s the radiation emitted by the groundconsidered longwave or shortwave

how do we see it

Combine this fact with your answer from thequestions to argue whether we can see direct emission of radiation from the ground

If you touch the ground on a typical day, does it feel hotter or colder than the burner?

Most objects are not blackbodies. Instead they emit and absorb radiationless efficiently than a blackbody. At a given wavelength, a real object emits a fraction ελ of theradiation a blackbody would emit at a given temperature. ελ is called the emissivity

The decrease in the wavelength of peak emission (λm) as a functionof temperature is captured in Wien’s displacement law, which states thatλmT “ b,

Planckfunction is that hotter bodies emit more radiation and have a peak emission at a shorter wavelength.

The albedo is the ratio of reflected light to incoming light

the solar zenith anglein that hemisphere is smaller, so sunlight hits its surface more directly and the local insolation ishigher. In the winter hemisphere sunlight hits Earth’s surface obliquely so that the local insolationis small and the climate ends up being cold.

The solar zenith angle (θz) is the angle that the Sun is from vertical atsome location. The solar zenith angle can be used to calculate the local insolation (S) with thefollowing formulaS “ S0 cos θz

Seasons are actually explained by Earth’s obliquity(see diagrams above and below), which currently has a value of 23.5 ̋. Summer happens in thehemisphere that is tilted toward the Sun during Earth’s orbit, and winter happens in the hemispherethat is tilted away from the Sun.

f a planet has an orbit with some eccentricity, it will receive a higher insolation at the points ofits orbit when it is closer to the Sun than at the points of its orbit when it is farther away. Earth’scurrent eccentricity is 0.0167, which leads to the insolation being about 7% larger when Earth isclosest to the Sun (January) than when it is farthest from the Sun (July)

So a planet that is twice as far from the Sun will receive one quarter as much energy per unittime per unit area

The distribution and total amount of solar radiation, or insolation, that Earth receivesare affected by Earth’s distance from the Sun, its eccentricity, and it’s obliquity

On the timescales of humans and human civilization, the Sun’s luminosity doesn’t vary bymuch. Based on fancy computer models and studying other similar stars, we think that the Sun’sluminosity varies by less than 0.5% over hundreds to thousands of years. There’s no indicationthat the Sun’s luminosity has had any significant trend over the past 100 years, when Earth’s globalmean temperature has risen by a degree Celcius or so

The Sun is the main source of energy for planet Earth. It is a “main-sequence” star,which means that it fuses hydrogen nuclei together in a thermonuclear reaction to make heliumnuclei and produce energy.

Electromagnetic radiation has a frequency (ν) and a wavelength (λ ). The wavelength isjust the distance between successive wave crests (peaks or maxima). The frequency is the numberof times wave crests pass you per second.

As we will learn overthe next few classes, everything emits electromagnetic radiation all the time.

onduction is when heatis moved through a material by its molecules jiggling together. In conduction we can’t see anymotion occuring on a human scale.

Convection is when a fluid (either a liquid like water or a gas like theatmosphere) moves to carry heat from one place to another. You might have felt this when youwere in a pond before. If you are just standing in a shallow region of a pond, sometimes thewater suddenly and briefly feels hotter or colder. This is convection of hot or cold water towardyou.

Roughly what is the typical atmospheric CO2 concentration minimum and maximum duringglacial cycles?

hich process produces atmospheric CO2: photosynthesis or burning fossil fuels?

he figure below shows the wind in Yosemite on August 5, 2020. Is this an example of theclimate or the weather?

On January 20, 1985, the temperature in Chicago reached a low of -27 ̋F. Is this a climate orweather statistic?

The average daily high temperature in Chicago in July is 82 ̋F and the average daily lowtemperature in Chicago in January is 22 ̋F. Are these climate or weather statistics?

f a tree burns completely in a forest fire, where did most of the mass of the tree go?

When it is summertime in the Northern Hemisphere, the plants thereget a lot of sunlight so they can do photosynthesis. As a result, they grow and pull CO2 out of theatmosphere.

The CO2 canvary a lot in the atmosphere, depending on how close you are to a forest and to people burningfossil fuels. The best place to measure it is high up in the atmosphere where the air gets mixed alot so that it is pretty uniform, and away from lots of people.

