In Farrier’s idea of relationality,as conceptualised in his work on the sacrifice zones, the human arguablyremains an undifferentiated entity; a universal ‘us’ or ‘we’ that suddenlyfinds itself becoming a geologic actor.

Yet in both cases, the human itself is often notsufficiently differentiated and remains an oversimplified, quasi-universalbeing. In this way, the conceptualisation of capitalist modernity as a projectthat silences nonhuman others (their temporality and their materiality) disre-gards, and unwillingly ghosts, the racial and colonial dimensions of the devel-opment of modern capitalism and their reverberations in the present.

want to argue that the focus on these spectres ofrelationality or enmeshment, which currently pervades research on theAnthropocene and its imaginaries, actually reproduces particular aspects ofcapitalist modernity.

However, from my perspective, and incontrast to Bauman, a disposable life is not necessarily a redundant one. Thoseworkers whose lives are disposable are usually indeed very necessary (theurban economy does not exist without their sweat and poorly paid labour),even if only as a whole or in general, and not as specific individuals orgroups. In other words: they correspond to lives that can be massivelysacrificed, as from an economic (capitalist) viewpoint, there is always plentyof similar lives to replace those human beings who become ‘useless’ orperish as a result of disease, injuries or death.

It is thatperdurance, and not inheritance, is the sine qua non of evolu-tion. It lies not in the transmission, from one generation to thenext, of an already constructed world but in the continualbringing forth or production of a world that—in the passage ofgenerations—is ever in formation.

functionality

This layered credit to Vespucci, designating America as a “no-place” territory, would prove useful for those set on effacing the lives and cultures of people inhabiting the land, and also of those brought from Africa to economically develop the territories for profit.

This study also showed that machine learning predictive models performed better with female only data, suggesting molecular changes in females might better model AD-related changes than those in males.

Besides sex hormones, many female-specific pathways have been identified to contribute AD susceptibilities. A cross-tissue meta-analysis revealed a female-specific immune signature in both brain and blood (55)

using single-strand conformation polymorphism (SSCP)

Future studies that include samples from males and females will now need to account for cell type composition in addition to sex chromosome complement and hormonal environment. This is because different sex ratios in cell type in cases versus controls may drive the gene expression signal more than the phenotype of interest.

Araya-Carrión realiza su propia extracción, pero esta no pretende la reinserción a-histórica y fetichista del aserrín en la circulación económica.

El jardín de la extracción capitalista se constru-ye mediante tecnologías de exterminio que acaban con la bio-diversidad natural y, por lo tanto, con la potencialidad actuante de la materia.

La intervención nos propone recorrer diversos tiempos (el ahora y el antes, los tiempos de la colonización, la opresión, la tortura y el exterminio, pero también distintos tiem-pos de resistencia colectiva) y diversos espacios (el aquí y el allá, el centro y la periferia, Neltume y Santiago).

Estas dos topologías dependen, a su vez, de dos perspectivas: la visión “desde abajo” ve en el pasado una consecu-ción de acontecimientos y la historia como una línea o una cadena que avanza hacia delante; la visión desde arriba es la perspectiva del ángel, quien intentando resistir la tempestad también lineal del progreso, logra ver el pasado como un cúmulo, como una colección de estratos de ruina sobre ruina.

En esa transgresión aparece la violencia acumulada. El aserrín es el amontonamiento de violencias históricas que se mantienen vigentes hasta el día de hoy en Neltume.

La lamngen en la fotografía demarca el recorrido de su rol como dispositivo testimonial, borrando su figura individual para invocar en su pluralidad una compleja red de posibilidades de testimonios e historia ancestral.

el aserrín

A word deployed in academe to curb racialist denotations is often used today inside and outside of academe with racialist con-notations. A word intended to promote pluralism often becomes a trope in con-servative agendas or in late liberal versions of the civilizing project.

Steven Pinker (2011)

However our love of life or biophilia, which leads us to treat animalsdecently and take care of our environment, shows that we can be caring to otherspecies.

biological evolution

Archeological excavations allow estimates of violence when they unearthbodies with smashed or decapitated heads, spearheads embedded in bones, andprojectiles inside rib cages (Pinker2011).

he net effect has been a reduction in prejudice.

