<br>

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/WGOKBX

Full Citation: Bethmann to Pourtales, Schoen, and Lichnowsky (21 July 1914) in Outbreak of the World War: German Documents, ed. Max Montgelas and Walter Schucking, collected by Karl Kautsky (New York: Oxford University Press, 1924), no. 100.

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Data Sources:<br> Source 1: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/DZH84T <br> Source 2: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/LQGWPJ <br> Source 3: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/CFTQJQ <br>

Full Citation (Source 1): De Bunsen to Grey (23 July 1914), in British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914, ed. G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley (London: HMSO, 1926), vol. 11, no. 90.

Full Citation (Source 2): Minute by Eyre Crowe on Buchanan to Grey (22 July 1914), British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914, ed. G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley (London: HMSO, 1926), vol. 11, no. 76

Full Citation (Source 3): Minute by Eyre Crowe on Buchanan to Grey (23 July 1914), British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914, ed. G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley (London: HMSO, 1926), vol. 11, no. 84

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Data Sources:<br> Source 1: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/JSCEFR <br> Source 2: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/K7QYLR <br>

Full Citation (Source 1): Pourtales to Bethmann (21 July 1914) in Outbreak of the World War: German Documents, ed. Max Montgelas and Walter Schucking, collected by Karl Kautsky (New York: Oxford University Press, 1924), no. 120, p. 159.

Full Citation (Source 2): Buchanan to Grey (23 July 1914), in British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914, ed. G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley (London: HMSO, 1926), vol. 11, no. 84.

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Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/1R5PWA

Full Citation: Buchanan to Grey (20 July 1914), in British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914, ed. G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley (London: HMSO, 1926), vol. 11, no. 76.

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Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/ENVVA6

Full Citation: Enclosure to Buchanan to Grey (25 July 1914), in British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914, ed. G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley (London: HMSO, 1926), vol. 11, no. 125

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Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/DGQBLD

Full Citation: Stephen Van Evera, The Cult of the Offensive, in Military Strategy and the Origins of the First World War, ed. Steven E. Miller, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Stephen van Evera (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 60-61

<br> This is an Annotation for Transparent Inquiry project, published by the Qualitative Data Repository. Please cite as:

Crawford, Timothy. 2015. "Data for: “Pivotal deterrence and the chain gang: Sir Edward Grey’s ambiguous policy and the July Crisis,” in: Pivotal deterrence: Third-party statecraft and the pursuit of peace". Qualitative Data Repository. https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S

Additional documentation can be found on QDR.

Learn more about ATI here.

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Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/TKD5N5

Full Citation: Bertie to Grey (30 July 1911), quoted in Keith Wilson, The Policy of Entente: Essays on the Determinants of British Foreign Policy, 1904-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 47

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Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/9SZYRX

Full Citation: John F. V. Keiger, Raymond Poincaré (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 180.

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Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/ZARVGG

Full Citation: Lichnowsky to Jagow (1 August 1914) in Outbreak of the World War: German Documents, ed. Max Montgelas and Walter Schucking, collected by Karl Kautsky (New York: Oxford University Press, 1924), no. 562.

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Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/EJBJDL

Full Citation: Marc Trachtenberg, "The Meaning of Mobilization in 1914," International Security 15 (winter 1990-91):120-150.

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Data Sources:<br> Source 1: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/1O1KN9 <br> Source 2: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/PKMYRQ <br>

Full Citation (Source 1): Luigi Albertini, The Origins of the War of 1914, 3 vols. (London: Oxford University Press, 1957), 2:604

Full Citation (Source 2): Viviani to P. Cambon (30 July 1914), British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914, ed. G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley (London: HMSO, 1926), vol. 11, no. 294.

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Data Sources:<br> Source 1: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/EN5J33 <br> Source 2: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/KWC5OO <br> Source 3: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/5JGWMY

Full Citation (Source 1): Samuel L. Williamson, The Politics of Grand Strategy: Britain and France Prepare for War, 1904-1914, 2d ed. (London: Ashfield Press, 1990), 340.

Full Citation (Source 2): Keith Wilson, The Policy of Entente: Essays on the Determinants of British Foreign Policy, 1904-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 117.

Full Citation (Source 3): Gerald Ritter, The Sword and the Sceptre: The Problem of Militarism in Germany (Coral Gables: University of Miami Press, 1970): 217-19.

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Analytic Note (Source 4): QDR NOTE: The original reference for the Grey quote in the citation above, mistakenly refers to "ibid., 123." The correct source, reproduced here, is Grey, Twenty Five Years, Vol. 1, p. 92.

Source Excerpt (Source 4): "Prime Minister Asquith had similar concerns. After learning of the Anglo-French conversations in September 1911, he thought the talks to be rather dangerous; especially the part which referred to possible British assistance. The French ought not to be encouraged in present circumstances, to make their plans on any assumptions of this kind."

Data Sources:<br> Source 1: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/4KSQAU <br> Source 2: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/7COS63 <br> Source 3: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/GNPKZI <br> Source 4: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/SNVHMA

Full Citation (Source 1): Samuel L. Williamson, The Politics of Grand Strategy: Britain and France Prepare for War, 1904-1914, 2d ed. (London: Ashfield Press, 1990), 330

Full Citation (Source 2): Keith Wilson, The Policy of Entente: Essays on the Determinants of British Foreign Policy, 1904-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 48

Full Citation (Source 3): Zara Steiner, Britain and the Origins of the First World War (New York: St. Martins, 1977), 123

Full Citation (Source 4): Viscount Grey of Fallodon, Twenty Five Years, 1892-1916, 2 vols. (New York: Frederick A. Stokes Co., 1925), 1:92

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Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/YNMYHY

Full Citation: Pierre Renouvin, The Immediate Origins of the War (28th June 4th August 1914) (New York: H. Fertig, 1969): 162.

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Data Sources:<br> Source 1: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/TCKIXI <br> Source 2: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/JAJTNZ <br> Source 3: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/RFMTMC <br> Source 4: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/VRSFBP

Full Citation (Source 1): Wilhelm to Jagow (28 July 1914) in Outbreak of the World War: German Documents, ed. Max Montgelas and Walter Schucking, collected by Karl Kautsky (New York: Oxford University Press, 1924), no. 293

Full Citation (Source 2): Luigi Albertini, The Origins of the War of 1914, 3 vols. (London: Oxford University Press, 1957), 2:470-71.

Full Citation (Source 3): Luigi Albertini, The Origins of the War of 1914, 3 vols. (London: Oxford University Press, 1957), 2:653

Full Citation (Source 4): Dale Copeland, The Origins of Major War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), 93-94

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Data Sources:<br> Source 1: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/OOR9MT <br> Source 2: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/TGUUY4 <br> Source 3: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/EQP6E2 <br>

Full Citation (Source 1): Viviani to P. Cambon (31 July 1914), British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914, ed. G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley (London: HMSO, 1926), vol. 11, no. 338.

Full Citation (Source 2): Bertie to Grey (31 July 1914), enclosure, British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914, ed. G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley (London: HMSO, 1926), vol. 11, no. 363

Full Citation (Source 3): Luigi Albertini, The Origins of the War of 1914, 3 vols. (London: Oxford University Press, 1957), 3:70.

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Data Sources:<br> Source 1: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/NLF8HD <br> Source 2: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/KDX6NN <br> Source 3: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/MNV63M <br>

Full Citation (Source 1): Bethmann to Tschirschky (29 July 1914) in Outbreak of the World War: German Documents, ed. Max Montgelas and Walter Schucking, collected by Karl Kautsky (New York: Oxford University Press, 1924), no. 377

Full Citation (Source 2): Bethmann to Tschirschky (30 July 1914) in Outbreak of the World War: German Documents, ed. Max Montgelas and Walter Schucking, collected by Karl Kautsky (New York: Oxford University Press, 1924), nos. 384

Full Citation (Source 3): Bethmann to Tschirschky (30 July 1914) in Outbreak of the World War: German Documents, ed. Max Montgelas and Walter Schucking, collected by Karl Kautsky (New York: Oxford University Press, 1924), nos. 385.

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Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/OMXDQ5

Full Citation: King George V to Kaiser Wilhelm (1 August 1914) in Outbreak of the World War: German Documents, ed. Max Montgelas and Walter Schucking, collected by Karl Kautsky (New York: Oxford University Press, 1924), no. 612.

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Data Sources:<br> Source 1: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/UIH9XB <br> Source 2: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/LGEBGR <br> Source 3: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/2KNDST <br>

Full Citation (Source 1): Hew Strachan,The First World War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 1:95, 93.

Full Citation (Source 2): Grey to Bertie (31 July 1914), British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914, ed. G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley (London: HMSO, 1926), vol. 11, no. 352

Full Citation (Source 3): Grey to Bertie (31 July 1914), British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914, ed. G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley (London: HMSO, 1926), vol. 11, no. 367.

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Data Sources:<br> Source 1: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/8B5R5U <br> Source 2: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/ENOMWI <br>

Full Citation (Source 1): Luigi Albertini, The Origins of the War of 1914, 3 vols. (London: Oxford University Press, 1957), 2:666-67

Full Citation (Source 2): Luigi Albertini, The Origins of the War of 1914, 3 vols. (London: Oxford University Press, 1957), 3:19-20

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Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/MAMGH2

Full Citation: Lichnowsky to Jagow (26 July 1914) in Outbreak of the World War: German Documents, ed. Max Montgelas and Walter Schucking, collected by Karl Kautsky (New York: Oxford University Press, 1924), no. 201.

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Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/6C6V5J

Full Citation: Lichnowsky to Jagow (26 July 1914) in Outbreak of the World War: German Documents, ed. Max Montgelas and Walter Schucking, collected by Karl Kautsky (New York: Oxford University Press, 1924), no. 236.

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Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/MXRWI5

Full Citation: Lichnowsky to Jagow (31 July 1914) in Outbreak of the World War: German Documents, ed. Max Montgelas and Walter Schucking, collected by Karl Kautsky (New York: Oxford University Press, 1924), no. 489.

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Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/AHTPY8

Full Citation: Samuel L. Williamson, The Politics of Grand Strategy: Britain and France Prepare for War, 1904-1914, 2d ed. (London: Ashfield Press, 1990), 330.

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Data Sources: <br> Source 1: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/D7SAHL <br> Source 2: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/3RDMAP <br>

Full Citation (Source 1): Grey to Buchanan (20 July 1914), British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914, ed. G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley (London: HMSO, 1926), vol. 11, no. 67. <br>

Full Citation (Source 2): Viscount Grey of Fallodon, Twenty Five Years, 1892-1916, 2 vols. (New York: Frederick A. Stokes Co., 1925), 1:299. <br>

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Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/MEENLO

Full Citation: Bethmann to Lichnowsky (27 July 1914) in Outbreak of the World War: German Documents, ed. Max Montgelas and Walter Schucking, collected by Karl Kautsky (New York: Oxford University Press, 1924), no. 248.

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Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/93DM9F

Full Citation: Bertie to Nicolson (14 May 1911), in J. Lowe and M. L. Dockrill, Mirage of Power: British Foreign Policy, 1902-14, 3 vols. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972), 3:433

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Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/NTJKR2

Full Citation: Keith Wilson, The Policy of Entente: Essays on the Determinants of British Foreign Policy, 1904-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 46

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Data Sources:<br> Source 1: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/CLM55K <br> Source 2: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/UZ1KCH <br>

Full Citation (Source 1): Lichnowsky to Jagow (22 July 1914) in Outbreak of the World War: German Documents, ed. Max Montgelas and Walter Schucking, collected by Karl Kautsky (New York: Oxford University Press, 1924), no. 118 and 121.

Full Citation (Source 2): Lichnowsky to Jagow (22 July 1914) in Outbreak of the World War: German Documents, ed. Max Montgelas and Walter Schucking, collected by Karl Kautsky (New York: Oxford University Press, 1924), no. 118 and 121.

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Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/ASAW1A

Full Citation: Grey to Rumbold (9 July 1914), in British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914, ed. G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley (London: HMSO, 1926), vol. 11, no. 41

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Data Sources:<br> Source 1: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/JNODBX <br> Source 2: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/BXJBDV <br>

Full Citation (Source 1): Lichnowsky to Jagow (27 July 1914) in Outbreak of the World War: German Documents, ed. Max Montgelas and Walter Schucking, collected by Karl Kautsky (New York: Oxford University Press, 1924), no. 258

Full Citation (Source 2): Lichnowsky to Jagow (27 July 1914) in Outbreak of the World War: German Documents, ed. Max Montgelas and Walter Schucking, collected by Karl Kautsky (New York: Oxford University Press, 1924), no. 265.

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Data Sources:<br> Source 1: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/JM1RJE <br> Source 2: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/BVJQDO <br> Source 3: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/APIZQV <br>

Full Citation (Source 1): Bethmann to Tschirschky (30 July 1914) in Outbreak of the World War: German Documents, ed. Max Montgelas and Walter Schucking, collected by Karl Kautsky (New York: Oxford University Press, 1924), no. 441.

Full Citation (Source 2): Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crises (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), 137, n. 105.

Full Citation (Source 3): Luigi Albertini, The Origins of the War of 1914, 3 vols. (London: Oxford University Press, 1957), 3:22.

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Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/MXIX0F

Full Citation: Luigi Albertini, The Origins of the War of 1914, 3 vols. (London: Oxford University Press, 1957), 3:185.