Some tiny fraction of the organic molecules produced by photo-synthesis manage to not get eaten. Instead they get buried by mud and dirt and sealed off fromthe atmosphere. Over millions of years they slowly clump together and get cooked by high tem-peratures and pressures under the groun

6CO2 ` 6H2O ÝÑ C6H12O6 ` 6O2

The total increase in global-meantemperature between the 1800s and 2020 is about 1.2 ̋C, or if we just need a rough number, it isabout „ 1 ̋C

What you should take away is that Earth has gotten A LOT colder over the past 50million years. We don’t know for sure why this is, but we think that the main reason is that thelevels of greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide have been decreasing

Longterm changes in temperature (cli-mate) caused by humans in most places are less than a couple degrees, but temperature typicallychanges by tens of degrees between the day and night and up to a hundred degrees between sum-mer days and winter days

Climate is the long-term average of weather conditions over manyyears.

The CO2 has increased from about 280 ppm before we started burning fossil fuels to about410 ppm today

Given your answer to the last question, by how much does theglobal mean temperature change over a glacial cycle?

Do glacial cycles start faster or end faster?

ow does this compare to the value you got in the classroom? Can you use thisas an excuse the next time you fall asleep in a class?

y now you should have some CO2 data from the classroom. How does the change in CO2during the class compare to the change in CO2 during glacial cycles and over the past fewhundred years

How does this compare with your estimate?

Roughly what are the minimum and maximum CO2 levels during normal glacial cycles?

Roughly what are the minimum and maximum temperatures over glacial cycles?

o the temperature and CO2 seem to be pretty well correlated over glacial cycles?

bout how long does each glacial cycle last?

Roughly what was the largest local increase in temperature between the 1950s decade andthe 2000s decade?

What are the names and exact years of these eruptions

oughly when were the largest volcanic eruptions since 1750 and by roughly how much didthey cool the planet

an long-term warming caused by increased CO2 and a number of short-term coolingscaused by emissions from volcanoes that block sunlight explain the observed temperaturerecord well?

hich continent has warmed the least?

hich continents have warmed the most?

What was the local increase in temperature between the 1950sdecade and the 2000s decade in the southeastern US?

What would you say is the most important thing fordetermining whether a region warmed a lot?

Does there appear to be much difference between the warming in the Eastern and Westernhemispheres?

as there more warming in the Northern or Southern hemisphere between the 1950s decadeand the 2000s decade?

Why do you think the temperature record is more uncertain for earlier years?

hy is the temperature record smoother when it is averaged over a longer period?

y about how much did the land surface warm between 1950 and 2000?

Do the various land surface temperature records roughly agree since about 1900?

RH “ 100 ˆ ees ,

Can you find a year where the weather was hotter for last week? Can you find a yearwhere the weather was colder?

ompare the data you retrieved with the extreme highs and lows for each day. Was last weekparticularly hot or cold?

Go to https://www.wunderground.com/history/daily/us/il/des-plaines/KORD/ and comparethe high and low to the average highs and lows for each day (the climate) with the data youretrieved (the weather).

id the temperature warm or cool a lot from any one day to the next?

For every day in the last week, record the highest temperature (high) and the lowest temper-ature (low) during that day (the weather for the past week)

Weather vs. Climate:

97 W

Cretaceous

hat are the minimum and maximum estimated extinction rates during the Cretaceous massextinction?

How couldthe extinction rate be much lower than a typical rate during a mass extinction?

by what factor would the extinctionrate exceed the highest range possible from the typical background value?

value

Could it reach that level if we don’t do somethingto be less destructive?

Assuming current extinction rates continue as they are and all threatened species go extinct,how many years would it take for the extinction rate among vertebrates to reach 75%?

much money does uncle Billy have?

s the highest percentage of threatened species

s there reason for hope basedon this?

was

Problems

Would thisprice increase seem important to them?

oes this seem like a significant change?

$326/metric ton in February 2011.

caloric intake

$157/metric

81 kg.

day

2010?

gallons?

6.9 ft by 5.4 ft by 6.4 ft.

“1000” into the computer program?

How many Newtons is a pound of force?

0.78 years.

4.7 km/s.

$300 per oz.

What is the order of magnitude?

?

Problems

Little America, Antarctica, it was evidently duesolely to combustion of fuel in the immiediatevicinity of the station.

The content of carbon dioxide in the atmos-phere, in contrast to oxygen, nitrogen, and therare gases, has been found to be significantlyvariable (GLUECKAUF, 1951).