Modern society further expanded the size of the in-group

Forthe greatest part of human history, biological factors controlled moral sentimentsand the overriding goal was to protect one’s family.

In a similar vein, Alexander Wendt (2003) tracespolitical organization from states through five increasingly encompassing stages:systems of states, societies of states, world society, collective security, and worldstate. Each stage remedies the flaws in the stage that precedes it.

As James Grier Miller (1977) explained years ago, since lifeformed on Earth 3.7 billion years ago, there has been a steady progression in thedirection of larger biological and social entities: cell, organ, individual, group,organization, community, society, and organizations of societies.

This way the notion of autonomization has a precise meaning: it is the introduction of new layers of ontological – both logical and historical – mediation between social forms and their material bases.

While neoliberalism has varied in its manifestations in different countries and regu-latory arenas, the common core has been the promotion of market-based solutions to a broad range of issues.

Such processes of collectivization are also a corollary of the increasinglyrespectable, mainstream ethical understanding that biomedical research isexplicitly a process of resource extraction and value production.

In other words, and in a process equally visible in the annals of bio-prospecting, ‘groups’ are not necessarily the precondition but rather theresult of efforts to obtain collective consent.

. Many benefit-sharing proposals inclinical research, as with bioprospecting, operate comfortably in the idiomof intellectual property – valuing contributions to innovation, and reward-ing participation in the Lockean project of adding labor to nature. But theyroutinely and definitively stop short of offering property rights as a kind ofbenefit itself.

the foundationalprohibition against ‘undue inducement’ – luring people, however indirectly,to participate in research by offering direct returns on their involvemen

This decision famously drew on and thus reaf-firmed the long-prevailing biomedical consensus that research is, funda-mentally, for the ‘good of humanity’ and that participation must continueto be rendered as an act of gift-giving or donation, with no basis for a directclaim for ‘getting back’

One of the peculiarities of capitalism is that it treats its struc-turing social relations as if they were ‘economic’. In fact, we quickly found it necessary to talk about the ‘non-economic’ background conditions that enabled such an ‘economic system’ to exist. These are features not of a capitalist economy, but of a capitalist society;

An economic system defined by private property, the accumulation of self-expanding value, markets in free labour and in other major inputs to commodity production, and by the market allocation of social surplus

But it turned out that there was a whole back-story about where capital itself comes from—a rather violent story of dispossession and expropriation. Moreover, as David Harvey has stressed, this back-story is not located only in the past, at the ‘origins’ of capitalism

In a capitalist society, he says, capital itself becomes the Subject. Human beings are its pawns, reduced to figuring out how they can get what they need in the interstices, by feeding the beast

systemic thrust or directionality: namely, the accumulation of capita

This leads directly to Marx’s second core feature, the free labour market, because the others—that is, the vast majority—now have to go through a very peculiar song and dance, in order to work and get what they need to continue living and to raise their children.

defining feature of capitalism is private property in the means of production, which presupposes a class division between the owners and the producers.

In general, then, we lack conceptions of capitalism and capitalist crisis that are adequate to our time

The upshot is that we are living through a capitalist crisis of great sever-ity without a critical theory that could adequately clarify it.

From 1990 to 2010, a centre-left coalition called Concertación – including the Socialist Party, the Communist Party, and the Christian Democratic Party

He hypothesizes that this is because‘the value’derived fromliteral extraction‘is so out of proportion to the effort; in some sense, we recog-nize that the value was“already there”–stumbled upon, not created...fromlabor’, but emerging‘fabulously, almost magically, as if from nowhere’(Fergu-son 2015, p. 184).

In many instances of capitalistvalorization and accumulation, profit takes more and more the shape of‘rent’, precisely due to its reliance on resources that are not intrinsic to capital’sturnover (Vercellone2013)

Nevertheless when we are attentiveto the continuities and ruptures that characterize the relations between literalextraction and extraction in the expanded sense, it becomes possible toattend to the prevalence and strategic role of extractive operations in contem-porary capitalism

Neoliberalism is a massive expansion of economic rationality and thinking, to the point where economic calculation, maximum benefit for minimum cost, becomes the very definition of rationality.

