39 Matching Annotations
  1. Nov 2019
    1. he Texas law is a permissible regulation of speech.

      I thought the reading said that is was not a permissible regulation of speech because it didn't fall under any of the qualifying categories to be prosecuted on.

    2. First Amendment is that government may always prohibit the expression of an idea whenever society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.

      Just because the idea someone is expressing is offensive or disagreeable does not mean the government will ALWAYS have the right to prohibit that expression. That is the reason we have the First Amendment to allow people to express their opinions even when they are different than others.

      "If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the Government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable."

    3. The Court agrees and argues

      The Court doesn't agree with the idea that they may always prohibit expression. Justice Brennan even went on to discuss all the ways that people are protected under the first amendment, and what it would take for the Court to get involved.

    4. One of the protesters, Arthur Smith, painted an American flag on his bare chest, but painted it upside down.

      This was not mentioned in the case at all. All that was said was another protester gave Johnson a flag, nothing about a painted flag being upside down.

    5. protesters assembled outside the convention hall.

      The protestors didn't meet outside the convention hall, they were marching through the streets.

    6. Looking at Johnson's actions, there is no evidence of an expressive element in his actions.

      Johnson did have an expressive element, he was voicing his opinion of the renomination of Reagan. The court however found that it was unlikely anyone was going to act out in some sort of way due to Johnson's expression. Also, because this was an act of expression about politics, Johnson was protected under the First Amendment.

    7. Second Amendment

      First* Amendment

    8. Dissent by Justince Kennedy

      justice Kennedy wrote a concurring opinion

    1. (1982)

      The case was in 2002.

    2. Additionally, the constitutionality of this program turns on whether most schools in the program are religious.

      The problem challenged was true private choice of a school. This was consistent with the Mueller, Witters, and Zobrest case and was also ruled constitutional.

    3. Only certain religious groups are free to participate.

      It wasn't restricted to certain religious groups. The funding was indirect to any religious school because the money was given to the families that had the choice to pick from any private school, regardless of what religion, or choose to remain at a public school.

    4. offend the 14th Amendment to the Constitution?

      The legal issue was whether or not the voucher program violated the first amendment's establishment clause. The establishment clause is enacted by the 14th amendment but the legal issue wasn't whether or not it was offending the 14th amendment.

    5. It is not neutral in all respects toward religion and is part of an attempt to channel funds to wealthy citizens who send their children to religious schools.

      The families that received the scholarships were not wealthy families. Most of the population that attended CLeveland City Schools fell below the poverty line.

    6. O'Connor: dissenting

      O'Connor did not write a dissenting opinion, it was actually a concurring opinion.

    7. Thomas: concurring

      The concurring opinions were from Thomas and O'Connor

    8. 7–2

      The vote was 5-4

    9. 5 percent of students used their vouchers at private schools.

      "Religious schools were the choice of the parents of 96.7% of students who used tuition vouchers at private schools."

    10. free exercise clause

      They sued over the First Amendment establishment clause.

    11. 10 percent of the private schools available were religious

      It was 80% of the private schools that were religious.

    12. Baltimore school district

      This is the incorrect school district. It was actually the Cleveland School District.

    13. Epstein and Walker, p194

      The legal citation is wrong, it should be 536 U.S. 639 (2002).

  2. Oct 2019
    1. Roberts: dissenting

      Should be Reed: dissenting Also missing Justice Minton: dissenting.

    2. Frankfurter: concurring

      Missing Justice Black: concurring.

    3. Vietnam War,

      This is supposed to be the Korean War

    4. By a vote of 6-3 the Court ruled against Youngstown Sheet & Tube.

      The vote of 6-3 is correct, but the vote was in favor of Youngstown Sheet & Tube company, and voting against Sawyer saying he did not have the right to issue the seize of the mills.

    5. Jackson: dissenting


    6. can be upheld

      The order cannot be upheld using this as an exercise of the president's military power as commander-in-chief.

