing the basis for a new policy in the area. To be sure, it was a calculated risk and the decision was not wholly implausible in that light. However, it is clear that the intervention has obscured as many problems (many which you suggest in your memorandum) as it has helped to solve."

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F68G8HMM/TYSBR0

      Full Citation: JFK to Herbert J. Spiro, August 8, 1958, Pre-presidential Papers-Senate Files, Box 693, JFK Library. (NP)

    7. clear case of outside aggression.”

      <br>

      Source Excerpt: "The situation in Lebanon was not precisely envisaged in the Eisenhower Doctrine which the Senate and House approved. The Lebanese situation is by no means entirely an 'internal' one but neither is it a clear case of outside aggression. [para break] In any event, we have no alternative but to give the United Nations a full run in the matter. I am hopeful that a U.N. force could be established in case of need in order to forestall the necessity for independent intervention by the United States and Great Britain. I would not be willing to declare a policy of non-intervention, but I think the U.N. method should be explored to the fullest. [para break] Unfortunately, this is one of those tragic situations, such as Cyprus, where there is some justice on both sides of the question and there can be no simple resolution. There are very real dangers both in intervening and in not intervening. We must simply act as sensibly as we can."

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F68G8HMM/LSQTGF

      Full Citation: JFK to V. Veinmeyr, July 11, 1958, Pre-presidential Papers-Senate Files, Box 693, JFK Library. (NP)

    8. in every part of the world[?]”

      <br>

      Source Excerpt: "Fighting thousands of miles from home in a jungle war in the most difficult terrain in the world - man to man - with the majority of the population hostile and sullen - or fighting guerilla warfare. The more troops we send the more will pass across the frontier of the battle. [para break] It will be another Korea without the limited terrain - with a complete battle for protection....action to be united - How can it support of the people of Vietnam - and the French people. [para break] The U.S. is willing to make any sacrifice on behalf of freedom but can American servicemen be the fighters for the whole free world, fighting every battle, in every part of the world."

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F68G8HMM/QPACHE

      Full Citation: JFK, Notes, 1957 (labeled "KS-1 1957" in the "Doodles" series), Personal Papers, Box 40, JFK Library. (pp. 2-3)

    9. military pacts as a solution to regional conflicts.

      <br>

      Source Excerpt: "I agree with you that a Southeast Asia Treaty Organization is a subject which must be approached by our Executive Branch with extreme caution, and, if such a treaty is entered into, the Senate must consider it with care before giving consent to its ratification. [para break] As I have previously stated, we must insist that any such united action in Southeast Asia be predicated upon complete independence for Indo-China, the active cooperation of all nations in that area as well as the other Western allies, and be undertaken under the auspices of the United Nations. Moreover, the military efficacy and possible consequences of such an alliance would also need to be considered. At present it appears doubtful that these conditions can be wholly met, and I shall continue to request that the President and Secretary of State refrain from hasty action in this regard."

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F68G8HMM/QWID57

      Full Citation: JFK to E. F. Baxter, July 16, 1954, Pre-presidential Papers-Senate Files, Box 647, JFK Library. (NP)

    10. France to grant independence.

      <br>

      Source Excerpt: "Since my visit to French Indo-China more than a year ago, I have been increasingly concerned with the gradual deterioration of the strength of the anti-communist forces in that area. [para break] It is of course obvious that no victory can be achieved, indeed defeat itself can only be averted, by mobilizing the support of the native population in this struggle against the forces of Viet Minh. The French have made some efforts to accomplish this by granting an increased degree of national independence, but in nearly every case it has been too little and too late; and the concessions have followed all too frequently a military success of the Viet Minh forces. [para break] The commitments of the United States continue to increase as the situation there deteriorates. We have therefore the right and the obligation to insist that all steps essential to victory be taken, and certainly it is of primary importance to give to the native populations of the three states the feeling that they have not bee given the shadow of independence but its substance. [para break] The American people want in exchange for their assistance the establishment of conditions that will make success a prospect and not defeat inevitable. I therefore believe that a reply to the enclosed questions would be of great assistance in determining whether these conditions are being established as expeditiously as can be reasonably expected." [end of letter]

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F68G8HMM/SNNVL4

      Full Citation: JFK to Foster Dulles, May 7, 1953, PPP-SF, Box 481, JFKL.

    11. before aid is given” to the French effort.

      <br>

      Source Excerpt: Memo giving Johnson direction: "Proceeding gently and in as quiet and confidential a way as possible, Senator Kennedy desires a little report to be gotten up for him on French Indo-China, with particular reference to the following points: 1. Senator Kennedy suspects the French have not been spending as much as they say have [sic] on the economic welfare of French Indo-China. 2. Senator Kennedy (who was there last year) suspects the French are still too much in control of the Government and that is one reason for the trouble. And therefore the US should insist on reforms being made there before aid is given." [rest of memo is pointing her to sources and agencies]

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F68G8HMM/W7V1BH

      Full Citation: L. P. Marvin to Priscilla Johnson, April 17, 1953, Pre-presidential Papers-Senate Files, Box 481, JFK Library.

    12. “regardless of ties to France” and Britain.

      <br>

      Source Excerpt: [Continuing on Vietnam] ". . . supporting French - who represent only [positive?] force to stop communists - and the necessity to stand for what America has traditionally stood for - independence - land-reform - etc. [para break] Seems that our policy must be true to latter regardless of ties to Freance + G.B. [long horizontal line here, doodle on page] Flew over delta area - and saw [?] system of [???] de Lattre [??] built to protect the area. [para break] Extremely vulnerable to attack from the air + would not be satisfactory if Chinese came in - Serves to protect 6 or 7 million people living in delta + [extensive?] rice paddies. 1200 of which [?]. De Lattre said "If Delta..." [end of page]

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F68G8HMM/RC9H02

      Full Citation: JFK Travel Journal, Personal Papers, Box 11, JFK Library. (p. 123)

    13. more important to force [the] French to liberalize political conditions.”

      <br>

      Source Excerpt: [Continuing on Vietnam] "G. [Gullion?] believes that we should go into this thing skeptically [?] Insist that political condition here match the military effort. Make sure that people are given sufficient independence so that they will fight. Perhaps it may be too late for this + people so cynical about French - that no political considerations [?] would have any effect - French paying here for past ? also). [para break] The fact is that many Vietnamese realize that a good many French have [??? Us written them off?] of shedding blood etc. and losing investments by leaving here as soon as war is concluded. [para break] We are more and more becoming identified in the minds of the people with the French we must do what we can as our aid . . ." o [IMGP1030]: [Continuing on Vietnam] ". . . gets more important to force French to [key word unclear] political conditions. We are not here to help French maintain colonial rule - but to stop communists When we were first here - French suspicion of U.S. interests - but feel now as though we have bought their proposition. [para break] Chinese Communists ["intrude"?] -- [??] about 6000 --- but give leadership [???] level. [para break]. Chinese army [?] on border - ready for invasion - as long as border remains open - you cannot smash guerilla movement. [para break] ECA spending for 3 [?] about 30,000,000. [para break] Why does France fight 1. Because of most evil [?] gains from their country 2. Prestige - doesn't want to sink from [???] of . . ."

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F68G8HMM/VOB5GH

      Full Citation: JFK Travel Journal, Personal Papers, Box 11, JFK Library. (pp. 130-131)

    14. all we offer is merely a defense of [the] status quo.”

      <br>

      Source Excerpt: [Continuing on Middle East, but then at bottom seems to be a quote about Asia, not clear where the quote ends.] "Communist agents move among the Asian people preaching [?] of national independence + of reforms, spread..." [end of page] o [IMGP1035]: [seems to be continuing quote] ". . . equality, of economic development and ?? of the evils of landlord-tenant relations. [note margin lines highlighting this (In other words, preach against status quo - we will lose if all we offer is merely a defense of status quo. We must show that we are for these things + yet we cannot ? [2 key words unclear] - communists have an obvious advantage). We must ? Communist imperialism and its ? to real independence. [para break] Asians feel that the West has always meant imperialism under the strongest power - + in the present case it is U.S. In addition we are ???? in Korea - and that has serious effect. [para break] Important that we indicate that we are not taking over role of ? Britain or France. [para break] While we should make great sacrifices to keep . . ."

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F68G8HMM/ETYGQI

      Full Citation: JFK Travel Journal, Personal Papers, Box 11, JFK Library. (pp. 133-134)

    15. need to protect our commitments around the world.”

      <br>

      Source Excerpt: JFK, "Our Lag in Conventional Forces," undated remarks (but from context, likely from 1959 or 1960), PPP-SF, Box 916, "Our Lag in Conventional Forces" folder, JFKL, p. 2. "...fashion -- each Red advance being too small to justify massive retaliation with all its risks. And history demonstrates that this is the great threat, this is the strategy of world Communism -- not an all-out nuclear attack. [para break] But unfortunately our defense priorities ignore this history. Under every military budget submitted by this Administration, we have been preparing primarily to fight the one kind of war we least want to fight and are least likely to fight. We have been driving ourselves into a corner where the only choice is all or nothing at all, world devastation or submission -- a choice that necessarily causes us to hesitate on the brink and leaves the initiative in the hands of our enemies. [para break] We have steadily cut the numbers and strength of our ground forces -- our Army and Marines. We have steadily failed to provide our conventional forces with modern conventional weapons, with effective, versatile firepower. And we have particularly failed to provide the airlift and sealift capacity necessary to give those forces the swift mobility they need to protect our commitments around the world. Do you realize that some of our units entering the Lebanon 'pipeline', so to speak, at the time of the Iraqi revolt, emerged at the other end only to find that by then the dust had settled -- we had already recognized the new regime -- and it was time to be evacuated? [para break] Back in 1954, when these manpower cuts began, I offered an amendment to prevent a cut in Army divisions from 19 to 17. A majority of Democratic Senators supported me. But the amendment lost -- and so did..."

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F68G8HMM/4KWZFK

      Full Citation: JFK, N.D.(titled "Our Lag in Conventional Forces"), Pre-presidential Papers-Senate Files, Box 916, JFK Library. (p. 2)

    16. did not have “nationalist backing.”

      <br>

      Source Excerpt: "In contrast to Indo-China -- the guerilla movement here has not got nationalist backing -- it is dominated and composed chiefly of aliens -- the Chinese."

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F68G8HMM/PSHE92

      Full Citation: JFK Travel Journal, Personal Papers, Box 11, JFK Library. (p. 138; p. 142)

    17. “subject to threats and intimidation” by guerrillas.

      <br>

      Source Excerpt: P. 139, continuing on Malaya: "went to American ? at about 5:00 -- ? - located six miles outside of Kuala Lumpur - the capital of Malaya. Required an armored car - and a truck with police. Place where staff lives - surrounded by cleared space - barbed wire - lights, windows covered against sabotage. [para break] Everyone feels situation deteriorating. That majority of Chinese sitting on fense as don't want to pick wrong side. Also subject to threats + intimidation therefore pay guerillas to keep them quiet. [para break] British persist in calling enemy bandits - even though admit there is strong potential motivation."

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F68G8HMM/0HYALT

      Full Citation: JFK Travel Journal, Personal Papers, Box 11, JFK Library. (p. 139)

    18. he seemed to understand the local nature of the conflict.

      <br>

      Source Excerpt: P. 137 of travel journal, seems to be in Malaya, mentions Briggs Plan: "Briggs Plan behind schedule but 80,000 ? ? have been resettled leaving 160,000 still to be dealt with." "Admits Briggs plan..." is in middle of page. Whole page reads: "About 10-15,000 British troops here -- of whom about 1/3 to 1/2 Ghurkas -- 40,000 regular police -- 20,000 guards trained for police duty. [para break] Admits Briggs plan not a success -- Based on idea that if population were gathered together instead of scattering [squatting?] all over country -- could be kept under surveillance -- protected and prevented from helping bandits...[skipping some] About moved about 2/3 of people under Briggs Plan."

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F68G8HMM/JMSDCT

      Full Citation: JFK Travel Journal, Personal Papers, Box 11, JFK Library. (p. 137; p. 140)

    19. insurgents off from their base of support among the people.

      <br>

      Source Excerpt: "Admits Briggs plan..." is in middle of page. Whole page reads: "About 10-15,000 British troops here -- of whom about 1/3 to 1/2 Ghurkas -- 40,000 regular police -- 20,000 guards trained for police duty. [para break] Admits Briggs plan not a success -- Based on idea that if population were gathered together instead of scattering [squatting?] all over country -- could be kept under surveillance -- protected and prevented from helping bandits...[skipping some] About moved about 2/3 of people under Briggs Plan."

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F68G8HMM/BM9VNN

      Full Citation: JFK Travel Journal, Personal Papers, Box 11, JFK Library. (p. 140)

    20. to make good use of U.S. aid.

      <br>

      Source Excerpt: Offers to meet to discuss issues. Says "In my judgment, India, better than most of the under-industrialized and uncommitted nations, does meet the 'ground rules' of economic performance and political freedom."

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F68G8HMM/VEVTNL

      Full Citation: JFK to John Davenport, April 16, 1958, Pre-presidential Papers-Senate Files, Box 692, JFK Library.

    21. short-term credit was less effective than “longer-term ‘seed’ capital.”

      <br>

      Source Excerpt: "...perpetuating growth does exist in many of the world's new nations. It is these nations that provide the truest defense against Communist penetration. [para break] How can these opportunities be seized? In answering this question we must consider not only amounts of money or the continuation of existing programs, but we must also concern ourselves with the quality of the program which we present to the under-developed world. For it is perfectly clear that different types of assistance have different impact. Much depends on the objectives of the assistance, whether it is directed primarily to economic or security ends, what its servicing and carrying charges are. Short-term credit is often a useful stopgap, but is effectiveness for the stimulation of economic growth is more limited than is longer-term 'seed' capital. [para break] First of all, the United States must rigorously re-evaluate both the political and economic effect of its large-scale military assistance programs. Korea, for example, now has the fourth largest army in the world. These military commitments have become frozen in countries such as Korea, Formosa, Pakistan, and yet the strategic situation has changed. In some instances perhaps this assistance is still an effective deterrent against Communist penetration and aggression, but in other instances the social and economic affect [sic] of large-scale military aid is one of dangerous distortion. Much military assistance is not economically productive. The problem is not one of simply transferring accounts from the military to the economic but rather to achieve the proper balance between the two. In areas where military assistance continues to have important uses and by-products, we should attempt to make it serve a more valuable..."

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F68G8HMM/RIOH1X

      Full Citation: JFK, "Remarks to Fifth National Conference on International Economic and Social Development," February 26, 1958, Pre-presidential Papers-Senate Files, Box 561, JFK Library. (p. 4)

    22. responding on a crisis-by-crisis basis to Soviet moves.