Questions of value then seem largely reactive, even futile.

But the discussion still focused on predictions about what genome editing will be able to do in the near term and what its biological risks are, even though it raises issues that clearly transcend immedi-ate concerns for health and safety.

Patent ownership rights benefitsome women and their families, but not others. Patentable subject matter derivedfrom human bodily tissues and plant knowledge are extracted from the bodiesand minds of some women, while other women become the beneficiaries of suchacts of corporeal and incorporeal appropriation leading to patented medical tech-nologies.

Women therefore are performing novel forms of labor within newcircuits ofbiocapital. In addition, women are primarily responsible for utilizingtechnological medical inventions to care for themselves and their families.

A generic Ponzi scheme refers to any investment opportunity thatdangles the promise of outsized profits through the hidden mechanism of payingdividends to early investors with money deposited by later investors.

First, we could explore the growing prevalence of private and/or com -mercial sources and mechanisms of funding within scientific research. Second, we could explore the growing emphasis placed upon a generic, abstract ‘science’(or ‘knowledge’ or even ‘information’) within influential policy and businesscircles as the source of economic growth and competitiveness, via ‘innovation’.

The privatization ofuniversal labor is an answer to problems of accumulation. But it causesnew contradictions as other attempts to counteract capitalist crises havedone.

But the problem lies in the fact thatinformation and technology once produced are usually quite simple to re-produce, and therefore the realization of the exchange value is questioned.Only the artificial creation of a monopoly in the form of intellectual prop-erty titles allows information to be traded and the desired exchange valueto be obtained.

monopoly, absolute rentand two forms of differential rents.

Generally, a rent can bedefined as an income which is enforced by the owner of a property title,even if he/she stands outside production.

irst, the separation of pro-ducers from their means of production, enclosures and the enforcement ofnew property rights in the sense of the original accumulation; second, theexpansion of capitalist property into new areas (e.g. colonial appropriation,privatizations); and third, dispossessions by stronger accumulation centers(e.g. large companies).

Thus, the orig-inal accumulation is not to be understood as a historical phase, but as apermanent characteristic of capital.

Luxemburg (1913: 397) impressively pointed out theviolent accumulation of capital at the expense of non-capitalist productionforms.

Thus, anew phase of capitalism was initiated which, due to general wage pressure,the bursting of ‘rigid labor markets’ and new forms of labor organization,enabled an increase in profit rates compared to the situation in the 1970s.

This financial capital can be defined as concentrated capital in the formof money whose owners expect a revenue (interests, dividends) based onownership and/or a yield from selling the property or creditor title.

The aim of this article is to theoretically explain that in additionto ‘normal’ accumulation, different forms of dispossession processesand value transfers are central characteristics of the current configura-tion of capitalism.

1) Although race and gender have occupied much scholarly and media attention, matriarchy, specifically black matriarchy, as both a racial and gender construct of otherness, has remained under-analyzed but yet routinely deployed in the social sciences, politics, and humanities; 2) Underlining patriarchal gift economies of exchange, bioethical matriarchy (or the bioethical matriarch) marks racialized and gendered forms of exchange arising from the absence of consent or of obligational precedents for reciprocation.

Specifically, how might transcending nature–society dualisms inform a normative left political economy that includes a green or environmental critique of capitalism, one in which socionatural relations are seen to be constitutive of what we mean by capitalism and what we mean by capitalist society as well as our critiques of these (Moore, 2011)?

Their Marxist appropriation thusvacillates between two alternatives: the surrogates are clinical laborers enti-tled to wages and labor protections, or they are capitalist rentiers contract-ing out their (re)productive biology in the global fertility market

Biological materiality assumes, in this analysis, a capacity for autono-mous value production.

Primitive accumulation is a powerful idea and undoubtedly captures something crucial about the functioning of global capitalism. However, it has also limitations in the contemporary context. It implies that there is an “external nature”, an outside to the circuits of capitalist valorization that can be discovered, plundered and expropriated for free.