Describinga task in a tiny and unfamiliar font makes people less confident that they cansuccessfully complete a task (Song & Schwarz, 2008), irrespective of actualability. In a similar vein, making a topic or its elements more familiar byexposing participants to them also leads people to be more confident thatthey can provide correct answers, irrespective of actual accuracy. Forexample, exposing participants to the equation 45 þ 56 makes peoplemore confident they can calculate the equation 45  56

That is, one way to train incompetent people torecognize their incompetence is to rid them of that incompetence

The experience of top performers is quite different. They accu-rately see that their peers are performing less well than they themselvesare—that is, their false consensus error is corrected—and thus increase howspecial or distinctive they believe their own performance and skills to be.Bottom performers, unable to recognize superior performance, do notreceive such a corrective benefit (Kruger & Dunning, 1999, Study 3).

They get themselves right. What they get wrong is otherpeople. Because correct answers come relatively easy to them, they mistak-enly believe that other people must be coming to the same correct choices.As a consequence, their own performances, albeit good, are not that specialrelative to how well they think other people are doing.

Thus, the inflated self-ratings that poor performing participants provide may fail to reflect whatparticipants really think about themselves.

over-claiming,and described it as a form of self-enhancement that was independent ofactual intellectual ability.

People also display their ignorance in other remarkable ways that provide athird explanation as to why people often fail to know what they fail toknow. In short, researchers have caught people expressing knowledge abouttopics that researchers know with certainty people cannot know anythingabout. Why are they certain? They are certain because these topics do notexist

Indeed, informingthem of the flaws, they had missed caused respondents to significantly lowertheir self-ratings on their methodological skills—except, interestingly, forskills related specifically to their own research (Caputo & Dunning, 2005,Study 4)

People’s catalogs are likelyto be imperfect because many of their deficits are camouflaged in one of twoways. First, many instances of an ignorance fall into the category of unknownunknowns. Second, many instances of ignorance may be obscured becausethey are hidden behind misbeliefs that people mistake for valid knowledgein the domain in question. Third, people may be able to construct responseson general world knowledge, or “reach-around” knowledge appears to berelevant and reasonable when it really is not.

That assertion is that people are destined notto know where the solid land of their knowledge ends and the slipperyshores of their ignorance begin. In perhaps the cruelest irony, the one thingpeople are most likely to be ignorant of is the extent of their own igno-rance—where it starts, where it ends, and all the space it fills in-between.

Economists, for example, have argued that most ignorance is rational, inthat there are several topics for which gaining expertise would just notprovide the tangible benefit to make it worthwhile

I also address a vexing question: If self-percep-tions of competence so often vary from the truth, what cues are people using todetermine whether their conclusions are sound or faulty?

In this chapter, I provide argument and evidence that the scope of people’signorance is often invisible to them. This meta-ignorance (or ignorance ofignorance) arises because lack of expertise and knowledge often hides in therealm of the “unknown unknowns” or is disguised by erroneous beliefs andbackground knowledge that only appear to be sufficient to conclude a rightanswer.

undergraduates consistently overrated the likelihood that they would act in generous or selfless ways.

Decisions about pairs in which one of the citiesis not recognized (more frequently the case for Ger-man than American cities in this case) are easier (pre-dict the recognized city) than decisions in which bothcities are recognized.While the more-is-less and the less-is-more researchtraditions differ with respect to the implications of thebehavioral findings for models of decision-making,they clearly show that, contrary to intuition, moreknowledge does not necessarily improve decisions

The les-sons from studies comparing clinical and actuarial pre-dictions are instructive. These studies have shown thatsimple statistical models do better in predicting patients’outcome than expert judgments of clinicians (Dawes,Faust, & Meehl, 1989). In fact, models based on thejudgments of experts do better than the judgments ofthe experts themselves (Dawes, 1971; Goldberg, 1970).One of the reasons for the suboptimal performance ofclinicians is that they treat each case as unique andimport knowledge irrelevant to the prediction of theoutcome.

In four experiments, weshow that more knowledge can decrease accuracy and simultaneously increase prediction confidence

Risk analyses decompose complex processes (e.g., nuclear power plants, terrorist attacks, sea-level rise) into more knowable parts. When data are available (e.g., valve failure rates), they canbe used as model inputs. When they are not, expert elicitation can be used to provide disciplinedjudgments

A common finding in calibration studies is that confidence and knowledge are positively, but im-perfectly, correlated, such that people tend to be overconfident with hard tasks and underconfidentwith easy ones

Understanding any decision begins by analyzing how fully informed individuals wouldview it in terms relevant to their values

CPT incorporates several behavioral principles in a single model. Loss aversion is one. It re-flects a tendency to be more sensitive to losses than to equal-sized gains (e.g., losing versus winning$5). Risk tolerance, probability weighting, and choice stochasticity are other CPT principles