      <br>

      Source Excerpt: "The purpose of this conference is to support a foreign economic policy which stands on its own feet. You are all well aware of the political and economic indispensability of foreign assistance. All of you realize how the scale of the Soviet economic challenge has grown, its new guises, its flexible repertoire of strategems, its range of economic capabilities. This gathering of evidence of the widespread critical restlessness which exists regarding the effort we are making in meeting the needs of economic take-off and transition in the underdeveloped world. The dangerous futility of running against the tide of events or in drifting in aimless futility are clear enough. But can this nation in fact release new initiatives, break the paralysis, generate new momentum? [para break] It is painfully evident that in foreign economic assistance there has been a wide gap between rhetoric and reality. In the universe of discourse there is an inflation of good intent. But in the realm of action we have made little creative achievement. Essentially our foreign aid program in recent years has been a series of holding actions without the release of new programs which imaginatively and searchingly meet the inevitable tests of the years ahead. Our policies have been spasmodic and episodic, in reflex to sudden crises and intermittent pressures. Most of the economic assistance given has been on a project-by-project, year-by-year, country-by-country basis. Only in recent months has public and critical thinking begun to move back to considering the long-term economic development. The Point Four program which was set in motion in 1949, the Gray Report of 1950, and the Rockefeller Report of 1951 cast perspectives on the hard policy programs of helping to accelerate economic growth in the under-developed areas. But the lengthened shadow of the Korean War and the emphasis on military assistance broke the spring of this early momentum."

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F68G8HMM/RIOH1X

      Full Citation: JFK, Remarks to Fifth National Conference on International Economic and Social Development, February 26, 1958, PPP-SF, Box 561, JFKL, 5.

    23. “our military assistance can leave a permanently good social impress.”

      <br>

      Source Excerpt: "...social purpose. In the economic growth of our own country and of other states such as Turkey, Mexico and the Philippines, which have passed into the transitional period of economic growth we have seen the value which the military can serve. The US army has its engineering tradition and it would be a happy outcome if our military assistance program, especially in Southeast Asia, could have the same influence among local troops. And there have been some encouraging signs in Laos, where the military meshed their activities with village development. If we could get more local soldiers to work on economic development efforts in irrigation, village schemes, public works, then our military commitments can have multiple benefits. Moreover, this recognizes the fact that in this area future wars will likely be limited in nature and depend on guerilla-type action. In such wars much depends upon the morale and disposition of the peasants. If soldiers, who naturally have an interest in modern techniques, are more socially mobile and often more skilled in the arts of administration, [they] can play a dynamic and innovative role in the destiny of new nations. Then our military assistance can leave a permanently good social impress. [para break] Second, we must build on the frail foundation of the Development Loan Fund. This revolving fund was unfortunately given far too short a lease on life and too narrow a capital base to reach the point of real effectiveness. The problem in the underdeveloped countries is to have a loan program which will allow us to commit ourselves to the longer cycle of economic development and the longer course. Unless we can build greater continuities into our assistance program, we are placed in the position of a surgeon who opens up the stomach without promising to sew it up again. This proposals which the Administration has made for the Fund this year sould [sic] be considered..."

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F68G8HMM/RIOH1X

      Full Citation: JFK, Remarks to Fifth National Conference on International Economic and Social Development, February 26, 1958, PPP-SF, Box 561, JFKL, 5.

    24. to countries without regard to the recipients’ needs or capacity.

      <br>

      Source Excerpt (Source 1): Letter to Louis F. Medeiros, June 23, 1959, about "military assistance to Iraq and other similar nations ... [para break] ... It has been discussed in relation to arms shipments to Iraq, jet shipments to Ethiopia, and the program of assistance which we are carrying out in Pakistan and also in South American countries. It is quite clear that many of our arms shipments have no relation to strategic requirements and in fact are often unusable by nationals of the state to which they are sent."

      Source Excerpt (Source 2): Second: "What about the balance between military and economic aid?" Answer: "This is another question in this field of foreign aid which has become blurred by discussion. It seems to me that one first has to decide whether the exigencies of the international situation really demand the kind of forces which we support throughout the world. My own view is that we have tended to follow military aid program patterns which were designed to fit situations which have now changed drastically from the standpoint of our over-all military strategy. I feel that we may be the victims of the same kind of administrative and policy lag in the area of planning military aid as I think we were faced with in connection with missile development. I don't think this problem boils down to a question of military aid versus economic and technical assistance. There are many situations where we need both. But because military programs can impose such a dreadful burden on any economy, particularly that of a less industrially developed country, I think we should be very careful in terms of both their assets and liabilities, both to us and the country concerned."

      Data Sources:<br> Source 1: https://doi.org/10.5064/F68G8HMM/F9FWOA <br> Source 2: https://doi.org/10.5064/F68G8HMM/UYLXQE

      Full Citation (Source 1): JFK to Louis F. Medeiros, June 23, 1959, Pre-presidential Papers-Senate Files, Box 716, JFK Library.

      Full Citation (Source 2): JFK, Draft, N.D.(titled "What about the Balance between Military and Economic Aid?"), Pre-presidential Papers-Senate Files, Box 561, JFK Library.

    25. and the necessity of responding to each country’s needs.

      <br>

      Source Excerpt: "I am firmly of the opinion that carefully planned and administered foreign aid programs redound to the best interests of the United States....I am particularly desirous that the economic development fund be adequately financed. The concept behind this fund is certainly a sound one and I believe will get us away from the past practice of establishing so-called country program levels which have not in all cases been related to the actual needs of the country concerned nor have the expenditures always been in the best interests of the United States."

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F68G8HMM/789EZE

      Full Citation: JFK to Dean Erwin N. Griswold of Harvard Law School, June 7, 1957, Pre-presidential Papers-Senate Files, Box 667, JFK Library.

    26. inter-Arab cleavages through its emphasis on the ‘Northern Tier.’”

      <br>

      Source Excerpt: Letter to Frank Maria, August 18, 1958, on Middle East, in reference to Senator's Flanders' resolution S. Con Res. 106 (to which JFK is opposed because he says "it proceeds from some false premises"). "First, at the heart of his reasoning is the belief that the primary source of unrest in the Middle East is the existence of the State of Israel and the support which the United States has given to that Middle East democracy. I would not deny that Israel has sharpened feelings and antagonisms within the Middle East and that it provides one more rallying point for Arab nationalism. However, it seems to me a gross misreading of Arab nationalism to believe that it became anti-Western only as a result of U.S. support for Israel--without recognizing the historic roots of Arab nationalism, the balkanization of the Middle East which occurred after the breakup of the Ottoman empire at the conclusion of World War I, and the role which Russia has played in the Middle East, most notably in the last five years. [para break] Secondly, I would suggest that, in so far as American policy is responsible, there are other mistakes which we have made--to believe, for example, that Nasserism is a mere outgrowth of Russian Communism, and the delusion of the Baghdad Pact which represents a belief that military alliances can provide stability and which has encouraged inter-Arab cleavages through its emphasis on the 'Northern Tier.' It was never realistic to believe that we could set off Iraq against Cairo. They were simply not two equivalent weights on the scale. Indeed, one of my reservations about the Flanders resolution is precisely the implication that there is a solution. There are corrections, improvements and gambles that we can take in the Middle East; confusion rests in believing that the type of pulsations which are vibrating through that area can be controlled by any single line of policy, however well motivated."

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F68G8HMM/UQY9L4

      Full Citation: JFK to Frank Maria, August 18, 1958, Pre-presidential Papers-Senate Files, Box 693, JFK Library.

    27. “the Baghdad Pact will have little effective influence.”

      <br>

      Source Excerpt (Source 1): Letter to Maurice Mordka has note calling "Northern Tier" concept "dubious," says "Unless we can develop an economic program which embraces the Middle East regionally and which stimulates multilateral assistance in the area, the Baghdad Pact will have little effective influence." (dated March 18, 1958, also says "the danger of external aggression is not the chief one in the Middle East at the present time.")

      Data Source (Source 1): https://doi.org/10.5064/F68G8HMM/5MRQHX

      Full Citation (Source 1): JFK to Maurice Mordka, March 18, 1958, Pre-presidential Papers-Senate Files, Box 691, JFK Library.

      Full Citation (Source 2): Kennedy, John F. 1957. "A Democrat Looks at Foreign Policy." Foreign Affairs 36 (44-59).

    28. to make its ameliorating effect on his life apparent.”

      <br>

      Source Excerpt: "Reason for spread of Communism is failure of those who believe a different [theory? Or no word at all?] and as they feel superior theory of life to explain this theory in terms intelligible to the ordinary man and to make its ameliorating effect on his life apparent. This especially true in Far East where do not have same experience + tradition in personal liberty that Westerners do - therefore do not miss it."

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F68G8HMM/5F3VJ7

      Full Citation: JFK Travel Journal, Personal Papers, Box 11, JFK Library. (p. 146)

    29. to maintain a status-quo wherever we find existing regimes anti-communistic.”

      <br>

      Source Excerpt: "We in America are apt to think of Asia in terms of teeming millions who live in squalor and who are deemed to no better fate. Poverty, lack of medical care and illiteracy are indeed the first to meet the eye of the new-comer, to that area. But the future of Asia may be made bright if we will only study its potential, and the alliance of Asia and democracy can be made steadfast if we heed the warning. [para break] The rough bottom of Asia's problem is landlordism. Who shall own the land. For centiries [sic] it has been in the hands of the powerful and wealthy few. The peasant has concluded that he has no escape but revolution itself from the crushing yoke of tenancy. [para break] We send technical experts abroad to help in seed selection, soil conservation, malaria control and the like. But we never raise or voices to better the economic lot under a land system where increased production merely enriches the few. We seem to forget that health programs and the like merely increase the number of people among whom the existing poverty must be rationed[.] [para break] We put billions of dollars behind corrupt and reactionary governments which exempt the rich from income taxes and fasten the hold of oligarchy tighter and tighter on the nation. [para break] The fact is that America has been so engrossed in providing a defense against Communism that we have lost the initiative. Our great weakness has been our negative attitude. We have been anti-communist. We have been "Pro" nothing. [para break] No matter how feverish our efforts, the red tide of Communism seems to spread abroad. We are seized with panic as the water laps on feeble dikes. So, we rush to the support of every group which opposes Soviet Communism. That puts us in partnership with the corrupt and reactionary groups whose policies breed the discontent on which Soviet Communism feeds and prospers--groups which might have long ago collapsed if it had not been for our assistance. In short we even support and sustain corruption and tyranny to maintain a status-quo wherever we find existing regimes anti-communistic." [end of page]

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F68G8HMM/GALQ86

      Full Citation: JFK, Speech to Massachusetts Federation of Taxpayers Associations, April 21, 1951, Pre-presidential Papers-House Files, Box 95, JFK Library. (p. 6)

    30. the Soviets can take control over areas without the use of military force.

      <br>

      Source Excerpt <br>[p. 1] "But while the threat to our security in both Western Europe and the Far East is primarily military, the political struggle for power has assumed increasing importance in recent months in other and equally vital areas. [para break] Harnessing as they have to their imperialistic aims, the apparatus of World-Wide Communism, with its emphasis on the internationalism of the proletariat and the doctrine of the class struggle, the Soviets have made tremendous progress toward securing control of that struggle, the Soviets have made tremendous progress toward securing control of that strategic arch between Turkey and the South China Sea, "An Area", in the words of the New York Times, "That Provides an ideal position for flanking maneuvers against both fronts." [para break] In these countries, Nationalistic passions have been sweeping with Forest-Fire fury and the passions are directed primarily at the Colonial policies of the West. The outbreaks in Morocco; the demands of the Egyptians for the control of the Suez; the Nationalization of oil in Itan [sic - Iran?]; the Communist-led up-risings in Indo-China, Malaya and Burma; the Syria-Israel Border dispute; the struggle between Pakistan and India over Kashmir; the Collapse of the Public [end of page]"

      <br>[p. 2] ". . . confidence in the Government of the Philipines, which is being exploited by the Hukbalahaps; all are symptomatic of the basic turmoil and tension in that area, which the Communists are exploiting."

      <br>[p. 4] "The crisis in Iran is not over oil alone, and it will not be solved by a settlement of the dispute with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. The struggle is older and deeper and its elements are common to the other countries of the Middle and Far East. The exploitation by Foreign countries of the resources and manpower of backward nations, the widespread illiteracy, misery and starvation, the domination by venal and corrupt politicians, and a massive and inefficient bureaucracy, a new and self-conscious proletariat, all compound to divide the Nations by turmoil and discontent. [para break] Faced with these disruptive forces in a vital strategic area, United States policy has been weak and vacillating."

      <br>[p.5] "The judgment of the United States that a threat to peace or security anywhere in the world is a threat to American security was first made specific in connection with the Middle East with the announcement of the Truman Doctrine in 1947. But at no time has the Middle East ceased to be closely linked with the total security interests of the United States. [para break] The actions that the United States can take in seeking to solve the problems of the security of the Middle East are conditioned, of course, at all times by prior American commitments elsewhere in the world, and by the resources, already severely strained, that the United States can make available."

      <br>[p. 6] "Of equal importance to military action is the development of techniques by which we might adjust the internal instability that creates a special threat to the security of the middle East, and which can result in action such as the Nationalism of the oil of Iran. We must recognize that by indirection, the Soviets can take control over areas without the use of military force. [para break] To combat this is a difficult and dangerous task, for not only must be avoid the suspicion of attempting to dominate the internal affairs of these nations, but also because the economy of the United States is already strained from bearing the financial burdens of the free world. Because of this, any economic measures envisaged must be considered primarily in relation to the security of this Area."

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F68G8HMM/GALQ86

      Full Citation: JFK, Speech to Massachusetts Federation of Taxpayers Associations, April 21, 1951, Pre-presidential Papers-House Files, Box 95, JFK Library. (pp. 1-5)

    31. the task has become nearly insuperable.

      <br>

      Source Excerpt: "But what makes our task infinitely more complicated is the nature of the enemy. Building strength against military aggressiveness is a difficult enough task. But the communists have endless weapons in their arsenal. Substantial fragments of still free nations give them primary loyalty to the enemy rather than each other. Their devotion to dialectical materialism and its high priests in the Russian presidium dwarf traditional loyalties, and therefore we and our friends are constantly faced with attacks on two fronts: the enemy is within the gate as well as beyond the wall. It is almost like attempting to contain air -- so wide-spread are the enemy's agents and those who follow his commands. This containment of communism was infinitely difficult in the days of Stalin -- but at least he personified to the world a bitter and implacable enemy on the make and in a hurry. Now with his passing and the substitution of the new policy of conquest by peace, with the resulting relaxation of external pressures, the task has become nearly insuperable. [para break] All of this is of course elemental, but I sometimes think in our impatience we fail to realize the enormity of what we are trying to do and must do in the future."

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F68G8HMM/NWPMPF

      Full Citation: JFK, Speech Draft, 1955 (labeled "KS-9 1955" in the "Doodles" series organized by Evelyn Lincoln), Personal Papers, Box 40, JFK Library. (p. 7, using Lincoln's page-numbering system)

    32. threatened by communist subversion or insurgency.”

      <br>

      Data Sources:<br> Source 1: http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v08/d106 <br> Source 2: http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v08/d105

      Full Citation (Source 1): Summary of "U.S. Overseas Internal Defense Policy," Editorial Note, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, VIII, Doc. 106

      Full Citation (Source 2): National Security Action Memorandum 182,"Counterinsurgency Doctrine," August 24, 1962, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, VIII, Doc. 105.

    33. despite his willingness to embrace the Pathet Lao.

      <br>

      Data Sources:<br> Source 1: http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v24/d13 <br> Source 2: http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v24/d25

      Full Citation (Source 1): Memorandum of Conversation, February 3, 1961, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, XXIV, Doc. 13.

      Full Citation (Source 2): Memorandum of Conference with President Kennedy, March 9, 1961, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, XXIV, Doc. 25.

    34. the question has become “tired and unanswerable.”

      <br>

      Full Citation: Herring, George C. 1997. "Lyndon Johnsons War?" Diplomatic History 21 (4): 645-650. (p. 648)

    35. have to concentrate her energies on these for many years.”