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Analytic Note: That Russia played a major role in escalating the July Crisis, and that it did so intentionally to exploit opportunities to weaken Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire, is argued vigorously by Sean McMeekin, The Russian Origins of the First World War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), chaps. 1, 2.

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/7PRL9P

Full Citation: D. C. B. Lieven, Russia and the Origins of the First World War (New York: St. Martins, 1983), 143-4.

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Data Sources:<br> Source 1: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/WGHRXV <br> Source 2: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/X8CN0O <br>

Full Citation (Source 1): Buchanan to Grey (18 July 1914), British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914, ed. G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley (London: HMSO, 1926), vol. 11, no. 60.

Full Citation (Source 2): Buchanan to Grey (25 July 1914), British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914, ed. G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley (London: HMSO, 1926), vol. 11, no. 112.

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Analytic Note: QDR NOTE: Original footnote text incorrectly referred first to Grey to Bertie (31 July 1914), BD, no. 352. That reference was to a quote that precedes note 99, and has now been moved to that note (see 99-b above).

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/V7TBR8

Full Citation: Grey to Bertie (31 July 1914), British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914, ed. G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley (London: HMSO, 1926), vol. 11, no. 367.

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Data Sources:<br> Source 1: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/FT8RYH <br> Source 2: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/GTVS3P <br> Source 3: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/SICCRC <br> Source 4: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/LPZRK7 <br> Source 5: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/HFKKKM

Full Citation (Source 1): Bertie to Grey(27 July 1914), British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914, ed. G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley (London: HMSO, 1926), vol. 11, no. 183

Full Citation (Source 2): Buchanan to Grey(27 July 1914), British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914, ed. G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley (London: HMSO, 1926), vol. 11, no. 198

Full Citation (Source 3): Communication by Beckendorff (27 July 1914), British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914, ed. G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley (London: HMSO, 1926), vol. 11, no. 206

Full Citation (Source 4): Luigi Albertini, The Origins of the War of 1914, 3 vols. (London: Oxford University Press, 1957), 2:403-8

Full Citation (Source 5): D. C. B. Lieven, Russia and the Origins of the First World War (New York: St. Martins, 1983), 145.

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Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/LOLHLT

Full Citation: D. C. B. Lieven, Russia and the Origins of the First World War (New York: St. Martins, 1983), 142.

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Data Sources:<br> Source 1: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/76TMIQ <br> Source 2: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/GW15IT <br>

Full Citation (Source 1): Jagow to Lichnowsky (25 July 1914) in Outbreak of the World War: German Documents, ed. Max Montgelas and Walter Schucking, collected by Karl Kautsky (New York: Oxford University Press, 1924), no. 192

Full Citation (Source 2): Lichnowsky to Grey (26 July 1914), British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914, ed. G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley (London: HMSO, 1926), vol. 11, no. 145.

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Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/K6T60F

Full Citation: Bertie to Nicolson (14 May 1911), quoted in C. J. Lowe and M. L. Dockrill, Mirage of Power: British Foreign Policy, 1902-14, 3 vols. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972), 3:433.

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Data Sources:<br> Source 1: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/07G3BF <br> Source 2: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/SBWLWO <br>

Full Citation (Source 1): Grey to Bertie, Ambassador to Paris (8 July 1914), in British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914, ed. G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley (London: HMSO, 1926), vol. 11, no. 38

Full Citation (Source 2): Grey to Buchanan, Ambassador to St. Petersburg (8 July 1914), in British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914, ed. G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley (London: HMSO, 1926), vol. 11, no. 39

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Data Sources:<br> Source 1: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/62U59Y <br> Source 2: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/9KYUP6 <br>

Full Citation (Source 1): Samuel L. Williamson, The Politics of Grand Strategy: Britain and France Prepare for War, 1904-1914, 2d ed. (London: Ashfield Press, 1990), 368

Full Citation (Source 2): Grey to Bertie (29 July 1914), British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914, ed. G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley (London: HMSO, 1926), vol. 11, no. 283.

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Data Sources:<br> Source 1: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/DBR1EF <br> Source 2: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/5QAD6H <br> Source 3: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/C6BNFO <br>

Full Citation (Source 1): Grey to Buchanan (20 July 1914), in British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914, ed. G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley (London: HMSO, 1926), vol. 11, no. 67

Full Citation (Source 2): Grey to Buchanan (22 July 1914), in British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914, ed. G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley (London: HMSO, 1926), vol. 11, no. 79

Full Citation (Source 3): Grey to de Bunsen, Ambassador to Vienna (23 July 1914), in British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914, ed. G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley (London: HMSO, 1926), vol. 11, no. 86.

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Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/TO0WGN

Full Citation: John F. V. Keiger, Raymond Poincare (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 174.

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Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/AWYS68

Full Citation: John F. V. Keiger, France and the Origins of the First World War (New York: St. Martins, 1983), 160.

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Data Sources:<br> Source 1: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/WWKNZ2 <br> Source 2: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/UHO3LT <br>

Full Citation (Source 1): Pierre Renouvin, "Britain and the Continent: The Lessons of History", Foreign Affairs 17 (October 1938): 111-115.

Full Citation (Source 2): D. C. B. Lieven, Russia and the Origins of the First World War (New York: St. Martins, 1983), 35

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Data Sources:<br> Source 1: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/W9QNY0 <br> Source 2: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/0O8RJK

Full Citation (Source 1): G. P. Gooch, Before the War: Studies in Diplomacy, 2 vols. (New York: Russell and Russell, 1967), 2: 58-59

Full Citation (Source 2): Zara Steiner, Britain and the Origins of the First World War (New York: St. Martins, 1977), 48

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Data Sources:<br> Source 1: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/AC3JIT <br> Source 2: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/BVOYFS <br>

Full Citation (Source 1): Grey to Bertie (24 July 1914), British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914, ed. G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley (London: HMSO, 1926), vol. 11, no. 98

Full Citation (Source 2): Grey to Buchanan (25 July 1914), British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914, ed. G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley (London: HMSO, 1926), vol. 11, no. 132

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Data Sources:<br> Source 1: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/C3WQIW <br> Source 2: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/CDFGHJ <br> Source 3: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/FOKW2X <br>

Full Citation (Source 1): Bethmann to Goschen (29 July 1914) in Outbreak of the World War: German Documents, ed. Max Montgelas and Walter Schucking, collected by Karl Kautsky (New York: Oxford University Press, 1924), no. 373

Full Citation (Source 2): Goschen to Grey(29 July 1914), British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914, ed. G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley (London: HMSO, 1926), vol. 11, no. 293.

Full Citation (Source 3): Gerald Ritter, The Sword and the Sceptre: The Problem of Militarism in Germany (Coral Gables: University of Miami Press, 1970): 152.

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Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/JRXXTB

Full Citation: Falkenhayn, in Luigi Albertini, The Origins of the War of 1914, 3 vols. (London: Oxford University Press, 1957), 2:502.

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Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/DXGOAE

Full Citation: Gerd Krumeich, Armaments and politics in France on the eve of the First World War: the Introduction of the three-year conscription, 1913-1914, trans. Stephen Conn (Dover, N.H.: Berg Publishers, 1984), 226.

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Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/AVU0VR

Full Citation: Minute by Crowe (31 July 1914), in British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914, ed. G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley (London: HMSO, 1926), vol. 11, no. 318

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Data Sources:<br> Source 1: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/T74RAV <br> Source 2: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/DIY80D <br> Source 3: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6G44N6S/54XYP7 <br>

Full Citation (Source 1): Rumbold to Grey(26 July 1914), British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914, ed. G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley (London: HMSO, 1926), vol. 11, no. 149.

Full Citation (Source 2): Luigi Albertini, The Origins of the War of 1914, 3 vols. (London: Oxford University Press, 1957), 2:342

Full Citation (Source 3): Immanuel Geiss, July 1914: The Outbreak of the First World War, Selected Documents (London: Batsford, 1967), no. 95.

The following Note should be at the beginning of every ATI, annotating the title: <br> This is an Annotation for Transparent Inquiry project, published by the Qualitative Data Repository. Please cite as:

Soifer, Hillel. 2015. "Data for: “Elite preferences, administrative institutions, and educational development during Peru’s aristocratic republic (1895–1919),” in: State and nation making in Latin America and Spain: Republics of the possible". Qualitative Data Repository. https://doi.org/10.5064/F6NP22C9

Additional documentation can be found on QDR.

Learn more about ATI here.

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Analytic Note: Against accounts that see the guano era in Peru as an instance in which a massive commodity boom undermines the incentives for state-building, Gootenberg’s book traces the projects that various segments of Peru’s political class envisioned as ways to turn guano revenue into long-term prosperity, and thus provides an overview of the broader intellectual context (though he notes in his preface (p.vii) that he prefers the term “social history of ideas” to intellectual history) in which the history of this first period of educational development efforts can be situated. Though he has little to say directly about education, he provides a thorough account of the Liberal project of the guano era which I discuss in this section of the chapter.

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6NP22C9/PZ03HV

Full Citation: Gootenberg, Paul (1993) Imagining Development: Economic Ideas in Peru’s ‘Fictitious Prosperity’ of Guano, 1840-1880 (Princeton University Press)

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Analytic Note: Despite its large size, scholarship on the Rumi Maqui rebellion of 1915 in the Puno region is fairly limited. One source that provides a useful overview of the conflict, and places it in the context of the broader history of rural revolts in Puno, is Rénique’s book, especially Chapter 2. Like this set of footnotes (#62-67) in general, the purpose is to buttress the claim that subaltern mobilization was growing over the course of the Civilista period, and becoming severe enough that the ability of the central state to stem it was called into question.

Full Citation: Jose Luis Rénique, La Batalla por Puno: Conflicto Agrario y Nacion en los Andes Peruanos (Lima: IEP, 2004).

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Analytic Note: My handwritten archival notes refer to a series of requirements laid out by the Consejo Superior de Instrucción Pública (Superior Council for Public Instruction) for all texts it approved. I do not have the full text, but three of the requirements mentioned are included in the sentence to which this footnote refers.

Full Citation: Memoria del Ministerio de Justicia, Culto, e Instrucción Pública 1897 (Lima) Found in the Archivo General de la Nación, Fondo Ministerio de Hacienda, Code H-6-1666, p.27

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Analytic Note: I do not have the original quote here, but pp.35ff include a summary by the director of primary education of the reports of provincial inspectors. The director of primary education notes that the reports are so negative that he has sent a circular to the inspectors urging them to stick to the facts and report accurately rather than seeking to curry favor by overstating the problems they encounter. [See FN 68 for another interpretation of this discussion]

Full Citation: Memoria del Ministerio de Justicia, Culto, e Instrucción Pública 1910, vol.2 (Lima) Found in the Archivo General de la Nación, Fondo Ministerio de Hacienda, Code H-6-1678

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Analytic Note (Source 1): The attached table includes the descriptive statistics derived from the dataset linked at 11-a, based on averages across districts unweighted for population. The figures quoted in the footnote are national rates.

Data Source (Source 1): https://doi.org/10.5064/F6NP22C9/V2HKUC

Full Citation (Source 1): Soifer, Hillel (2009) Descriptive Statistics for Dataset from Censo Escolar (Qualitative Data Repository [distributor])

Full Citation (Source 2): Newland, C. (1994). The Estado Docente and Its Expansion: Spanish American Elementary Education, 1900-1950. Journal of Latin American Studies, 26(2), 449–467.

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Analytic Note: The sentence to which this footnote is appended states that “Because the Civilista state relied less on local elites in the highlands, their opposition was an obstacle that could be gradually overcome.” And more generally, the claim I make here is that the central state pushed its development project against the interests of these elites until rural unrest, beginning in about 1915, drove a compromise between the two powers and the end of concerted state development. We should not, in other words, see the Civilista state policies as a reflection of the preferences of highland elites. This inability of highland elites to rely on the central state as a faithful guarantor of their preferred policies is a central theme of Jacobsen’s book cited here.

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6NP22C9/OOUKFX

Full Citation: Jacobsen, Nils (1996) Mirages of Transition: The Peruvian Altiplano 1780-1930 (University of California Press)

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Analytic Note: Kapsoli’s book excerpts (pp.211-228) from an essay by Alberto Flores Galindo entitled ‘La Oligarquía Arequipeña y los Movimientos Campesinos 1895-1930’ p.217 includes a table taken (unclear whether the data is compiled from this source or the table as a whole is copied) from a 1923 publication by Flores Marín and Pachas Castillas entitled ‘Luchas Campesinas en el Perú 1900-1920. The table indicates that Peru as a whole saw 65 peasant mobilizations in the decade 1901-1910, and 72 in the decade 1911-1920. I made an error in the chapter in using these figures to refer to the number of peasant mobilizations in the southern provinces of Cuzco, Arequipa, and Puno – the correct figures for mobilizations in this region, given in the rightmost column of the table, are 29 and 20 for the two decades respectively. Like this set of footnotes (#62-67) in general, the purpose is to buttress the claim that subaltern mobilization was growing over the course of the Civilista period, and becoming severe enough that the ability of the central state to stem it was called into question.

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6NP22C9/SSQBYS

Full Citation: Kapsoli, Wilfredo (1977) Los Movimientos Campesinos en el Perú 1879-1965 (Lima: Delva Editores)

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Analytic Note: This quote from the education minister in his annual report reflects the motivation behind the series of contests referred to in this footnote to create new primary school readers and texts. pp.827-8 [note that footnote in published version refers to pp.877-8] refers to the creation on May 9, 1905 of a contest for such a reader. p.904 refers to a contest for a text to cover the first two years of primary school, to be called ‘El Libro de la Escuela Elemental Peruana.’