Rather, we argue that the emergence and growth of open science has not necessarily or fundamentally al-tered the dynamic of the political economy of research and innovation, primarily because this shift away from private property rights has not displaced the political-economic valuation of research in terms of returns on in-vestment (derived from monopoly rents)

Consequently, we want to stress that neoliberalism is better character-ized as a shift towards rentiershiprather than entrepreneurship, in that the life sciences – the epitome of an imagined hi-tech future – is not driven by the (risky) development of new products and processes, but rather by the (ongoing and far less risky) reconfiguration of property rights and ownership to turn knowledge into an asset (Zeller, 2008; Birch and Tyfield, 2013; Birch, 2017c, 2017d).

The growing and accelerating demands upon research and innovation ends up in a destructive feedback loop because neoliberalism simultaneously trans-forms the processes, institutions and relations of research and innovation in ways that systemically reduce their fecundity for system renovation (e.g., enclosing knowledge behind IP rights that limit its use).

We can thus identify quite directly from the nature of neoliberalism as a system its tendency to systemic crisis and permanent, and likely deepening, need for wholesale system renovation – that is, the re-setting of the socio-technical system such that it can accommo-date (politically, culturally, ecologically) yet more, greater and faster (supposed) entrepreneurship.

Moreover, this work in economics goes beyond its analytical pur-pose, representing a key knowledge-power technology in the legitimation of neoliberalism (Tyfield, 2016).

We define neoliberalism as a political-economic system built on epistemic market fundamentalism. Here the market is conceptualized as not only the best of all possible mechanisms for economic allocation, but, far more radically, as the best of all possible mechanisms for decision-making and, hence, knowledge production

we focus on the specific and interactive dynamics of both research and innovation andne-oliberalism in order to understand the reproduction of neoliberalism as a political-economic system, and its potential disruption via new, emergent socio-technical systems.

a resource that is controlled by the entity as a result of past events (forexample, purchase or self-creation) and from which future economic benefits(inflows of cash or other assets) are expecte

conceptualize assetization as aprocess in which value is constituted by the management of value andvaluation, especially as they relate to organizational entities and theircapacities.

he presentvalue of a [discounted] future stream of earnings

My aim in this article is to understand the seeming contradiction betweenhigh and rising financial valuations in the life sciences sector and its con-tinuing failure to deliver on the promise of bountiful new products andservices

The Guardian, August 29, 2011

However, such assetmarkets have a ‘‘Ponzi-like character’’ according to Harvey (2010, 21), inthat the purchase of assets drives up their value leading to further invest-ment creating an asset bubble that eventually bursts, as evident in the recentand ongoing financial crisis.

It is only through the circulation ofcapital that rent can be extracted; it is only through the extraction of (poten-tial) rent that scarce (and fictitious) assets produce value; and it is onlythrough the creation of legal or technological monopolies that such assets canbe created

Commodities, be they ‘‘bio-commodities’’ (i.e., fragments of vitality) ornormal commodities, are products of a labor process. Value isrealizedthrough market exchange, but it is constituted by production

First,there is an issue with how these concepts—particularly those marshaledby Waldby and Rose—link ‘‘vitality’’ and value. Second, there is an issuewith how they conceptualize value as a dual concept comprising (broadlyspeaking) ethical and economic value. Third, there is an issue with the the-orizing of financial speculation, especially in relation to the production ofsurplus value from biological resources. Finally, there is a general issuewith the appropriation of Marxist terminology (e.g., surplus, capital, value,etc.) in that these concepts are selectively adopted without adequatelyaddressing their original formulations in the LTV.

This involves highlighting three key processes: first, a shiftin value creation from productive to immaterial labor; second, the emer-gence of a financialized-rentier regime of accumulation; and third, theshift from commodity-based to anasset-based market exchange

In particular, we want to highlightthe need to consider the importanceof asset-based economic processes (e.g., property, rent, etc.) in anyunderstanding of the bioeconomy. Theseasset-based processes contrastmarkedly withcommodity-based processes (e.g., production, labor, etc.)that characterize the Marxist language and concepts on which STStheorists draw

The first is a political–economic, and Marxist, use of thetermvalueto refer to economic or market practices (e.g., profit and share-holder value), while the other is a more ethical framing of the term value,which could perhaps (like Waldby above) more distinctively be termedval-ues(e.g., ethics, meanings)

On one hand, biovalue is ‘‘trans-lated’’ into health (2002, 317); on the other hand, and slightly contradic-tory, biovalue is the ‘‘yield’’ of vitality or health (ibid., 310).