      <br>

      Source Excerpt: "I had then and still hold my doubts as to the possibility of a policy of neutrality between communism and democracy, between tyranny and liberty, but I could see as I travelled [sic] through India the enormous domestic problems that faced her and how she would necessarily have to concentrate her energies on these for many years. With a low standard of living frequently close to starvation, with a population far greater than ours, her national budget is only seven-tenths of the budget of New York City. As one of Nehru's Ministers said to me: 'How can you expect us after only four years to have a foreign policy, when after a hundred and fifty years you seem still to be searching for one?' [para break] I went on eastward to the areas of conflict in Malay and Indo-China. The two countries to me presented quite different problems. Malaya was impregnated with banditry and guerilla warfare. It was individuals in rebellion against authority -- individuals who were the have-nots of that world stealing and robbing from those that had. It was a war of British police, mainly recruited from the dependencies, against murderers and thieves, mostly alien, with the native population passive and neutral. There are no significant numbers of regular British troops in Malaya; although there are thousands of police. I could find little evidence of any real progress in that struggle. The resettlement of the squatters under the so-called Briggs Plan had failed to meet..."

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F68G8HMM/CCHXJ0

      Full Citation: JFK, Speech to Boston Chamber of Commerce, November 19, 1951, Pre-presidential Papers, Campaign Files, Box 102, JFK Library. (p. 5)

    36. “Uncle Sugar is as dangerous a role for us to play as Uncle Shylock.”

      <br>

      Source Excerpt: "There is not time today to fill in further details of this journey. But there is and must be time for all of us to try and understand the meaning of these events, to bring some order out of our confusion and what we ought to do about them. I say advisedly 'all of us', for just as I remarked the other night -- 'Our Foreign Policy is too important a thing to be left to the experts and the diplomats alone'. [para break] We must, I suggest, try and think in terms of three categories of things -- the things we cannot and must not do, the things we are doing that we should not be doing, and the things we are not doing that we should be doing. [para break] Let me first list the things we cannot and must not do. They are: [para break] FIRST: We cannot reform the world. We cannot and should not impose upon this Eastern world our values, our institutions or our customs. True, there is a basic sameness in all men, the desire to be free from want, from illness, from tyranny. But, however much we may value our conceptions of suffrage, our mechanical well-being, even our bathtubs, the East may think little or nothing of them. [para break] SECOND: We cannot abolish the poverty and want that for centuries has characterized this area. There is just not enough money in the world to relieve the poverty of all the millions of this world who may be threatened by Communism. We cannot and should not attempt to buy their freedom from this threat; all we can do is help them achieve that freedom if they really wish to do so. Our resources are not limitless. The vision of a bottle of milk for every Hottentot is a nice one, but it is not only beyond our grasp; it is far beyond our reach. Moreover, we ought to know now that more expenditures bring no lasting results. People who are with us merely because of the things they get from us are weak reeds to lean upon. And we do these peoples no good by such uncontrollable expenditures, for we tend by our very generosity to create a spirit of dependency that... destroys their will to rely upon their own strength. The thirty billions that we are spending in Europe since the war have yet to prove that they have made for the self-reliance of that area and will make those nations worthy bastions of defense. But whatever may be true there, to repeat such a procedure in Asia or in the South Pacific is impossible. We must make this plain not only to our people at home but plain beyond any peradventure of doubt to our Asiatic friends. There must be no misunderstanding on this score. Uncle Sugar is as dangerous a role for us to play as Uncle Shylock. [para break] Now let one turn to my second group of the things we are doing that we should not be doing. [para break] FIRST: Our representatives abroad should be not merely citizens of the United States but Americans dedicated to the principles that we live by. We have no need to apologize that is American, from the merchants of Boston, to the backwoodsmen of Tennessee or the loggers of the great Northwest. All this is America. We want no aping of foreign customs or the personal arrogation to our representatives of privileges given to them because they come from a powerful country. With some notable exceptions who are doing a real job for us under difficult circumstances, our representatives abroad seem to be a breed of their own, moving mainly in their own limited circles not knowing too much of the people to whom they are accredited, unconscious of the fact that their role is not tennis and cocktails but the interpretation to a foreign country of the meaning of American life and the interpretation to us of that country's aspirations and aims. [para break] SECOND: We must make no broad, unlimited grant, to any government. Aid and help in the matter of techniques is a different thing. It is concrete and business-like to tender help along these lines. But as some of our recent experience demonstrates, more grants of money are debilitating and wasteful. More than this, they favor the 'ins' as contrasted from the 'outs'. Techniques, however, favor neither; Service and 'know-how' are neutral. [para break] THIRD: Our propaganda must reach all levels and all types of men. Nothing seemed quite so futile to me as the current practices of the Voice of America. Fashioned to short-wave radio sets that only the rich can afford, often transmitted in languages that only the rich have been...

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F68G8HMM/C5SL2T

      Full Citation: JFK, Speech to Boston Chamber of Commerce, November 19, 1951, Pre-presidential Papers, Campaign Files, Box 102, JFK Library. (pp. 7-8)

    37. methods of riot control and counterinsurgency.

      <br>

      Data Sources:<br> Source 1: http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v08/d59 <br> Source 2: http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v08/d72

      Full Citation (Source 1): National Security Action Memorandum 114, "Training for Friendly Police and Armed Forces in Counter-insurgency, Counter-subversion, Riot Control and Related Matters," November 22, 1961, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, VIII, Doc. 59.

      Full Citation (Source 2): National Security Action Memorandum 132, "Support of Local Police Forces for Internal Security and Counter-insurgency Purposes," February 19, 1962, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, VIII, Doc. 72.

    38. the East may think little or nothing of them.”

      <br>

      Source Excerpt: "There is not time today to fill in further details of this journey. But there is and must be time for all of us to try and understand the meaning of these events, to bring some order out of our confusion and what we ought to do about them. I say advisedly 'all of us', for just as I remarked the other night -- 'Our Foreign Policy is too important a thing to be left to the experts and the diplomats alone'. [para break] We must, I suggest, try and think in terms of three categories of things -- the things we cannot and must not do, the things we are doing that we should not be doing, and the things we are not doing that we should be doing. [para break] Let me first list the things we cannot and must not do. They are: [para break] FIRST: We cannot reform the world. We cannot and should not impose upon this Eastern world our values, our institutions or our customs. True, there is a basic sameness in all men, the desire to be free from want, from illness, from tyranny. But, however much we may value our conceptions of suffrage, our mechanical well-being, even our bathtubs, the East may think little or nothing of them. [para break] SECOND: We cannot abolish the poverty and want that for centuries has characterized this area. There is just not enough money in the world to relieve the poverty of all the millions of this world who may be threatened by Communism. We cannot and should not attempt to buy their freedom from this threat; all we can do is help them achieve that freedom if they really wish to do so. Our resources are not limitless. The vision of a bottle of milk for every Hottentot is a nice one, but it is not only beyond our grasp; it is far beyond our reach. Moreover, we ought to know now that more expenditures bring no lasting results. People who are with us merely because of the things they get from us are weak reeds to lean upon. And we do these peoples no good by such uncontrollable expenditures, for we tend by our very generosity to create a spirit of dependency that..."

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F68G8HMM/C8DNYB

      Full Citation: JFK, Speech to Boston Chamber of Commerce, November 19, 1951, Pre-presidential Papers, Campaign Files, Box 102, JFK Library. (p. 7)

    39. develop techniques that will checkmate this new advance.”

      <br>

      Source Excerpt: "The policies of the fascists in the 30's proved the truth of Karl von Clausewitz saying that war is simply 'the continuation of politics by other means'. If his statement is amended to peace is simply 'the continuation of war [note - JFK crossed out "politics" here and added "war"] by other means' we will have an accurate generalization of communist policy in recent months. Peace has never been used with such effectiveness as a tactic in a strategy of world conquest. And the central problem for us now is to develop techniques that will checkmate this new advance. [para break] Since 1947 when the Communists attempted to seize control of Greece which had been pledged in one of World War II's less publicized agreements under the influence of the West, most specifically of Great Britain, the United States has been engaged in putting together against great odds a grand alliance, dwarfing any in world history. [I sometimes think that we fail to realize how complicated is the task to which we have set our hand. To attempt to combine nations of endless geographical, cultural and ethnological variety, many of which have memories of centuries of mutual hostility, others of which have been exploited for centuries in the most savage and systematic manner and a few of which suffer from a severe maldistribution internally, of economic and political power, is a most difficult endeavor. For these are the disparate elements which the United States seeks to catalyze into a stable world wide alliance." [end of page]

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F68G8HMM/CPPSGX

      Full Citation: JFK, Speech Draft, 1955 (labeled "KS-9 1955" in the "Doodles" series organized by Evelyn Lincoln), Personal Papers, Box 40, JFK Library. (p. 6, using Lincoln's page-numbering system)

    40. as such its enemy and not its friend.”

      <br>

      Source Excerpt: "...let alone to follow what may be a precarious path of neutrality away from what she regards fundamentally as a Western and not an Eastern conflict. [para break] East of Singapore, the key to the whole situation originally lay in China. The failure of our earlier China policy and the loss of the friendship the millions of Chinese once held for us are tragedies beyond all measure. Whether we shall ever recoup these losses, no one can say. But in Southeast Asia, we mean very little now and that little is not good. In Indo-China we have allied ourselves to the desperate effort of a French regime to hang on to the remnants of empire. There is no broad, general support of the native Viet Nam Government among the people of that area and there will be none until the French give clear indications that, despite their gallantry, they are fighting not merely for themselves but for the sake of strengthening a non-Communist native government so that it can move safely toward independence. These Indo-Chinese states are puppet states, French principalities with great resources but as typical examples of empire and of colonialism as can be found anywhere. To check the southern drive of Communism makes sense but not only through reliance on the force of arms. The task is rather to build strong native non-Communist sentiment within these areas and rely on that as a spearhead of defense rather than upon the legions of General de Lattre, brilliant though he may be. And to do this apart from and in defiance of innately nationalistic aims spells foredoomed failure. To the rising drive of nationalism, we have unfortunately become a friend of its enemy and as such its enemy and not its friend."

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F68G8HMM/BQXHSH

      Full Citation: 20. JFK, Radio Speech reporting on Middle and Far East Trip, November 14, 1951, Pre-presidential Papers-House Files, Box 95, JFK Library. (p. 5)

    41. “accept[ing] the Russian model of economic modernization.”

      <br>

      Source Excerpt: "There are many reasons why a drastic cut or abandonment of foreign aid - conceived as economy at home - would mean a decisive loss of ground abroad. [para break] Though our foreign assistance programs are in some respects rigid and out-of-date and have included some waste, there are still important national and security objective which foreign aid can help to reach. In several areas of the world our assistance can be geared to business-like objectives and methods which are not mere reflexes to foreign blackmail or fabricated crises. [para break] We tend to forget that foreign aid does have a high return; it is not just a one way giveaway. Foreign assistance and defense support is necessary for the prevention of limited wars and accidental incidents which can trigger a war situation by reinforcing local troops and supplying them with appropriate weapons. Foreign aid can help to protect against Democratic failure in some underdeveloped areas, especially India which has a real program of Democratic economic development and is engaged in a historic competition with China. This assistance is one of the main protections we have against the erosion of the Western alliance and our vital bases in Europe and along its periphery. [para break] If we do not continue foreign aid in its major outlines and adopt [adapt?] it to the changing pattern of events, Europe will drift into neutralism, our own defense costs will have to rise, and our world trade and resource position will deteriorate. Moreover, other nations, disenchanted by Western methods of economic development and attracted by the new Soviet economic offensive in trade and aid, will accept the Russian model of modernization and fall into the Soviet sphere as China did after World War II. The dimensions of our struggle against Communism have changed. The economic challenge of the Soviet Union has reinforced the continuing military threat of the Communist world. We should not attempt to compete with the Soviet Union measure for measure, move for move. But we must have in the years ahead a foreign economic program which stands on its own feet. I am confident that we have the human will and economic margin to make the kind of effort which the times and the common interest demand."

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F68G8HMM/ICWMEU

      Full Citation: JFK, undated and untitled document that begins "There are many reasons why a drastic cut or abandonment of foreign aid . . . ," Pre-presidential Papers-Senate Files, Box 561, JFK Library. (p. 1)

    42. those peoples that our policies must be directed.”

      <br>

      Source Excerpt: "If one thing was borne into me as a result of my experiences in the Middle as well as the Far East, it is that Communism cannot be met effectively by merely the force of arms. It is the peoples themselves that must be led to reject it, and it is to those peoples that our policies must be directed. A Middle East Command operating without the cooperation and support of the Middle East Countries, including Israel, not only would intensify every anti-western force now active in that area but from a military standpoint would be doomed to failure. The very sands of the desert would rise to oppose the imposition of an outside control upon the destinies of these proud peoples. As its commander said only the other day, Suez is a mere temporary and worthless bastion if encircled by enemies and not friends. [para break] The true enemy of the Arab world is poverty and want. In our search for security we have failed too often to see that the way to friendship is to..."

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F68G8HMM/62EYYR

      Full Citation: JFK, Radio Speech reporting on Middle and Far East Trip, November 14, 1951, Pre-presidential Papers-House Files, Box 95, JFK Library. (p. 3)

    43. not merely for political blackmail or prestige buildups.”

      <br>

      Source Excerpt: "2. Senator Kennedy has been active throughout his career in the Congress in seeking ways of liquidating untenable colonial relationships and bringing the newer nations into constructive association with the United States. Beginning in 1950, Senator Kennedy, on the basis of personal observation and study, warned about the dangers imminent in Indo-China and the need to achieve solutions before catastrophe. Many of the suggestions which he made were belatedly made after further losses in 1954. In 1957, Senator Kennedy spoke out openly on the need to achieve a solution in Algeria before this situation tore apart NATO and the inner strength of the Western alliance in Europe. He proposed that Algeria be made a part of a federation with France which would include also the pro-Western free nations of Tunisia and Morocco." Continues in next paragraph: "3. Senator Kennedy has spoken forcefully, most recently in a notable address in August, regarding the dangers of lags in our military effort. Especially in long-range missiles, and in our ability to wage local 'brush-fire' wars, there is critical danger that there will be a widening gap between the resources of the Soviet Union...and the United States. He has also repeatedly warned about the dangers that such a 'gap' can pose to our ability to hold firm in our alliances in Europe and Asia, and the dangers it creates for a growing neutralism in nations which we can inadequately defend. [para break] 4. Senator Kennedy, in association with Senator Cooper of Kentucky, has been the foremost exponent of the need to aid India in its long-term economic effort. He has pointed out again and again the opportunities and the dangers which exist in India for all the West. If the United States and other Western nations come to the assistance of India before a deep crisis has set in, then there is a real chance to prevent another 'China story' from occuring in the Far East. In India the West has the best chance for building a non-Communist nation with effective influence against the growing threat and influence of Communist China." [para break] "5. Senator Kennedy has long been a leader in the effort to achieve more satisfactory foreign aid programs. He was a strong supporter of the Marshall Plan and has supported actively defense economic programs for other nations. He has been especially concerned to achieve a better balance between our economic and military programs and to make certain that our large commitment in military assistance...is used constructively and not merely for political blackmail or prestige buildups."