Source Excerpt: “El Perú necesita un libro de lectura propio, nacional, que poner en manos de los alumnos de las escuelas de primera enseñanza.” (xlvi)

Source Excerpt Translation: “Peru needs its own, national, reading book to put in the hands of primary school students.”

Full Citation: Memoria del Ministerio de Justicia, Culto, e Instrucción Pública 1905 (Lima) Found in the Archivo General de la Nación, Fondo Ministerio de Hacienda, Code H-6-1673, various pages (see original footnote for page citations)

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Analytic Note: Bensel’s account of the retreat from Reconstruction, as a shift from the project of occupation and permanent restructuring to one of negotiation and withdrawal, is quite similar to the trajectory observed in Peru during the Civilista era. And as I do in this paper, he traces the shifting nature of northern policies during this period to shifts in the ruling coalition. The decline of Reconstruction is examined in detail in Chapter Six of his book.

Full Citation: Richard Bensel, Yankee Leviathan: The Origins of Central State Authority in the United States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

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Analytic Note: Footnotes 23-25 & 27-29 draw on Gootenberg (1993) for specific examples of the developmental projects of the guano era. As the annotation to FN 21 describes, this book is the most complete account of what he calls the “social history of ideas” about the role of the state during this period. Here I cite Gootenberg’s recounting of the famous statement by the country’s most important railroad engineer, Ernesto Malinowski. A typographical error in the published paper directs the reader to p.92 of Gooteberg (1993), but the relevant quote above can be found on p.91.

Source Excerpt: “The chief surveyor, one Ernesto Malinowski (the Polish émigré who later oversaw Pardo’s trans-Andean line), expressed high hopes that railroads for Peru ‘will be the resolution of all social problems.’ [emphasis in original] Two thirds of the country had yet to be made ‘Peruvian’ according to this Central European’s nation-integrating model.” (90)

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6NP22C9/PZ03HV

Full Citation: Gootenberg, Paul (1993) Imagining Development: Economic Ideas in Peru’s ‘Fictitious Prosperity’ of Guano, 1840-1880 (Princeton University Press)

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Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6NP22C9/VBMJLW

Full Citation: Soifer, Hillel (2009) Dataset from Censo Escolar (Qualitative Data Repository [distributor])

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Analytic Note: Like this set of footnotes (#62-67) in general, the purpose is to buttress the claim that subaltern mobilization was growing over the course of the Civilista period, and becoming severe enough that the ability of the central state to stem it was called into question. The degree of unrest and the state’s response to it are discussed at length in Chapters 3 and 4 of Hazen’s dissertation.

Full Citation: Dan C. Hazen, The Awakening of Puno: Government Policy and the Indian Problem in Southern Peru (PhD dissertation, Yale University, 1974).

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Analytic Note: In data collected during the broader period of archival research from which this paper is drawn, I track enrollment per population at the provincial level over time. The sentence from which this footnote draws summarizes the information contained in the attached tables. The data in this table, drawn from various sources, makes several points. First, it supports the claim cited in the sentence where this footnote appears - that educational development outside highly urban areas was very limited in 1897. Second, it shows the significant development of schooling over the subsequent two decades; the phenomenon this paper seeks to explain. Enrollment and school-age population data for 1897 are drawn from the 1898 Memoria del Ministerio de Justicia, Culto, e Instrucción Pública p.374ff, which is located in the Archivo General de la Nación, Fondo Ministerio de Hacienda, Location H-6-1667. Enrollment and school-age population data for 1921 are drawn from the 1922 Memoria del Ministerio de Justicia, Culto, e Instrucción Pública vol.2, pp.731ff, which is located in the Archivo General de la Nación, Fondo Ministerio de Hacienda, Location H-6-1694.

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6NP22C9/JXEYZF

Full Citation: Soifer, Hillel David (2006) ‘Authority Over Distance: Explaining Variation in State Infrastructural Power in Latin America’ (PhD Dissertation, Harvard University Department of Government) Table 3.4 p.176.

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Analytic Note: The claim that a broad political coalition of elites based in mining, agriculture, and nascent industry emerged in the aftermath of the War of the Pacific and sought to establish political order and restore social peace is not a controversial one in the historiography. I cite Thorp and Bertram here because they most fully elaborate the social underpinnings of this political coalition, and the set of economic changes that brought it to power.

Full Citation: Rosemary Thorp and Geoffrey Bertram, Peru 1890–1977: Growth and Policy in an Open Economy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978).

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Analytic Note (Source 1): The Table here is reproduced from my hand-written notes from the original document. It shows the average salary received by teachers in each of Peru’s then 21 departments, ranked from highest to lowest. A trope of concerns about educational development, both in Peru and elsewhere, was that salaries were too low to attract qualified teachers to many parts of the country.

Analytic Note (Source 2): My notes from the original source refer to problems with paying teachers, especially in more far-flung locations where information cannot be relayed to the capital by telegraph.

Data Source (Source 1): https://doi.org/10.5064/F6NP22C9/QHSLWY

Full Citation (Source 1): Memoria del Ministerio de Justicia, Culto, e Instrucción Pública 1903 (Lima) Found in the Archivo General de la Nación, Fondo Ministerio de Hacienda, Code H-6-1671

Full Citation (Source 2): Memoria del Ministerio de Justicia, Culto, e Instrucción Pública 1906 (Lima) Found in the Archivo General de la Nación, Fondo Ministerio de Hacienda, Code H-6-1674, p.xxxii

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Analytic Note: This document compiles data collected from various sources about the number and spatial distribution of police in Peru during the period 1847-1918. The sentences to which the footnote is appended refers to figures from the end of this period for various highland regions, and to the lack of growth in policing during the previous five decades. Like this set of footnotes (#62-67) in general, the purpose is to buttress the claim that subaltern mobilization was growing over the course of the Civilista period, and becoming severe enough that the ability of the central state to stem it was called into question.

Source Excerpt: Table 5.6

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6NP22C9/VZGINX

Full Citation: Soifer, Hillel David (2006) Authority over Distance (unpublished PhD dissertation, Department of Government, Harvard University), Table 5.6 pp.314-15.

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Analytic Note: The footnote cites p.10; this was an error introduced in the revision process. The quote appears on p.110.

Source Excerpt: “Table 3.1 includes two possible proxies for state centralization/pacification. One is the date of the first national census. Such efforts require that government representatives not only have authority to ask sometimes difficult questions, but also can be protected from random violence while performing their jobs.”

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6NP22C9/J0GXMV

Full Citation: Centeno, Miguel Ángel (2002) Blood and Debt: War and the Nation State in Latin America (Penn State University Press)

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Analytic Note: The dataset I compiled from the Censo Escolar, which was used to gather the information discussed here as well as elsewhere in the paper, is linked here.

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6NP22C9/VBMJLW

Full Citation: Soifer, Hillel (2009) Dataset from Censo Escolar (Qualitative Data Repository [distributor])

The following Note should be at the beginning of every ATI, annotating the title: <br> This is an Annotation for Transparent Inquiry project, published by the Qualitative Data Repository. Please cite as:

Ellett, Rachel. 2016. "Data for: “Democratic and judicial stagnation,” in: Pathways to judicial power in transitional states: Perspectives from African courts". Qualitative Data Repository. https://doi.org/10.5064/F6PN93H4

Additional documentation can be found on QDR.

Learn more about ATI here.

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Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6PN93H4/EATR7N

Full Citation: Ndyanabo v Attorney General (Civil Appeal No. 64 of 2001) [2002] TZCA 2 (14 February 2002). http://www.saflii.org/tz/cases/TZCA/2002/2.html <br> https://web.archive.org/web/20161004194738/http://www.saflii.org/tz/cases/TZCA/2002/2.html

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Analytic Note: Assessing the historical track record of judicial appointments during the Nyerere era was challenging. Interviewees frequently offered diametrically opposed accounts. But, in general, the appointments were not particularly politicized because all individuals were recruited within the single party structure and tended to work their way up through the judicial hierarchy.

Source Excerpt: Traditionally although we were socialist, there was high respect for the rule of law and the judiciary. Under Nyerere there was respect for separation of powers. The judiciary was quite independent. The appointments to the judiciary were not politically motivated. There were not appointments from outside the judiciary. They worked their way up from the bottom. The court made decisions that made it quite independent. Getting people from aside the judiciary has affected independence. There wasn’t so much agitation about abuse of independence. The level of the average Tanzanian doesn’t take him to an understanding of the courts. The newspaper editors don’t understand the courts.

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6PN93H4/HP2OGR

Full Citation: Ellett interview with Tanzanian lawyer, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania (May 2007)

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Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6PN93H4/5XNRCY

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Analytic Note: More detailed and recent data available from author upon request.

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6PN93H4/K3NL7J

Full Citation: Original data collected by author

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Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6PN93H4/RHL5ID

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Analytic Note: This interviewee points to an important argument in the political science literature, that judges wait for signals from government before deciding how to rule in highly politicized or visible cases. In the case of Tanzania it is not that judges are waiting to see who will be out of power or who is coming into power (see for example, Gretchen Helmke (2005) Courts Under Constraints: Judges, Generals and Presidents in Argentina. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press). In Tanzania while there has been a slight slip in CCM hegemony, they still command a significant majority in the legislature. Rather, in Tanzania the calculated judgments relate to how far the courts can go in pushing more expansive rights, and how much the CCM will tolerate opposition and dissent.

Source Excerpt: In Tanzania, it is not that we dont have high profile political cases they are there but the judiciary is a careful judiciary. Because you find a very potentially volatile case, but the way they come to the decision they argue very carefully. Case of Paul Mhozya, against the former President, the argument was brilliant, but ending result is negative and disappointing. There are cases that are potentially volatile, big. But the courts have a very clever way of coming to their decisions. The judiciary reads the times. In the case of Ndyanabo: If that case had come during the last phase of the government, it would have been different. Case of Takrima, giving food, etc. part of African hospitality. If that was decided during the last phase of government, it wouldnt have been decided in that way. They are trying to be politically correct. They wait for signals. They wait for signals.

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6PN93H4/HIV93Y

Full Citation: Ellett interview, Law Professor, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, May 2007

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Analytic Note: Full news article from Daily Monitor (Available through Lexis Nexis)

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6PN93H4/DNCU7B

Full Citation: Uganda; Besigye Judge Quits Africa News, February 4, 2006 Saturday The Monitor ‘Besigye judge quits’ Daily Monitor (4 February 2006).

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Analytic Note: Longer excerpt of interview (with redactions to protect confidentiality) is provided for further examples and context. Field notes indicate that the Judge was talking about ‘preparing the ground’ or ‘smoothing the way’ in advance of potentially controversial judgments as a preemptive strategy. If key political elites- Minister of Justice, Prime Minister, President – are brought on to the side of the judges before the judgment is made public this may insulate it from aggressive criticism and may even improve the possibility of compliance. However, this obviously also represents a breach of separation of powers. Can institutional separation of powers be strengthened through secret elite bargaining?

Source Excerpt: “I wrote my decisions then I went to see the President I know people will come and tell you that I am trying to open up old wounds, that I am giving judgments on these people. So I am going to give this judgment and this will be in the interests of these parties. When I go to Dar es Salaam I am bothered by a certain family about this. I thought I should tell you that because I know people would tell you wrong things then there will be commotion for nothing. I used that system a few times. When something is sensitive then I would prepare the grounds. Our decisions should not cause commotion, Courts are there to provide justice to the nation, not to stir up problems. They should be a stabilizing force. If my decision is going to destabilize I should prepare things.”

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6PN93H4/WV1ILR

Full Citation: Ellett interview, Tanzania Court of Appeal Judge, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania (June 2007)

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Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6PN93H4/5SMKLN

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Analytic Note: This court case was a pivotal turning point for the regime and the Malawian courts. It marked the beginning of a new period of interference. This Supreme Court decision demonstrates the bold and independent decision-making of the court at this time.

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6PN93H4/8UYHBJ

Full Citation: In Re: Question of the Crossing of the Floor by Members of the National Assembly; In Re: Presidential Reference of a Dispute of a Constitutional Nature under Section 89(1)(h) of the Constitution and Section 65 of the Constitution (44 of 2006) 20007] MWHC. http://www.malawilii.org/files/mw/judgment/high-court/2007/426/426.pdf

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Analytic Note: The retirement speech of the former Chief Justice of Tanzania is included here in full. It nicely demonstrates the institutional legacy of an office defined in a very specific way by individuals in the past, most especially by former Chief Justice Nyalali. The juxtaposition of bold leadership of the judiciary with a more timid corps of judges below is an interesting case in contrasts.

Source Excerpt: “The least harmful organ of state must not weaken its resolve to protect the weak against the oppression or tyranny of the strong and the ruthless. Those exercising state power must never be left in doubt that transgression of the people’s basic rights will be met by the fury of the law.”

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6PN93H4/BDOLPC

Full Citation: Shivji, Issa G, and Hamudi Majamba. (2011) Rule of Law Versus Rulers of Law: Justice Barnabas Albert Samatta's Road to Justice. Dar es Salaam, Tanzania: Mkuki na Nyota Publishers.