In recent work, I have suggested that the sentiment of many biotech boosters has themimaginingB0already to be latent inB—to believe that biological process itself alreadyconstitutes a form of surplus value and profit production (Helmreich, 2007)

but one of the more generalclaims of the present essay will be that biological potency as such, in biocommerce, isoften (mis)taken to be a primordial ontology upon which biocapitalism merely elaborates

Bioeconomy appears to be an emergent, present, but also promissory economic regime built on the exploitation of old and new biological resources.

“You could say, ‘I don’t want any commercial companies to have access to my data.’ The problem is that they are partnering all over the place. So maybe Children’s Hospital from Town Y accesses your data, and that’s OK with you, but their partner is Pfizer.”

There’s definitely an upside to making your genome available to researchers, say Briscoe and Gray: If your DNA isn’t included, it can’t be part of what the researchers discover. But there’s a dark side, as well.

useful work for human beings.

the minor peak and fat tails of isonymic distancecurves will become faint

In this article, we adjust the parameterγto get eight communitiesfor all network community detection

In contrast to the clustering result derived from k-means cluster-ing (see Figure S4 in Supporting Information), the eight communityallocations derived from MMST network (see Figure 5) are not onlyclear and intuitive but also sensible and reasonable

Of particular importance here is Yann Moulier Boutang’s work (1998) on the historyof slave labour and its relationship to what Marx (1867) termed primitive accumulation, apre-capitalist mode of often violent primary resource acquisition (land, mineral wealth,forests, etc.) which both gives capital its resource base and dispossesses traditionalguardians, thus creating a free labour force.

This ranges from the strategic marketing of individual choice and regimes of appraisal through which individual choice is promoted and expanded to aspects of government historically subject to more overt forms of government regulation.

In this sense, governmentality and biopolitics can be read as a culmination of Foucault's thought, and an exposure of the complexity and resilience of sovereign power and its close relationship with biopower, sometimes termed by Foucault as political theory's failure to “cut off the king's head,” or displacing the role of sovereignty in dominant ontologies of the political.

Governmentality and biopolitics speak both of the construction and articulation of “population,” and to the management of said population.

To identifySDE we used the NOISeqBIO method [31, 32] to com-pare gene expression in the common tissues betweenmen and women.

First, it is often stated that sex-biased expression underlies phenotypic sexual dimorphism, and it remains unclear what proportion of sex-biased genes are relevant at the phenotypic level. Second, many assume that sex-biased genes represent resolved sexual conflict over optimal expression, as it is this resolution that permits transcriptional, and therefore pheno-typic, sexual dimorphism. Finally, we often search for the footprint of sexual selection in the sequence and expression characteristics of sex-biased genes, assuming that we can find it there.

And yet, sexual dimorphism is in many ways a form of polyphenism, or even just an extreme form of phenotypic plasticity, and the study of sexual dimorphism has implications for a broad array of intra-specific variation.

This means that we often must assume that genes expressed differently between phenotypes are related to, and perhaps even responsible for, these complex phenotypic differences.

“Relational autonomy” is the label that has beengiven to an alternative conception of what it means to be a free,self-governing agent who is also socially constituted and whopossibly defines her basic valuecommitments in terms of inter-personal relations and mutual dependencies.

For many, the ordinary is a disaster.

ends up negating the persistent role played by violence in the neoliberal regimes of the biopolitical and the bioeconomic (Bazzicalupo 2006a; Mbembe 2003), and that celebrates the sovereignty of a given model of the individual (specifically the liberal individual), simulta-neously refusing to consider the continuing reproduction—as the material condition of this sovereignty itself—of other “forms of life,” other models of subjectivity, in which the distinction between consent and coercion is far from invisible (see Papadopolous and Stephenson 2006; esp. 10).