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F68G8HMM/IDQK0G

      Full Citation: Memo, N.D.(titled "Foreign Policy Activities"), Pre-presidential Papers-Senate Files, Box 692, JFK Library. (p. 2)

    44. military reforms essential to internal respect and stability.”

      <br>

      Data Source: http://research.archives.gov/description/193915

      Full Citation: JFK, Special Message to the Congress on Urgent National Needs, May 25, 1961 in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961. 1962. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. (pp. 399-400)

    45. problems of all of these nations in one blanket resolution.”

      <br>

      Source Excerpt: "Finally, this resolution presents problems to the Congress because of the very nature of the Middle East itself. Today, no two nations in that area justify the same considerations. The Jewish State of Israel, the strong nationalism of Egypt, the deterioration in Jordan, the dangers of an overthrow in Iraq, the Communist penetration of Syria, the separate alliances to which Turkey, Iran and Pakistan belong -" [end of page] o [IMGP1068]: "these are all individual considerations which make it difficult to provide a single remedy for these widely varying problems of all of these nations in one blanket resolution. Nevertheless, some facts are in general agreement: the area is currently one of instability and of dangerous Communist penetration; it is an area vital to our security which must be kept free from Communist control, at whatever sacrifice or risk; and in the securing of these objectives and the prevention of war, partisan considerations must be ruled out."

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F68G8HMM/KIWAUP

      Full Citation: JFK, Speech Draft, N.D.(titled "Congress Looks at the Eisenhower Middle East Doctrine"), Pre-presidential Papers-Senate Files, Box 675, JFK Library. (pp. 6-7)

    46. little value in a war that is primarily civil.”

      <br>

      Source Excerpt: P. 9 "...defeats will not bring about miracles - but [handwritten: "the immedciate gravity of independence"] is of transcendent importance and is long overdue. [para break] The emphasis placed in recent days on the building of a system of guarantees among some of the neighboring countries, should not blind us to the fact that the war in Indo-China is an internal one -- that the assistance given to the Communist forces within the country by the Chinese is substantially less than what we are giving the French Union forces -- [unclear if this is where the addition is meant to go but possibly here] that the French Union forces outnumber the Communist forces -- and that military guarantees of assistance from surrounding countries in case of outright aggression by the Chinese will be of little value in a war that is primarily civil. [para break] The support of the countries that Secretary Dulles visited last week -- England and France -- are of course essential to effective united action, but Asia cannot be saved in Europe. The support of the Asians themselves is a primary requisite to success -- and not only of the Australians, New Zealanders and the people of the Philippines -- who are after all island people -- but the masses of continent of Asia itself, who have viewed the war because of its colonial complexion, with a cold neutrality. Although the United States would be expected to bear its proportionate share of the burden, we cannot save those who will not be saved. We cannot preserve the independence of Indo-China and Southeast Asia, regardless of the extent of our effort, unless the people of [handwritten insertion] Asia, in India, Burma, Indonesia as well as the people of the Asiatic S.E. [end handwritten insertion] will play their proper part in any united effort. [handwritten addendum] These are the hard facts that must be considered before we undertake unilateral action in that area that could result in disaster or a bloody stalemate." [end of page]

      Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F68G8HMM/4LQW2F

      Full Citation: JFK, Speech Materials for Speech to Cook County Democrats, Chicago, April 20, 1954 (labeled "KS- 3 1954" in the "Doodles" series), Personal Papers, Box 40, JFK Library. (p. 9)

    47. the basis for U.S. policy in South Vietnam by March 1962.

      <br>

      Data Sources:<br> Source 1: http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v02/d42 <br> Source 2: http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v02/d51

      Full Citation (Source 1): Roger Hilsman, "A Strategic Concept for South Vietnam," February 2, 1962, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, II, Doc. 42.

      Full Citation (Source 2): Robert Thompson, Draft Paper, N.D.(titled "Delta Plan"), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, II, Doc. 51.

    48. there was little the United States could do to stop the coup.

      <br>

      Data Sources:<br> Source 1: http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v04/d236 <br> Source 2: http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v04/d242

      Full Citation (Source 1): Bundy to Lodge, October 29, 1963, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, IV, Doc. 236.

      Full Citation (Source 2): Saigon to State, October 30, 1963, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, IV, Doc. 242.

    49. we are not saving them for the Junior Prom.”

      <br>

      Full Citation: Rostow to JFK, March 29, 1961, quoted in Fordham, Benjamin O. 2004. "A Very Sharp Sword: The Influence of Military Capabilities on American Decisions to Use Force." Journal of Conflict Resolution 48 (5): 632-656. (p. 632)

  3. Aug 2019
    1. What the Iran-Iraq War Tells Us about the Future of the Iran Nuclear Deal

      <br> This is an Annotation for Transparent Inquiry project, published by the Qualitative Data Repository.

      <br/>

      <font>The Data Overview discusses project context, data generation and analysis, and logic of annotation.</font> </br/>

      Please cite as:

      Tabatabai, Ariane M.; Tracy Samuel, Annie. 2019. "Data for: What the Iran-Iraq War tells us about the future of the Iran nuclear deal". Qualitative Data Repository. https://doi.org/10.5064/F6IOMX5S.

      Additional documentation can be found on QDR.

      Learn more about ATI here.

  4. Jul 2019
    1. Pastoralist Decision-Making on the Tibetan Plateau

      <br> This is an Annotation for Transparent Inquiry project, published by the Qualitative Data Repository.

      <br/>

      <font>The Data Overview discusses project context, data generation and analysis, and logic of annotation.</font> </br/>

      Please cite as:

      Yeh, Emily T.. 2018. "Data for: Pastoralist decision-making on the Tibetan plateau". Qualitative Data Repository. https://doi.org/10.5064/F6WACFVR

      Additional documentation can be found on QDR.

      Learn more about ATI here.

    2. Village Five of Gouli Township

      <br>

      Analytic note: This is a photograph of part of Village Five, Gouli Township (the study site) in July 2009, to give a sense of the pastoral landscape. These are winter pastures. Rows of dung, collected for use as fuel, can be seen in the photo, as can rolls of barbed wire used for fencing.

      Data source: https://data.qdr.syr.edu/file.xhtml?fileId=15507

      Full Citation: Yeh et al, July 2009. Site landscape photograph, Village Five, Gouli Township.

    3. the relationship between livestock and rangeland condition, snowstorms, daily herding practices, livestock sales, identity, and household aspirations and definitions of success.

      <br>

      Data Source: https://data.qdr.syr.edu/file.xhtml?fileId=15505

      Note on data source: For greater transparency, the semi-structured interview guide is attached. Questions were translated into Tibetan and were not necessarily all asked, or in order.

      Full Citation: Yeh et al, 2009. Household survey with semi-structured interview guide.

    4. contract their livestock to other households.

      <br>

      Analytical Note: This file contains a detailed write-up of strategies of herding relevant to Pasture #6 in our study, the use rights of which are held by Pastoralist L, who is in the category of "wealthier household..[with] more livestock than they feel their land or labor can support." This detailed write-up by Gaerrang was based on interviews conducted in person, in Tibetan, in summer 2009, 2010, and with some follow-up phone calls in 2011. Each pasture in our study was similarly described. The complicated narrative of contracts provides the reader with a view of the type of data we were dealing with, and provides further evidence of the complexity of contracting. It can also be read as another example of "successful use of contracts" beyond the cases of Pastoralist T and Pastoralist H provided in the next section of the paper.

      Data Source: https://data.qdr.syr.edu/file.xhtml?fileId=15509

      Full Citation: Gaerrang, 2011. Write-up of strategies of herding relevant to Pasture #6, the use rights of which are held by Pastoralist L. Based on interviews conducted in person, in Tibetan, in summer 2009, 2010, and with some follow-up phone calls in 2011.

    5. our intention is not to paper over differences in the degree to which this is the case.

      <br>

      Analytic Note: As part of our study, we asked pastoralists to judge each other's herding skills, and we also developed our own rankings based on our observations. Our quantitative analyses have shown, however, that these skill categories were only weakly correlated with changing productivity over time.

    6. “age of degeneration”

      <br>

      Pastoralist S: “The size of livestock in past was larger than today’s livestock….This is because the sa bcud [nutrition/essence] of the soil is getting worse, and as result the land cannot sustain the livestock as much as it could in the past. Therefore the livestock is not as large as used to be."

      "Malnutrition of the land is due to the lots of mining and digging the soil for various reasons."

      "In a similar way, people are getting smaller. There was a stone in my winter pasture that had been moved by my grandfather’s brother. He had used the stone for making an altar. Last year, Village Five wanted to use it make another altar somewhere else, but they had to use ten people to move the stone…In general, everything is getting smaller. This is because of the degeneration of time. With this degeneration, all living beings are less fortunate that their ancestors.”

      Pastoralist DT: [after stating that the soil had lost its bcud, was asked why.] “The earth is getting older and so it is losing its nutrition. It’s just like people. When you’re young, even if you’re ugly, your skin is still smooth, but when you get older your skin is all wrinkled. So the issue is time. Time has gone on longer and so the earth is losing its vitality, just like people do as they get older. Degeneration of time.”

      Pastoralist TK: “There is huge difference between the size of yaks in the past and now. ..People are also become smaller than used to be. One is the general degeneration of [the current] time.”

      Full Citation: Gaerrang and Yeh, 2009. Interview excerpts from fieldwork, further context examples.

    7. in places where livestock do not grow well, then the grass does not grow even where no livestock are put on the land,” a proposition contradicted by our vegetation study (Harris et al. 2016).However, these assessments are tempered and somewhat contradicted by other statements, sometimes by the same herders, that do suggest the importance of livestock density, usually couched in terms of a problem of trampling rather than grazing per se.

      <br>

      Analytical note: After analyzing our initial data, we were particularly interested in further probing herders’ views of the determinants of grassland productivity. Author Volkmar conducted follow-up interviews in Gouli in 2014. Here are some additional responses to the question, “if you were to herd more than the number of livestock you have indicated as the maximum number you would want to graze, what if anything would be the effect in that year and in subsequent years?”

      Corresponding Source: Harris R. B., Samberg L. H., Yeh E. T., Smith A. T., Wang W., Wang J., Gaerrang, and Bedunah D. (2016). Rangeland responses to pastoralists’ grazing management on a Tibetan steppe grassland, Qinghai Province, China, The Rangeland Journal. 38(1): 1-15. doi: 10.1071/RJ150410.

      Source excerpt translations:

      Pastoralist B: “If you herded more what the land could sustain, it could affect the land to some extent; but it will not be as serious as the damage caused by pikas.”

      Pastoralist DK: “If I herded 800 sheep, then half if not more that would die at the end of winter and the land (soil) would be die if this happened several years in a row. If I herded 200 yaks in my winter pasture, but herded them in the summer pasture for about 3 months, the pasture should be fine. …I personally think that it is not good to herd too many livestock on one’s pasture. We should herd what the land could sustain.”

      Pastoralist N: “It is said that if you herded more than what the land could sustain, the herd would kill the pasture by tramping, which should affect the grass growth in the next year. “

      Pastoralist GK: “[my] pasture can sustain 400 sheep. That is without yaks, and 400 sheep do not harm the pasture and they do not die. There is no difference between herding 500 sheep and 700 sheep in terms of grassland condition. If you herd more than 400 sheep, the additional number of sheep would die. In my pasture, every year, herds graze until there is no grass left, but the grass is same every year. 400 sheep could graze for six months and 700 sheep could finish the grass within about three months. When there is no grass left, there are no herds to graze. Generally speaking, in some parts of pasture, the grass grows better than other places. If it is place where grass grows well, then regardless of number of livestock, grass grows every year; if it is a place where grass does not grow well in most years, the grass does not grow very much even no livestock is herded.”

      Pastoralist K: “If the number of livestock exceeds the maximum number, then the livestock would die but this will not impact on next year’s grass growth as long as the precipitation is good.”

      Pastoralist LG: “If I herded 1500 sheep, which is more than the land could sustain, the sheep would die after the grass is finished. The [next year] grass growth is the same if the precipitation is the same. If I graze 800 sheep they won’t die, but the grass would be finished when I move to the spring pasture…The difference is that if the pasture was grazed during the spring when the grass was growing, then the height of grass would be not as good as otherwise, in which the grass wasn’t grazed by livestock during the grass growing period of spring.”

      Note: Pastoralist GK’s statement here appears to somewhat contradict another statement that he made, as quoted in the article, “if you herd fewer livestock on the pasture, this is good for grassland condition.” This is one example where herders appeared to invoke a radical nonequilibrium view (in which only physical factors, i.e. precipitation and temperature, but not herbivory are controls on vegetation productivity) that was negated elsewhere in statements as well as by their actual herding practices.

      Full Citation: Volkmar, 2014. Follow-up interviews in Gouli, herders’ views of the determinants of grassland productivity.

    8. Most herding households in Gouli take part in contracting of livestock and land.

      <br>

      Analytic Note: This spreadsheet of livestock management over the winter of 2009-2010 was compiled in June 2010 by Gaerrang. Each winter pasture in the study site given a number and interviews were conducted to determine how many, what types, and whose livestock were grazing, during what part of the winter season. This illustrates that due to extensive contracting, pasture use rights often do not correspond to livestock labor. W is an active middleman involved in mediating deals between other herders. The spreadsheet also demonstrates that the idea of “winter pasture” is complicated by the fact that not all livestock are on a specific winter pasture during the winter season.

      Data Source: https://data.qdr.syr.edu/file.xhtml?fileId=15508

      Full Citation: Gaerrang. June 2010 (compiled). Livestock spreadsheet of livestock management over the winter of 2009-2010.

    9. there is widespread agreement that livestock weights have decreased over time.

      <br> Full Citation: (1) Interview July 7, 2009, with Herder H. Interview conducted in Tibetan by Gaerrang and Yeh, notes taken in English at time of interview by Yeh. (2) Interview July 26, 2009 with Herder T. Interview conducted in Tibetan by Gaerrang and Yeh, notes taken in English at time of interview by Yeh. (3) Interview July 13, 2009, with Herder S. Interview conducted in Tibetan and later transcribed in English by Gaerrang.

      Source Excerpt: Interview July 7, 2009, with Herder H. “The weight of livestock has definitely decreased. Ten years ago a big sheep would weigh 80-90 jin (1/2 kilo) whereas now they weigh only 60-70 jin. Yaks used to weigh 570-80 and now only 200-some jin.” Interview conducted in Tibetan by Gaerrang and Yeh, notes taken in English at time of interview by Yeh.

      Source Excerpt: Interview July 26, 2009, with Herder T. Interview conducted in Tibetan by Gaerrang and Yeh, notes taken in English at time of interview by Yeh. Question: “ On average, is there a difference in the weight of sheep and yaks between 10 years ago and now?” Answer: “There is a huge difference between the size of yaks in the past and now. Yaks were bigger in the past. There were yaks that weighed over 250 kilograms. Now it is hard to have such big yaks. This is not because herders do not allow yaks to grow big enough, but rather even though herders let their yaks get old enough, they would not be as big as the ones in the past. People are also become smaller than used to be. There are two reasons for smaller livestock, I think. One is the general degeneration of time, when everything is becoming smaller and smaller. The second reason is the grass scarcity over the recent several years.”