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Analytic Note: Evidence from the 2014 election suggests that the relatively low involvement of the judiciary in the 2009 election was not a trend. This indicates the non-linear empowerment of courts. The courts in the 2014 election were at the center of the disputed Presidential contest. Each political party rushed to the courts seeking stay-orders and injunctions. The party leading in the polls at that time, the wanted the Electoral Commission to continue the vote tally and to announce the winner within the mandated 8 days. The second and third ranked parties wanted the vote counting to halt and an electoral rerun to be held. The various cases were consolidated into a single election case, the result of which was to uphold the power of the Electoral Commission to count and recount the vote, but not to extend the period beyond the mandated eight days after the election. The role of the judiciary in resolving electoral disputes is subject to debate within the literature. On one hand it aids in the peaceful resolution of conflict that may otherwise be violent. On the other, however, it could be seen as delegitimizing the election by bypassing the will of the people. As for the impact on the judiciary, the intense scrutiny increases the possibility of the politicization of the institution.

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Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6PN93H4/YWO6UF

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Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6PN93H4/CJSHFB

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Analytic Note: Munlos political partisanship was confirmed as he left political office announcing his intent to run for President. Subsequent interviews conducted in 2013 indicate the full scope of former Chief Justice Munlos political partisanship. The full scope of the former Chief Justices political activities was something interviewees were willing to discuss openly now he had left office. The issue of leadership of the judiciary and politicization of the office of the Chief Justice is debated within the literature. The Chief Justice must be political in order to protect the judiciary, but cannot be political in a partisan fashion.

Full Citation: Government stuns ACB in Muluzi Case Malawi Today, July 11, 2012, http://www.malawitoday.com/print/news/125932-govt-stuns-acb-muluzi-case-says-its-not-ready

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Analytic Note: Full judgment appended.

Source Excerpt: The Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania and other relevant laws oblige the people of this country to live together with mutual respect and tolerance. It is one of the principal obligations of good citizenship.

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6PN93H4/AJCNFG

Full Citation: Dibagula v Republic (Criminal Appeal No. 53 of 2001) [2003] TZCA 1 (14 March 2003). http://www.saflii.org/tz/cases/TZCA/2003/1.html <br> https://web.archive.org/web/20161004195749/http://www.saflii.org/tz/cases/TZCA/2003/1.html

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Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6PN93H4/LU8VQX

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Analytic Note: The claim of this interviewee is important because it speaks to the controversies surrounding the overreach of the courts. This narrative was reflected in the broader public and political arena which can be linked to the attempted passage of the so-called 2011 Injunctions Bill. This bill would have prevented the courts from issuing injunctions against the government. The complete original data on civil cases filed by type between 1990 and 2006 collected by the author from the handwritten court registry is offered here, including judicial review cases.

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6PN93H4/QS79V0

Full Citation: Original data collected by author, May 2007, Blantyre Malawi.

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Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6PN93H4/ZPAK3V

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Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6PN93H4/B72V5P

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Analytic Note: New data indicates a slight shift in appointees towards the South. This supports the broader arguments made about increased politicization of the judiciary under Mutharikas second term in office. Included is raw data, not coded, collected in 2013.

Cross-reference to appointment data in Note 2

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6PN93H4/HBF5UQ

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Analytic Note: This is an important argument about the strategic use of law by political elites. The government, in this case maintains the status quo as long as the court case is pending. A form of strategic delay.

Source Excerpt: Opposition parties say they foresee a long delay in passing the final verdict on the controversial Section 65 of the Constitution. MCP spokesperson Nicholas Dausi claimed the Judiciary is receiving enormous pressure and interference from the Executive branch of government to delay the final verdict on the matter because they want to rule by default "since they are surviving by court orders" But Dausi could not give evidence of pressure and interference. We hope the Judiciary will conform to and comply with their constitutional mandate to interpret the laws of Malawi and we pray that they expedite the matter. I dont think the Judiciary will dance to the tune of the Executive"

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6PN93H4/RKNG7E

Full Citation: Opposition foresee delay on section 65 The Nation (28 July 2006).

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Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6PN93H4/GCUJLD

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Analytic Note: Full version of constitutional petition

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6PN93H4/LPEG4B

Full Citation: Attorney General v Uganda Law Society (CONSTITUTIONAL APPEAL NO. 1 OF 2006) Available at UGandalii website. http://www.ulii.org/ug/judgment/supreme-court/2009/2 <br> https://web.archive.org/web/20161004200434/http://www.ulii.org/ug/judgment/supreme-court/2009/2/

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Analytic Note: Full takrima judgment uploaded. Case is important because it demonstrates the way in which a judiciary whose independence has been severely undermined and circumscribed it still capable of issuing independent, forceful judgments. Moreover, it demonstrates the non-linear nature of judicial empowerment and institutional consolidation.

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6PN93H4/GRMJCA

Full Citation: Legal and Human Rights Centre (LHRC) and Others v Attorney General (1) (Miscellaneous Civil Case No 77 of 2005) [2006] TZHC 1 (24 April 2006). http://www.saflii.org/tz/cases/TZHC/2006/1.html <br> https://web.archive.org/web/20161004195335/http://www.saflii.org/tz/cases/TZHC/2006/1.html

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Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6PN93H4/4GO4FH

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Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6PN93H4/RU61UF

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Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6PN93H4/ZTT27K

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Analytic Note: Full election related appeals judgment uploaded. Excerpt highlights the pragmatic conservatism of the Court of Appeal. They assert the political question doctrine and argue that this is not a constitutional question. But in their obiter dicta at the end of the judgment, they note how this positions violates international law. Further demonstrating that judges are writing to multiple audiences simultaneously.

Source Excerpt: In our case, we say that the issue of independent candidates has to be settled by Parliament which has the jurisdiction to amend the Constitution and not the Courts which, as we have found, do not have that jurisdiction. The decision on whether or not to introduce independent candidates depends on the social needs of each State based on its historical reality. Thus the issue of independent candidates is political and not legal However, we give a word of advice to both the Attorney General and our Parliament: The United Nations Human Rights Committee, in paragraph 21 of its General Comment No. 25, of July 12, 1996, said as follows on Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, very similarly worded as Art 23 of the American Convention and our Art 21: The right of persons to stand for election should not be limited unreasonably by requiring candidates to be members of parties or of specific parties. Tanzania is known for our good record on human rights and particularly our militancy for the in the liberation struggle. We should seriously ponder that comment from a Committee of the United Nations, that is, the whole world.

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6PN93H4/Y9VASO

Full Citation: Attorney General v Mtkila, Court of Appeal of Tanzania at Dar es Salaam, Civil Appeal No. 45 of 2009. http://www.judiciary.go.tz:8081/help/topic/com.optima.infocenter.judgements/Court%20of%20App

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Analytic Note: New interview data highlights continued reference to the importance of region in judicial appointments in Malawi. This data also highlights the challenge of making evidence based claims about regional bias or regional balancing of appointments in Malawi. Rather the continued salience of region and ethnicity in Malawian judicial politics should be analyzed in terms of perceptions of judicial legitimacy rather than patterns in decision making. A concomitant issue is judge or forum shopping, once the judge has been appointed. Once again, this is typically explained through reference to the regional identity of the judge.

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Analytic Note: Low-intensity battle over salary and conditions continues. Judicial strikes related to salary disputes over the last decade have pushed the boundaries of political activism for Malawian judges. Judges acting as their advocates brings a degree of politicization. This news article highlights the challenges of maintaining the delicate balance between advocacy and politicization.

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Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6PN93H4/HZN25W

Full Citation: State v President of the Republic of Malawi and Others; Exparte: Malawi Law Society (6 of 2006) [2007] MWHC 7 Fri, 02/09/2007. http://www.malawilii.org/mw/judgment/high-court/2007/7

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Analytic Note: I include a larger excerpt of this interview with a Tanzanian High Court judge because the context provides an interesting contrast. He states that the judiciary in Tanzania is independent. Then, he goes on to talk about writing judgments in a one party language versus a multiparty language. Although small, this provides a great deal of insight into the Tanzanian case. One of the reasons the judiciary has not experienced such direct and forceful interference as compared to Uganda for example - is simply because they are not rocking the boat, they are deciding cases in the 'right way.' If they do over step their mark they are reigned back in through government nullification of their judgment.

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6PN93H4/8HOGPT

Full Citation: Ellett interview, Tanzania High Court Judge, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, June 2007

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Analytic Note: The 2011 bill was passed into law. The Act was a clear violation of separation of powers and a fundamental violation of access to justice. Ultimately the Malawi Parliament repealed the Act at the end of May 2012, reverting back to the original provision. This Act, although ultimately not successful, demonstrates the ways in which a powerful judiciary can be circumscribed through a range of strategies of interference. The attempt at formally circumscribing judicial power in Malawi was preceded by many years of powerful rhetorical attacks by the President, who argued the judiciary was standing in the way of policy making and progress.

Source Excerpt: The court shall not, in any proceedings, grant an injunction or make any order against the Government or a public officer if the effect of granting the injunction or making the order would be to give any relief against the Government or a public officer which could not have been obtained in a suit against the Government or a public office.

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6PN93H4/JXMK3I

Full Citation: Civil Procedure (Suits by or Against the Government or Public Officers) Amendment Act (2011). http://www.malawilii.org/mw/legislation/act/2011/11 <br> https://web.archive.org/web/20161004194937/http://www.malawilii.org/mw/legislation/act/2011

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Source Excerpt: Le Général Gilinsky, en conformité des instructions reçues, crut pouvoir faire franchir la frontière a la 1re armée - par echelons de corps - entre le quatorzième et le dix-huitième jour et, à la 2e armée,- tous les corps en même temps,- le dix-huitième jour. Le Généralissime n'approuve a pas le plan visant à faire avancer la 1re armée par échelons; en conséquence une directive du Groupe Nord-Ouest fixa le passage de la frontière pour la 1re armée toute entière au 17 août (18e jour), et pour le gros des corps de la 2e au 19 août (20e jour). La vérité oblige cependant à noter qu'au terme fixé la 2e armée ne se trouve a pas tout à fait prête à marcher, l'organisation de ses arrières n'étant pas encore terminée. C'est à l'histoire qu'il appartiendra de juger si la cause de ce retard doi être attribuée à un manque d'énergie de la part des organes administratifs de cette armée qui n'avaient pas remplir leur devoir à temps, ou à des erreurs dans le calcul préliminaire du délai de sa mise sur pied définitive.

Source Excerpt Translation: General Zhilinskii, in accordance with the instructions, thought the 1st army group could cross the border between the fourteenth and eighteenth day, and the 2nd Army could cross with all its troops simultaneously on the eighteenth day. The Commander-in-Chief did not approve the plan to move the 1st army in increments; this was because a directive from the North-West Group specified having the entire 1st army cross on August 17th (18th day), and the majority of the 2nd army on August 19th (20th day). However, it is necessary to note that the second army was not quite ready to march, and its organization was incomplete. History will determine whether the cause of this delay can be attributed to a lack of energy on the part of the army administrative bodies that had not fulfilled their duty in time, or an inaccurate estimate of how much time it would take for the foot crossing to occur.

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/YKPGEZ

Full Citation: lurii Nikiforovich Danilov, La Russie dans la Grande Guerre Mondiale (1914-1917) (Paris: Payot, 1927; French ed. of Rossiia), p. 182.

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Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/IT0NNP

Full Citation: A. M. Zaionchkovskii, Podgotovka Rossi k imperialisticheskoi voine (Moscow: Gosvoenizdat, 1926).

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Source Excerpt (Source 4): "Moreover, possessing an intimate knowledge of the actual state of Russia, and realising the internal dangers the Empire would have to face if war broke out, Stolypin frankly dreaded a war and consequently anything which might lead to the collision so often predicted with Germany." (33)

Data Sources:<br> Source 1: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/D9NVOK <br> Source 2: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/53EUIZ <br> Source 3: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/OAV5DU <br> Source 4: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/T6ZSQX

Full Citation (Source 1): I. V. Bestuzhev, Bor'ba v Rossii po voprosam vneshnei politiki, 1906-1910 (Moscow: Akademiia Nauk, 1961), p. 315.

Full Citation (Source 2): I. I. Astaf'ev, Russko-germanskie diplomaticheskie otnosheniia 1905-1911 gg. (Moscow: Moskovskii Universitet, 1972), pp. 90-94. Location: shareable

Full Citation (Source 3): Astaf'ev, "Potsdamskoe soglashenie 1911g," Istoricheskie zapiski no. 85 (1970), p. 157.

Full Citation (Source 4): A. Nekludoff, Diplomatic Reminiscences before and during the World War, 1911-1917 (London: Murray, 1920), pp. 32-33.

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Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/QNLEUY

Full Citation: A. M. Zaionchkovskii, Podgotovka Rossii k imperialisticheskoi voine (Moscow: Gosvoenizdat, 1926).

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**Source Excerpt (Source 2): "It was widely believed in the Russian Army before 1914 that Sweden would join the Central Powers in case of a war with Russia- 'Germany and Sweden are at war against Russia' was the assumption on which maneuvers of the St. Petersburg army corps in Augusts 1910 were based- so it was not surprising that she was the object of much attention on the part of the two Russian attachés stationed in Stockholm." (228)

Data Sources:<br> Source 1: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/TO3YYK <br> Source 2: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/VCZRJK

Full Citation (Source 1): A. M. Zaionchkovskii, Podgotovka Rossii k imperialisticheskoi voine (Moscow: Gosvoenizdat, 1926), pp. 183-85.

Full Citation (Source 2): Alfred Vagts, Military Attaché (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), p. 228.

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Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/CKISSA

Full Citation: A. M. Zaionchkovskii, Podgotovka Rossii k imperialisticheskoi voine (Moscow: Gosvoenizdat, 1926), pp. 140, 183-230, 301.