PB instructs them to choose, out of these possiblefuture children, the one who is likely to be the mostadvantaged. And this means that, on our account ofdisability, parentsdohave reasons not to have a futurechild who is likely to be disabled if they have the optionof choosing another who is expected to have less or nodisability

This is a question for the theory of well-being.

PB instructs women toseriously consider IVF if natural reproduction is likely tolead to a child with a condition that is expected to reducewell-being significantly, even if that condition is not adisease.

They include the welfare of the parents, of existing chil-dren, and of others, possible harm to others, and othermoral constraints.

These are the familiarand morally admirable attitudes of many prospectiveparents. And they are entirely compatible with later cher-ishing and loving one’s children – once these have comeinto existence.

If couples (or single reproducers) have decided tohave a child, and selection is possible, then they havea significant moral reason to select the child, of thepossible children they could have, whose life can beexpected, in light of the relevant available informa-tion, to go best or at least not worse than any of theothers.

it contrasts a neutralist with a normative account of gender-specifi c disease

even if the correlation between causal factors (X1) and disease (Y) appears genuine, it may not indicate a causal relation if X1 and Y have a common cause (X) or if X1 is a concomitant factor to X in causing Y. I

It is an objective, value-neutral biological entity open to scientifi c investigation using an empirical or positivist methodology

Because there are limits to both a naturalist and nominalist understanding of gender-specifi c disease, the chapter argues in favor of what I call a methodological naturalist account of gender-specifi c disease

This chapter explores how gender-specifi c disease provides a descriptive account of human biological dysfunction that diff ers between the genders.

The project argues that gender-specifi c disease and related bioethical discourses are philosophically integrative. Gender-specifi c disease is integrative because the descriptive roles of gender, dis-ease, and their relation are inextricably tied to their prescriptive roles

As de Beauvoir famously said, “[o]ne is not born, but rather becomes, a woman. No biological, psychological, or economic fate determines the fi gure that the human female presents in societ

Butler cautioned that the feminist distinction between sex and gender retains a binarism of stable categorical complementarity

According to feminist philosopher Iris Marion Young (2005), the sex-gender distinction gained notoriety in the mid-twentieth century with the rise of second-wave feminism

In contrast, “gender” is typically used by clinicians to refer “to the socially constructed roles, behaviours, activities, and attributes that a given society considers appropriate for men and women” (World Health Organi-zation 2010).

Typically in medicine, “sex” is a term used by clinicians to refer to the biological and physiological features that defi ne what it means to be “female” and “male”

In 1997, the physician, cardiologist, and researcher Mari-anne J. Legato founded the Partnership for Women’s Health (2007) at Columbia University in New York City, New York.

One might note that the defi nitions above share the view that gen-der-specifi c medicine attends to how “normal” biological “function” or biology “diff ers” between the “genders” in the “same” disease, thus high-lighting key claims in our understanding of gender-specifi c disease.

It attends to the meaning of “normal” and “function” and asks whether a biomedical understanding of such notions can adequately account for what is being addressed and treated in gen-der-specifi c disease. It considers the challenge of determining “diff erence” between women and men, and females and males, and asks whether these diff erences based on biomedical criteria are suffi cient to account for what is being investigated. It explores how “gender” and “disease” are under-stood in gender-specifi c medicine and how gender is understood as a causal “variable” in disease expression and treatment.

Is gender-specifi c disease discovered or created? Is it simply a function of disclosing the diff erence that chromosomes make in disease expression or is it a trendy classifi cation created in order to address past failures to study diseases that aff ect women in unique ways and to advocate for alternative ways? Is gender-specifi c disease value-neutral or value-ladened? Is it simply a “fact” disclosed by clinical scientists or is it an “evaluation” of biomedical dysfunction by clinicians and patients? Is gender-specifi c disease local or global in its reach? Is it a clinical category that makes sense only in particular contexts or one that transcends local knowledge communities that can be used in the service of global medicine? Whereas these questions paint a simplistic picture of the options, we are left with important questions: What is gender-specifi c disease? How do we know it? What role, if any, do values play in the clinical category?