    7. sugar manufacturing industry

      It was the steel manufacturing plants.

    1. of any State to the contrary notwithstanding."

      I'm confused here too. Contrary and notwithstanding both mean in spite of, but why are they on right after the other. It reads in my mind as a double negative. But I think I understand what they're trying to say. Laws made in pursuance of the Constitution that abide by the "law of the land" are valid, and any law to the contrary of what is said in the Constitution, is not valid.

    2. After this declaration, it can scarcely be necessary to say that the existence of State banks can have no possible influence on the question.

      What question? Is it saying State banks don't have an influence, or do? The next sentence says there's no intention to create a dependence between the Government and the states. So if there was no dependence created, where does that leave state banks?

  3. Sep 2019
    1. the plain import of the words seems to be, that in one class of cases its jurisdiction is original, and not appellate; in the other it is appellate, and not original.

      Im confused on how he's going back and forth between appellate and original. Can anyone clarify the sentence a little?

    2. If an act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void, does it, notwithstanding its invalidity, bind the courts, and oblige them to give it effect? Or, in other words, though it be not law, does it constitute a rule as operative as if it was a law?

      How could an act of legislation that does not agree with the constitution be acted on as if it were a law? Is it like moral where people just understand and do it, or how does this apply to the case?

    3. If congress remains at liberty to give this court appellate jurisdiction, where the constitution has declared their jurisdiction shall be original; and original jurisdiction where the constitution has declared it shall be appellate; the distribution of jurisdiction, made in the constitution, is form without substance.

      I am a little confused here too. I understand the difference between original and appellate jurisdiction, but are they saying if a case is improperly ruled....I'm not sure how to ask this. They're throwing around original and appellate and I don't know what they're trying to say here.

    1. It would depend on the nature of the two.

      I don't understand how Layton can argue the difference between a Jesuit run school, and a daycare run in the place of a church. He says there's fine lines of control but they both seem to have to do with religion.

    2. One would think that if there's play in the joints, that that would include the concept that States are free to say we don't want to spend money from the public FIs on houses of worship. Now, you say this affects free exercise. We seem to be confusing money with religious practice.

      Justice Sotomayor would be my second guess for the two justices that dissented themselves from the decision. I think this statement here validates her thoughts by saying "we". Now this may just be her generalizing who believes this, but to me it came across as part of her duties do not include the concepts of funding houses of worship.

    3. What if you had a program at the -- the State capital? You had tours for school groups, and you had someone who, you know, coordinated, tied it into the social studies program; school groups can come in, but no religious schools. Is that okay?

      I think Justice Roberts is another Justice in the majority. He seems to be poking holes in Layton's argument about how this is conditional issue. He then rips into Layton for having two competing lines, and Layton changing those lines as he is trying to respond to Roberts.

    4. that when we have a program of funding -- and here we're funding playground surfaces -- that everybody is entitled to that funding, to -- to that particular funding, whether or not they exercise a constitutional right; in other words, here, whether or not they are a religious institution doing religious things.

      I think Justice Kagan is part of the majority. She states that everyone is eligible and entitled to the funding whether or not the group is participating in religious activities. And she backs it up by saying that the money is not being put toward religious activities, it's just going to the playground, regardless of who uses it.

    5. I suppose I am confused with what Layton is trying to say prior to and following this statement made by Samual A. Alito Jr. If both the Lutheran school and the Jesuit were influenced or run by a religious entity why would one be eligible for funding and the other not be?

    6. The priest was being told you can't be a priest or a congressman.

      I don't understand why Cortman is continuing to use this example when, at least to me, it's clear that this case and the case involving McDaniel are different. Sotomayor made it clear that no one is taking away the playground, and that it was only McDaniel being deprived of the position. I hear Cortman saying and stressing "you can't have both", but I just don't think it was the strongest argument for him to use. Why keep referring to the other case, after Sotomayor made a clear point this is not the same thing.