Such questions prove so hard to answer that studies routinelyexclude many responses as seemingly not reflecting the respondents’ true preferences (Engel et al.2016). Similarly, cost-benefit analysts often ask people how much they are willing to pay, in dollarterms, to protect nonmarket goods (e.g., historic sites, endangered invertebrates, child welfare).These questions are so hard (or objectionable) that many people refuse to answer or give otherprotest responses (Meyerhoff & Liebe 2010

im Zachos and colleagues [7] combined a bunch of data like this to make the plot ofglobal temperature shown in the figure below

We can represent aerobic respiration with the following chemical equation.C6H12O6 ` 6O2 ÝÑ 6CO2 ` 6H2O

Plants build themselves by taking carbon dioxide (CO2) andwater (H2O) from the air and combining them with power provided by the Sun to make organicmolecules.

There are different ways to define mass extinctions, but one common one isthat 75% or more of species went extinct in a few million years or less.

Global warming can beconsidered a threat multiplier in that it can make problems worse, and potentially push a marginalsituation over the limit. For example, global warming tends to make dry places drier and wet placeswetter. The Middle East is a dry place, where water resources already lead to conflict.

he vertical axis, which gives the value of the DJIA indollars, is logarithmic. This means that a given vertical displacement tells you about the percentagechange, even though the actual change in dollars for that vertical displacement is much largertoward the top of the plot than toward the bottom of it. To calculate the order of magnitude on alogarithmic plot, all we do is find the power of 10 that the number is closest to. For example, theorder of magnitude of the DJIA was $100 in 1900, $100 in 1920, $100 in 1940, $1,000 in 1960,$1,000 in 1980, and $10,000 in 2000.

The wet bulb temperature is the temperature a thermometer would have if youwrapped a wet rag around its bulb and blew air over it (see figure below)

The reason for this is that a major way humans lose heat is by the evaporation of sweat.It takes energy to evaporate sweat, just like it takes energy to boil water. When sweat evaporatesfrom their skin, humans have to give up energy and this cools them off. When the surroundingair is dry, it’s easy to evaporate water from sweat into it and it’s easy for humans to cool off

So if the relative humidity is 50%, the watervapor pressure is 50% of the saturation water vapor pressure. The relative humidity is a commonway to talk about how much water vapor is in the air

maximum amount of water air can have in it the saturation vapor pressure

wet bulb

RH “ 100 ˆ ees

It is not surprising that such an ambitious agenda has generated two typesof historiography.20 Some have written Bandung into history as a story ofdisappointment, with little long-term impact on international relations andno concrete agenda that gained traction with the countries of the globalSouth. They argue that the Conference failed to have a tangible impact –there were no new international institutions that were established, and nonew collective initiatives that proved sustainable.21 Others, however, havemeasured Bandung differently. They look at the follow-up conferences thattook place in the years after Bandung and the multiple solidarity movementsthat emerged from these efforts as not insignificant for the decolonization ofinternational relations. While acknowledging the limited character of Ban-dung’s formal effects, these other accounts have described the conference asrepresenting and emboldening an emotional and psychological experienceshared across the postcolonial and non-white world

Abstention from the use of arrangements of collective defence to serve the particular interests of anyof the big power

r economic co-operation among the participating countries on thebasis of mutual interest and respect for national sovereignty.

p r o m o te g o o d w ill a n d c o - o p e r a tio n a m o n g th e n a t io n s o f A s ia a n dA fr ic a , t o e x p lo r e a n d a d v a n c e th e ir m u tu a l a s w ell a s c o m m o n in te r e s tsa n d to e s ta b lis h a n d p r o m o te frie n d lin e s s a n d n e ig h b o u r ly r e la tio n s

The author considered population size as a possible explanatory variable.Logically, the proportional size of a country's indigenous population mightimpact success in achieving its goals either (1) because concession to a pro-portionately smaller population would present less of a threat to the interestsof political and economic elites or, (2) because a proportionately large popula-tion has more resources (voters, demonstrators) on which to draw in its struggle.Thus, logically, success may be correlated with either a small or a large popu-lation. It also is possible that both logics may combine to neutralize any sys-tematic correlation between the size of the indigenous population and thesuccess of autonomy claims in Latin America.Table 4 seems to support the first hypothesis. With the exception of Ecua-dor, the proportion of indigenous population in the "successful" cases tends tobe smaller than in the "failed" cases.

Popular, dominant president supports indigenous rights. Three of the fourconstituent assemblies--Colombia, Peru, Venezuela--are characterized bystrong leadership from a sitting president. Colombia's president C6sar Gaviriaand Venezuela's Hugo Ch~ivez had a significant electoral 25 and substantivemandate to oversee a radical reform of democratic institutions.