We performed parallel ChIP-seq experi-ments on craniofacial tissues obtained from 17 individualhuman embryos spanning a critical window for the formationof the human orofacial apparatus (Figure 1A)

To identify regulatory sequences important for human cranio-facial development, we utilized ChIP-seq of six post-transla-tional histone modifications across multiple stages and multiplebiological replicates of early human craniofacial development.

The only way I can get access to that data is if I give my bone to David or Johannes and wait until they process it — and bury me in the list of contributors to their paper.”

The idea, he writes in his book, “was to make ancient DNA industrial — to build an American-style genomics factory” that would liberate such fields as archaeology, history and anthropology from hitherto insoluble debates.

Vanuatu is a volcanic archipelago of more than 80 islands littered in an extended slingshot shape across an 800-mile arc of the South Pacific.

“everywhere researchers look for differences between men and women, they find them

The giftedness of nature, he points out, ‘also includes smallpox and malaria, cancer and Alzheimer’s disease, decline and decay

As it is commonly framed, the question is whether a particular kind of enhancement, e.g., memory enhancement or the extension of human life span, will really benefit those who are subjected to it. Would they really be better off than we are now?

human enhancement (particularly, but not exclusively, genetic enhancement) should be avoided because it is dangerous, and it is dangerous because, or insofar as, it represents hyperagency, that is the aspiration to remake nature in such a way that it serves our purposes and satisfies our desires (even more than it already does), or, in short, the drive to mastery.

Those confident of good health and long life would opt out of the pool, causing other people's premiums to skyrocket.

This would transform three key features of our moral landscape: humility, responsibility, and solidarity.

But we also admire players like Joe DiMaggio, who display natural gifts with grace and effortlessness.

Some who worry about the ethics of cognitive enhancement point to the danger of creating two classes of human beings: those with access to enhancement technologies, and those who must make do with their natural capacities.

Some say cloning is wrong because it violates the right to autonomy: by choosing a child's genetic makeup in advance, parents deny the child's right to an open future.

Brent arguesthat ‘the underlying logic used to make inferencesfrom genomic data [is] in a primitive state charac-teristic of an observational stage of science’

ethical ramifications of widely accessible tools for altering genomes.

Innovative Genomics Initiative.

I told myself that bioethicists were better positioned to take the lead on such issues.

Second, the proprietary knowledge theyproduce is exempt from political controls.

Some worry that this is the first step toward using gene editing to create people with extreme intelligence, beauty or athletic ability. But that, for now, is not possible. Such traits are thought to be affected by possibly hundreds of genes acting in concert, and affected in turn by the environment. The biggest ethical concerns for now are with rogue scientists enticing couples who do not realize the risks to babies that might result from the experiments. And when those children grow up, the altered genes will be passed on to their children, and to their children’s children, for generations to come

Such methodscould effectively destroy an entire speciesand could have significant environmentalconsequences.

CRISPR/Cas, in contrast,recognizes its target sequence via guide RNAmolecules that can be cheaply and easilysynthesized.

Or it may be itself a form of solidarity at the heart of the practice of care, because it is based on recognition of the human value of rescuing a person from fear and despair to give them a better chance of flourishing in the future.

Using a solidarity‐based perspective, we have argued that strategies to address this challenge need to start with a reconsideration of the value of work and labour.

She would receive remuneration for this work as a recognition of its value for society

overcome the preju‐dices that lead us to attribute more value to jobs that fare better at the labour market than to the (often unpaid or underpaid) work nec‐essary for the basic functioning of our societies.

Gender, in these accounts, emerges as a technique of social control in the service of capitalist accumulation.

The trouble with many of these responses, however, is that they take the increase in technical capacities, per se, to basically be the heart of the matter9. Ergo: technical solutions are proffered as adequate to technical problems. This technical approach is framed as 'dual use': there are good uses and bad uses, good users and bad users.

lucid honesty

My argument is straightforward: Despite all the apparatus of private property, markets, commodity fetishism, and more, taking the gift out of the commodity is never easy. It is work that has to be repeated over and over.