      Source Excerpt: Interview July 13, 2009, with Herder S. Interview conducted in Tibetan and later transcribed in English by Gaerrang. Question: “ On average, is there a difference in the weight of sheep and yaks between 10 years ago and now?” Answer: “ The size of livestock in the past was larger than today’s livestock. There were yaks as heavy as over 300 kilograms in the past, but now the largest one is 250 Kilograms. Similar with sheep’s weight. It is also because the nutrition of soil is getting worse. As a result the land could not sustain the livestock as well as it could in the past. Therefore the livestock is not as large as they used to be. Malnutrition of the land is due to lots of mining and digging of the soil for various reasons.”

      Analytic note: These are excerpts from 3 interviews conducted at the field site which give an example of these statements about livestock weights.

    10. soil’s “nutrition” or “essence” (sa bcud). The latter is widely deployed to explain why grassland condition suffers as a result of mining

      <br>

      An additional useful source: Yeh, Emily T and Kunga T. Lama 2013. "Following the caterpillar fungus: nature, commodity chains and the place of Tibet in China's uneven geographies." Social & Cultural Geography . 14(3): 318-340.

      Source excerpt: "The removal of substances that constitute the "bcud" (nutrition or essence) of the earth is widely believed to be harmful. Loss of grassland productivity, generalized environmental degradation, and natural disasters such as earthquakes are all attributed to the removal of the "bcud," mostly in the form of minerals.....According to one elderly pastoralist woman in Golog: '....Minerals have also been taken away, taking away the "bcud" of the place. This has made it harder for people in this region to survive, decreasing their fortune [bsod nams] and hindering prosperity...'" (p. 324).

      Full Citation: Yeh E. T. (2014). Reverse environmentalism: contemporary articulations of Tibetan Buddhism, culture, and environmental protection. In: Van der Veer P, Miller J, Yu D.S., (eds.), Religious Diversity and Ecological Sustainability in China. Routledge, New York, pp. 194–218.

    11. 2008

      <br>

      Analytic note: This longer excerpt from the report provides a further illustration of typical claims about grasslands in Tibet, as discussed in the first two paragraphs of the introduction.

      Source excerpt translation: Page 370, "Section 2: Support the transformation of traditional pastoralism, development green ecological industries for the plateau:

      [The government] should try hard to change these concepts in traditional pastoralism: judging wealth by livestock numbers, perceiving rangeland as free resources, using [rangeland] without limit, and the unwillingness to slaughter or sell. [It should] strenuously support the transformation of grasslands animal husbandry toward modern animal husbandry. [It should] properly provide organization and services, using state support to control livestock numbers, adjust herd structure, improve standards for breeds, raise the level of mechanization in animal husbandry, implement the extermination of pikas and rodents, plant grass, scatter seeds on grasslands, and other improvement projects…"

      Data source: https://data.qdr.syr.edu/file.xhtml?fileId=15504

      Full Citation: Yeh et al. 2008, Grassland Report. Pg. 370, Section 2.

    12. as demonstrated in the epigraphs above, they are premised upon the assumptions that Tibetan pastoralists

      <br>

      Analytic note: Here is another example of the prevalence of these assumptions. This brochure, entitled “Constructing the Grassland Ecological Protection Compensation Subsidy Incentive Mechanism – Responsibility, Conditions and Standards” was distribute to herders in the TAR. Text is in Tibetan on one side and Chinese on the other. Both the illustrations and the text make the assumptions that (1) herders need to be educated about overgrazing, (2) without this education, herders would naturally overstock their rangelands, (2) overstocking beyond carrying capacity will lead to desertification. Brochure copy provided by Kelly Hopping.

      Source excerpt translation (text below the cartoons): ““When grass and livestock are in equilibrium, the cows and sheep are healthy and strong. When the livestock numbers increase, the grassland degrades. The grassland desertifies, and the livestock die.”

      Data source: https://data.qdr.syr.edu/file.xhtml?fileId=15506

      Full Citation: Yeh et al., n.d. Overgrazing Brochure.

    13. considering labor availability when making decisions about herd sizes

      <br>

      Analytic note: The following excerpts from interviews conducted in 2009 by Gaerrang provide additional evidence for the ways in which pastoralists consider available labor power in making decisions about herd size and composition.

      Source excerpts: Herder H: “I cannot increase the number of yaks and sheep I have. If there were more land and also more labor available it might be possible….There is currently not enough labor to manage a larger herd of yak or sheep.”

      Herder DT: “If I do not have enough people then I can’t focus on the movement of yaks and I won’t be able to increase livestock numbers. Five years ago I stopped herding and instead my daughter and son-in-law now take care of the livestock.”

      Herder T: “I make decisions about yaks or sheep based on labor. I have three sons: two went to schools and the other is married, living in town. So, there are only two people herding now.”

      Herder LT: “I consider labor because with only one person, herding 20 yaks and 500 sheep is too difficult.”

      Full Citation: Gaerrang, 2009. Interview excerpts, additional evidence for the ways in which pastoralists consider available labor power in making decisions about herd size and composition.

    14. They also require that those who take in livestock must compensate owners for any livestock loss, including livestock deaths from heavy snow.

      <br>

      Analytic Note: For example, Pastoralist K, one of the more impoverished herders in the village, lost 290 sheep during snowstorms from 1995-1997, going from 480 sheep to 190 sheep. In the winter of 2005, he began to contract her herders’ sheep in an attempt to build up his herd. The winter of 2005-2006 he had 200 of his own sheep, 300 of N’s sheep and 400 of RY’s sheep on his pasture. The following winter, he herded 100 of his own sheep, 100 of W’s sheep and 100 of another herder’s sheep on his land. However the following year there was again a snow disaster, leading to the loss of a large number of both his own sheep and those belonging to others, which he was required to replace. Thus his herd fell to the lowest it has been since decollectivization.

      Full Citation: Yeh E. T., and Gaerrang, 2011. Tibetan pastoralism in neoliberalising China: continuity and change in Gouli. Area 43(2): 165–172.

    15. These statements about the importance of temperature and precipitation for vegetation dynamics are supported by a number of studies

      <br>

      Analytical note: Here are more interview excerpts regarding weather and grassland condition/livestock numbers and decisions. These bring in the issue of snowstorms, which was omitted from the paper due to length considerations. These interviews were conducted in July and August 2009 by Gaerrang, in Tibetan.

      Source Excerpt:

      Pastoralist LT: “We usually keep female livestock, because keeping female livestock can multiply the number of livestock…The composition of livestock can change and it is related to the annual weather condition, if it is good (the quality of grass growth, few snowing and good herder), the number of livestock will increase.”

      Pastoralist LG: "When there is more rain, grass grows better, particularly those with flowers, which are really good for yaks. If there were more of grass that was mixed with flowers, yaks would become more productive in milk, which is a very important indication of yaks’ nutritional status."

      "A smaller herd is better when there is snow disaster. This is because it is much easier to feed a small number of livestock when there is snow disaster. During the snow disaster, the grass in some parts of ground is accessible to livestock because wind blows away the snow on grass. But there isn’t much of this, so fewer livestock can access more of it. For instance, the grass that comes out of the snow is only enough for 300 sheep, but not for 500 sheep."

      "Last year we had a snow disaster. Three years ago, there was a period of time, during which there was drought for several years in a row. During those drought years, many livestock died (some households lost 15, 20 50 sheep, others have lost 100 yaks). During those years, grass did not grow well."

      "It was cold in summer last year, so the grass did not grow well even though there was pretty good rain….Yes, it is colder in summer time. In summer time, sometimes, yak dung is frozen in the morning. It wasn’t like that in the old days."

      Pastoralist S: "If people know there will be snow disasters, they would try to reduce their livestock number significantly, because this would help them to keep more livestock alive during the snow disaster. A smaller herd is easier to feed, and grass on the sunny side of slopes and grass that are exposed at the surface could feed a small number of livestock."

      Full Citation: Gaerrang, July and August 2009. Interviews conducted in Tibetan.

    16. This can be seen in how herders describe which livestock they graze at what times in what locations.

      <br>

      Source excerpt translation: (A few additional interview quotes about herding provide further evidence of knowledge-as-skill).

      Pastoralist RC: “I only have yaks because this area is better for herding yaks. It used to be a hunting area. It is not as good for sheep because of the altitude. Sheep are more likely to lose weight and die with this weather.”

      Pastoralist L: “In this area, my pasture is the smallest one. Therefore, I cannot herd at random, letting the livestock go wherever they want. I must follow them and make sure to leave some part of the pasture. I manage strong and weak livestock differently so that I get enough grass for all livestock. Weaker livestock graze on areas with thicker grass.”

      Full Citation: Yeh et al. Interviews with Pastoralist RC and Pastoralist L.

    17. Herders are largely opposed to poisoning because of their Buddhist stance on the mass taking of life, and because they note that pika numbers bounce back quickly from poisoning.

      <br>

      Analytic note: These two interview excerpts provide evidence for this statement about herders’ experience with and attitudes toward pika eradication.

      Source excerpt: For example, in an interview, pastoralist K was asked, “Are you willing to poison pikas if the government provides you with the techniques and materials? Why or why not?” He responded, “I am not willing to carry it out because I am Tibetan and it’s sinful. It’s said that the pika population increases as more poisoning programs are being carried out and therefore, such a program is not good. There is a sutra that is used to control the population of the pikas. I have heard from others that monks at the monastery have been reciting the sutra.”

      Source excerpt: In an interview, pastoralist LT stated in response to the same question, “I myself am not willing to implement the poisoning program..because it is sinful from the religious perspective.” He was then asked, “Do you think pastureland condition has improved as a result of the pika poisoning program? Why or why not?” He replied “There is no evidence to show that the poisoning program has yielded positive outcomes to the grassland as a result of the program implemented in 2006.”

      Full Citation: Choying, Palden, 2005. Two interviews conducted in Tibetan at the field site.

      These two interviews were conducted in Tibetan by PaldenChoying in 2005 in the field site.

    1. to condemn Iraq's wartime breaches of jus ad bellum and jus in bello.

      <br>

      Analytic Note: By its nature the nuclear nonproliferation regime is based and depends on international law and order—on the efficacy, reliability, and equity of international institutions like the United Nations and, to a lesser extent, of individual and groups of countries operating in those systems. For Iran, the failure of the United Nations (and of individual countries) to operate according to those standards during the Iran-Iraq War has made it question the organization’s ability to do so more generally. The twentieth volume of the War Chronology highlights how Iran’s distrust of the United Nations, which was generated by the international community’s behavior in the first weeks of the war and the failure to recognize and punish Iraq as the instigator of the conflict, was a critical factor leading to Iran’s controversial decision to invade Iraq in 1982. The sections from that volume quoted in the article demonstrate that Iran’s apprehension regarding the ability of the United Nations to act equitably and to protect its vital interests, which has been a key challenge in reaching a nuclear deal, is grounded in its wartime experience.

      Source Excerpt 1: “Iraq’s aggression against Iran was completely unquestionable, but the UNSC’s first reaction on 23 September 1980 (1 Mehr 1359), one day after the beginning of the war, in an official statement (which does not have much legal value) avoided ‘holding Iraq as the aggressor’ against Iran and [only] noted the ‘situation’! The council did not even deem ‘armed conflict’ on the borders of the two states as a ‘violation of peace’ [or] a ‘threat against peace.’ … In this way the SC actually disregarded chapter 8 of its charter that [called for] ‘action in cases that threaten peace, violate peace, and acts of aggression.’”

      Source Translation 1: با این که تجاوز عراق به ایران کاملاً محرز بود اما شورای امنیت سازمان ملل در اولین واکنش خود در ۲۳ سپتامبر ۱۹۸۰ (۱ مهر ۱۳۵۹) یعنی یک روز پس از آغاز جنگ، در بیانیهای رسمی (که از نظر حقوقی ارزش چندانی ندارد) از 'احراز تجاوز' عراق به ایران خودداری کرد و از آن با عنوان 'وضعیت' یاد کرد! شورا حتی 'درگیری مسلحانه' در مرزهای دو کشور را در حد 'نقض صلح' و 'تهدید علیه صلح' هم ندانست. ... به این ترتیب شورای امنیت عملاً مواد فصل هفتم منشور یعنی 'اقدام در موارد تهدید علیه صلح، نقض صلح و اعمال تجاوز' را نادیده گرفت.

      Source Excerpt 2: “As stated in the provisions of the Resolution [479], which did not mention Iraq’s aggression and/or its violation of Iran’s territorial integrity, the ceasefire proposals did not discuss [that] explicitly [either] and did not request Iraq’s aggressor forces to withdraw from the occupied territories. This Resolution only requested that Iran and Iraq avoid more use of force and indeed the implication was that Iraq’s aggressor army [could] still hold the occupied areas and Iranian forces could not carry out operations to recover its own occupied territories! In addition, the SC in Resolution 479, like its statement of September 23, considered the war a ‘situation between Iran and Iraq’ and by defining the Iran-Iraq War a ‘situation,’ deemed it a case that might lead to international friction and/or discord, not one where international friction and/or discord [already] existed. Therefore existing realities/facts were ignored.”

      Source Translation 2: چنان که از مفاد قطع نامه برمیآید، اشارهای به تجاوز عراق و یا نقض تمامیت ارضی ایران نشده، پیشنهاد آتش بس به صراحت مطرح نیست و از نیروهای متجاوز عراق خواسته نشده است که سرزمینهای اشغالی را ترک کنند. در این قطع نامه تنها از ایران و عراق خواسته شد که از استفاده بیشتر از زور خودداری کنند که در واقع مفهوم آن چنین است که ارتش متجاوز عراق همچنان مناطق اشغالی را در اختیار داشته باشد و نیروهای ایران برای بازپس گیری سرزمینهای اشغالی خود عملیاتی انجام ندهند! علاوه بر این، شورای امنیت در قطع نامه ۴۷۹ نیز همچون بیانیه ۲۳ سپتامبر، جنگ را با عنوان 'وضعیت میان ایران و عراق' مورد بررسی قرار داد و با اطلاق 'وضعیت' به جنگ ایران و عراق، آن را حالتی دانست که ممکن است به اصطکاک بینالمللی و یا اختلاف منجر شود نه حالتی که در آن، اصطکاک بینالمللی و یا اختلاف وجود دارد. بنابراین واقعیتهای موجود را نادیده گرفته بود.

      Link: The UN statement and UNSC resolution to which the volume refers in this quote can be found at: http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/479(1980) <br> Permanent link: https://perma.cc/8K43-DW6R <br>

      Full Citation: Rūzshumār-i Jang-i Īrān va ‘Irāq, Jild-i 20: ‘Abūr az Marz; Ta’qīb-i Mutajāviz bā ‘Amalīyyāt-i Ramażān [Chronology of the Iran-Iraq War, Vol. 20: Crossing the Border; Pursuing the Aggressor in the Ramazan Operations] (Markaz-i Muṭāla‘āt va Taḥqīqāt-i Jang [Center for War Studies and Research], 1381/2002-03), 20-21.

    2. that can withstand U.S. “provocations.”

      <br> Analytic Note: In an earlier version of the article, we had a longer description and analysis of the notion of “resistance economy” presented by Khamenei. We cut those sections given the space constraints. The following is the full paragraph on resistance economy: Meeting Iran’s practical needs is not limited to the technological and military realms and extends also to the country’s economy. While believing that their country should be able to meet its basic needs, the Iranian public and many within the regime also recognize that closing it off is also not viable. These conflicting views have been reconciled somewhat easily through efforts to develop what has been termed a “resistance economy.”