Eachhad more than ten years experience with indigenous politics and commandedthe admiration of non-indigenous delegates and the attention of the media. In allthree cases indigenous delegates entered the assembly with concrete proposalsthat had been vetted and approved by their constituents in a series of public assem-blies

Directly elected constituent assembly. In four of our five cases constituentassemblies were convened and directly elected. The exception is Bolivia, wherePresident Gonzalo S~nchez de Lozada directed the reform via the only consti-tutionally sanctioned route--passage of a law by two successive legislatures.Consensus among the three dominant parties secured legislative approval of adraft constitutional reform law during the Paz Zamora regime (1989-1993).Sfinchez de Lozada used his legislative voting majority to secure the secondcongressional approval in 1994, together with a set of statutory laws with con-stitutional implications. S~inchez de Lozada had no need or desire to negotiatehis vision of constitutional reform with opposition parties or unrepresentedsocial movements (Molina 1997). L4Indigenous delegates participate directly in assembly.

U.S. intervention also was decisive in Nicaragua. As part of its strategy todislodge the Sandinistas, the United States took advantage of the long-stand-ing conflict between the Coast and Managua by putting special emphasis ondestabilizing the region (Dfaz Polanco 1991: 191). The U.S. role in theSandinista-Miskitu conflict is not fully known, since many CIA documentsremain classified. Nevertheless,

An influential ally increases the bargaining leverage of the autonomy claimantby taking the part of the armed indigenous group against the government. Theally's actions increase the costs to the government (e.g., strained relations witha vital foreign ally, further warfare with a U.S.-backed guerrilla force) of fail-ing to achieve an agreement. The precise actions taken vary in the two cases.In Panama, the ally pressures the government to enter into peace talks, medi-ates those talks, and acts as guarantor of the resulting agreement. In Nicaraguathe ally provides financial and military resources to armed indigenous com-batants. In this case the ally prefers that peace talks do not take plac

In Guatemala and Mexico, indigenous organizations claiming autonomyrights fought unsuccessfully for direct participation in negotiations on indig-enous rights accords that were part of larger peace agreements. Beginning in1990, Guatemalan Maya organizations sponsored numerous fora on the peaceprocess. Documents emerging from these discussions explicitly demandedpolitical and administrative autonomy, specifically the restructuring of the statealong linguistic and ethnic lines.

Nevertheless, the region's indigenous population actively par-ticipated in the lengthy consultations on autonomy and their elected represen-tatives in the Multi-Ethnic Assembly approved the autonomy statute (DfazPolanco 1991" 191)

As in Guatemala, the original agenda of Mexico's mainly indigenous armedmovement, the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN), encompassedan extensive list of economic, political, and social demands. Indigenous au-tonomy claims were not explicitly advanced until the rapid consolidation of anational movement for indigenous autonomy in the months following the ini-tial 1 January 1994 uprising.

The uprising challenged the capacity of the newPanamanian government to retain control of the former Colombian province.The United States brokered peace talks on March 4 between Panamanian offi-cials and chiefs from thirteen Kuna communities. The agreement guaranteedthe Kuna the rights of other Panamanian citizens and recognized their right to"maintain order among themselves" without the interference of police--a par-tial concession to their autonomy claims (Howe 1998: 280-289).

I first discuss the circumstances in each case that led to the establishment ofthe negotiating site--peace talks to end armed conflict between the govern-ment and indigenous combatants. I then present evidence that the two POSvariables--opened access to decision-making spheres and an influential ally--were present in the two successful cases and absent in the failed ones (seeTable 2)

Onlyfive Latin American states (Colombia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Panama, and Ven-ezuela), however, constitutionally codified ethnically defined autonomyregimes. I explain why indigenous autonomy claims in these countries weresuccessful while in four other countries they failed. I argue that indigenouspeoples' organizations were successful when they could raise their autonomyclaims in a forum that was part of a larger regime bargain, allowing them toinsert their claims in a discussion of fundamental regime issues. Without theurgency of the larger regime bargain, governments are free to ignore indig-enous autonomy claims. The cases exhibit two distinct negotiating sites forthis larger regime bargain: (1) peace talks resolving an armed conflict betweenthe government and indigenous combatants; and (2) debates on constitutionalreform generated by larger crises of governability and legitimacy that requiredthe renegotiation of fundamental regime issues.