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Source Excerpt (Source 3): "Чрезвычайно усложнившаяся вследствие балканских событий международно-политическая обстановка данного времени -- говорилось в постановлении -- требует безотлагательного осуществления некоторых мер по усилению боевой готовности нашей армии." (136)

Source Excerpt Translation (Source 3): "'The international political climate of the time,' the resolution said, 'enormously complex as a result of the events in the Balkans, requires immediate implementation of certain measures to enhance the combat readiness of our army.'"

Data Sources:<br> Source 1: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/3ON1YD <br> Source 2: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/0XYTZG <br> Source 3: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/SM6IT9

Full Citation (Source 1): A. M. Zaionchkovskii, Podgotovka Rossii k imperialisticheskoi voine (Moscow: Gosvoenizdat, 1926), pp. 297, 306.

Full Citation (Source 2): A. A. Manikovskii, Boevoe snabzhenie russkoi armii, 1914-1918 (Moscow: Vysshii voennyi redaktsionnyi sovet, 1923), vol. III, pp. 7-8.

Full Citation (Source 3): V. I. Bovykin, Iz istorii vozniknoveniia pervoi mirovoi voiny: Otnosheniia Rossii i Frantsii v 1912-1914 gg. (Moscow: Moskovskii Universitet, 1961), p. 136.

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Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/DDHZXU

Full Citation: V. A. Emets, "O roli russkoi armii v pervyi period mirovoi voiny 1914-1918 gg." Istoricheskie zapiski no. 77 (1965), p. 63.

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Analytic Note (Source 2): QDR NOTE: The attached source provided by the project author is a substitution of the original one cited and comes from a subsequent edition. The relevant pages (p. 136-37 in this edition) are attached here.

Data Sources:<br> Source 1: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/JBIVRN <br> Source 2: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/NP7QVR

Full Citation (Source 1): A. M. Zaionchkovskii, Podgotovka Rossii k imperialisticheskoi voine (Moscow: Gosvoenizdat, 1926), pp. 117, 266.

Full Citation (Source 2): A. A. Kersnovskii, Istoriia russkoi armii (Belgrade: Tsarskii Vestnik, 1933-35), part III (1881-1917), pp. 602-3.

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Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/FHQWRO

Full Citation: I. I. Vatsetis, Operatsii na vostochnoi granitse germanii v 1914g. Chast' 1-ia:Vostochnoprusskaia operatsiia (Moscow: Gosvoenizdat, 1929), p. 139.

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Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/DL7HTP

Full Citation: Russia, 10-i otdel General'nogo shtaba RKKA, Vostochno-prusskaia operatsiia: Sbornik dokumentov, or VPO (Moscow: Gosvoenizdat, 1939), no.5, p. 38.

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Data Sources:<br> Source 1: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/SR53JM <br> Source 2: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/D5QQFX

Full Citation (Source 1): A. M. Zaionchkovskii, Podgotovka Rossii k imperialisticheskoi voine (Moscow: Gosvoenizdat, 1926), pp. 156-57.

Full Citation (Source 2): A. M. Zaionchkovskii, Podgotovka Rossii k imperialisticheskoi voine (Moscow: Gosvoenizdat, 1926), pp. 348-54.

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Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/MAD277

Full Citation: Georges Maurice Paléologue An Ambassador's Memoirs (London: Hutchinson, 1923-1925), vol. 1, p. 104.

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Data Sources:<br> Source 1: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/I47K6L <br> Source 2: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/2TCQ8P <br> Source 3: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/VXXMPZ

Full Citation (Source 1): A. V. Ignat'ev, Russko-angliiskie otnosheniia nakanune pervoi mirovoi voiny (1908-1914 gg.) (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoi literatury, 1962), p. 112.

Full Citation (Source 2): Alfred Vagts, Military Attaché (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), p. 379.

Full Citation (Source 3): V. A. Emets, Ocherki vneshnei politiki Rossii v period mirovoi voiny: Vzaimootnosheniia Rossii s soiuznikami po vedeniia voiny (Moscow, Nauka, 1977), 36.

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Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/FVH8NF

Full Citation: M. Bonch-Bruevich, "Dve privychki," Razvedchik no. 1152, 27 November 1912, pp. 801-2.

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Analytic Note: QDR NOTE: The attached source provided by the project author is a substitution of the original one cited and comes from a subsequent edition. The relevant page (p. 160 in this edition) is attached here.

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/HB8YRU

Full Citation: A. A. Kersnovskii, Istoriia russkoi armii (Belgrade: Tsarskii Vestnik, 1933-35), part III (1881-1917), pp. 622-23.

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Source Excerpt (Source 1): "На закрытом заседании Государственной думы в апреле 1912 г. товарищ военного министра Поливанов заявил, что 'дело сдвинулось, и кошмарное впечатление от той необеспеченности армии средствами, в которой она оставалась в первые годы после войны, этот кошмар, слава богу, остается позади.'" (115)

Source Excerpt Translation (Source 1): "At a closed session of the State Duma in April 1912, Minister of War Polivanov stated that '...things started moving and the unfunded army's nightmarish experience of unpreparedness, which remained in the first years after the war -- that nightmare, thank God, has been left behind.'"

Data Sources:<br> Source 1: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/WKBAWE <br> Source 2: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/RXOHYY

Full Citation (Source 1): A. V. Ignat'ev, Russko-angliiskie otnosheniia nakanune pervoi mirovoi voiny (1908-1914 gg.) (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoi literatury, 1962), 115.

Full Citation (Source 2): Georges Louis, Les carnets de Georges Louis (Paris: Rieder, 1926), vol. I, p. 151.

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Source Excerpt (Source 2): "Вчера у него с Сухомлиновым шел разговор о крепостях и Сухомлинов его убедил в... их упразднения." (70)

Source Excerpt Translation (Source 2): "Yesterday he [E. V. Bogdanhovich] discussed fortresses with Sukhomlinov and Sukhomlinov convinced him to...their abandonment." (70)

Data Sources:<br> Source 1: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/UGUFVN <br> Source 2: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/DTBM6Q <br>

Full Citation (Source 1): A. M. Zaionchkovskii, Podgotovka Rossii k imperialisticheskoi voine (Moscow: Gosvoenizdat, 1926), pp. 209-10.

Full Citation (Source 2): A. A. Polivanov, Iz dnevnikov i vozpominanii po dolzhnosti voennogo ministra i ego pomoshchika, 1907-1916 gg. (Moscow: Vysshii voennyi redaktsionnyi sovet, 1924), 70-73.

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Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/72KXLF

Full Citation: A. A. Strokov, Vooruzhennye sily ivoennoe iskusstvo v pervoi mirovoi voine (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1974).

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Source Excerpt: "Русский оперативный план 1912 г. был как бы нацелен на будущее, исходил из приращения в ближайшие два-три года необходимых сил для осуществления обеих наступательных операций."

Source Excerpt Translation: "The Russian operational plan of 1912, as it were focused on the future, was based on an increase of the forces in the coming two-three years that would be necessary to carry out both offensive operations."

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/EBAXFF

Full Citation: V. A. Emets, "O roli russkoi armii v pervyi period mirovoi voiny 1914-1918 gg." Istoricheskie zapiski no. 77 (1965), p. 67.

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Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/NCSZQ5

Full Citation: A. M. Zaionchkovskii, Podgotovka Rossii k imperialisticheskoi voine (Moscow: Gosvoenizdat, 1926), pp. 184, 190.

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Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/ZVHTER

Full Citation: A. M. Zaionchkovskii, Podgotovka Rossii k imperialisticheskoi voine (Moscow: Gosvoenizdat, 1926), pp. 206-7.

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Source Excerpt (Source 3): "Неудачной была и дислокация армии. Следствием этого являлось неравномерное распределение войск по территории империи." (47)

Source Excerpt Translation (Source 3): "The army was also not properly allocated. The consequence of this was the uneven distribution of forces throughout the empire's territory." (47)

Analytic Note (Source 4): This source is meant to introduce the concept of Russian military repositioning within Poland for non-Russian language readers.

Source Excerpt (Source 4): "Profiting from the lessons of the Japanese war, the reorganization of the Russian defense system continued apace. In the summer of 1910 an imperial decree revised the mobilization plan and deactivated four fortresses in Poland. As a result, the army's centers of concentration shifted eastward away from the frontier. This move was designed to overcome two problems. First, because of its relatively undeveloped rail network, the Polish salient could be squeezed as if in a vise by coordinated Austrian and German attacks along the flanks. Second, rapid advances in the development of artillery had reduced the effectiveness of fortresses and turned them into potential traps for their garrisons. Therefore, the plan called for the Russian army to concentrate beyond the reach of the enemy and then pass over to the offensive." (70-71) "The German military attach reported that the revised plan reflected 'purely strategic considerations.' The French high command received advance notice; the technical adjustment fell within the terms of the Franco-Russian military convention. The French press was greatly agitated, however, because reports of the new plan appeared almost at the same time as the Potsdam meeting. French journalists warned that Russia was prepared to surrender the Kingdom of Poland, and that other dire consequences were in the offing." (71)

Data Sources:<br> Source 1: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/YW5OSU <br> Source 2: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/IBSVKC <br> Source 3: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/UJHH2K <br> Source 4: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/LTZO4O

Full Citation (Source 1): A. M. Zaionchkovskii, Podgotovka Rossii k imperialisticheskoi voine (Moscow: Gosvoenizdat, 1926), pp. 84-86.

Full Citation (Source 2): A. A. Polivanov, Iz dnevnikov i vozpominanii po dolzhnosti voennogo ministra i ego pomoshchika, 1907-1916 gg. (Moscow: Vysshii voennyi redaktsionnyi sovet, 1924), pp. 61, 94.

Full Citation (Source 3): I. I. Rostunov, Russkii front pervoi mirovoi voiny (Moscow: Nauka, 1976), 47.

Full Citation (Source 4): Sergei Oldenburg, The Last Tsar: Nicholas II, His Reign and His Russia (Gulf Breeze, Fla.: Academic Press International, 1977), vol. III, p. 72.

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Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/NSMFRX

Full Citation: A. M. Zaionchkovskii, Podgotovka Rossii k imperialisticheskoi voine (Moscow: Gosvoenizdat, 1926), p. 243.

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Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/I3BXXQ

Full Citation: A. M. Zaionchkovskii, Podgotovka Rossii k imperialisticheskoi voine (Moscow: Gosvoenizdat, 1926), pp. 237, 258-59.

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Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/LAZGW8

Full Citation: A. M. Zaionchkovskii, Podgotovka Rossii k imperialisticheskoi voine (Moscow: Gosvoenizdat, 1926), pp. 350-52.

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Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/EEUVP4

Full Citation: M. V. Alekseev, Rech' 8 avgusta 1917 Gen. M. V. Alekseeva na moskovskom soveshchanii obshchestvennykh deiatelei (Moscow: Moskovskii Listok, 1917), pp. 1-2.

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Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/PQW5CK

Full Citation: A. M. Zaionchkovskii, Podgotovka Rossii k imperialisticheskoi voine (Moscow: Gosvoenizdat, 1926), pp. 236, 263.

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Source Excerpt (Source 1): Большое значение он уделял и железнодорожной связи России с окраннами - с Кавказом и Средней Азией. Поэтому совершенно неправ Васильев в своем утверждении, что "требования генерального штаба на постройку стратегических линий начиная с 1908 почти прекратились.» (13)

Source Excerpt Translation (Source 1): "He put a lot of importance on the railway connections with the Caucasus and Central Asia. Therefore, Vasiliev is incorrect in his statement that 'the requirements of the General Staff for the construction of the strategic lines began disappearing in 1908'." (13)

Data Sources:<br> Source 1: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/DL6NTY <br> Source 2: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/XQYNGB

Full Citation (Source 1): A. L. Sidorov, "Zheleznodorozhnyi transport v pervoi mirovoi voine i obostrenie ekonomicheskogo krizisa v strane," Istoricheskie zapiski no. 26 (1948), p. 13. Location: available in Microform FN3967 at Columbia University Library.

Full Citation (Source 2): A. M. Zaionchkovskii, Podgotovka Rossii k imperialisticheskoi voine (Moscow: Gosvoenizdat, 1926), p. 80.

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Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/N3OSPB

Full Citation: A. Samoilo, Dve zhizni (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1958), p. 144.

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Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/EBW3DY

Full Citation: A. A. Ignat'ev, Piat'desiat let v stroiu, (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo khudozhestvennoi literatury, 1959), vol. I, pp. 522-23, 531.

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Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/GT2MT4

Full Citation: A. M. Zaionchkovskii, Podgotovka Rossii k imperialisticheskoi voine (Moscow: Gosvoenizdat, 1926), pp. 103, 350.

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Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/8LEDTP

Full Citation: A. A. Polivanov, Iz dnevnikov i vozpominanii po dolzhnosti voennogo ministra i ego pomoshchika, 1907-1916 gg. (Moscow: Vysshii voennyi redaktsionnyi sovet, 1924), 62.