      In Khamenei’s words, resistance economy is “an economy that is resilient,” immune to sanctions and fluctuations in the world economy, and can withstand U.S. “provocations.” Ultimately, the narrative of “resistance economy” is largely built around sanctions resulting from the nuclear crisis but borrows language, themes, and ideas from the lesson of distrust learned from the war. Today, it serves to rally the nation around the regime’s more conservative elements’ inward-looking policies of self-reliance and to alleviate concerns stemming from the lack of trust in the future of the JCPOA process.

    3. Rafsanjani made the decision to resume the [nuclear] program” during the Iran-Iraq War

      <br>

      Analytic Note: We noted in the article that, according to Akbar Etemad, the founder of the Iranian nuclear program under the Shah, the Islamic Republic resumed the program under Rafsanjani’s presidency, which began in the summer of 1989. However, other accounts of Iran’s nuclear efforts indicate that it was during the war and Khamenei’s, not Rafsanjani’s, presidency, that Tehran resumed the program. Available sources suggest that the latter account is more likely to be accurate. We did not discuss this point in the article, but wanted to address it here and to note that, despite the discrepancy, Etemad’s insights remain very valuable given his involvement in Iran’s nuclear program. The following excerpt is the full section on that issue from the interview with him conducted over the phone on June 10, 2014, followed by the Iran’s Primer’s account of Iran’s nuclear progress in the mid-1980s.

      Source Excerpt 1: Q: So, you started working on the nuclear program and then the revolution happened and changed everything. At first, the revolutionaries decided to halt the nuclear program because they thought it was yet another western imposition. But then, the program was resumed in the 1980s. At that point, you were no longer formally involved in the program, but did you have any contact with decision-makers at that point? Can you describe what was going on in Tehran, what the new leadership was thinking about the nuclear program?

      A: The first few years, the AEOI was destroyed. The theory, at that point, like many other things at that time, was that the United States had imposed nuclear energy on us. This was until Rafsanjani’s presidency. He was the one who made the decision to resume the program. I was in France. For years, they wanted to negotiate with me to go back. But I didn’t want to. I didn’t think working in Iran would be possible. I didn’t go. The first person they picked for the organization was someone who didn’t even know anything about the atom. They went and bought centrifuges from Pakistan, and tried to enrich Uranium.

      Source Excerpt 2: Q: Iran obviously claims that it’s never gone after nuclear weapons, just energy. Based on the communications you had with them at the time, what is your assessment of that?

      A: From the beginning, they wanted to have all the options. And they were right. I’ll tell you why I say this. The reason is that they only went after enrichment. Nothing else, just enrichment.

      Source Excerpt 3: According to the Iran Primer’s account, however, A 2009 internal IAEA working document reports that in April 1984, then President Ali Khamenei announced to top Iranian officials that Khomeini had decided to launch a nuclear weapons program as the only way to secure the Islamic Revolution from the schemes of its enemies, especially the United States and Israel.

      Iran began developing a gas centrifuge program in 1985, according to IAEA reports but realized that it needed foreign assistance to make progress on centrifuges. Iranians visited potential suppliers abroad in order to acquire and learn how to operate key centrifuge equipment. In 1987, Iran acquired key components from the A.Q. Khan network, a rogue nuclear supply network operating out of Pakistan’s state-run nuclear weapons program. The components included: • A starter kit for a gas centrifuge plant • A set of technical drawings for a P-1 (Pakistani) centrifuge • Samples of centrifuge components • And instructions for enriching uranium to weapon-grade levels. (Weapon-grade uranium is the most desirable highly enriched uranium for fission nuclear weapons and is over 90 percent enriched.)

      Full Citation: David Albright and Andrea Stricker, “Iran Nuclear Program,” The Iran Primer (2010/ Updated in 2015), http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/irans-nuclear-program <br> Permanent link: https://perma.cc/E3F4-A7DS <br>

    4. because of Iraq's “vindictive opposition to Iran.”

      <br>

      Source Excerpt: در مجموع گسترش جنگ در خلیج فارس و خطرات ناشی از آن به حضور و همکاری نظامی گسترده شرق و غرب با سه نوع نظام و ایدئولوژی متعارض: کمونیستی در شوروی، سرمایهداری در غرب و سنتی پادشاهی در کشورهای منطقه، انجامید. آنها از انقلاب اسلامی و گسترش آن احساس خطر می کردند. حضور گستردۀ نظامی آنها در منطقه که هر روز بر میزان آن افزوده میشود، عملاً جبهۀ جدیدی برای جمهوری اسلامی در مرزهای آبی جنوب به وجود آورد؛ جبهای که توانایی نظامی آن را تجزیه و درآمدهای ارزی و اقتصادی کشور را به طور کامل تهدید می کرد. توان نظامی و وضعیت اقتصادی و موقعیت بینالمللی ایران به هیچ وجه قابل مقایسه با عراق نبود. در یک طرف همۀ قدرتهای بزرگ جهان قرار داشت و در سوی دیگر جمهوری اسلامی ایران. چنین وضعیتی در منطقۀ خلیج فارس، روند تحولات جبهه و جنگ را تحت تأثیر قرار داد و در نهایت به تصمیمات جدیدی در چگونگی تداوم و پایان جنگ منجر شد.

      Source Excerpt Translation: “Overall the spread of the war in the Persian Gulf and the dangers stemming from it were the result of the presence and extensive military cooperation of east and west [and] three competing systems and ideologies: communism in the USSR, capitalism in the west, and traditional monarchism in the regional states. They were [all] alarmed by the Islamic Revolution and its spread. In practice, their military presence in the region, which increased in scale every day, brought about a new front for the Islamic Republic on the southern maritime borders; a front that divided its military power and completely threatened the state’s currency and economic revenue. Iran’s military power, economic situation, and international position were in no way comparable to Iraq[’s]. On one side were all the world’s major powers and on the other [was] the Islamic Republic of Iran. Such a situation in the Persian Gulf affected developments on the front and in the war and ultimately resulted in new decisions in the manner of continuing and ending the war.”

      Full Citation: Rūzshumār-i Jang-i Īrān va ‘Irāq, Jild-i 51: Jang-i Maḥdūd-i Īrān va Amrīkā dar Khalīj-i Fārs [Chronology of the Iran-Iraq War, Vol. 51: Limited War of Iran and America in the Persian Gulf] (Markaz-i Muṭāla‘āt va Taḥqīqāt-i Jang [Center for War Studies and Research], 1387/2008-09), 35-36.

      The fifty-first volume of the War Chronology series emphasizes how the continuation of the war and its spread into the Persian Gulf had the effect of uniting countries with very different “systems and ideologies.”

    5. Iraq had easy access to weapons and a wealth of financial and logistical aid.

      <br>

      Analytic Note: Another significant element of the global imbalance during the war, according to Iran, was the difficulty Iran had accessing weapons and other materiel during the conflict. The implications of that difficulty for Iran’s national security strategies today are clear: Since the war Iran has remained determined to prevent that problem from arising again. The primary way it has done so is by developing indigenous weapons capabilities in order to lessen its reliance on other countries in supplying its arms needs.

      Source Excerpt 1: با مقایسه وضعیت ایران و عراق از نظر تأمین سلاح و تجهیز نیروهای نظامی، ایران با مشکلات داخلی و بینالمللی شدیدتری مواجه بود. کمبود منابع مالی ناشی از تحریمهای بینالمللی و حمله عراق به مراکز اقتصادی و تأسیسات نفتی و صنعتی کشور، توان اقتصادی ایران را در تخصیص منابع ارزی به نیازهای جنگی بهحصوص تأمین تسلیحات و تجهیزات، با محدودیت شدیدی مواجه کرده بود. در عرصه بینالمللی فشار و محدودیت بر ایران برای تهیه جنگافزارها بهمراتب شدیدتر بود. در ماجرای سفر مک فارلین به تهران – که به رسوایی دولت ریگان در ادعای مبارزه با تروریسم، تلاش برای تحریم تسلیحاتی ایران و حمایت همهجانبه از اعراب انجامید – اعتبار امریکا در منطقه و جهان بهشدت آسیب دید و فشار این کشور بر ایران و حمایت آشکارتر از عراق و کشورهای منطقه ابعاد جدیدتری یافت.

      Source Excerpt Translation 1: “Comparing the situations of Iran and Iraq in terms of securing arms and equipping [their] armed forces, Iran was confronted with more severe internal and international problems. The lack of funds due to the international embargoes and Iraqi attacks on the country’s economic centers and oil and industrial facilities, placed severe restrictions on Iran’s economic strength/ability in allocating financial resources/foreign exchange reserves to its war needs and especially in procuring arms and equipment. In the international arena the constraints and restrictions in procuring arms even greater. In MacFarlane’s adventure to Tehran – which led to a scandal for the Reagan administration which claimed to combat terrorism, endeavor to embargo Iranian arms, and fully support the Arabs – severely harmed America’s credibility in the region and the world and its pressure on Iran and more open support for Iraq and the states of the region took on newer dimensions.” (32)

      Source Excerpt 2: اما عراق در خریدهای تسلیحاتی خود با هیچ کدام از موانع و مشکلات ایران به این شدت روبهرو نبود. عراق نیز همانند ایران ناگزیر بود که بیشتر درآمدهای خود را صرف هزینههای جنگ کند. لیکن بر خلاف ایران نه تنها با تحریمی روبهرو نبود بلکه از کمک قابل توجهی نیز بهره میبرد. کشورهای عرب منطقه از هیچگوره کمک نظامی، تسلیحاتی، مالی، اقتصادی و حمایتهای سیاسی و تبلیغاتی به عراق دریغ نمیکردند. سلاحها، تجهیزات و اوازم خریداری شده عراق با استفاده از کشتیها و بندرهای کویت، عربستان و اردن حمل و به وسیله کامیون به عراق منتقل میشد.

      Source Excerpt Translation 2: “In purchasing its weapons Iraq in no way faced the obstacles and problems that Iran intensely/severely did. Like Iran it was inevitable that most of Iraq’s income would be spent on the costs of the war. But in contrast to Iran, Iraq not only did not face an embargo but it also benefitted from considerable assistance. The Arab states of the region did not deny Iraq any kind of military, arms, financial, or economic aid or political and propaganda support. Weapons, equipment, and necessities purchased by Iraq were transported to Iraq by using the ships and ports of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan and transferred to Iraq by truck.”

      Full Citation: Rūzshumār-i Jang-i Īrān va ‘Irāq, Jild-i 47: Ākharīn Talāsh’hā dar Junūb [Chronology of the Iran-Iraq War, Vol. 47: Last Struggles in the South] (Markaz-i Muṭāla‘āt va Taḥqīqāt-i Jang [Center for War Studies and Research],1381/2002-2003), 32-33.

    6. Iranian leaders define the Iran-Iraq War as a conflict between Iran and a powerful group of states.

      <br>

      Analytic Note: The Revolutionary Guards connect the Iran-Iraq War to Iran’s contemporary security situation in the way they narrate the history of the conflict. They began issuing publications on the war in 1981, and have steadily produced new material since then. The monographs published during the war focused on promoting the political and social issues that were important to the Guards. Several periodicals documented the progress of the war, relevant political developments, and information on Iranian martyrs. The IRGC publications produced after 1988 include studies of the war’s causes and effects, its phases, its impact on Iranian cities, and the roles of the participants. Several IRGC organizations, including its political, education, and propaganda departments, produce publications on the war. Imam Husayn University, founded by the IRGC in 1986, publishes a journal on defense policy that often includes articles about the conflict. The Center for War Studies and Research (now called the Center for Holy Defense Documentation and Research), which the IRGC established after the war to produce analytical studies and general-use reference works about the conflict, is responsible for many other publications. All together, the Revolutionary Guards have published numerous periodicals and more than one hundred books on the subject.

      Source Excerpt: This quote from a study published by the Center for War Studies and Research demonstrates well how the IRGC views the war: جنگ ایران و عراق پیوندی تنگاتنگ با انقلاب اسلامی دارد به گونهای که بدون درک درست آن، نمیتوان به تحلیلی فراگیر از انقلاب اسلامی دست یافت. همچنین این پدیده به دلیل تأثیرات و پیآمدهای فراوانش، دست کم تا چند دهه آینده، بر همه موضوعات مربوط به سیاست داخلی و خارجی جمهوری اسلامی ایران مؤثر خواهد بود.

      Source Excerpt Translation: “The Iran-Iraq war is linked closely to the Islamic Revolution, so without a correct understanding of [the war], it is impossible to understand the Islamic Revolution. This [war], because of its vast impact and outcomes, will affect every issue of internal and foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran for at least the next several decades.”

      Link: https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/samuel_perceptions.pdf <br> Permanent link: https://perma.cc/UQE2-MZJT <br>

      Full Citations: Tajzīyah va Taḥlīl-i Jang-i Īrān va ‘Irāq Jild-i 1: Rīshah’hā-yi Tahājum (Analysis of the Iran-Iraq War, Vol. 1: Roots of Invasion), 2nd ed. (Markaz-i Muṭāla‘āt va Taḥqīqāt-i Jang (Center for War Studies and Research), 1380/2001-02), 15.

      Description of IRGC sources from Annie Tracy Samuel, “Perceptions and Narratives of Security: The Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps and the Iran-Iraq War,” International Security Program Discussion Paper 2012-06 (Cambridge, Mass.: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 2012),

    7. will affect every issue of internal and foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran for at least the next several decades.

      <br>

      Analytic Note: The Revolutionary Guards connect the Iran-Iraq War to Iran’s contemporary security situation in the way they narrate the history of the conflict. They began issuing publications on the war in 1981, and have steadily produced new material since then. The monographs published during the war focused on promoting the political and social issues that were important to the Guards. Several periodicals documented the progress of the war, relevant political developments, and information on Iranian martyrs. The IRGC publications produced after 1988 include studies of the war’s causes and effects, its phases, its impact on Iranian cities, and the roles of the participants. Several IRGC organizations, including its political, education, and propaganda departments, produce publications on the war. Imam Husayn University, founded by the IRGC in 1986, publishes a journal on defense policy that often includes articles about the conflict. The Center for War Studies and Research (now called the Center for Holy Defense Documentation and Research), which the IRGC established after the war to produce analytical studies and general-use reference works about the conflict, is responsible for many other publications. All together, the Revolutionary Guards have published numerous periodicals and more than one hundred books on the subject.

      Source Excerpt: This quote from a study published by the Center for War Studies and Research demonstrates well how the IRGC views the war: جنگ ایران و عراق پیوندی تنگاتنگ با انقلاب اسلامی دارد به گونهای که بدون درک درست آن، نمیتوان به تحلیلی فراگیر از انقلاب اسلامی دست یافت. همچنین این پدیده به دلیل تأثیرات و پیآمدهای فراوانش، دست کم تا چند دهه آینده، بر همه موضوعات مربوط به سیاست داخلی و خارجی جمهوری اسلامی ایران مؤثر خواهد بود.

      Source Excerpt Translation: “The Iran-Iraq war is linked closely to the Islamic Revolution, so without a correct understanding of [the war], it is impossible to understand the Islamic Revolution. This [war], because of its vast impact and outcomes, will affect every issue of internal and foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran for at least the next several decades.”

      Link: https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/samuel_perceptions.pdf <br> Permanent link: https://perma.cc/TT3M-Y2SF <br>

      Full Citations: Tajzīyah va Taḥlīl-i Jang-i Īrān va ‘Irāq Jild-i 1: Rīshah’hā-yi Tahājum (Analysis of the Iran-Iraq War, Vol. 1: Roots of Invasion), 2nd ed. (Markaz-i Muṭāla‘āt va Taḥqīqāt-i Jang (Center for War Studies and Research), 1380/2001-02), 15.