Au-tonomy is the "articulating d e m a n d " - - t h e demand through which all otherclaims are fulfilled.

only ethnic group in Latin Americawhose claims challenge the territoriality of states

In the pluricultural state they propose, indigenous peoples are preconstitutedand self-governing collective entities within the national political community.The key institutional component of this vision is the construction of politico-territorial autonomy regimes in which each indigenous culture may freely de-velop without interference from the state and non-indigenous society.

(1) peace talks intended to endarmed struggle when the regime faced a serious challenge to maintain politicalorder or territorial control, or (2) a severe crisis of legitimacy and governabilitythat forced political elites to renegotiate fundamental regime structures via the pro-cess of constitutional reform.

Through a systematic examination of nine cases, the author identifies factors thatenabled indigenous movements in five Latin American countries to secure formalrecognition of politico-territorial autonomy regimes

This narrow analytic focus on governmental institutions rests on anunstated but pervasive assumption that variation in state capacity andlegitimacy does not matter for regime outcomes

Demands for local autonomy, however, actually challenge the ad-ministrative homogeneity entailed in decentralization and federalism

In short, the individual is the foundationalunit of rights and responsibilities in a polity presumed to be moving to-ward a more liberal democracy. Policymakers have voiced concernabout equalizing treatment before a state that engaged in indiscrimi-nate repression and torture and, to that end, advocate paying closer at-tention to the rule of law. In a context where dissidents were killed orjailed, indigenous people were excluded and/or repressed, and regionswere controlled by local bosses, the call for a universalizing set of normsand institutions to protect individuals is an important normative steptoward deepening democracy

In this context, indigenous movements now pose a postliberal chal-lenge, by demanding a different kind of political mapping—one thatwould secure individual rights but also accommodate more diverseidentities, units of representation, and state structures

Yet, as the next section underscores, LatinAmerican states have not secured these neoliberal citizenship rights—in particular, for Indians—even while they start to take away the socialrights, access to the state, and indigenous local autonomy once unwit-tingly associated with corporatist citizenship regimes. This inability tosecure neoliberal citizenship regimes is in large part a function of theweak reach and retreat of the state

n this context, state efforts to build and register peasant communi-ties had unintended consequences. Via land reform and credit pro-grams, Indians secured the spaces in which they could institutionalizeindigenous community practices at the local level.13 In more ways thanone, the distribution of inviolable communal lands to registered peasantcommunities provided Indians with the physical space not only forfarming but also for securing governance by traditional indigenous au-thorities. In this way the legal registration of communities and grantingof community-based property created a legally defined, state-sanc-tioned geographic area that allowed for the growth and/or maintenanceof politically autonomous local enclaves, indigenous culture, and polit-ical practices

Land reforms in Mexico (1934), Bolivia (1953),Guatemala (the short-lived reform of 1952), Ecuador (1964 and 1973),and Peru (1968), for example, weakened landed elites' control of thecountryside, redistributed significant tracts of land, and provided in-centives for Indians to register as peasant communities. This registra-tion reorganized the countryside along state-regulated corporatist lines,with many peasant communities joining peasant federations in hopesof gaining access to land and the state. These corporatist reforms broughtwith them the creation and expansion of social services in the areas ofagricultural support, infrastructure, education, and health. Access to landand these services was often gained through corporatist associations. Inshort, the state and union organizations imposed a class identity on Indi-ans as the ticket for political incorporation and access to resource

The expansionof political and civil rights has tended to coincide with the decline insocial rights and the promotion of liberal or pluralist modes of interestintermediation. Organized social sectors (such as workers and peasants)have lost their state assurance of a basic standard of living and similarlyhave lost their main institutional means of accessing and occasionallyinfluencing the state. Although citizenship regimes have such signifi-cant consequences for state-society relations, however, they are neitherequal to nor derivative of political regimes. As we will see, corporatistand neoliberal citizenship regimes developed in democratic and au-thoritarian regimes in Latin America (and Western Europe, for thatmatter)

As this article highlights, however,one cannot isolate these governmental institutions from their mooringsin state and society. Indeed, we need to analyze democratic politics inthe context of state-society relations by evaluating the reach of state in-stitutions and assessing the broader social forces that surround, support,and oppose the terms of democracies' new institutions.