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Source Excerpt (Source 1): "The arrival in the field of the first-line divisions could not by any means be taken to indicate that the Russian armies were forthwith in a state of readiness. The officers of the General Staff had never received proper training, either at the Staff College or on their later service, in the technique of the administration of higher formations. The armies after mobilization ought to have had a certain time at their disposal, in order to get the administrative, supply, and lines-of-communications organizations into working order. The following fact will serve as a clear illustration of this unpreparedness regarding the administration of higher units. The 'Regulation of Army Administration in the Field,' published before the Japanese war, was considered unsatisfactory: nevertheless right up to 1914 no new one could be completed; commissions worked upon it, and drafts were prepared, but were not decided upon, and the new 'Regulations' were hastily issued just before the war itself. But the most characteristic peculiarity of the Kiev war game was the circumstance that the working of lines of communications and supply services was ignored. This shows the futile ideas of strategy of the Chief Directorate, which made the war game into an exercise in adventures upon the map and into juggling with figures." (38-39)

Data Sources:<br> Source 1: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/PEZMZA <br> Source 2: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/RY7P5J

Full Citation (Source 1): N. N. Golovin, The Russian Campaign of 1914 (Ft. Leavenworth, Kans.: Command and Staff School Press, 1933) p. 38-9.

Full Citation (Source 2): A. A. Polivanov, Iz dnevnikov i vozpominanii po dolzhnosti voennogo ministra i ego pomoshchika, 1907-1916 gg. (Moscow: Vysshii voennyi redaktsionnyi sovet, 1924), p. 99.

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Source Excerpt (Source 3): "I have already said that the united sympathies of the Russian Government and people were on the side of Serbia. At the beginning of 1913, public sympathy with Serbian aspirations became so strong that it inspired in me a certain fear lest the Government should find itself unable to control the course of political events. In the society circles alluded to above, which were in close touch with certain Court and military centers, there was a rooted conviction that a favourable moment was approaching for settling with Austria-Hungary for the sins of the Aehrenthal policy. This attitude was the result of the intrigues of certain men some of whom were hypnotized by personal ambitions while others suffered from a false conception of patriotism, and a third party, the most numerous, acted from a sense of fundamental opposition to the Government, and in ignorance of the general political situation in Europe. As a matter of fact, if Russia had decided at this moment to do more than afford Serbia and her allies diplomatic support she would have had to do this trusting in her own strength alone at her own risk and on her own responsibility, as neither France nor England would have stood by her to defend foreign interests but little understood by them." (78)

Data Sources:<br> Source 1: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/LVG5BC <br> Source 2: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/G4SDEH <br> Source 3: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/UTMEZT

Full Citation (Source 1): K. F. Shatsillo, Russkii imperializm i razvitie flota (Moscow: Nauka, 1968), p. 100. Location: shareable

Full Citation (Source 2): Edward C. Thaden, Russia and the Balkan Alliance of 1912 (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1965).

Full Citation (Source 3): Sergei Sazonov, Fateful Years, 1909-1916 (New York: Stokes, 1928), p. 78.

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Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/TXOWNQ

Full Citation: F. F. Palitsyn, chief of the main directorate of the General Staff, and M. V. Alekseev, first oberquartermaster, Svod ukazanii dannykh nachal'nikom General'nogo Shtaba vo vremia voennoi igry ofitserov General'nogo Shtaba v 1907 godu (St. Petersburg: Voennaia tipografiia, 1908), p. 7

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Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/JTOUK0

Full Citation: I. I. Rostunov, Russkii front pervoi mirovoi voiny (Moscow: Nauka, 1976).

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Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/YBMQEU

Full Citation: A. M. Zaionchkovskii, Podgotovka Rossii k imperialisticheskoi voine (Moscow: Gosvoenizdat, 1926), pp. 302-20.

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Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/KLT2SB

Full Citation: A. M. Zaionchkovskii, Podgotovka Rossii k imperialisticheskoi voine (Moscow: Gosvoenizdat, 1926), p. 241.

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Analytic Note: Bruce Menning has subsequently reported important archival discoveries that flesh out the debates over Russian deployment concepts between Danilov and Alekseev. He shows that overcommitments and contradictions in the Russian operational plan in 1914 were influenced both by bureaucratic politics and by ambivalence within each of these key participants in the planning process. While adding fascinating nuance, this generally confirms the interpretations offered here. See Bruce W. Menning, "Pieces of the Puzzle: The Role of Iu. N. Danilov and M. V. Alekseev in Russian War Planning before 1914," The International History Review, Vol. 25, No. 4 (December 2003), 775-798.

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/ENG5BY

Full Citation: A. M. Zaionchkovskii, Podgotovka Rossii k imperialisticheskoi voine (Moscow: Gosvoenizdat, 1926), pp. 236-37, 238-43.

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Data Sources:<br> Source 1: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/XVTI7K <br> Source 2: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/RHUWRZ

Full Citation (Source 1): A. M. Zaionchkovskii, Podgotovka Rossii k imperialisticheskoi voine (Moscow: Gosvoenizdat, 1926), p. 254.

Full Citation (Source 2): A. M. Zaionchkovskii, Podgotovka Rossii k imperialisticheskoi voine (Moscow: Gosvoenizdat, 1926), p. 269.

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Source Excerpt (Source 2): "В разговоре с военным министром был затронут еще вопрос о вызове командующих войсками Западных округов для проверки их подготовки к управлению армиями." (99)

Source Excerpt Translation (Source 2): "In a conversation with the minister of war another question was raised, about the call to the military commanders of the Western districts to check their preparations for the management of the armies." (99)

Data Sources:<br> Source 1: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/SB4RP9 <br> Source 2: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/QGYUCW

Full Citation (Source 1): A. M. Zaionchkovskii, Podgotovka Rossii k imperialisticheskoi voine (Moscow: Gosvoenizdat, 1926), pp. 89, 281-301.

Full Citation (Source 2): A. A. Polivanov, Iz dnevnikov i vozpominanii po dolzhnosti voennogo ministra i ego pomoshchika, 1907-1916 gg. (Moscow: Vysshii voennyi redaktsionnyi sovet, 1924), pp. 99-100.

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Data Sources:<br> Source 1: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/UPYIWD <br> Source 2: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/V5PLLC <br> Source 3: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/M228NE

Full Citation (Source 1): I. I. Astaf'ev, Russko-germanskie diplomaticheskie otnosheniia 1905-1911 gg. (Moscow: Moskovskii Universitet, 1972), p. 4.

Full Citation (Source 2): A. V. Ignat'ev, Russko-angliiskie otnosheniia nakanune pervoi mirovoi voiny (1908-1914 gg.) (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoi literatury, 1962), p. 116.

Full Citation (Source 3): V. I. Bovykin, Iz istorii vozniknoveniia pervoi mirovoi voiny: Otnosheniia Rossii i Frantsii v 1912-1914 gg. (Moscow: Moskovskii Universitet, 1961), p. 72.

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Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/SCEGZW

Full Citation: V. A. Emets, Ocherki vneshnei politiki Rossii v period mirovoi voiny: Vzaimootnosheniia Rossii s soiuznikami po vedeniia voiny (Moscow: Nauka, 1977), p. 67.

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Source Excerpt: "...что при всякой политической комбинации Швеция останется нейтральной." (458)

Source Excerpt Translation: "...that in any political combination Sweden will remain neutral. " (458)

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/TOLFXT

Full Citation: A. A. Ignat'ev, Piat'desiat let v stroiu (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo khudozhestvennoi literatury, 1959), vol. I, pp. 457-58.

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Analytic Note (Source 2): QDR NOTE: The attached source provided by the project author is a substitution of the original one cited and comes from a subsequent edition. The page numbers of both editions match.

Analytic Note (Source 3): QDR NOTE: The attached source provided by the project author is a substitution of the original one cited and comes from a subsequent edition. The page numbers of both editions match.

Data Sources:<br> Source 1: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/MTMD3S <br> Source 2: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/DVUPQP <br> Source 3: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/5VV38W <br> Source 4: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/MOSRTR

Full Citation (Source 1): A. M. Zaionchkovskii, Podgotovka Rossii k imperialisticheskoi voine (Moscow: Gosvoenizdat, 1926), pp. 244, 246, 256, 260-61, 278.

Full Citation (Source 2): I. I. Rostunov, Russkii front pervoi mirovoi voiny (Moscow: Nauka, 1976), 57.

Full Citation (Source 3): I. I. Rostunov, Russkii front pervoi mirovoi voiny (Moscow: Nauka, 1976), 93.

Full Citation (Source 4): A. M. Zaionchkovskii, Podgotovka Rossii k imperialisticheskoi voine (Moscow: Gosvoenizdat, 1926), pp. 259-60.

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Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/FIZTLB

Full Citation: A. M. Zaionchkovskii, Podgotovka Rossii k imperialisticheskoi voine (Moscow: Gosvoenizdat, 1926), pp. 420, 422.

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Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/SXNWJ2

Full Citation: A. M. Zaionchkovskii, Podgotovka Rossii k imperialisticheskoi voine (Moscow: Gosvoenizdat, 1926), pp. 159-63.

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Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/FJCXQ6

Full Citation: A. M. Zaionchkovskii, Podgotovka Rossii k imperialisticheskoi voine (Moscow: Gosvoenizdat, 1926), p. 278.

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Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/KD9J9D

Full Citation: Alfred Vagts, Military Attaché (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), pp. 333, 374ff.

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Analytic Note: QDR NOTE: The attached source provided by the project author is a substitution of the original one cited and comes from a subsequent edition. The relevant page (p. 158 in this edition) is attached here.

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/EDHR87

Full Citation: A. A. Kersnovskii, Istoriia russkoi armii (Belgrade: Tsarskii Vestnik, 1933-35), part III (1881-1917), p. 621.

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Source Excerpt (Source 2): LIST OF PARTICIPANTS The War Game Director-in-Chief: War Minister General Sukhomlinov. Chief of Staff of the Director-in-Chief: Chief of the General Staff General Yanushkevich. Quartermaster-General: General Danilov. The World War Commander-in-Chief: the Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaievich. Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief: General Yanushkevich. Quartermaster-General: General Danilov North-Western Group of Armies G.O.C.: General Jilinsky. Chief of Staff: General Oranovksy Commander of the First Army: General Rennenkampf Chief of Staff: General Mileant Commander of the Second Army: General Baron Raush von Traubenberg Chief of Staff: General Leontiev G.O.C.: General Jilinsky Chief of Staff: General Oranovsky Commander of the First Army: General Rennenkampf Chief of Staff: General Mileant Commander of the Second Army: General Samsonov Chief of Staff: General Postovsky "The main idea of the Kiev war game was based upon the supposition that Russia and France were at war with Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy: Russia had gone as far as mobilization, but was awaiting events. This being the state of affairs politically, the strategic position was supposed to be as follows: Germany was aiming her first blow against France. In Eastern Prussia she was deploying a force of ten first-line and eleven reserve infantry divisions, which were to take the offensive upon the Middle Nyeman on the front Grodno-Olita. The object of the German operations was supposed to be to shatter our unprepared advance troops on the Middle Nyeman by means of a sharp and sudden blow, and to drive off as many as possible of the Russian forces, in order to facilitate the operations of the Austro-Hungarian armies advancing on the front Sedlitz- Brest-Litovsk-Kobrin." (36)

Data Sources:<br> Source 1: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/I11OIK <br> Source 2: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/I3FYW2

Full Citation (Source 1): A. M. Zaionchkovskii, Podgotovka Rossii k imperialisticheskoi voine (Moscow: Gosvoenizdat, 1926), p. 9.

Full Citation (Source 2): N. N. Golovin, The Russian Campaign of 1914 (Ft. Leavenworth, Kans.: Command and Staff School Press, 1933), p. 36.

The following Note should be at the beginning of every ATI, annotating the title: <br> This is an Annotation for Transparent Inquiry project, published by the Qualitative Data Repository. Please cite as:

Snyder, Jack. 2015. "Data for: “Russia: The politics and psychology of overcommitment,” in: The ideology of the offensive: Military decision making and the disasters of 1914". Qualitative Data Repository. https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS.

Additional documentation can be found on QDR.

Learn more about ATI here.

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Data Sources:<br> Source 1: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/SEJ5GA <br> Source 2: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/XGETFK

Full Citation (Source 1): F. F. Palitsyn, chief of the main directorate of the General Staff, and M. V. Alekseev, first oberquartermaster, Svod ukazanii dannykh nachal'nikom General'nogo Shtaba vo vremia voennoi igry ofitserov General'nogo Shtaba v 1907 godu (St. Petersburg: Voennaia tipografiia, 1908), pp. 5-7.

Full Citation (Source 2): M. V. Alekseev, Voina 1877-1878 gg. na aziatskom teatre: Deistviia otdel'nogo kavkazkogo korpusa (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia shtaba voisk gvardii, 1892), pp. 9, 13, 32-33

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Data Sources:<br> Source 1: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/VK6PTH <br> Source 2: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/ZHECGW <br> Source 3: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/14DQCH <br> Source 4: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/GHHBIZ

Full Citation (Source 1): Russia, 10-i otdel General'nogo shtaba RKKA, Vostochno-prusskaia operatsiia: Sbornik dokumentov (Moscow: Gosvoenizdat, 1939).

Full Citation (Source 2): A. M. Zaionchkovskii, Podgotovka Rossii k imperialisticheskoi voine (Moscow: Gosvoenizdat, 1926), pp. 249-50.

Full Citation (Source 3): Varshavskii voennyi okrug, shtab (signed by Kliuev), "Otchet o dvukhstoronnei polevoi poezdke ofitserov General'nogo Shtaba Varshavskogo voennogo okruga, proizvedennoi v iulie 1909g." (Warsaw: Tipografiia okruzhnogo shtaba, 1909).