      Description of IRGC sources from Annie Tracy Samuel, “Perceptions and Narratives of Security: The Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps and the Iran-Iraq War,” International Security Program Discussion Paper 2012-06 (Cambridge, Mass.: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 2012),

    8. Iran's occupation of Iraq's Faw Peninsula and its drive toward Basra in January 1987

      <br>

      Analytic Note: Several volumes of the War Chronology contend that there was a direct connection between changes in the balance between the belligerents and increased international involvement, with any substantial shift in Iran’s favor leading to efforts on the part of other countries to restore the balance or give Iraq the advantage. The forty-seventh volume points to two key shifts in the second half of the war as fitting that pattern. The first was Iran’s taking of Iraq’s Fav Peninsula. Though the success of that operation is often overstated in the Iranian sources, the capture of the strategic territory did represent one of Iran’s most significant incursions into Iraq. The second was the revelation of the Iran-Contra Affair, which in Iran is often referred to as “MacFarlane’s adventure” in honor of U.S. National Security Advisor Robert MacFarlane’s expedition to Iran to arrange the deal.

      Source Excerpt: سقوط فاو در آخر سال ۱۳۶۴، لطمۀ شدیدی بر موقعیت نظامی عراق وارد آورد و مسئولان جمهوری اسلامی ایران، آمادگی خود را برای بررسی زمینههای پایان جنگ نشان دادند. عراق نیز از اوایل سال ۱۳۶۵ با اتخاذ استراتژی 'دفاع متحرک' در زمین و تهاجم گسترده هوایی و موشکی به اهداف اقتصادی و صنعتی ایران کوشید از پیآمدهای منفی سقوط فاو بکاهد. قبل از افشا شدن ماجرای مک فارلین، بخشی از مسئولان جمهوری اسلامی امیدوار بودند که با به دست آوردن یک هدف نظامی مهم، میتوان در حوزه سیاسی به پایان جنگ نزدیک شد؛ امریکا هم به طور مستقیم به مذاکره با ایران برای خاتمه دادن به جنگ امیدوار بود. لیکن افشای ماجرای مک فارلین ضربه شدیدی بر اعتبار امریکا در نزد کشورهای حامی عراق در منطقه وارد کرد و معادلات دیپلماتیک در منطقه دستخوش تغییر. ... در چنین وضعیتی که تلاشهای دیپلماتیک با فشارهای آشکار علیه جمهوری اسلامی ایران در جریان بود، پیروزی در عرصه نظامی و دستیابی به منطقه استراتژیک بصره میتوانست موقعیت سیاسی ایران را در وضع به مراتب بهتری برای پایان دادن به جنگ قرار دهد. بنابراین با وجود تغییر در مواضع امریکا و تشدید فشار علیه ایران، این تحلیل در میان برخی از مسئولان تقویت شده بود که اجرای موفقیتآمیز یک عملیات مهم میتواند تحقق خواستههای جمهوری اسلامی ایران را تسهیل سازد.

      Source Excerpt Translation: “The fall of Fav at the end of 1364 [February-March 1986] was an intense shock for Iraq’s military position and Islamic Republic of Iran officials indicated their readiness to examine bases for ending the war. In the beginning of 1365 [spring 1986] Iraq tried to diminish the negative consequences of the conquest of Fav by adopting its ‘mobile defense’ strategy on the land and its widespread air and missile assaults on Iranian economic and industrial targets. Before the revelation of MacFarlane’s adventure, some Islamic Republic of Iran officials hoped that the realization of an important military aim would bring them closer to an end to the war in the political realm; America had also hoped to engage in direct discussions with Iran in order to end the war. But the revelation of MacFarlane’s adventure was a severe hit to America’s credibility with the regional states supporting Iraq and the diplomatic equations [of who was the victim in the war] in the region changed. … In this situation of diplomatic efforts with overt pressure against the Islamic Republic of Iran, a military victory and success in the strategic area of [the Iraqi city of] Basrah could improve Iran’s political position and put it in a better position to end the war. Therefore, with the change in the American position and the intensification of pressure against Iran, the analysis of some [Iranian] officials was strengthened that the successful execution of an important operation could facilitate the realization of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s wishes.

      Full Citation: Rūzshumār-i Jang-i Īrān va ‘Irāq, Jild-i 47: Ākharīn Talāsh’hā dar Junūb [Chronology of the Iran-Iraq War, Vol. 47: Last Struggles in the South] (Markaz-i Muṭāla‘āt va Taḥqīqāt-i Jang [Center for War Studies and Research],1381/2002-2003), 18.

    9. Khamenei distanced himself from the deal and from the moderate president, Hassan Rouhani, who delivered it

      <br>

      Analytic Note: Since the JCPOA’s implementation process started in January 2016, the regime’s leadership has become more divided on what course of action will best ensure economic rejuvenation for the country. The debate has brought out key lessons from the war, including how the country should balance self-reliance and much-needed economic exchange with the world community and how it should deal with enduring distrust of foreign powers. While moderates and reformists largely continue to see economic interdependence as the right way forward, others have instead emphasized self-reliance. In particular, Khamenei has used his public appearances and televised remarks a number of times since the end of the talks to tell his base that he was right in advocating for caution when dealing with the United States in particular, whose leaders, Khamenei argues, cannot be trusted. Khamenei has repeated this sentiment multiple times since the JCPOA was signed. The following excerpt from July 2016, a year after the conclusion of the JCPOA and six months into its implementation, captures Khamenei’s distrust of the United States, what he views as European complicity in obstructing Iranian economic recovery, and belief that the JCPOA will not translate into prosperity for the nation.

      Source Excerpt: نمونهاش همین مذاکرات هستهای و برجام است که امروز مسئولین دستگاه دیپلماسی خود ما و همان کسانی که در این مذاکرات از اوّل تا آخر حضور داشتند، همینها دارند میگویند آمریکا نقض عهد کرده است، آمریکا زیر ظاهر آرام و زبان چرب و نرم مسئولانش و وزیر خارجهاش و دیگران، از پشت دارد تخریب میکند، مانع ارتباطات اقتصادی کشور با کشورهای دیگر دنیا است؛ این را مسئولین خود برجام دارند میگویند. این حرفی است که بنده البتّه از یک سال پیش و یکسالونیم پیش، مرتّب تکرار کردم که به آمریکاییها نمیشود اعتماد کرد - بعضیها سختشان بود قبول کنند - امّا امروز خود مسئولین ما میگویند. همین هفتهی گذشته، مسئولین محترم مذاکره کنندهیما با طرفهایشان در اروپا جلسه داشتند؛ همین حرفها را مسئولین ما به آنها گفتند و آنها جواب نداشتن. ... شش ماه هم از امضای برجام میگذرد، هیچ تأثیر محسوس و ملموسی هم در وضع معیشت مردم به وجود نیامده است؛ درحالیکه خب، برجام اصلاً برای برداشتن تحریمها بود؛ برای اینکه تحریمهای ظالمانه برداشته بشود. مگر غیر از این است؟ خب برداشته نشده؟ ...بنده سال گذشته در سخنرانی عمومی … گفتم برجام و این مذاکرات هستهای، برای ما یک نمونه خواهد بود؛ ببینیم آمریکاییها چهکار میکنند؛ اینها که حالا با زبان چرب و نرم میآیند، گاهی نامه مینویسند... خیلی خب ببینیم در عمل چهکار میکنند. حالا معلوم شد در عمل چهکار میکنند! در ظاهر وعده میدهند، با زبان چرب و نرم حرف میزنند امّا در عمل توطئه میکنند، تخریب میکنند، مانع از پیشرفت کارها میشوند؛ این شد آمریکا؛ این شد تجربه. حالا آمریکاییها میگویند بیایید دربارهی مسائل منطقه با شما صحبت کنیم! خب، این تجربه به ما میگوید این کار برای ما سمّ مهلک است.

      Source Excerpt Translation: An example [of U.S. untrustworthiness] lies in the nuclear negotiations and the JCPOA. Today, our own diplomats and the very people who were present in the negotiations from start to end, these very people are saying that the United States has violated the deal. America, under its calm surface and the nice words of its officials and its Secretary of State and others, is damaging [the JCPOA]. They pose an obstacle to [Iran’s] economic relations with other countries. This is what those responsible for the JCPOA are saying themselves. But that America cannot be trusted is what I had said repeatedly from a year ago and a year and a half ago. Some would hardly accept it. But today our own officials say this. This past week, our honorable negotiators had a meeting with their European counterparts. Our negotiators said the same thing and [the Europeans] did not have an answer.

      … Six months have passed from the signature of the JCPOA and there has been no tangible impact on the daily lives of people. And this is while, well, the JCPOA was fundamentally to remove the sanctions, it was so that the unjust sanctions would be removed. Is it not so? Well, they have not been removed. … Last year in a speech I said that the JCPOA and these nuclear negotiations would be an example for us; we will see what the Americans do. These [Americans] who now come with nice words, sometimes write letters… let’s see what they do in practice. Now it has become obvious what they do in practice! On the surface, they make promises and speak nice words, but in practice, they conspire and destroy. They pose an obstacle to things moving forward. That’s America. Now the Americans say come and let’s talk about regional issues! Well, this experience tells us that this is a deadly poison.

      Link: http://www.ghatreh.com/news/nn41019143/گفتم-برجام-این-مذاکرات-هسته-برای-نمونه-خواهد-بود-ظاهر. <br> Permanent link: https://perma.cc/F4HE-MTAH <br>

      Full Citation: “Guftam Barjām va īn muzākirāt-i Hastih-yi barā-yi Mā yik Nimūnih Khāhad Būd [I Said the JCPOA and these Nuclear Negotiations Would Be an Example for Us]” Qatrih (Ghatreh), July 22, 2016.

    10. the event in modern Iranian history whose significance and impact rival that of the revolution itself: the 1980–88 Iran-Iraq War.

      <br>

      Analytic Note: In his September 21, 2017 column in Foreign Policy, Stephen Walt highlights our article in his discussion of the impact of great wars on states. Walt, perfectly capturing and broadening what we observed in the case of Iran and the Iran-Iraq War, writes that our article demonstrates “that major wars have powerful and long-lasting effects on a nation’s subsequent foreign or military policy.”

      Source excerpt: We show, Walt continues, “[H]ow the Iran-Iraq War had a profound and enduring effect on how Iran’s ruling elites perceive the outside world and how they think about different foreign-policy tools, including their approach to nuclear weapons. … “When you think about it, these insights make perfect sense. Great wars are wrenching, costly, and frightening events that affect all of society; they are episodes where the future of the entire country is on the line. Those who fight in these wars are often scarred by the experience, and the lessons drawn from victory or defeat will be etched deeply into the nation’s collective memory. The experience of past wars is central to most national identities, and national security remains one of the paramount justifications for having a strong state apparatus. The narratives that states construct about great wars help define what it means to be a patriot, or a ‘good citizen,’ and help set the boundaries for political discourse for years to come.

      “If you want to understand the foreign policy of a great power, therefore (and probably lesser powers as well), a good place to start is to look at the great wars it has fought.”

      Link: http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/09/21/great-powers-are-defined-by-their-great-wars/ <br> Permanent link: https://perma.cc/GLT9-JK2D <br>

      Full Citation: Stephen M. Walt, “Great Powers Are Defined by their Great Wars,” Foreign Policy, September 21, 2017.

    1. From Legal Doctrine to Social Transformation? Comparing U.S. Voting Rights, Equal Employment Opportunity, and Fair Housing Legislation1

      <br> This is an Annotation for Transparent Inquiry project, published by the Qualitative Data Repository.

      <br/>

      <font>The Data Overview discusses project context, data generation and analysis, and logic of annotation.</font> </br/>

      Please cite as:

      Pedriana, Nicholas. 2018. "Data for: From legal doctrine to social transformation? Comparing U.S. voting rights, equal employment opportunity, and fair housing legislation". Qualitative Data Repository. https://doi.org/10.5064/F6AISJL0

      Additional documentation can be found on QDR.

      Learn more about ATI here.

    1. the U.S. State Department Office of Inspector General admitted that there was “no way to readily identify ROL [rule of law] funding and subsequently to identify duplicate programs, overlapping programs, or programs conflicting with each other.”

      <br>

      Data Source:

      https://data.qdr.syr.edu/file.xhtml?fileId=15358

      Full citation: U.S. State Department Office of the Inspector General, “Report of Inspection: Rule-of-Law Programs in Afghanistan” (Washington, D.C.: U.S. State Department, 2008), p. 23.

    2. Although it recognized the potential benefits of nonstate justice, the policy demanded that “informal dispute resolution decisions need to be consistent with Shariah, the Constitution, other Afghan laws and international human rights standards.”

      <br>

      Data Source:

      https://data.qdr.syr.edu/file.xhtml?fileId=15355

      Full citation: Ministry of Justice, “Draft National Policy on Relations between the Formal Justice System and Dispute Resolution Councils” (Kabul: Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2009), p. 3.

    3. For example, funding from the State Department INL Bureau for rule-of-law assistance in Afghanistan ballooned from $26.5 million in 2006 to $328 million in 2010.

      <br>

      Data Source:

      https://data.qdr.syr.edu/file.xhtml?fileId=15354

      Full citation: Liana S. Wyler and Kenneth Katzman, “Afghanistan: U.S. Rule of Law and Justice Sector Assistance” (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2010), p. 27.

    4. The Obama administration's transformative plans for Afghanistan were crystallized in the unified civil-military U.S. Foreign Assistance plan for 2011 to 2015.

      <br>

      Data Source:

      https://data.qdr.syr.edu/file.xhtml?fileId=15353

      Full citation: My focus is on the joint plan, as it had explicit unified approval. For similar plans, see U.S. Department of Defense and U.S. Department of State, “United States Government Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan for Support to Afghanistan” (Kabul: U.S. Department of Defense and U.S. Department of State, 2009); and Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, “Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy.”

    5. [j]ustice and rule of law programs will focus on creating predictable and fair dispute resolution mechanisms to eliminate the vacuum that the Taliban have exploited with their own brutal form of justice.

      <br>

      Data Source:

      https://data.qdr.syr.edu/file.xhtml?fileId=15352

      Full citation: Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, “Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy” (Washington, D.C.: U.S. State Department, 2010), p. ii.

    6. Stanley McChrystal, argued that effective counterinsurgency involved bolstering the quality of and access to both state and nonstate justice mechanisms “that offer swift and fair resolution of disputes, particularly at the local level,” to disrupt the Taliban and their justice system.

      <br>

      Data Source: https://data.qdr.syr.edu/file.xhtml?fileId=15351 Full Citation: Stanley McChrystal, “Commander’s Initial Assessment” (Kabul: International Security Assistance Force, 2009), sec. 2, p. 14.

    7. The program proclaimed neutrality regarding nonstate justice, “provided that dispute resolution is not administered by the Taliban or other insurgent groups.

      <br>

      Data Source: https://data.qdr.syr.edu/file.xhtml?fileId=15350

      Full Citation: U.S. Department of Defense, “Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan: December 2012” (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 2012), p. 113.

    8. The program sought to (1) enhance human resources, (2) construct justice infrastructure, (3) increase public awareness and access to state courts, and (4) improve physical security for judges and other judicial actors in ten provinces.