These developments are particularly striking and consequential inLatin America. The regions' third-wave democracies have experiencedincreasing politicization of indigenous identities and organization ofindigenous movements,2 phenomena that appear to reverse the region'scomparative historical record of weakly politicized ethnic cleavages

pecifically, it high-lights how new political institutions, rather than securing democraticconsolidation across the board, have in fact had a more checkered ef-fect

ccordingly, they ex-plain the capacity to consolidate democracy largely as a function ofinstitutional design

nstead,qualitative evidence suggests that politicians used for-bearance to expand the welfare goods they could pro-vide and signal a commitment to poor voters

Yet, an estimated 53,000 unlicensedstreet vendors work selling everything from featherdusters to used clothing in Santiago (Appendix). Whydo these public violations of the law persist? I sug-gest that politicians rely on forbearance in low-incomedistricts as a way to win votes and signal their commit-ments to the poor

The main hurdle to show forbearance is evidence ofpolitical intent. Simply asking politicians why enforce-ment lags raises concerns about “cheap talk.” Politi-cians may blame a lack of resources when they useforbearance to extract votes or resources, or they mayclaim benevolent welfare motivations to mask institu-tional weakness. Due to this risk, I consider a strategyto infer intent from the elasticity of enforcement. Elas-ticity refers to how responsive one variable, in this caseenforcement, is to a change in another, like budgets, en-forcement costs, or competing social concerns.

Second, forbearance can be provided outside ofthe normal budgetary and legislative process, mak-ing it both an ideal source of corruption and infor-mal welfare provision. It is a “hidden” transfer.

I em-phasize three general features that can lead politiciansto favor forbearance as a distributive tool: the trans-fers can be (1) revoked, (2) adjusted informally, and(3) targeted to those willing to violate the law.

If a governmentdoes nothing to prevent squatting, then the wealthy cantake valuable pieces of land to build large houses andabsorb the greatest absolute benefit from governmentleniency. However, the poor may receive the maximumrelative benefit given that they spend a greater shareof their income on housing and they are potentiallyjudgment proof in the case of prosecution. Weak en-forcement thus has mixed distributive effects: it is likelyregressive in absolute terms, and progressive in relativeterms.

I demonstrate how mayors in poordistricts systematically prevent the police from usingexisting enforcement resources as a way to build elec-toral support

This article introduces the concept of forbear-ance to describe the intentional and revocable nonen-forcement of law. Forms of forbearance differ in theirdistributive incidence and mode of delivery, rangingfrom a well-studied corrupt subtype in which politi-cians carve out legal exemptions for their cronies to aless expected subtype in which laws are waived for thepoor as a form of informal welfare provision. Acrosssubtypes, I argue that forbearance has three distinctfeatures that make it a powerful form of distribution:it can be revoked, hidden from legislative debate andoversight, and used to target resources to those willingto bear the costs of illegality

Indeed,classic definitions of state capacity center on whetherauthorities can make and enforce binding rules forsociety (e.g., Mann 1984, 188). The size of informaleconomies even proxies for state capacity in empiricalwork (e.g., Polidano 2000)

I instead introduce the concept of forbearance, or the intentional and revocablenonenforcement of law, and argue that politicians often withhold sanctions to maximize votes as well asrents. Drawing on tools from price theory and distributive politics, I present several methods to separatesituations when politicians are unable versus unwilling to enforce the law.

Thus, I argue that the countries in cluster two not onlyexperienced a distinct form of political incorporation, but this process was slowed bythe prevalence of racial and ethnic diversity

One final characteristic that differentiates the top-performing social policy regimeis the fact that all four countries are characterized by a low level of ethnic and racialdiversity. Indeed, as illustrated in Fig. 4, the primary division in the region withregard to racial and ethnic diversity is between the countries in the mobilizingincorporation-industrialist regime (Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, and Uruguay) andthe remaining three groups of states.

The democratic setting in Costa Rica laid the groundwork for aliberal project that extended basic citizenship rights to broad sectors of society,prompting the incorporation of marginalized groups

The Costa Rican case provides evidence of the way in which the incorporation ofunderprivileged groups can occur even in a setting of minimal industrialization. Inthis way, Costa Rica reveals a different path to the formation of extensive risk coping

While the fact that this policy innovationhappened in a non-democratic setting may raise questions about the relevance ofmobilization in prompting the new system, it would be erroneous to conclude thatthe reforms were unaffected by this impetus. Such a conclusion would neglect thefact that policies result from long-term processes. In the case of Chile’s pensionsystem, the thrust for such reforms took root and acquired power during the periodof industrialization and political incorporation of Labor that preceded the 1924 coup

reveals that sustained democracy can compensate for low levels of industrialization,generating a setting where social rights are central to political debate

General expenditure measures also limit the ability of researchers to assess howfunding is distributed within policy areas. The decision about how governmentspending is to be divided among different programs has profound effects on whichsocietal groups are protected and which remain exposed to risk. It is, therefore,important to understand not only how much is spent on a given sector, but also howthe funds are distributed between programs

Such data do not, for example, permit an assessment of who isbenefiting from the spending

2008 Brazil spent just over 26%

“corporatistincorporation-industrialist.”