Full Citation (Source 4): Varshavskii voennyi okrug, shtab, "Nekotoryia takticheskiia polozheniia vyrabotannyia na s"ezde starshikh pekhotnykh i artilleriiskikh nachal'nikov pri Shtabe Varshavskogo voennogo okruga v fevrale 1910g." (Warsaw: n.d.).

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Data Sources:<br> Source 1: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/AUJT2L <br> Source 2: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/MH4G0A

Full Citation (Source 1): Jean Savant, L'épopée russe (Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1945), p. 38.

Full Citation (Source 2): V. A. Emets, Ocherki vneshnei politiki Rossii v period mirovoi voiny: Vzaimootnosheniia Rossii s soiuznikami po vedeniia voiny (Moscow, Nauka, 1977), p. 76.

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Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/G5UVAU

Full Citation: A. Samoilo, Dve zhizni (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1958), p. 114.

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Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/ROJVPG

Full Citation: A. M. Zaionchkovskii, Podgotovka Rossii k imperialisticheskoi voine (Moscow: Gosvoenizdat, 1926), pp. 258ff, 314ff.

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Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/VILGNT

Full Citation: A. M. Zaionchkovskii, Podgotovka Rossii k imperialisticheskoi voine (Moscow: Gosvoenizdat, 1926), p. 75.

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Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/FH0VPS

Full Citation: A. M. Zaionchkovskii, Podgotovka Rossii k imperialisticheskoi voine (Moscow: Gosvoenizdat, 1926), p. 87.

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Analytic Note (Source 2): Attests to the idea that the French would be unwilling to participate in armed conflict.

Source Excerpt (Source 2): Discussions between Izwolsky and Count Witte: Count Witte: "...expressing the conviction that France had lost all remembrance of its ancient warlike virtues; that the immense majority of Frenchmen cared not a whit for the lost provinces, which were only of interest to a handful of Chauvinists, possessing little or no influence in the country; and finally that the French nation, imbued with the ideas of international socialism and the pacifist propaganda, would always shrink from armed conflict with German, especially if it grew out of oriental affairs." (132)

Data Sources:<br> Source 1: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/VZCSS2 <br> Source 2: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/5MBNTC

Full Citation (Source 1): A. M. Zaionchkovskii, Podgotovka Rossii k imperialisticheskoi voine (Moscow: Gosvoenizdat, 1926), p. 212.

Full Citation (Source 2): A. P. Izvolskii, The Memoirs of Alexander Iswolsky (London: Hutchinson, 1920), p. 132.

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Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/ERTFZY

Full Citation: A. M. Zaionchkovskii, Podgotovka Rossi k imperialisticheskoi voine (Moscow: Gosvoenizdat, 1926), pp. 351.

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Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/GDOKBU

Full Citation: Varshavskii voennyi okrug, shtab (signed by Kliuev), "Otchet o dvukhstoronnei polevoi poezdke ofitserov General'nogo Shtaba Varshavskogo voennogo okruga, proizvedennoi v iulie 1909g." (Warsaw: Tipografiia okruzhnogo shtaba, 1909), pp. 7, 12.

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Data Sources:<br> Source 1: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/REFAGJ <br> Source 2: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/KYDCYT

Full Citation (Source 1): A. M. Zaionchkovskii, Podgotovka Rossii k imperialisticheskoi voine (Moscow: Gosvoenizdat, 1926), p. 240.

Full Citation (Source 2): General'nyi shtab RKKA, 10-i otdel, Vostochno-prusskaia operatsiia: Sbornik dokumentov (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1939), documents no. 4 (Colonel Stogov of the central General Staff), no. 5 (Kliuev), and no. 8 (staff of the Second Army).

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Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/TI25N3

Full Citation: I. I. Rostunov, Russkii front pervoi mirovoi voiny (Moscow: Nauka, 1976), p. 100.

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Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/KXPQSR

Full Citation: N. F. Evseev, Avgustskoe srazhenie 2-i russkoi armii v Vostochnoi Prussii (Tannenberg) v 1914 godu (Moscow: Gosizdat, 1936), pp. 70, 87.

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Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/C3K4OM

Full Citation: V. A. Emets, Ocherki vneshnei politiki Rossii v period mirovoi voiny: Vzaimootnosheniia Rossii s soiuznikami po vedeniia voiny (Moscow, Nauka, 1977), 25-67.

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Source Excerpt (Source 2): "...the Russian army on entering Eastern Prussia, would come up against the web of railways which had been carefully prepared by the German General Staff against this contingency. Under these circumstances Russia could attain a decisive strategic success upon the north-western line of operations only on condition of a big numerical superiority, and after extensive technical work on improving the lines of communications." (63) "Lastly, there was one very important strategical factor that gave cause for deep thought before the East Prussian line could be chosen. In this case the invasion of Russian territory by the Austro-Hungarian armies would become inevitable. The fact had to be faced that the armies of the weakened south-western group might be forced to retreat, and this would indubitably create in Turkey and Rumania the impression of a defeat inflicted upon Russia, and it would become more than probable that both these countries would join the Central Powers. Then not only would Russia be subjected to a blockade, but also operations against Rumania would necessitate the detachment of forces at the expense of the strategic reserves which would otherwise go to the reinforcement of the active front." (64) "The defeat of the Austro-Hungarians would guarantee us against action on the part of Rumania, whose attitude towards war clearly showed that, in case of a conflict between Russia and the Central Powers, she would join forces with the winning side. At the same time this defeat would also create for Russia a situation very advantageous for the development of 'direct' operations against Germany; indeed, in case of a decisive victory in Galicia, the Russian armies would find themselves upon the frontiers of Silesia, the invasion of which would unquestionably represent a blow which Germany would feel more than an invasion of Eastern Prussia, in view of Silesia's rich resources of coal." (64-5) "We could certainly expect that, should a Russian victory in Galicia be accompanied by the destruction of the mass of the first-line Austro-Hungarian army, the Empire of the Hapsburgs would be forced to capitulate, and Germany would thus be left isolated." (65)

Data Sources:<br> Source 1: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/I0XNTF <br> Source 2: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/PZJCVQ

Full Citation (Source 1): A. M. Zaionchkovskii, Podgotovka Rossii k imperialisticheskoi voine (Moscow: Gosvoenizdat, 1926), p. 241.

Full Citation (Source 2): N. N. Golovin, The Russian Campaign of 1914 (Ft. Leavenworth, Kans.: Command and Staff School Press, 1933) p. 63-66.

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Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/ZCX1O8

Full Citation: A. M. Zaionchkovskii, Podgotovka Rossii k imperialisticheskoi voine (Moscow: Gosvoenizdat, 1926), pp. 201-2, 319-20.

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Source Excerpt (Source 2): "A 1910 estimate, signed by Danilov, was somewhat more realistic, but it still served as a rationale for Danilov's defensive, Germany-oriented plan. Danilov believed that on operational grounds Germany would prefer to seek a decision first against France. A rapid decision in the east would be precluded by the unlimited room for a Russian withdrawal into the interior in the face of superior forces. Consequently, the Germans would deploy most of their forces against France, leaving 25 divisions (6 active corps and 13 reserve divisions) in the east. He expected this force to attack from East Prussia on the tenth day of mobilization, trying to disrupt the slower Russian concentration. As a result, Danilov argued, the Russian zones of concentration should be withdrawn out of reach of disruptive attack." (314)

Data Sources:<br> Source 1: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/OR8RFM <br> Source 2: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/CELKER

Full Citation (Source 1): A. M. Zaionchkovskii, Podgotovka Rossii k imperialisticheskoi voine (Moscow: Gosvoenizdat, 1926), pp. 185-95.

Full Citation (Source 2): Jack Snyder, "Defending the Offensive: French, German, and Russian War Planning, 1870-1914" (Columbia University dissertation, 1981), pp. 313-14.

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Source Excerpt (Source 1): "The way in which General Sukhomlinov himself defended the interests of Russia can be seen from the continuation of the above-quoted extract from his "Recollections": 'I used to take no personal part in these meetings,' writes General Sukhomlinov, 'but entrusted the defense of our interests to the Chief of the General Staff, who rendered his report to me. I used to give the protocols of these sittings to the Emperor.'" (53)

Data Sources:<br> Source 1: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/UBKAX8 <br> Source 2: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/KAVQEW

Full Citation (Source 1): N. N. Golovine, The Russian Campaign of 1914 (Ft. Leavenworth, Kans.: Command and Staff School Press, 1933) p. 53-54.

Full Citation (Source 2): A. M. Zaionchkovskii, Podgotovka Rossii k imperialisticheskoi voine (Moscow: Gosvoenizdat, 1926), p. 348.

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Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/VWM0ZO

Full Citation: V. A. Emets, Ocherki vneshnei politiki Rossii v period mirovoi voiny: Vzaimootnosheniia Rossii s soiuznikami po vedeniia voiny (Moscow, Nauka, 1977), 67.

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Source Excerpt (Source 1): "реорганизации и улучшения, флот надо было строить по сути дела заново, а казна пуста и пополнить ее никакими ухищрениями невозможно, сокращать расходы на другие нужды- значит прийти к экономическому разорению и финансовому истощению страны. Единственный выход из этого положения В. Н. Коковцов видел в значительном уменьшении численности армии в мирное в время (особенно крепостей, центральных и местных учреждений Военного ведомства, исключении из списков флота старых кораблей и т.п.)." (205)

Source Excerpt Translation (Source 1): "...the fleet had to be reorganized, improved, and practically rebuilt, but the treasury was empty and no trickery could replenish it. Cutting spending to serve other needs meant bringing the country to economic ruin and financial exhaustion. V.N. Kokovtsov saw the only way out of this sitution in a significant reduction of the size of the army during times of peace (especially fortresses, central and local institutions of the Military Department, decommissioning of old ships, etc.)." (205)

Data Sources:<br> Source 1: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/T3QWUD <br> Source 2: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/BZZSFS

Full Citation (Source 1): K. F. Shatsillo, Russkii imperializm i razvitie flota (Moscow: Nauka, 1968), 205.

Full Citation (Source 2): A. A. Manikovskii, Boevoe snabzhenie russkoi armii, 1914-1918 (Moscow: Vysshii voennyi redaktsionnyi sovet, 1923), vol. III.

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Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/8HLQAE

Full Citation: A. M. Zaionchkovskii, Podgotovka Rossii k imperialisticheskoi voine (Moscow: Gosvoenizdat, 1926), pp. 244, 277, 354, and 272.

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Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/KEZJ6Z

Full Citation: A. M. Zaionchkovskii, Podgotovka Rossii k imperialisticheskoi voine (Moscow: Gosvoenizdat, 1926), p. 254.

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Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/GS8W6U

Full Citation: General Dobrorol'skii, Glavnoe upravlenie general'nogo shtaba, mobilizatsionnyi otdel, "Nastavlenie okruzhnym shtabam po sostavleniiu novogo mobilizatsionnogo raspisaniia i po vvedeniiu ego v deistvie," document no. 54, 1913 (Lenin Library, Moscow).

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Source Excerpt: "Afin d'aider à accélér notre entrée en campagne contre l'Allemagne, la France ouvrit à notre gouvernement un large credit pour la construction de voies ferrées d'Importance stratégicue. Cette aide financière dont nous avons largement profité à l'epoque et que nous n'avions pas l'intention de refuser nos plus dans l'avenir, pesa lourdement sur le libre développement de nos plans stratégiques. Ce poids de vait se faire sentir pendant toute la durée de nos relations d'Alliés avec la France et aucun de nos chefs d'état major general ne put parvenir à s'en libérer. Nos alliés se rendalent bien compte de ce fait et faisaient seulement remarquer au cors des conférences qu'en principe l'importance de notre offensive était pour eux en raison directe de la rapidité de son déclenchement." (117)TRANSLATION: To aid in the acceleration of our campaign's entry into Germany, the French government gave us a large credit for the construction of important strategic railways. The financial aid which profited us largely at the time, and that we do not intend to refuse more of in the future, mattered significantly for the development of our strategic plans. This weight resonates for the duration of our relations with our French allies and that neither of our heads of state could break free of it. Our allies are well aware of this fact and were only out to prove that the impact of our offensive was in direct proportion to the speed of its release.

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/VKCHUR

Full Citation: Iurii Nikiforovich Danilov, La Russie dans la Grande Guerre Mondiale (1914-1917) (Paris: Payot, 1927; French ed. of Rossiia), p. 117.

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Analytic Note (Source 1): The standard historical literature has portrayed Sukhomlinov as advocating at this time a relatively large scale partial mobilization against Austria, based on a misleading account in the memoirs of the chairman of the Council of Ministers.

Source Excerpt (Source 1): "Sukhomlinov said that he had not informed us, since he believed it best that we should learn from the Tsar himself what he had in mind. Then the Tsar, opening a map on the table before him, began to explain, calmly and clearly, the ratio of Russian and Austrian military forces on our frontier, the weakness of our infantry, numbering not over 90 rifles to a company while the Austrian infantry numbered 200, the slowness of our transport, and the consequent necessity for considerably increasing the troops stationed near the frontier."

Source Excerpt (Source 2): "Под нажимом французской дипломатии в высших правительственных сферах России неоднократно обсуждался вопрос о военных мероприятиях против Австро-Венгрии. Однако Россия не была готова к войне." "...Меры по мобилизации (выдвигание кавалерии к границе, вручение мобилизационных билетов запасным в пограничных округах и др), предложенные Сухомлиновым, советом министров отклонены..."