      <br>

      Analytic Note: DOD produced large, comprehensive bi-annual reports to Congress that discussed a wide range of DOD activities not just ROLFF-A.

      Data Source: https://data.qdr.syr.edu/file.xhtml?fileId=15349

      Full Citation: U.S. Department of Defense, “Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan/United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghan National Security Forces: April 2012” (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 2012), p. 75.

    9. comprehensive audits of the JSSP have shown no demonstrable evidence that the program advanced the rule of law or even met its own programmatic objectives.

      <br>

      Data Source: https://data.qdr.syr.edu/file.xhtml?fileId=15348

      Full Citation: SIGAR, “SIGAR 14-26 Audit Report: Support for Afghanistan’s Justice Sector—State Department Programs Need Better Management and Stronger Oversight” (Washington, D.C.: SIGAR, 2014); and SIGAR, “SIGAR 15-68 Audit Report.”

    10. a grand total of over 300 JSSP courses training over 13,500 students.

      <br>

      Analytic Note: SIGAR produced a wide range of written products, including thematic reports on US aid, such as the report on rule of law assistance, financial audits, and general periodic reports to Congress.

      Data source: https://data.qdr.syr.edu/file.xhtml?fileId=15346

      Full citation: SIGAR, “SIGAR 15-22 Financial Audit: Department of State’s Afghanistan Justice Sector Support Program—Audit of Costs Incurred by Pacific Architects and Engineers, Inc.” (Washington, D.C.: SIGAR, 2014), p. 2.

    11. It sought to capitalize on the perceived desire of many local actors to increase their social standing.

      <br>

      Data Sources:

      https://data.qdr.syr.edu/file.xhtml?fileId=15343

      https://data.qdr.syr.edu/file.xhtml?fileId=15344

      Full citation: Checchi and Company Consulting, “Final Evaluation Report: Rule of Law Stabilization Program—Informal Component” (Kabul: USAID, 2014); and Samuel Schueth, Shahla Naim, and Haroon Rasheed, “Performance Evaluation of the Rule of Law Stablization—Informal Component Program” (Kabul: USAID, 2014).

    12. (1) improving and strengthening the traditional dispute resolution system, (2) bolstering collaboration between the informal and formal justice systems, and (3) supporting cooperation for the resolution of longstanding disputes.

      <br>

      Data Source:

      https://data.qdr.syr.edu/file.xhtml?fileId=15341

      Full citation: Checchi and Company Consulting, “Monthly Report, January 2014 Rule of Law Stabilization Program—Informal Component (RLS-I); Contract Number: Aid-306-C-12-00013” (Kabul: USAID, 2014), p. 1.

    13. RLS-Formal emphasized “capacity building” of judicial actors and administrators, as well as improving legal education and raising “public legal capacity and awareness.

      <br>

      Data Sources:

      https://data.qdr.syr.edu/file.xhtml?fileId=15339

      https://data.qdr.syr.edu/file.xhtml?fileId=15340

      Full citation: The program also undertook activities to promote gender equality and other social goals. See Jack Leeth, Terence Hoverter, and Aman Tajali, “Rule of Law Stabilization—Formal Sector Component Program Evaluation” (Kabul: USAID, 2012), p. 1; and Tetra Tech DPK, “Rule of Law Stabilization (Formal Component): Final Report” (Kabul: USAID, 2014).

    14. ‘promote and support the informal justice system in key post-conflict areas’ as a way of improving stabilization.

      <br>

      Data Sources:

      https://data.qdr.syr.edu/file.xhtml?fileId=15338

      Full citation: “Annex A: Scope of Work,” in Denis Dunn, Don Chisholm, and Edgar Mason, “Assessment: Afghanistan Rule of Law Stabilization Program (Informal Component)—Final Report” (Kabul: USAID, 2011), p. 35.

    15. develop[] a justice system that is both effective and enjoys wide respect among Afghan citizens is critical to stabilizing democracy and bringing peace to the country.

      <br>

      Data Sources:

      https://data.qdr.syr.edu/file.xhtml?fileId=15337

      Full citation: Tetra Tech DPK, “Afghanistan Rule of Law Stabilization Program (Formal Component): Performance Monitoring Plan July 2012 to January 2014” (Kabul: USAID, 2012), p. 1.

    16. the program's chosen evaluation criteria: (1) creation of a “national policy on the informal justice sector” and (2) usage of state courts as reflected in survey results.

      <br>

      Data Sources:

      https://data.qdr.syr.edu/file.xhtml?fileId=15336

      Full citation: Checchi and Company Consulting, “Contract No. Dfd-1-00-04-00170-00: Eighteenth Quarterly Performance Monitoring Report for the Period January 1 to March 31, 2009” (Kabul: USAID, 2009), p. 25.

    17. Reform of the commercial court as well as the promotion of human rights and women's rights under Islam also received priority.

      <br>

      Analytic Note: USAID programs required quarterly and occasionally even monthly reports. USAID reports are generally, though not always available through the Development Experience Clearing House (https://dec.usaid.gov/dec/home/Default.aspx). <br> Permanent link: https://perma.cc/D9JU-DT6F <br>

      Source Note: Unfortunately, there is a typographical error in the article footnote. The document should be from 2007 not 2006. The objectives are boilerplate text that appear consistently across reports.

      Data Sources:

      https://data.qdr.syr.edu/file.xhtml?fileId=15334

      Full citation: Checchi and Company Consulting, “Contract No. Dfd-1-00-04-00170-00: Twelfth Quarterly Performance Monitoring Report for the Period July 1 to September 30, 2007” (Kabul: USAID, 2006), p. 3

    18. the State Department, and later the Defense Department totaling more than $1 billion on more than sixty programs.

      <br>

      Analytic Note: While SIGAR has been the subject of some criticism for its emphasis on failed and under performing projects, it was a vital source of information about rule of law programs. This is especially true for non-USAID projects which generally provided for less stringent reporting requirements and less public access to the documents that are produced.

      Data Sources:

      https://data.qdr.syr.edu/file.xhtml?fileId=15333

      Full citation: All figures for comprehensive program costs were taken from SIGAR, “SIGAR 15-68 Audit Report: Rule of Law in Afghanistan—U.S. Agencies Lack a Strategy and Cannot Fully Determine the Effectiveness of Programs Costing More Than $1 Billion” (Washington, D.C.: SIGAR, 2015).

    19. This dynamic would seem to provide major donors with meaningful influence over the recipient state's decisions and actions. Donors, however, dislike being seen as dictating state behavior

      <br>

      Data Source: https://data.qdr.syr.edu/file.xhtml?fileId=15332

      Full citation: USAID, “USAID/Afghanistan Strategic Plan, 2005–2010” (Washington, D.C.: USAID, 2005); and U.S. Mission Afghanistan, “U.S. Foreign Assistance for Afghanistan.”

    20. the Afghan state depended on U.S. support to undertake even its most basic of functions, such as maintaining police, courts, and the military

      <br> Data Source:

      https://data.qdr.syr.edu/file.xhtml?fileId=15330

      Full citation: U.S. Government Accountability Office, “Afghanistan: Key Oversight Issues” (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2013), pp. 25–26.

    21. Afghanistan has constituted a major U.S. foreign policy and national security priority for more than a decade

      <br>

      Analytic Note: The National Security Strategy of the United States is produced periodically by the executive branch. It outlines what the administration believes are the most significant threats facing the United States and how they plan to address those challenges.

      Data Sources:

      https://data.qdr.syr.edu/file.xhtml?fileId=15327

      https://data.qdr.syr.edu/file.xhtml?fileId=15328

      https://data.qdr.syr.edu/file.xhtml?fileId=15329

      Full citations: George W. Bush, “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America” (Washington, D.C.: Execuitive Office of the President, 2002); George W. Bush, “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America” (Washington, D.C.: Executive Office of the President, 2006); and Barack Obama, “National Security Strategy” (Washington, D.C.: Executive Office of the President, 2010).

    22. Justice and rule of law programs will focus on creating predictable and fair dispute resolution mechanisms to eliminate the vacuum that the Taliban have exploited

      <br>

      Analytic Note: The U.S. Mission Afghanistan’s Performance Managing Plan articulated the consensus priorities, strategies, and activities of U.S. involvement in Afghanistan from 2011-2015. It was approved by all the relevant agencies in 2010.<br> More generally, this article draws extensively on materials produced by implementers, donors, and government agencies. These documents are important as they can illuminate their respective strategies, activities and goals. Moreover, they reflect assumptions regarding causal mechanisms as well as the link between their activities and desired change. These materials articulate clear views on the motivations of key actors and institutions, which can then be subject to investigation. International actors seeking to promote the rule of law are quite forthright about their specific objectives (though not necessarily their motivations). This makes it possible to trace the evolution of rule of law efforts over time and how actors responded, or failed to respond, to unfolding events, as well as to critically examine the ends pursued and means selected.

      Data Sources:

      https://data.qdr.syr.edu/file.xhtml?fileId=15326

      Full Citation: U.S. Mission Afghanistan, “U.S. Foreign Assistance for Afghanistan: Post Performance Management Plan 2011–2015” (Kabul: U.S. Mission Afghanistan, 2010), p. 9

    1. Factors Perceived as Influencing Local Health Department Involvement in Mental Health

      </a> <br> This is an Annotation for Transparent Inquiry project, published by the Qualitative Data Repository.

      <br/>

      <font>The Data Overview discusses project context, data generation and analysis, and logic of annotation.</font>

      <br/> Please cite as:

      Purtle, Jonathan. 2018. "Data for: Factors perceived as influencing local health department involvement in mental health". Qualitative Data Repository. https://doi.org/10.5064/F6SUMYSH.

      Learn more about ATI here.

    2. such actions could be construed as infringing upon the LBHA’s territory.

      <br>

      Analytic note: One LHD official discussed how they tracked population mental health metrics in their surveillance system, but did not follow these metrics closely for fear of infringing upon the territory of the LBHA. As this respondent said: “So we do monitor that. We don't get as deeply into it because for political reasons, we never wanted it to be seen like we're stepping on their toes, per se.” (Respondent 2)

      Full Citation: Interview with Respondent 2.

    3. how community members conveyed this at meetings conducted as part of community health needs assessment processes

      <br>

      Analytic note: Respondents also described how mental health was often the focus of the implementation plan reports that came about in response to the findings from community health needs assessment processes. As one respondent described, “Well, the entire plan is, again, mental health is the sole flavor.” (Respondent 7)

      Full Citation: Interview with Respondent 7.

    4. which stressful childhood experiences can lead to health risk behaviors.

      <br>

      Analytic note: In addition to the ACE study having impacts on how LHD officials think about mental health issues, some LHD officials discussed how the ACE study informed the activities they performed related to mental health, specifically activities that did not involve direct clinical services—which was beyond the scope of practice for many LHDs.

      As one respondent stated, “So maybe a public health role, maybe we don’t do anything directly to impact or deliver services that directly impact ACEs, but we promote, and we advocate, and say okay what we really need to do is have a lot more quality childcare programs for our young children, and support for the parents.” (Respondent 7)

      Full Citation: Interview with a Local Health Department (LHD) and Respondent 7.

    5. and opportunity exists for LHDs to integrate mental health promotion activities into mainstream practice

      <br>

      Analytic note: The idea that mental health is important to the enterprise of public health is not new. In 1926, Charles E. Winslow, President of the American Public Health Association, asserted that there was a strong rationale to integrate mental health into the scope of public health practice. As he stated in a 1926 address to APHA members: “It is impossible to consider, even in the briefest summary, the future program of the public health movement without at least some reference to the vast and fertile fields of mental hygiene… in the not-distant future I am inclined to believe that the care of mental health will occupy a share of our energies perhaps as large as that devoted to the whole range of other disorders affecting other organs of the body.” (p. 1078).

      Full Citation: Winslow C-E. Public health at the crossroads. American journal of public health 1926;16(11):1075-1085.

    6. a proportion that increased by 38% between 1990 and 2010 and is projected to continue to rise.

      <br>

      Analytic note: The 2004 Global Burden of Disease Survey found that unipolar depressive disorders were the number one cause of disability in the high-income countries, such as the United States (where the current study was conducted). These disorders accounted for 8.2% of annual disability adjusted life years, more than ischemic heart and cerebrovascular disease.

      Full Citation: Mathers, C., Fat, D. M., & Boerma, J. T. (2008). The global burden of disease: 2004 update. World Health Organization.

    7. In 33% of interviews, respondents described challenges that stemmed from administrative boundaries.

      <br>

      Analytic note: A theme related to administrative boundaries: One respondent expressed that there was minimal collaboration between the LHD and the LBHA because both organizations were effective within their respective roles. As the respondent said, " And I think you know, again [we are a] relatively strong public health entity that there hasn't been a push from either of our standpoints to really get into each other's business. And you know they come to us for stuff. We go to them for stuff.” (Respondent 3)

      Full Citation: Interview with Respondent 3.

    8. population-based mental illness prevention activities.

      <br>

      Analytic note: More recent data from the 2016 Profile Study of Local Health Departments indicate that 20.3% of LHDs engage in population-based mental illness prevention activities compared to 60.2% of them engaging in population-based prevention activities for physical chronic disease. These statistic underscore that LHD engagement in the area of mental health is still the exception, not the norm.

      Full Citation: National Profile of Local Health Departments (Profile) report. 2016. NACCHO (National Association of County & City Health Officials).

    9. divergent perspectives between LHDs and LBHAs

      <br>

      Analytic note: Some LHD officials also lamented that the general public, not just LBHAs, perceived mental health too narrowly (i.e., just in terms of clinical services for people with severe mental illness.

      One respondent described how her LHD worked to expand conceptualizations of mental health among the general public and policymakers. As she stated, “So part of our challenge is trying to communicate to the public and to policymakers that when you talk mental health, you really – people only see tip of the iceberg. They think about the crazy person standing on the street corner yelling and talking to themselves, but they're not thinking about all the kids who have behavioral issue, family dysfunction, who are depressed…” (Respondent 10)

      Full Citation: Interview with Respondent 10.

    10. capacity to use these systems to generate small area estimates and also integrate mental health metrics into syndromic disease surveillance systems

      <br>

      Analytic note: A recent study validated the use of syndromic disease surveillance for mental health conditions.

      Full Citation: Goldman-Mellor, S., Jia, Y., Kwan, K., & Rutledge, J. (2017). Syndromic Surveillance of Mental and Substance Use Disorders: A Validation Study Using Emergency Department Chief Complaints. Psychiatric Services, 69(1), 55-60.

    11. We’re trying to figure out where we fit”

      <br>

      Analytic note: The main findings of the study are encapsulated in this quote. This was in the original title of the manuscript. The quote was provided at the very end of the interview when the respondent was asked if she had anything else that she would like to add. The full quote is: “I just want to say lastly that mental health is on our mind all the time. We’re trying to figure out where we fit. We’ve figured out some ways, but it’s there, like we think about it a lot. For whatever that’s worth, we think about it a lot.”

      Full Citation: Interview with Respondent 6.

    12. communities calling on LHDs to address mental health.

      <br>

      Analytic note: "’It's unacceptable for you to just wait until we collapse in the street. This is not okay.’" (Respondent 2) This is what one LHD official was told by a community member at a community health needs assessment meeting. The community member was referring to the fact that, in this community, it is very difficult to access public mental health services before an issue reaches crisis proportions.

      Full Citation: Respondent 2 comments from a community member at an LHD community health needs assessment meeting.