I, therefore, expect thatcountries where political incorporation occurred by means of mobilization will becharacterized by high levels of risk prevention and risk coping coverage. I call thissocial policy regime “mobilizing incorporation-industrialist.”

These studiesshow that in settings where marginalized groups are incorporated into the politicalarena and possess mobilizing power, there is greater pressure on the state to respondto their needs and expand social protection policy. I define political incorporation assomething different from simple voting rights. Rather, I contend that politicalincorporation occurs when marginalized sectors such as labor, peasants, and/or theurban informal sector enjoy institutionalized access to the political arena via partiesor other organizations and when these groups are capable of influencing nationaldebate.

I define social policy regimes as the package of state-provided policies thatprotect citizens from poverty and re-distribute income and life opportunities. Iargue that these regimes consist of two policy dimensions: one that seeks toprevent social risks via investment in human capital, which I call risk prevention,and a second that addresses risks once they have occurred through subsidies andother direct forms of direct intervention, which I refer to as risk coping.

This article builds and improves upon previous research,seeking to both classify Latin American social policy regimes and provide a theoryto explain those groupings. The theory moves past economic and socio-structuralfactors, incorporating politics into the explanation of why Latin American statesexhibit distinct social policy regimes.

he analysis provides evidence that acountry’s record of industrialization, the nature of political incorporation, andlevels of ethnic and racial diversity are key determinants of the size and scope ofLatin America’s social policy regimes

we show that environmental legislation isa policy domain that is increasingly relevant to large producers’core interests. Second, we argue that environmental outcomes can-not be fully understood without analyzing political factors such asthe power of economic interests affected by enforcement.

The compensatory fund53 was intended to remunerate producersin red and yellow areas for their environmental services—i.e., theiropportunity cost of preserving the forest—by subsidizing projectsfor conservation and for sustainable management activities. The factthat provinces only received a small proportion of the resources towhich they were entitled gave governors discretion to determinewho would benefit from the fund.54 In both Santiago and Chaco, gov-ernors chose to allocate funds to appease organized groups thatresisted the expansion of the agricultural frontier rather than reach-ing producers or landowners who could illegally engage in large-scale deforestation in the absence of positive incentives for compli-ance.

The intervention government intro-duced important reforms to stop deforestation and protect peasantcommunities. It banned forest clearings and set up a Crisis Com-mittee with producers, peasant organizations such as MOCASE,and NGOs. It also created the Observatory of Land to help solveland disputes and issue titles to low-income occupants, promotedthe revision of clearing permits, and asserted the urgent need topass legislation on land use

As in the other core Chaco provinces, the most controversialissues were the design of the zoning map and the regulation of landuse. Producers, especially investors from outside the province,pressed for a larger share of green areas in order to clear them foragriculture. Representatives from the timber industry were alsointerested in reduced levels of conservation, yet they clashed withthe agricultural sector because they feared that if forests were clas-sified as ‘‘green,” they would be exhausted. Unlike agriculture, more-over, timber extraction could be allowed in yellow areas, and thusclassifying a large share of forests as yellow would benefit timberproducers at the expense of agricultural producer

The NFPR stipulates that OTBNs should be designed through aparticipatory process and approved by the provincial legislature,potentially opening up two institutional spaces for social influence.Governors have the upper hand during this process, as they canmake it more or less participatory, draft the original bill, and intro-duce changes through vetoes and decrees

A substantial body of research suggests that state capacity isfundamental for policy implementation. Subnational states thatare more capable (Levitsky & Murillo, 2013) would allow for betterenforcement of the NFPR. However, core Chaco provinces exhibitsimilar scores on commonly used proxies of state capacity suchas provincial revenue and the infant mortality rate.35 At the sametime, provinces received comparable national funds to build moni-toring capacity, which were allocated according to the size and clas-sification of their forestlands. None of these metrics corresponds toprovinces’ implementation scores

Indigenous communities,which are numerous and well organized, have also pressed for astrict OTBN

In Salta, large producers areespecially powerful; they control 75 percent of total farmland,and farms >10,000 ha comprise 47 percent of the province’s totalfarmland. At the other extreme, Chaco has an important but smal-ler share of total farmland in large parcels (31 percent); thus, largeproducers in this province are not dominant actors in rural politicsand lack the structural power that they enjoy in the other Chacoprovinces

Implementation of the NFPR: consistency of design and enforcement, core Chaco provinces, 2007-201