Source Excerpt Translation (Source 2): [FULL] The highest Russian governmental circles discussed the question of military activities against Austria-Hungary multiple times under pressure by French diplomats. Nevertheless, Russia was not ready for a war. Furthermore, the ruling circles in Russia treated the French position with suspicion because while the political and military figures of the Third Republic were broadcasting unofficial promises to the Russian representatives, at the same time the French government stubbornly avoided making any official statements whatsoever. This suspicion was reflected, partially, in the 1912 "Plan for the Defense of Russia in the Event of a General European War" drawn up by the Russian General Staff, where it was stated that "recent experience showed that Russia can hardly count on French assistance in those cases where French interests are not directly affected... The contemporary policy of that country clearly indicates that France will take into account above all its own interests and not the interests of the alliance. Therefore, if at the time of a conflict, French interests are also affected, Russia can then see a faithful and active ally; in the opposite case, France can easily play the same waiting game in the twin alliance, as Italy -- in the triple one. In general, we are not at all guaranteed the kind of energetic diplomatic support by France and the unconditional active cooperation of all its armed forces, as Germany and Austria have already promised to one another on numerous occasions." And the ruling circles in Russia had even lower hopes for active support on the part of England. All these considerations motivated the tsarist government to be especially circumspect regarding its Balkan deals and to refrain from any steps that could drag Russia into a war. As Kokovtsov writes in his Vospominania (Memoirs), on 23 (10) of November, 1912, at a meeting with Nicholas II at which, in addition to himself, Sazonov, Sukhomlinov, Zhilinskiy and the Minister of Railways Rukhlov were present, the Minister of War suggested conducting a mobilization of the whole Kiev and Warsaw districts, as well as preparing for the mobilization of the Odessa district. Kokovtsov, Sazonov and Rukhlov expressed opposition to these measures. On Kokovtsov's suggestion, it was decided instead of mobilization, 'to prolong by 6 months everybodys last service term across Russia and in this way to increase at once our army's membership by a full one-quarter." On December 12 and 18 (November 29 and December 5), 1912 meetings of the Council of Ministers took place also dedicated to the question "Of some measures for military precaution, provoked by the present-day political situation." In the special minutes dedicated to these sessions, it is discussed that the Minister of War addressed the Chairman of the Council of Ministers in confidential letters in which, while noting the fact that "the Austro-Hungarian government has lately initiated military activities directed squarely against Russia and which far exceed the boundaries of precautions brought on by the current political situation," he offered to take the following measures for strengthening the Russian military position on the Austrian border: 1) Strengthen the cavalry units located at the border in the Kiev and Warsaw districts, at the expense of the internal resources of those districts. 2) In addition, move out to the southern front of the Warsaw military district two separate cavalry units from the Moscow military district. 3) Bring up to wartime levels the numbers of the infantry units of the Warsaw and Kiev districts by calling up the reserves for training exercises. In this way, several units with special types of weapons could be brought up to full strength as a set. 4) Increase the number of horses for the cavalry and infantry units in the border areas of the Warsaw and Kiev military districts. 5) Strengthen the defense of the railway bridges with military units, as well as that of some of the bridges on the roadways in the Warsaw and Kiev military districts. 6) Ban the foreign export of horses out of European Russia. Kokovtsov and Sazonov again spoke against Sukhomlinov's proposals. "In the opinion of the Chairman and the Minister of Foreign Affairs -- it is recorded in the Council of Ministers' special minutes from November 29 and December 5, 1912 the political situation at the present time appears tense to a maximum degree and any reckless step on our part can bring about the most frightening of consequences - toward armed conflict with Austria, which in its turn will inevitably lead to a conflict with Germany, i.e., to a Europe-wide war. Meanwhile, we cannot consider the military support to us of all the countries of the Triple Entente as unconditionally secured. In these circumstances, a war with the Triple Alliance led by Germany seems to us at the present time a certain disaster, furthermore since we have no active naval forces in the Baltic Sea and the army has not yet been brought up to a sufficient degree of preparedness, while the internal status of the country is far from the kind of high-patriotic attitude that might permit us to rely on a mighty upheaval of national spirit and intense immediate support." As a result, drawing on the necessity for "further developments of our military preparation to be subordinated to the demand for political prudence and special caution," the Council of Ministers, accepted points 1, 4 and 5 from Sukhomlinov's proposal and "did not pursue [points 2, 3 and 6] for the time being, yet leaving their implementation contingent on the further course of events." In a private letter to Ignatiev, the clerk at the French desk of the headquarters of the General Staff Vineken reported, "In the Council of Ministers, Kokovtsov and Sazonov are the most peace-loving; Tsarskoe [Selo] also seems absolutely opposed to war. Public opinion is rather indifferent; the press and a part of the public figures exaggerate the Slavic movement. The mobilization measures (bringing forward the cavalry at the border, handing out mobilization tickets to the reservists in the border regions, etc.) that Sukhomlinov proposed were turned down by the Council of Ministers, hence a certain annoyance on the part of our boss."

Source Excerpt (Source 3): "Up to October 7, the reports show that Russia- 'without doubt in connection with the Balkan crisis'- had undertaken the following measures: 1. Wide calling for reservists in all circles of Russian Poland for training which is to be ended October 20th (all arms of the years 1905, 1907; parts of the levy of 1904, 1906). 2. Retention of the third year's levy [dritter Prasenzjahr gang] in the same region. 3. Preparedness for a trial mobilization in certain circles of Russian Poland, the carrying out of which, however, is to be ordered later (16th-19th Oct). 4. Completion of the peacetime strength, partial increase of "erhohte Friedenstande" in the region of Warsaw. 5. Completion of certain troop movements." (158-59) "On the other side, Russia had spent eighty million rubles completing the supplies for the army and still retained her third year levy under colors. This meant that the Russian army had been increased by approximately 350,000, of which about 150,000 were kept on the eastern frontier." (257)

Data Sources:<br> Source 1: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/B7I3WE <br> Source 2: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/C3JQDT <br> Source 3: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/7IWEMG

Full Citation (Source 1): V. N. Kokovtsov, Out of My Past (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1935), pp. 344ff.

Full Citation (Source 2): V. I. Bovykin, Iz istorii vozniknoveniia pervoi mirovoi voiny: Otnosheniia Rossii i Frantsii v 1912-1914 gg. (Moscow: Moskovskii Universitet, 1961), pp. 151-53.

Full Citation (Source 3): E.C. Helmreich, The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars, 1912-1913 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1938), pp, 158-59, 257-58.

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Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/GBGTCL

Full Citation: A. M. Zaionchkovskii, Podgotovka Rossii k imperialisticheskoi voine (Moscow: Gosvoenizdat, 1926), p. 201.

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Source Excerpt: "Danilov's personality provides the key to this difference... He had dreamed as a youth of becoming a mining engineer, but his father forced him into the army. Indeed, his painstakingly technical approach to military duties recalls the engineer's style." (20) "General Danilov's decision was motivated by a sense of duty and patriotism. His feeling, as expressed in his writings, was that whatever administration was in control of the state, the country's leadership would look out for traditional Russian interests in foreign affairs." (19) "Danilov's constant view was that Germany, with its surging industrial strength and imperial ambitions, was the primary threat to Russia's security. He worried, too, that a weak Russia might tempt an attack by Germany, or by its ally, Austria-Hungary. He was occasionally criticized for seeing attacks coming from all quarters, including 'from the Martians.'" (20) "Historians, Soviet and western, have pictured General Danilov as stubborn and inflexible; unwilling to cut a corner or take a risk, a product and supporter of The Old Regime. A reading of his memoirs shows, however, that he had a strong sense of duty; that he was critical of the imperial family; doubtful of Nicholas II's intelligence, and hopeful that the creation of the State Duma in 1905 was the beginning of a parliamentary, and more positive, era, in Russia's history." (20)

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/9QDLM2

Full Citation: Nicholas Daniloff, "How Russia's Military tried to Undermine Lenin's Separate Peace," Foreign Service Journal, June 1980, pp. 19-20.

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Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/S47923

Full Citation: A. A. Polivanov, Iz dnevnikov i vozpominanii po dolzhnosti voennogo ministra i ego pomoshchika, 1907-1916 gg. (Moscow: Vysshii voennyi redaktsionnyi sovet, 1924), p. 97.

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Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/YBCINE

Full Citation: A. M. Zaionchkovskii, Podgotovka Rossii k imperialisticheskoi voine (Moscow: Gosvoenizdat, 1926), p. 348.

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Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/XHKMFC

Full Citation: V. A. Emets, Ocherki vneshnei politiki Rossii v period mirovoi voiny: Vzaimootnosheniia Rossii s soiuznikami po vedeniia voiny (Moscow: Nauka, 1977), p. 47.

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Source Excerpt: "It will be seen from these operation orders that General Samsonov had shifted the line of deployment of his army still farther to the left, linking the left flank of the XV Corps to the I Corps right flank, which was operating on the Mlava-Soldau line. In his telegram No. 1012 dated the 17th August General Jilinsky objected to this change of the front of deployment (of the XV, XIII, and VI Corps) still farther westwards. In this telegram he said: 'On the basis of my proposals, approved by the Grand Duke and set forth in Directive No. 2, the front specified for the attack of the Second Army to the west of the Masurian Lakes was from the line Mishinets-Khorjele to Rudschanny-Passenheim. You have extended your left flank to Jaboklik, and consequently the front of the three corps of the Second Army during the march to the frontier will cover 60 versts, which I consider excessive. General Samsonov's army had in fact been 'pulled' westwards... The Second Army, which had commenced its offensive before the formation and organization of its lines-of-communication and subsidiary services had been completed, was fatally bound to the Russian railway lines." (179)

Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/51TGRX

Full Citation: N. N. Golovin, The Russian Campaign of 1914 (Ft. Leavenworth, Kans.: Command and Staff School Press, 1933), pp. 179-80.

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Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/PMLAXV

Full Citation: A. M. Zaionchkovskii, Podgotovka Rossii k imperialisticheskoi voine (Moscow: Gosvoenizdat, 1926), p. 307.

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Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/PPURCO

Full Citation: Iu. N. Danilov, "Na puti krusheniiu: Ocherki iz poslednogo perioda russkoi monarkhii," unpublished manuscript written in Paris, 1926 (in the possession of Nicholas Daniloff and Houghton Library, Harvard University), pp. 38, 61-62, 105ff, abridged and published in German as Dem Zusammenbruch entgegen (Hannover: Hahnsche, 1928).

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Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/TSO4EI

Full Citation: V. A. Emets, Ocherki vneshnei politiki Rossii v period mirovoi voiny: Vzaimootnosheniia Rossii s soiuznikami po vedeniia voiny (Moscow: Nauka, 1977), pp. 74-75.

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Data Sources:<br> Source 1: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/XNAMG1 <br> Source 2: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/FB5MRI

Full Citation (Source 1): K. F. Shatsillo, Rossiia pered pervoi mirovoi voinoi: Vooruzhennye sily tsarizma v 1904-1914 gg. (Moscow: Nauka, 1974), p. 15.

Full Citation (Source 2): Iu. N. Danilov, Velikii kniaz' Nikolai Nikolaevich (Paris: Imprimerie de Navarre, 1930), p. 62, trans. and abridged as Le Grand-duc Nicolas (Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1932).

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Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/RJFSFU

Full Citation: A. M. Zaionchkovskii, Podgotovka Rossii k imperialisticheskoi voine (Moscow: Gosvoenizdat, 1926), pp. 235, 243.

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Data Source: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/6INWNO

Full Citation: "Otchetnaia rabota po operativnoi chasti 2-i armii", undated in Russia, 10-i otdel General'nogo shtaba RKKA, Vostochno-prusskaia operatsiia: Sbornik dokumentov (Moscow: Gosvoenizdat, 1939), p. 35, 57.

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Analytic Note (Source 2): This piece serves as a general, English-language background reference, providing context.

Source Excerpt (Source 2): "By the summer of 1905 the military situation on the Western front was acknowledged to be deplorable. Military strength was reduced as reinforcements were sent to the Far East, morale was low and combat readiness nonexistent. A year later General Palitsyn was to declare that the military situation was worse on the Western front than in the Far East and that security in Europe could only be ensured by an agreement with Germany. He therefore argued that any agreement with England in Asia should be strictly limited. The naval situation, after the sending of the Baltic fleet to the Pacific, was if anything worse, and the navy acknowledged its incapacity to defend either Kronstadt or the capital if a war were to break out in the Baltic. Germany, it was argued, was the natural, 'strong', ally of Russia, particularly at a time of military weakness." (106)

Data Sources:<br> Source 1: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/ZROYUP <br> Source 2: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/PZZDRK <br> Source 3: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/UFQCAA <br> Source 4: https://doi.org/10.5064/F6KW5CXS/RSQBGR

Full Citation (Source 1): A. M. Zaionchkovskii, Podgotovka Rossii k imperialisticheskoi voine (Moscow: Gosvoenizdat, 1926), pp. 166-67.

Full Citation (Source 2): Beryl J. Williams, "The Revolution of 1905 and Russian Foreign Policy," in C. Abramsky and B. Williams, eds., Essays in Honour of E. H. Carr (London: Macmillan, 1974).

Full Citation (Source 3): I. I. Rostunov, Russkii front pervoi mirovoi voiny (Moscow: Nauka, 1976). 88-91.

Full Citation (Source 4): F. F. Palitsyn and M. V. Alekseev, "Doklad o meropriiatiiakh po oborone Gosudarstva, podlezhashchikh osushchestvleniiu v blizhaishee desiatiletie," marked top secret, 1907 or 1908, especially pp. 48-49, 53, 58-59.

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